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EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS 
Capex – Capital expenditure is the money an entity spends to build, buy, 
improve and fix a long-term asset. 
CAPM – Capital asset pricing model describes the relationship between risk 
and expected return and which is used in pricing risky investments and for 
discounting. 
CBA – Cost-benefit analysis is a systemic approach to evaluating and 
comparing cost and benefits of the possible to implement alternatives of the 
investment project. 
CCF – Cumulated cash flow that is the sum of all of the net cash flows that 
have been generated by an entity since inception. 
CDF – Cumulative distribution function, which calculates the cumulative 
probability for a given x value and which is used in the dissertation to determine the 
probability that the cost of investment project implementation will be lesser than or 
equal to a certain value. 
CDS – Credit default swap, which is a particular type of swap used to transfer 
credit exposure between two or more parties, which can also be used to calculate 
risk premium for discounting under the CAPM-based approach. 
CEA – Cost effectiveness analysis is a method of analysis which compares the 
relative costs to the outcomes of two or more alternatives of IP implementation. 
CF – Cash flow, or the amount of cash moving into and out of the IP. 
CL – Contingent liability is a possible obligation arising from past events and 
depending on uncertain future events. Contingent liability may cause additional cost 
of IP implementation. 
CN – Competitive neutrality is costs that are added to public sector’s scenario 
of IP implementation to make state-owned and private entities competing on a same-
level playing field. 
CP – Conventinal procurement is traditional purchase by governments and 
state-owned enterprises of goods, services and works. 
CPI – Consumer price index is an indicator that measures changes in the price 
level of consumer goods and services. 
CSFs – Critical success factors are elements necessary for an investment 
project to be implemented as the PPP. 
EC – The European Commission is an institution of the EU responsible for a 
complex of tasks such as proposing legislation, implementing decisions and 
managing the day-to-day operation of the EU. 
ECB – The European Central Bank is an institution of the EU managing the 
euro, framing and implementing monetary policy of the EU. 
EIB – The European investment bank is an institution of the EU providing 
funding for projects which help to achieve the aims of the EU, both within and 
outside the EU. 
ENPV – Economic Net Present Value is an indicator which measures net socio-
economic benefits of possible alternatives of IP implementation. 
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EPEC – European PPP Expertise Centre is an initiative involving the EIB, the 
European Commission and European Union Member States and Candidate 
Countries for strengthening the capacity of its members to enter into PPP 
transactions. 
ERR – Economic Rate of Return is a metric used in economic assessment of 
the IP measuring the socio-economic usefulness of its possible alternatives. 
ESI fund – European structural and investment funds. 
EU – the European Union. 
FDR – Financial discount rate is a rate used to discount the future cash flows. 
FNPVc – financial NPV on investment (costs) is defined as the sum that results 
when the expected discounted investment and operating costs of the IP are deducted 
from the discounted value of the expected revenues. 
FOPSmax – Maximum financial obligations of the public sector are the 
maximum financial obligations of the public sector rational to assume in the PPP. 
Any larger obligations above this threshold mean that PPP does not provide VfM to 
the public sector in respect of cost efficiency. 
FOPSrtn – Maximum financial retained obligations of the public sector is the 
maximum amount of risk rational to assume to the public sector. 
FV – Financial viability is the ability to generate sufficient income to meet the 
cost of IP implementation being affordable to the PPA and satisfying the financial 
requirements of stakeholders. 
GA – Governmental authority is the government of a country,  its its any 
subdivision, state or local authority, any agency, regulatory body that has 
administrative power or function of or pertaining to government. 
ICOR – Investment cost overrun risk. 
ICT – Information and communications technologies. 
IP – Investment project is a document which financially, economicaly, 
technically and socially validates the goals of investments, evaluates the financial 
and socio-economic return on investments and other indicators of efficiency, 
indicates the financing (funding) needed as well as the financial resources and dates 
of IP implementation. 
JV – Joint venture is a cooperative enterprise entered by at least one entity of 
the public sector and one or more private entities to implement a specific IP of 
public infrastructure and deliver services; as owners contribute assets, they have 
equity according to which the management rights of the enterprise are shared 
proportionally. 
LCC – Life cycle costing is a costing technique that considers all costs of IP 
implementation and during the economic life of the developed asset (construction, 
purchase price, installation, operation, maintenance, repair, disposal, etc.) 
LRG – Loan repayment guarantee is a promise of the PPA to assume a limited 
or unlimited debt obligation of the private entity, if the private entity defaults. 
MARF – Marginal annual revenue flow is the sum of revenue, above which the 
private entity has to share the revenues at a determined ratio with the PPA in the 
PPP. 
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MCA – Multi-criteria analysis, which is an analytical method which aims to 
compare different actions according to multiple criteria. 
MPpr – Maximum payment for the private sector in the PPP, which is the 
maximum payments to the private sectors for transferred tasks including associated 
risks, above which the PPP becomes financially irrational. 
NFB – Non-financial benefit is a benefit which improves the quality of 
infrastructure and service delivery and/or makes them being earlier accessible, 
which is relevant to customers. 
NPC – Net present costs is the present value of all costs of IP implementation 
and service delivery throughout the economic life of investments. 
NPM – New public management is an approach used in the public sector to 
modernise it by applying practice and innovation of the private sector. 
NPV – Net present value is the present value of CFs received from the IP 
compared to the initial investment and the present value of other expenditure related 
to IP implementation at the required rate of return. 
O&M – Operation and management is a form of PPP. 
OECD – the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Opex – Operational expenditure, which include all cost related to the operation 
and maintenance of an infrastructure and provision of services. 
Optimization – Maximization of benefits the public sector can potentially get 
through alternative ways of implementing investments considering various 
technical, legal, financial and social restrictions.  
PaS – Parking space, which is a location specially designated for parking. 
PCIP – Public capital investment programs is a program which funds the 
public IPs. 
PD – Probability distribution is a statistical function which relates all the 
possible values with their likelihoods and according to which a random variable can 
take a value within a given range. 
PFI – Private Finance Initiative is a form of PPP. 
P-I – Probability-impact method used to assess risk. 
PPA – Public procurement authority can be any entity of the public sector 
which purchases assets and services according to the rules of public procurement. 
PPP – public-private partnership, generally considered as an alternative way of 
public procurement and delivery of public infrastructure and services. 
PS – Public service is a service such as transport, education, health care, etc. 
provided by the government or municipality to people in its jurisdiction. 
PSC – Public sector comparator is a tool used by PPAs to make a decision by 
testing whether a PPP offers VfM in comparison with the most efficient scenario of 
the public sector. 
Pu. S. – Public sector is a portion of an economic system which is controlled by 
the government. 
RC – Risk case represents the outcome which deviates from the most likely 
scenario and causes loss. 
RF – Risk factor, which can cause a risk event. 
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RFP – Request for proposal is a document which contains information that 
bidders could fully understand regarding what is required and expected in a 
particular public procurement. Typically, it includes information about the PPA, 
requirements and scope of the IP, bidder qualification requirements, timeline, 
guidelines for the proposal and other information. 
RG – Risk group is a group of risks which have a similar affect on the 
outcome. 
Risk – Investment cost overrun risk. 
SB – Shadow bid is a financial model of the expected PPP. 
SD – Standard deviation is a measure which shows how numbers are spread 
out. 
SDR – Social discount rate is an interest rate used in cost-benefit analyses of 
public IPs to calculate the socio-economic return on investments. 
SGP – the Stability and Growth Pact is a set of rules designed to ensure that 
countries in the EU pursue sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies. 
SPV – the Special purpose vehicle is a legal entity created for a specific 
purpose of IP implementation and delivery of infrastructure and services in the PPP. 
UK – the United Kingdom. 
UP – Unitary payment are unitary payment charges paid by a PPA to private 
sector consortiums for services agreed over the length of PPP contracts. 
USA – the United States of America. 
VAT – Value-added tax. 
VfM – Value for money is somehing that is well worth the money spent on it. 
VfM analysis allows evaluating the benefits of PPP against the CP, accordingly 
VfM is a driving factor in any decision for the use of PPP. 
WACC – Weigthed average cost of capital. 
WB – the World Bank. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relevance of the research topic. The relevance of assessing the 
possibilities of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure can be substantiated from the scientific, economic, financial and social 
perspectives. Most researchers (Bednarek et al., 2012; Carbonara, Costantino, & 
Pellegrino, 2014; Chou, Ping Tserng, Lin, & Yeh, 2012; Ke, Liu, & Wang, 2008; 
Kurniawan, Mudjanarko, & Ogunlana, 2015; Moszoro, 2010, 2014; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016; Yin Wang, 2015; Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015; Xu et al., 2012; 
Xueqing Zhang, 2011) highlight the importance of development of the assessment 
tools which would allow to complexly assess the most effective ways and forms as 
well as determining the optimal conditions of provision of public infrastructure and 
services.  
A numerous amount of literature (Ball, 2011; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; 
Khadaroo, 2008; Lopez-Lambas & Monzon, 2010; Martins, Marques, & Cruz, 2011; 
Moro Visconti, 2014; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & 
Trojanowski, 2013) is focused on the empirical researches of possibilities of the 
private sector to increase the efficiency and quality of public services’ delivery. 
Within the PPP context, the concept of Value for Money (VfM) is widely 
recognized as the primary measure of PPP’s efficiency and it is used as the main 
justification for choosing public or private financing for delivering public 
infrastructure and services (Liu, Love, Smith, Regan, & Palaneeswaran, 2015; 
Martins et al., 2011; Shaoul, 2005; N. Wang, 2014). A wide range of literature on 
the topic indicates (Burke & Demirag, 2015; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Harada & 
Ogunlan, 2015) that the PPPs, compared with the methods of conventional 
procurement (CP), can deliver better VfM. Since it is considered only as a 
possibility, it is commonly agreed that for the implementation of PPP, its VfM 
should be clearly demonstrated. Many studies disclosed the importance of assessing 
the critical success factors (CSFs) (S. T. Ng, Wong, & Wong, 2012; Song, Wang, & 
Cavusgil, 2015; Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen, 2015), the use of public sector 
comparator (PSC) (Fernandes, Ferreira, & Moura, 2015; Gupta, Gupta, & Agrawal, 
2013; Tsamboulas, Verma, & Moraiti, 2013; Yin Wang, 2015), structuring the 
optimal PPP contract in respect of financial viability and affordability (Bednarek et 
al., 2012; Gasiorowski & Moszoro, 2008; Lu, Peña-Mora, Wang, Shen, & Riaz, 
2015; Moszoro, 2010), concession period (Bao, Peng, Ablanedo-Rosas, & Gao, 
2014; Hanaoka & Palapus, 2012; Yu & Lam, 2013; Khanzadi, Nasirzadeh, & 
Alipour, 2012; S. T. Ng, Xie, Cheung, & Jefferies, 2007; Xueqing Zhang, 2011), 
concession pricing (Qiu & Wang, 2011; Xu et al., 2012), payment mechanism 
(Asao, Miyamoto, Kato, & Diaz, 2013; Burke & Demirag, 2015; Felix; Villalba-
Romero & Liyanage, 2016) and risk sharing and allocation (Fischer, Leidel, 
Riemann, & Alfen, 2010; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Takashima, Yagi, & Takamori, 2010) 
to achieve VfM. Otherwise, the lessons learnt over the last two decades have 
disclosed (D. Hall, 2015; Olalekan & Hashim, 2014; Spackman, 2002; Xueqing 
Zhang, 2011) that the implementation of PPP’s without sufficient economic and 
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financial justification may lead to financial, economic and social problems in the 
future. 
Many academics emphasize the importance of assessing the possibilities to 
optimize public investments by attracting the resources of the private sector and 
know-how from the economic perspective. The researches (Anwar, 2006; Benito, 
Montesinos, & Bastida, 2008; Berawi et al., 2014; Bin & Quan, 2012; Bom & 
Ligthart, 2014; Carranza, Daude, & Melguizo, 2014; Clark & Root, 1999; Daido & 
Tabata, 2013; Duran-fernandez & Santos, 2014; Esfahani & Ramírez, 2003; Glomm 
& Ravikumar, 1999; M. R. Gupta & Barman, 2010; Heijdra & Meijdam, 2002; 
Herranz-Loncán, 2007; Hosoya, 2014; Kateja, 2012; Khandelwal & Khanapuri, 
2015; Mamatzakis, 2003; Mejia-Dorantes & Lucas, 2014; Melo, Graham, & Brage-
Ardao, 2013; Mota & Moreira, 2015; Percoco, 2014; Pradhan & Bagchi, 2013; Shi 
& Huang, 2014; Tamai, 2014; E. C. Wang, 2002; Zawawi, Ahmad, Umar, Khamidi, 
& Idrus, 2014) argue that the provision of public infrastructure, which requires 
continuous capital investments to expand and maintain, is a must for the country’s 
economic growth and competitive ability. Here public infrastructure is considered 
such infrastructure as facilities, structures, equipment, services and institutions that 
are owned by the public or is for public use and are essential to the economy and 
quality of life of a nation, region or city. Therefore, by implementing investments 
the governments are responsible for the development of infrastructure to the level 
which would satisfy the needs of society and would provide a basis for economic 
development. Accordingly, the investment in public infrastructure is highlighted as 
an important aspect in the public sector’s economics. While other researchers 
(Agénor, 2010; Mu, Jong, & Koppenjan, 2011; Sambrani, 2014; Wojewnik-
Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 2013) indicate a lack of public funds and governments’ 
capacity to satisfy all infrastructural needs of the countries. 
A large number of literature (Akhmetshina & Mustafin, 2015; Esteve, Ysa, & 
Longo, 2012; S. T. Ng et al., 2012; Reeves, 2005; Willoughby, 2013) on economic 
rationale for the assignment of more responsibility to the private sector claims that 
the PPP can release governments’ tight budgetary pressure, enhance productivity, 
encourage innovations, improve cost effectiveness, allow better risk allocation and 
increase VfM. A growing PPP market worldwide (PPIAF, 2016) shows that the PPP 
plays an important role in the development and maintenance of the public 
infrastructure and services. Considering the increasing number of PPP contracts, 
many researches (Chatterjee & Mahbub Morshed, 2011; Sarmento & Renneboog, 
2016; Yin Wang, 2015) also emphasize the change of the public sector’s role. The 
PPP allows the public sector to be no longer a provider of public infrastructure and 
services and focus more on the functions of their strategic planning and regulation 
instead.  
However, according to Boyer & Newcomer (2015), Gordon, Mulley, Stevens, 
& Daniels (2013). A. Gupta et al. (2013), Hwang, Zhao, & Gay (2013), S. T. Ng et 
al. (2012), Yin Wang (2015), Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen (2015) much of the success 
of PPP depends on the government’s skills and abilities to identify and balance the 
interests of all stakeholders as well as to assess the expected value of going into the 
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PPP and, in case of positive results of VfM assessment, to construct the very PPP 
contract, encouraging the right incentives from all the stakeholders.  
While the results of empirical studies (Ahmed & Ali, 2006; Babatunde, Perera, 
Zhou, & Udeaja, 2015; Janssen, Graaf, Smit, & Voordijk, 2016; S. T. Ng et al., 
2012) reveal that the PPP is likely to be considered as very complex by 
governments. Many still existing barriers, including the lack of expertise in PPP, 
make it challenging for governments to assess whether PPP is a feasible, affordable 
and the most VfM way to deliver public facilities and services. 
The importance of assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize public 
investments is also emphasized from the financial perspective. Researchers (Bin & 
Quan, 2012; A. H. Chen, 2002; Kateja, 2012; Liu et al., 2015; Martins et al., 2011; 
Mota & Moreira, 2015; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; 
Schepper, Haezendonck, & Dooms, 2014; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 
2016) argue that the large up-front capital investment costs, including the associated 
risk required to be financed, by implementing investment projects (IPs) in traditional 
way on one hand and the government’s budget constraints on other hand are a 
formidable financial challenge for governments to combine that, in turn, makes the 
PPP increasingly attractive to assess as a way potentially enabling to acquire and 
maintain the public infrastructure financially viable. This is especially relevant in the 
countries where the budget deficit’s ceiling is restrained by artificially created rules 
such as the rules for the member states on budget deficits and debt under the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the European Union (EU) (Benito et al., 2008; 
Fernandes et al., 2015; Kellermann, 2007; Shaoul, 2011). 
Many other financial benefits possible to reach in the PPP are listed by 
Carbonara et al. (2014), Daito & Gifford (2014), de Jong, Mu, Stead, Ma, & Xi 
(2010), Liu et al. (2015), Shaoul (2005), Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski 
(2013), who have a unanimous opinion that the PPP is not a silver bullet and it does 
not outright mean the financial benefit. 
Literature on the financial VfM assessment discloses various critical aspects 
associated with the private participation needed to be assessed to make a decision 
for the most appropriate financing model for the provision of public infrastructure 
and services. The most discussed among them are: whole-life cost saving (Carmona, 
2010; Clark & Root, 1999; Daito & Gifford, 2014; Parker & Hartley, 2003; 
Schepper et al., 2014; Thomas Ng, Xie, Skitmore, & Cheung, 2007), assessment and 
allocation of risk (Burke & Demirag, 2015; Chang, 2014; Chou et al., 2012; Hwang 
et al., 2013; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010; Lehtiranta, 2014; 
N. Wang, 2014), formation of capital structure formation (B. L. Chen, Liou, & 
Huang, 2012; Khmel & Zhao, 2015; Moreno, López-Bazo, & Artís, 2002; Moszoro, 
2014; Mu et al., 2011), structuring of payment and compensation mechanism 
(Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Gordon et al., 2013; Khmel & Zhao, 2015; Morales, 
Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2013; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; 
Zawawi et al., 2014) and determination of the concession period (Bao et al., 2014; 
Carbonara et al., 2014; Hanaoka & Palapus, 2012; Yu & Lam, 2013; Khanzadi et al., 
2012; S. T. Ng et al., 2007; L. Shen, Bao, Wu, & Lu, 2007; Xueqing Zhang, 2011). 
The ongoing debate regarding the appropriate assessment of these and other 
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financial aspects shows that the VfM assessment within the PPP context is one of 
the most important issues in the theoretical project finance also resulting in the 
absence of a universally accepted empirical practice (EPEC, 2015b). Wojewnik-
Filipkowska & Trojanowski (2013) argue that the choice of the most appropriate 
financial model is one of the key issues with public investments. While 
Zangoueinezhad & Azar (2014) emphasize the importance of developing a favorable 
environment to soundly assess the most effective ways of implementing public 
investments. According to Carbonara et al. (2014), Sarmento & Renneboog (2016), 
Wang (2014), the development of reliable tools and techniques which enables to 
objectively measure VfM in the PPP is an inherent part of this process. 
It is also important to assess the possibilities of PPP to optimize public 
investments from the social perspective because governments’ decisions regarding 
the most effective ways of providing public infrastructure and services have an 
impact on communities’ possibilities to have more or/and better qualitative public 
services for the same or lower costs that, in turn, affects the social welfare (Diana, 
1995; Kellermann, 2007; Mamatzakis, 2007; Maskin & Tirole, 2008; Sambrani, 
2014; Silvestre, 2012). Abednego & Ogunlana (2006) argue that the PPP may offer 
a long-term sustainable approach to improving the social infrastructure, enhancing 
the provided value of public assets and making the better use of taxpayer’s money. 
Accordingly, the assessment of additional social benefits available in PPPs is an 
inherent part of the complex VfM assessment, of which reliable and transparent 
performance also makes it easier to be accepted by the society (Babatunde et al., 
2015; S. T. Ng et al., 2012). 
The relevance of assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize public 
investments is also emphasized from the scientific perspective, because the 
assessment of the most beneficial way of implementing public investments within 
the context of PPP is still a methodologically complicated process. While scientific 
literature does not provide any models enabling to complexly evaluate the 
possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure. Although the 
PPP is widely analyzed and the assessment of its possibilities to increase VfM in 
developing and maintaining public infrastructure and services attracts a lot of 
attention in the academic literature (Ball, 2011; Carmona, 2010; Clark & Root, 
1999; Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009; Forsyth, 2005; Gudelis & Rozenbergaitė, 2004; 
Iseki & Houtman, 2012; Macário, 2010b; Maskin & Tirole, 2008; Molen, Vilys, 
Damkus, & Jakubavičius, 2010; Mu et al., 2011; Olalekan & Hashim, 2014; Parker 
& Hartley, 2003; Percoco, 2014; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Roehrich, Lewis, & 
George, 2014; Sambrani, 2014; Shaoul, 2005, 2011; Sharma, 2007; Vajdic, 
Mladenovic, & Queiroz, 2012; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 2013; 
Wong, de Lacy, & Jiang, 2012; Zawawi et al., 2014), most of researchers 
(Babatunde et al., 2015; Ball, 2011; Benito et al., 2008; Bernardino, Hrãebícãek, & 
Marques, 2010; Desgrées du Lou, 2012; Galilea & Medda, 2010; Grimsey & Lewis, 
2005; Liu et al., 2015; Mota & Moreira, 2015; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Reeves, 
2005; Roehrich et al., 2014; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; Wong et al., 2012) 
argue that there is neither a generally accepted definition, nor a unique model of the 
PPP. The debate on the PPP definition discloses it being studied at various levels of 
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analysis, adopting different theoretical approaches and emphasizing diverse key 
dimensions. However, a review of literature on the PPP concept (de Jong et al., 
2010; Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Bin Yang, Yang, & Kao, 2010; Kavaliauskaitė 
& Jucevičius, 2009; Obrazcovas, 2010; Percoco, 2014; Roehrich et al., 2014; 
Sambrani, 2014; Urbonavicius, 2010; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 2013; 
Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014) indicates the attempts to detect the optimal PPP 
forms and schemes depending on the government’s attitudes towards the scope of 
tasks, ownership of infrastructure, mechanism of payments and compensation to the 
private partner, share of risk transfer and other specific aspects. 
Most researchers (Bao et al., 2014; Carbonara et al., 2014; Gasiorowski & 
Moszoro, 2008; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Kurniawan et al., 2015; S. T. Ng et al., 
2007; Shaoul, 2005; L. Y. Shen & Wu, 2005; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 
2016; Yin Wang, 2015; Xu et al., 2012) highlight the importance of developing tools 
and techniques which enable to form the optimal PSC and PPP options as one of the 
essential preconditions, which makes the comparison of these options for VfM 
rational. The formation of the very comparative model, in which a mix of qualitative 
and quantitative variables needs proper assessment is emphasized as equally 
important (Ball, 2011; Fernandes et al., 2015; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005; Liu et al., 2015; D. Tsamboulas et al., 2013). 
However, a wide range of literature on this topic (Khadaroo, 2008; Moro 
Visconti, 2014; Roehrich et al., 2014; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; N. Wang, 
2014) also indicates that the VfM within the PPP context is still a difficult concept 
offering competing understandings, among which a complex approach as well as 
more considerable attempts to develop universal tools for assessing VfM of the 
PPP’s IPs are missing.  
The summative assessment of the recent scientific publications allows stating 
that although VfM is a key criterion of PPP’s value, there is no consistency or 
cumulative development regarding a methodology of the systemic VfM assessment. 
This discloses a significant gap in scholarly and practical understandings of how the 
VfM assessment should be constructed and how this concept should be properly 
applied. Additionally, although the assessment of possibilities in respect of 
optimization in various contexts including the assessment of investments is a 
growing trend in scientific articles (Baioletti & Petturiti, 2011; Carnevale & 
Lombardi, 2015; Gutiérrez & Lozano, 2016; Melkonyan, Gottschalk, & Vasanth, 
2017; Pavlovskis, Antucheviciene, & Migilinskas, 2017; Rutkauskas & Stasytyte, 
2010; Siali, Flazi, Stambouli, & Fergani, 2016; Xili Zhang, Zhang, & Xiao, 2013), a 
review of academic literature discloses the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure still being analyzed only fragmentally, 
mostly focusing on several and mostly separately analyzed aspects, such as cost 
analysis (Chou, 2011; Fernandes et al., 2015; Jorgensen, Halkjelsvik, & 
Kitchenham, 2012; Makovšek, 2014; Mirdamadi, Etienne, Hassan, Dantan, & 
Siadat, 2013; Okmen & Oztas, 2010; Rostami, Sepehrmanesh, Gharahbagh, & 
Mojtabai, 2013; Schepper et al., 2014; W. C. Wang, Wang, Tsui, & Hsu, 2012; 
Andreas Wibowo & Alfen, 2013), determination of financial discount rate (FDR) 
(Ball, 2011; Evans, 2009; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004), accounting treatment (Benito et 
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al., 2008; Grubišić Šeba, Jurlina Alibegović, & Slijepčević, 2014; Hodges & 
Mellett, 2012; Kellermann, 2007; Mota & Moreira, 2015; Sarmento & Renneboog, 
2016), risk allocation (Abednego & Ogunlana, 2006; Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & 
Hardcastle, 2005; Carbonara et al., 2014; Chou et al., 2012; Fredebeul-Krein & 
Knoben, 2010; Hoppe & Schmitz, 2010; Hwang et al., 2013; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Ke 
et al., 2010; Medda, 2007), etc. herewith not covering the whole assessment process 
as well as a full spectrum of factors important to evaluate for making reasonable 
decisions regarding the most effective ways of providing public infrastructure and 
services. 
According to Buškevičiūtė & Raipa (2011), in modern society, the decision-
making can be characterized by one important aspect – the use of analytical models 
and methodologies which are intended to streamline decision-making. However, 
many issues mentioned above show that PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments 
in public infrastructure have not been sufficiently investigated yet and the 
appropriate tools are not fully developed, therefore, require more scientific attention. 
The scientific problem and the level of its investigation. A gap in the scientific 
literature within the context of the assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure confirms the existence of a significant scientific 
problem in this field. The scientific discussions on the research topic is mostly 
concentrated on the very VfM assessment; however, neither the performance of this 
assessment, as such, nor the formation of rational comparative objects is sufficiently 
analyzed. 
Scientists (Ball, 2011; Berawi et al., 2014; Burke & Demirag, 2015; Desgrées 
du Lou, 2012; English & Guthrie, 2003; Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Fernandes et 
al., 2015; Gordon et al., 2013; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004, 
2005; Harada & Ogunlan, 2015; Khadaroo, 2008; Liu et al., 2015; Moro Visconti, 
2014; Nisar, 2007; Shaoul, 2005; Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012; D. Tsamboulas et 
al., 2013; N. Wang, 2014) are mostly focused on several aspects of VfM assessment 
within the PPP context: disclosure of its importance for the achievement of best 
value, development of its performance technique based on benchmarking of PSC 
and PPP options, analysis of CSFs important for VfM increase, and identification of 
the problems related to application of the approach of VfM assessment. Regarding 
these aspects, issues related to the formation of optimal capital structure (Bednarek 
et al., 2012; Gasiorowski & Moszoro, 2008; Lu et al., 2015; Moszoro, 2010), 
determination of FDR (Ball, 2011; Evans, 2009; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004), 
assessment and optimal allocation of risks (Abednego & Ogunlana, 2006; Bing et 
al., 2005; Carbonara et al., 2014; Chou et al., 2012; Chung, Hensher, & Rose, 2010; 
Fredebeul-Krein & Knoben, 2010; Gordon et al., 2013; Hoppe & Schmitz, 2010; 
Hwang et al., 2013; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Ke et al., 2010; Martins et al., 2011; Medda, 
2007; A. Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Li Yin Shen, Platten, & Deng, 2006), evaluation 
of non-financial benefits (NFBs) (Mota & Moreira, 2015) and difficulties of VfM 
assessment in dealing with uncertainty (Cruz & Marques, 2013; Grimsey & Lewis, 
2005; Kokkaew & Wipulanusat, 2014; Lehtiranta, 2014; Loizou & French, 2012; 
Okmen & Oztas, 2010; Sanderson, 2012; Tirelli, 2006) are mostly analyzed. As an 
important factor for higher VfM achievement, authors also separately analyze the 
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problems related to the determination of concession period (Bao et al., 2014; 
Carbonara et al., 2014; Hanaoka & Palapus, 2012; Yu & Lam, 2013; Khanzadi et al., 
2012; S. T. Ng et al., 2007; Xueqing Zhang, 2011), encouragement of adequate 
incentives from the private sector through the determination of appropriate payment 
and compensation mechanism (Armada, Pereira, & Rodrigues, n.d.; Asao et al., 
2013; Brandao & Saraiva, 2008; Hanaoka & Palapus, 2012; Huang & Chou, 2006; 
Takashima et al., 2010; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; Yinglin Wang & 
Liu, 2015; Andreas Wibowo, 2004; Andreas Wibowo et al., 2012; Zawawi et al., 
2014), and accounting and budgetary treatment (Ashuri, Kashani, Molenaar, Lee, & 
Lu, 2012; Benito et al., 2008; Grubišić Šeba et al., 2014; Haslam, 2005; Hodges & 
Mellett, 2012). However, most of these problems and aspects are analyzed only 
fragmentally and the attempts to apply an integrated complex approach are very 
limited in literature. There are no developed models allowing to complexly assess 
the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure and make 
reasonable decisions for the most efficient ways of their implementation. Here, 
complexity is considered through combining such aspects as the structuring of both 
the rational to compare PSC model and the optimized PPP model and their rational 
comparison, where VfM to the public sector would be assessed, including such 
elements as the determination of FDR, assessment of the most beneficial option for 
IP’s implementation, assessment and allocation of risk, determination of rational 
scope of PPP, calculation of the public sector’s obligation in the PPP, optimization 
of the ratio of public and private capital as well as capital structure in the PPP and 
others, also considering the concepts of efficiency, effectiveness, rationality, 
affordability and optimization. 
Several arguments can be found for this situation. Firstly, although the 
relationships between the public and private sectors have been analyzed by many 
scientists (Ahmed & Ali, 2006; Ashuri et al., 2012; Babatunde et al., 2015; Ball, 
2011; Benito et al., 2008; Carbonara et al., 2014; Carmona, 2010; Clark & Root, 
1999; de Jong et al., 2010; Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; 
Grubišić Šeba et al., 2014; Harada & Ogunlan, 2015; Hellowell, 2013; Iseki & 
Houtman, 2012; Janssen et al., 2016; Khadaroo, 2008; Lawther & Martin, 2005; Liu 
et al., 2015; Macário, 2010a; Molen et al., 2010; Mota & Moreira, 2015; Mu et al., 
2011; Müller & Turner, 2005; Olalekan & Hashim, 2014; Parker & Hartley, 2003; 
Percoco, 2014; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Reeves, 2005; Roehrich et al., 2014; 
Roll & Verbeke, 1998; Sambrani, 2014; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; Shaoul, 
2011; Sharma, 2007; Silvestre, 2012; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; 
Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015; Wang, 2014; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 
2013; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014; Xueqing Zhang, 2011), there is neither a 
single definition nor a unique model of PPP, which, in turn, determines a particular 
uncertainty about PPP as an alternative way of developing the infrastructure and 
providing services and, therefore, creates a difficulty in establishing a universal and 
unchallenged tool for VfM assessment. Secondly, the concept of VfM is also not 
consensual and, depending on the approach, may include multiple elements, which 
are not systemized in literature. Thirdly, VfM assessment is rational only if the 
rational options are compared; however, the process of their formation is only 
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fragmentally analyzed. Finally, the very VfM assessment is just one element in the 
entire process of assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure, while neither this process nor the internal links between its above-
mentioned elements are complexly analyzed as well as their role in decision-making 
regarding the way of implementation are revealed. Accordingly, some scientists 
(Ball, 2011; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Khadaroo, 2008; Moro Visconti, 2014) argue 
that due to its multifaceted and somewhat controversial nature, the VfM assessment 
is too complex and not transparent enough, which, in turn, encourages critiques and 
causes conflict over the very PPP. 
Despite its central role in decision-making for the most effective way of 
implementing investments in public infrastructure, there is a lack of studies which 
would apply a complex approach and disclose the internal links between the key 
elements needed to be coherently evaluated to maximize VfM to the public sector in 
the PPP. Such researchers as Carbonara et al. (2014), Hanák & Muchová (2015), 
Sarmento & Renneboog (2016) state that the sound assessment of efficiency of 
public resources’ use is considered as one of the main challenges related to public 
investment. Accordingly, a complex scientific problem in this field results in a need 
to create an integrated complex model of for assessing the possibilities of PPP to 
optimize investment in public infrastructure which would integrate the key elements 
of analysis and decision-making for the most efficient way of developing public 
infrastructure. Regarding the presented problematic aspects of assessing the 
possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure, the scientific 
problem of the dissertation is raised: how to assess the possibilities provided by the 
PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure that the results obtained would 
enable to make reasonable decisions regarding the most efficient ways for their 
implementation? 
The scientific problem in this dissertation is solved by: 1) emphasizing the 
importance of governments’ role in achieving objectives to increase the efficiency in 
the development of public infrastructure; 2) disclosing the factors encouraging 
entities of the public and private sectors to go into the PPPs 3) analyzing the PPP as 
a possibility to optimize investments in public infrastructure as well as considering 
the VfM assessment as the main technique used to assess these possibilities; 4) 
identifying criteria allowing the public procurement authority (PPA) to identify IPs 
having PPP potential and therefore rational to be analyzed for implementation as the 
PPP, and; 5) finally developing a methodology and an integrated complex model for 
assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
The theoretical approach of the assessment is based on the following theories of: 1) 
provision of public infrastructure and services; 2) welfare maximization; 3) 
negotiations; 4) x-ineffectiveness; 5) resource-based, and 6) rational choice of 
financial resources. The dissertation also integrates the following views of: 1) 
increase of efficiency of public investments; 2) collaboration of public and private 
sectors; 3) reliable assessment and rational allocation of risks, also considering such 
aspects as: 1) VfM for the public sector assessment; 2) profit maximization for the 
private entity, and; 3) the asymmetry of information between the private and public 
sectors. 
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The object of the research – the assessment of possibilities of PPP’s to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure. The optimization in this dissertation is 
considered as maximization of benefits the public sector potentially can get through 
alternative ways of implementing investments considering various technical, legal, 
financial and social restrictions. 
The aim of the research – to prepare a complex integrated model of assessing 
the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
The objectives of the research are as follows: 
1. To analyze the theoretical premises of the public and private sectors’ 
collaboration in optimizing the investments in public infrastructure by 
disclosing a) the importance of government’s role in the efficient use of 
public resources for the development of infrastructure, b) economic and 
financial aspects of optimizing investments in public infrastructure, and 
c) key factors encouraging the public and private sectors to collaborate; 
2. To define the concept of PPP and, through the comparative analysis of 
its multiple forms and schemes, to reveal its peculiarities for the 
formation of assumptions related to the assessment of PPP’s 
possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure; 
3. To identify the main elements of VfM assessment within the context of 
PPP and to determine the key aspects to be considered as well as the 
factors to be evaluated to make reasonable decisions for an effective 
implementation of investments in public infrastructure; 
4. To structure the methodological approaches of assessing the 
possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure; 
5. To assess empirically the validity of the created model for assessing the 
possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure in 
the case of a hypothetical IP. 
The methods of research 
In the theoretical part of the dissertation the first three objectives are 
accomplished by using the methods of scientific literature analysis, synthesis, 
comparison and generalization. 
The model of assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure is developed by using the same methods as have been used to 
achieve the previous objectives; however, for performance of the empirical 
researches, the methods of statistical analysis and financial analysis and modeling 
have been additionally used. The research data was processed and analyzed by using 
the programs of EasyFit and MS Excel. The results are obtained by using the 
methods of integration and logic analysis. 
The created model is assessed by using the methods of CBA, financial analysis 
and modeling, simulation, comparison and logic analysis. 
Conclusions are prepared by using the method of logic analysis and 
generalization. 
The structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation consists of an introduction, three the main parts and 
conclusions. Figure 0.1 provides the scheme of the dissertation structure. 
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The first part of the dissertation is devoted to the analysis of theoretical aspects 
of assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
It starts with the analysis of government’s role in optimization of investments in 
public infrastructure, an analysis of economic and financial aspects of this kind of 
optimization as well as factors encouraging both the public and private sectors to go 
into the PPP. It finishes with the formation of conception of evaluation of the private 
sector’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure (Part 1, Section 
1). The next major section analyzes the PPP as a possibility to optimize investments 
in public infrastructure (Part 1, Section 2): it provides the concept and definition of 
the PPP, analyzes and systemizes the forms of PPP, discloses its advantages and 
disadvantages and finally ends with an analysis of structuring of the PPP. Part 1 of 
the dissertation finishes with the theoretical aspects of assessing the possibilities of 
PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure, where the conception of VfM 
assessment is defined as well as different practices and factors which increase VfM 
are analyzed and systemized (Part 1, Section 3). 
INTRODUCTION (problem, aim)
I PART II PART
Theoretical aspects of assessing the 
possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure
1. Theoretical premises of collaboration 
between the public and private sectors in 
optimizing investments in public 
infrastructure (1st objective).
2. PPP as a possibility to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure
(2nd objective).
3. Theoretical aspects of VfM assessment 
(3rd objective).
Formation of a model for assessing the 
possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure 
(4
th
 objective)
1. Methodological reasoning for the 
model for evaluating The possibilities of 
PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure.
2. Formation of the model for Assessing 
the possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure.
III PART
Verification of the model for assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure (5th objective)
Conclusions
1. DR of the member states of the EU.
2. Determination of the main assumptions used on the created model.
3. Description of the hypothetical IP.
4. Simulation and empirical verification of the created model.
 
Figure 0.1. Logical structure of the dissertation (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
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The second part is devoted to the development of a complex model for 
assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
Firstly, the methodological reasoning of solutions for issues related to this 
assessment is provided (Part 2, Section 1), based on which the created model is 
presented in the second major section (Part 2, Section 2). 
In the third part, the suitability of the created model to assess the possibilities of 
PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure is empirically assessed. 
Accordingly, in the first major section the main assumptions used in the created 
model are determined (Part 3, Section 1). Then, the IP is described, based on which 
(Part 3, Section 2) the model’s suitability to be applied in solving the theoretical and 
practical issues related to the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure is verified in the second major section. 
The dissertation ends with the provision of consolidated conclusions revealing 
the results in the achievement of dissertation’s objectives. 
The scientific novelty and theoretical significance of the dissertation 
1. Systemizing the financial and socio-economic aspects, the theoretical 
premises of collaboration between the public and private sectors in 
optimizing investments in public infrastructure are analyzed and, based 
on these results, the conception of evaluation of the private sector’s 
possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure is 
developed and theoretically reasoned; 
2. The conception of the PPP as a possibility to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure is analyzed; 
3. Integrating various approaches, the conception of VfM assessment is 
defined within the context of the PPP and, filling the gap in scientific 
literature; a methodology allowing to assess VfM for the PPA, the 
public sector and the users separately is developed; 
4. Analyzing various approaches and methods of risk assessment, the 
methodology of risk assessment and allocation in the PPPs is 
developed; 
5. The scientific field of empirical researches analyzing the tendencies of 
investment cost overrun in the public IPs is supplemented by providing 
the empirically-based PDs and their parameters which best enable to 
assess cost overrun risk in these IPs in the case of Lithuania; 
6. Systemizing various approaches to calculation of FDR of the public 
sector, a methodology allowing to calculate the specific FDRs for each 
of the member states of the EU is developed; 
7. Considering the features of PPP, criteria allowing to identify the IPs 
having a potential of PPP are formed; 
8. Considering the identified requirements of various stakeholders, 
conditions allowing to optimize the option of IP’s implementation with 
the appropriate involvement of the private sector is formulated, making 
it financially viable and rational to compare against the option of the 
public sector; 
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9. A methodological interface between the CBA and assessment of PPP’s 
possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure is 
identified; 
10. A complex methodology for assessing the possibilities of PPP to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure is developed and 
empirically-grounded. 
Possible practical application of dissertation findings1 
1. The results of this dissertation, i.e. the empirically-based PDs and their 
parameters are applied for the assessment of investment cost overrun 
risk for all public IPs of which capital investments exceed 300k EUR in 
the public sector of Lithuania; 
2. The methodology of PPP indicators’ (FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr) 
calculation developed in this dissertation as well as the formulated 
principles of risk assessment and allocation are applied in practice for 
assessing the expected public sector’s obligations and payments in the 
public sector of Lithuania; 
3. A complex integrated model for assessing the possibilities provided by 
the PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure is created, 
allowing the developers of a public IP in Lithuania and other countries 
to have a practical tool to perform this task and make reasoned 
decisions for the most efficient way of IP’s implementation; 
4. The assessment of the created model’s suitability to be applied in 
practice provides clarity of how the appropriate issues of the 
assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure could be practically solved. 
Scientific approbation of the dissertation. The results of the dissertation 
research were published in five scientific publications and have been presented in 
two international scientific conferences. 
Articles indexed in the Web of Science with Impact Factor: 
1. Jasiukevičius, Linas; Vasiliauskaitė, Asta. (2018). The assessment of 
Public-Private Partnership’s possibilities to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure. Inžinerinė ekonomika = Engineering economics. 
Kaunas University of Technology. Kaunas: ISSN 1392-2785. Vol. 29, 
No. 1, p. XXX. 
2. Jasiukevičius, Linas; Vasiliauskaitė, Asta. (2015). Cost overrun risk 
assessment in the public investment projects: an empirically-grounded 
research. Inžinerinė ekonomika = Engineering economics. Kaunas 
University of Technology. Kaunas: KTU. ISSN 1392-2785. Vol. 26, 
No. 3, p. 245-254. 
Articles indexed in the Web of Science without Impact Factor: 
                                                 
1 From 2013 the author of this dissertation at the time of the preparing this work has also 
worked as a developer of CBA methodology in Lithuania as well as an expert of public-
private partnership at the Central Project Management Agency, where he had a possibility to 
apply the research results in practice by improving the methodologies of CBA and PPP. 
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1. Jasiukevičius, Linas; Vasiliauskaitė Asta. (2015). Risk assessment in 
public investment projects: impact of empirically-grounded 
methodology on measured values of intangible obligations in 
Lithuania. Procedia social and behavioral sciences: 20th international 
scientific conference economics and management 2015 (ICEM-2015). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. ISSN 1877-0428. 2015, vol. 213, p. 370-375. 
(Presented in conference Economics and Management 2015). 
Publications in other international databases (articles in periodicals, collections 
of articles and conference proceedings): 
1. Jasiukevičius, Linas; Vasiliauskaitė, Asta. (2013). The relation between 
economic growth and public-private partnership market development in 
the countries of the European Union // Economics and management = 
Ekonomika ir vadyba. Kaunas University of Technology. Kaunas: 
KTU. ISSN 1822-6515. 2013, No. 18 (2), p. 226-236. (Presented in 
conference Economics and Management 2013). 
2. Jasiukevičius, Linas; Vasiliauskaitė, Asta. Formation of optimal capital 
structure in private-public partnership // Economics and management = 
Ekonomika ir vadyba. Kaunas University of Technology. Kaunas: 
KTU. ISSN 1822-6515. 2012, no. 17(4), p. 1275-1281. 
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1. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ASSESSING THE POSSIBILITIES OF 
PPP TO OPTIMIZE INVESTMETS IN PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
As an independent research field, the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure begun to develop since the late 1980s 
under the influence of spreading neoliberal ideologies (Morales et al., 2013). Under 
the neoliberal critics’ diagnosis of inability of the public sector alone to fill the gap 
of public infrastructure needed for economic development and the encouragement of 
the public bureaucracy to hand over the provision of public facilities and services to 
the private actors, the search for potential forms of the public and private sectors’ 
collaboration as well as the assessment of their effectiveness has become relevant in 
practical and academic points of view (Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009; Y. Zhang, 
2014). VfM is a primary concept which is the basis for developing a methodology 
for assessing PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments, i.e. it is mostly focused on 
the comparison of the public and private options of IP’s implementation. Here 
emerges the necessity to apply a complex approach which would integrate all 
aspects important to consider and all factors required to coherently evaluate the 
reliability of VfM assessment and rational decision making for the most effective 
way to provide the public infrastructure and services. Accordingly, to achieve the 
aim of the research, there is a need for integrated systematic analysis of theoretical 
premises and aspects of assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure. 
In this part of the dissertation the theoretical premises and incentives of 
collaboration between the public and private sectors are analyzed as well as PPP as 
the possibility to optimize investments in public infrastructure, and the theoretical 
aspects and problems of VfM assessment within the context of PPP. 
1.1. Theoretical premises of collaboration between the public and private 
sectors in optimizing investments in public infrastructure 
The analysis of theoretical premises of collaboration between the public and 
private sectors starts with the analysis of government’s role in the optimization of 
investments in public infrastructure. The economic and financial aspects of 
optimizing public investments are also analyzed. In the second section, the factors 
encouraging the public and private sectors to collaborate are investigated. Finally, 
the conception of assessing the possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure is provided. 
1.1.1. Role of government in the optimization of investments in public 
infrastructure 
Traditionally, the governments as well as the entire public sector are 
responsible for providing specific services, such as health, education, justice, 
transport, public security and national defense, and for developing and maintaining 
the basic infrastructure, such as roads, ports, prisons, hospitals, libraries, schools, 
etc. needed for their delivery. Situations described in the economic literature as 
‘market failures’ are one of the main reasons determining that these types of services 
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and infrastructure cannot be provided entirely by the private sector (Bond, 1999; 
Burke & Demirag, 2015; B. L. Chen et al., 2012; Devapriya, 2006; Herranz-Loncán, 
2007; Link & Scott, 2001; Roll & Verbeke, 1998; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; Y. 
Zhang, 2014). Due to a lack of profitability, the private entities are not able to 
provide them at the quality required2 by the PPA and quantity needed by the users. 
However, for various social, political and economic reasons, their provision as 
‘merit goods’ is vital for a society where governments are responsible for the 
assurance of universal access to these goods and services, which, therefore, may 
obtain a partially or purely ‘public’ statue (Duran-fernandez & Santos, 2014). 
Without such intervention, the public infrastructure which is free of charge to 
society would not be built, especially when it requires enormous capital investments, 
such as networks of roads, railways, street lighting, electricity transmission and 
distribution, etc. The second reason of the above-mentioned services and 
infrastructure to be provided by the public sector is that they may be characterized as 
natural monopolies and, due to their sensitivity for public interest, require at least 
some public intervention. Moreover, their provision may not be efficient in the 
competitive market (Auriol & Picard, 2013; Bin & Quan, 2012; Evenhuis & 
Vickerman, 2010; Kateja, 2012; Radygin, Simachev, & Entov, 2015; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016; Silvestre, 2012; Dimitrios a. Tsamboulas & Kapros, 2003; 
Urbonavicius, 2010; Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015). The third reason for public 
provision of infrastructure is the existence of economy of scale in production. In this 
case, central and coordinated provision might be more efficient than a decentralized 
and uncoordinated supply by private entities (Duran-fernandez & Santos, 2014). 
Finally, the private sector is less interested in externalities i.e. economic growth, 
sustainable development, social-economic benefits etc., therefore, the intervention of 
the public sector is required (Agénor, 2010; M. R. Gupta & Barman, 2010; 
Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016). 
The government authorities (GAs) have to ensure that investments in public 
services and infrastructure primarily would have a positive net impact on economic 
development and social welfare (Carmona, 2010; B. L. Chen et al., 2012; Diana, 
1995; Haughwout, 2002; Macário, 2010a; Percoco, 2014; Sambrani, 2014; 
Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014). In such cases, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the 
most prevalent systematic approach applied to select the socially-economically 
optimal alternative of IPs’ implementation (Brzozowska, 2007; Toke & Lauber, 
2007; Vandermeulen, Verspecht, Vermeire, Van Huylenbroeck, & Gellynck, 2011). 
However, beside the social-economic benefit, the public services and infrastructure 
should be provided in the most financially-efficient manner (Bao et al., 2014; B. L. 
Chen et al., 2012; de Jong et al., 2010; Diana, 1995; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; 
Harada & Ogunlan, 2015; Janssen et al., 2016; Kurniawan et al., 2015; Mota & 
Moreira, 2015; Raipa & Kavaliauskaitė, 2008; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; 
                                                 
2 Standards for public services and infrastructure often are not well-defined in the public 
sector. Moreover, the public sector itself does not always follow the conditions applied for 
public services provision, which at the same time are obligatory for the private entities 
intended to participate in public provision. This, in turn, distorts the comparative results of 
the public and private sectors’ performance. 
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Shaoul, 2005; E. C. Wang, 2002). The GAs have a task and responsibility to 
maximize the value to the society available from the limited public resources. 
Considering the fact that, on the one hand, conventional provision of public 
infrastructure usually requires high initial investments (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 
2010; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; N. Wang, 2014), and, on the other 
hand, there exist financial and budgetary constraints (Alexandersson, Nash, & 
Preston, 2008; Benito et al., 2008; Bom & Ligthart, 2014; Daito & Gifford, 2014; 
Fernandes et al., 2015; Grubišić Šeba et al., 2014; Hanák & Muchová, 2015; 
Kellermann, 2007; Khmel & Zhao, 2015; Maskin & Tirole, 2008; Mota & Moreira, 
2015; Percoco, 2014; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; Shaoul, 2011; Tamai, 2014; 
Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen, 2015; Andreas Wibowo, 2004), governments have to 
play an administrative role and create opportunities and conditions for private 
investors (Čiarnienė & Vienažindienė, 2007; de Jong et al., 2010; Huang & Chou, 
2006; Khmel & Zhao, 2015; Sikka, 2015; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 
2013; Y. Zhang, 2014), whose participation may potentially create a more efficient 
alternative to the conventional provision (Carbonara et al., 2014; Gouveia & 
Raposo, 2012; Grubišić Šeba et al., 2014; Hanaoka & Palapus, 2012; Janssen et al., 
2016; Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen, 2015). Their participation in the development of 
public infrastructure can be justified only if there are reasoned arguments to expect 
that the private entities can optimize investments in public infrastructure, i.e. they 
can deliver a greater value and/or efficiencies additional to those obtainable purely 
from the public sector (Burke & Demirag, 2015; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Harada & 
Ogunlan, 2015; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Liu et al., 2015; Martins et al., 2011; Shaoul, 
2005; N. Wang, 2014). Nevertheless, scientific literature is rich in respect of studies 
which present the negative experience of public sector’s collaboration with the 
private sector beside the positive (Daito & Gifford, 2014). Therefore, decision-
making regarding the ways of developing the public infrastructure requires accurate 
ex-ante assessment (Ball, 2011; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Liu et al., 2015; Moro 
Visconti, 2014; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Tsamboulas et al., 2013; Tsamboulas 
& Kapros, 2003; Wang, 2014). While governments, despite a lack of specific 
knowledge and practice (Ernest Effah; Ameyaw & Chan, 2015; Khan & Mushtaq, 
2009), are responsible for the accumulation of essential competence needed to make 
rational decisions (Ahmed & Ali, 2006; Boyer & Newcomer, 2015; Iseki & 
Houtman, 2012; Mota & Moreira, 2015), which, considering the possibilities of the 
public sector to replace infrastructure at an average rate of 1–2% per year, may 
affect the society for as long as 50–100 years (Roelich et al., 2015).  
Growing private participation in the development of public infrastructure in 
respect of both the number of IPs and the value of capital investments (PPIAF, 
2016) discloses a changing role of the GAs in the provision of public facilities and 
services to the society as well as put into question the role of government in the 
economic progress and efficient use of public resources (Chatterjee & Mahbub 
Morshed, 2011; Frischmann, 2005; Marcelin & Mathur, 2014; Sineviciene & 
Vasiliauskaite, 2012). In some cases, instead of being the provider, the public sector 
remains only the guarantor and retains the overall operational responsibility, while 
the provision is committed to the private sector (Bin & Quan, 2012; Galilea & 
30 
Medda, 2010; Müller & Turner, 2005; Olalekan & Hashim, 2014; Shaoul, Stafford, 
& Stapleton, 2012; Yin Wang, 2015). Such transfer allows the government to focus 
more on their strategic planning and regulation (Abednego & Ogunlana, 2006; 
Gordon et al., 2013; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Liu et al., 2015; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016). In other words, governments as strategic investors seek to 
maximize social-economic benefits through investments (Esfahani & Ramírez, 
2003). While, on the operational level, the private sector in a broad spectrum of 
possible cooperation forms with the public sector can potentially provide additional 
possibilities in respect of efficiency, quality and financial accessibility. However, 
their use also depends on the government’s investment policy regarding the level of 
the private sector’s involvement in the economic sectors, traditionally considered as 
a domain of the public sector (Chatterjee & Mahbub Morshed, 2011). 
Over the last two decades, the policy shift towards market provision of many 
public goods, services and, especially, infrastructure shows an increasing relying on 
the private sector for the provision (Auriol & Picard, 2013; Devapriya, 2006; 
Janssen et al., 2016; Roehrich et al., 2014; Yin Wang, 2015). For example, between 
1990 and 2014, about 7,000 PPP infrastructure IPs (two-thirds of them during the 
last decade) worldwide represented a total capital value of nearly US$2,543 trillion 
(World bank, 2016b). Moreover, the case related to private provision is much 
stronger in the economies characterized by a higher level of economic development, 
such as the UK, France, Canada, Australia, the USA, Spain, Germany, etc. 
(Babatunde et al., 2015; Chatterjee & Mahbub Morshed, 2011; Shaoul, 2011). These 
findings show a conscious choice of some countries to move towards a greater 
involvement of the private sector in the provision of public service and 
infrastructure. Moreover, right-wing governments have been more active in 
promoting this phenomenon (Marcelin & Mathur, 2014). 
Historically, the first long-term agreements between governments and private 
entities for the construction and operation of public infrastructure are found in the 
UK in the second half of the 17th century, at the time of industrial expansion and 
embryonic public finances (Auriol & Picard, 2013; Parker & Hartley, 2003). After 
an entire century, the first similar agreements were signed in France, Spain, Italy, 
Belgium and Germany (Sambrani, 2014; Skietrys & Raipa, 2009). However, 
although the concept of using private capital to provide public goods and services 
have been known for several centuries, the cooperation between the public and 
private sectors has significantly increased across the globe only in the late 1980s 
(Alonso, Clifton, & Diaz-Fuentes, 2013; Babatunde et al., 2015; Dunn-Cavelty & 
Suter, 2009; Kateja, 2012; Lawther & Martin, 2005; Morales et al., 2013; 
Pauliukevičiūtė, 2010; Shaoul et al., 2012; Skietrys & Raipa, 2009; Šutavičienė, 
2011b) by starting to implement neoliberal economic reforms in many countries, 
among which, the cases of the UK and the USA are the best known (Baker & 
Burdman, 1996; Clark & Root, 1999; Khadaroo, 2008; Lawther & Martin, 2005; 
Loh & Hu, 2014; Sikka, 2015; Yin Wang, 2015; N. Wang, 2014; Whiting, 2013). 
Through various neoliberal political and economic practices, collectively referred to 
as the Washington Consensus (Loh & Hu, 2014; Marangos, 2009; Sheppard, 
Leitner, & Marangos, 2009), (reviewed by Ioris, 2012; Loh & Hu, 2014; Morales et 
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al., 2013; Shaoul, 2011; Shaoul et al., 2012; Y. Zhang, 2014), these countries have 
privatized, liberalized and deregulated the markets previously exclusively preserved 
by the public sector. This New Right ideological movement based on the concept 
that ideas and practices used in the private sector can also be successfully applied in 
the public sector, and codified under the name of the New Public Management 
(NPM), encouraged the adoption of business principles and management techniques 
from the private sector into the public sector (Acerete, Stafford, & Stapleton, 2011; 
Alonso et al., 2013; Bezes et al., 2012; Čiarnienė & Vienažindienė, 2007; English & 
Guthrie, 2003; Hood, 1995; Matei & Antonie, 2014; Matei & Chesaru, 2014; 
Newberry, 2013; Raipa & Kavaliauskaitė, 2008; Shaoul et al., 2012; Silvestre, 2012) 
as well as increased the involvement of the private sector in managing and 
delivering public infrastructure and services. This policy shift towards the private 
provision, in turn, resulted in a decrease of state intervention in many economic 
sectors and caused a reduction of the scale and scope of the public sector in general 
(Savas, 1999; Shaoul et al., 2012). 
However, the allowance for private entities to own or participate in the 
management, construction and maintenance of major infrastructure through various 
forms of partnerships between the public and private entities have not reduced the 
responsibility of governments in ensuring and maximizing opportunities for 
entrepreneurship, innovation and efficiency in the public sector (Hellowell, 2013; 
Kurniawan et al., 2015; Loh & Hu, 2014; Morales et al., 2013; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016; Y. Zhang, 2014). It rather highlighted the role of governments in 
the adoption of the private sector’s practices and rationalities in the public sector. 
Previously, the governments exercised coordination and steering through hierarchy, 
bureaucracy and detailed regulation. While under a paradigm of NPM, they are 
focused on results (A. Matei & Antonie, 2014; Scupola & Zanfei, 2016), and 
governance is created through networks based on interdependence, negotiation and 
trust among a number of public and private actors (Shaoul et al., 2012; Silvestre, 
2012). The adoption of the private sector’s mentalities and practices gradually 
influenced the public servants increasingly to think and manage like business 
entrepreneurs (Morales et al., 2013).  
However, the increasing private participation in the provision of public 
infrastructure and services also increasingly challenges governments to overcome 
the specific issue known as the principal-agent or agency problem (Benito et al., 
2008; Čiarnienė & Vienažindienė, 2007; Gordon et al., 2013; Guilding, Warnken, 
Ardill, & Fredline, 2005; Keser & Willinger, 2007; Macário, 2010b; Müller & 
Turner, 2005; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Saam, 2007; Shrestha, Chan, Aibinu, & 
Chen, 2016; Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015; Wright, Mukherji, & Kroll, 2001). It 
occurs because of different natures of the public and private entities. The GAs (‘the 
principals’) primarily seek social welfare and VfM. While, the main purpose of the 
private entities (‘the agents’) is business sustainability and profit maximization. This 
determines that the principal-agent relations between the public and private sectors 
can exist if the balance between the interests of both parties is achieved (Evenhuis & 
Vickerman, 2010; Hwang et al., 2013; Yu & Lam, 2013; Khmel & Zhao, 2015; 
Kurniawan et al., 2015; Lehtiranta, 2014). However, it is the responsibility of the 
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GAs to select the most suitable private entities and ensure their performance within 
the public’s quality requirements (Carmona, 2010; Harada & Ogunlan, 2015; 
Macário, 2010a; Xu et al., 2012) as well as to get the best VfM to the public sector 
in comparison with CP (Liu et al., 2015; Wang, 2014). 
However, according to Fernandes et al. (2015), Guilding et al. (2005), Müller & 
Turner (2005), Stasiukynas (2011), Wright et al. (2001), Zitron (2006), these tasks 
are not without problems. The first one known as ‘the moral hazard problem’ can 
appear when the private entities, which are engaged to provide some services on the 
PPAs’ behalf and delegated to make some decisions, do not act in the best interests 
of the GAs. They do what is best for themselves and do what is best for the GAs 
only if their interests are aligned instead. The second one, referred as ‘the adverse 
selection problem’, arises due to the inability of the GAs to acquire all information 
about the private entities and information which is available to or possessed by the 
private entities, as well as monitor their actions perfectly. Theories of transaction 
cost and agency state that governments as a customer get into a worse situation than 
engaged agents due to information asymmetry, uncertainty and other environmental 
and human factors (Stasiukynas, 2011). Therefore, the GAs cannot fully know all 
arguments for decisions made by the private entities and be totally certain whether 
these decisions are right choices on behalf of the public sector. This information 
asymmetry can determine the government entities as being unable to select the most 
appropriate private entities for specific tasks and monitor results of their 
performance perfectly which, in turn, can cause inefficiencies regarding the 
provision of public infrastructure and services and create potential for mistrust and 
morality issues (Benito et al., 2008; Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Saam, 2007; 
Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015; Wright et al., 2001). 
Agency theory suggests solving these issues by aligning the interests of the two 
parties through contracts designed so that the agreed conditions would encourage 
positive incentives from the private party to perform consistently with the social 
goals and better VfM for the public sector (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Gordon et 
al., 2013; Macário, 2010b; Moro Visconti, 2014; Müller & Turner, 2005). Saam 
(2007) provides a review of possible solutions for the agency problem which include 
various decisions related to the procedure of the private entity’s selection, 
determination of partnership form as well as payment and compensation mechanism, 
and monitoring. Their complex application allows reducing the private entities’ 
hidden characteristics and intensions as well as hidden information and knowledge 
they possess. However, this also makes the ex-ante VfM assessment a complicated 
task. Nevertheless, there is a unanimous agreement (De Clerck & Demeulemeester, 
2015) that in general the GAs are responsible for overcoming the inefficiencies 
through a well-designed tender procedure, the development of a contract that 
contains adequate incentives, strict monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in 
the contract. However, the efficient implementation of these aspects remains a 
relevant issue both in academic and political debates. 
There are many elements of the contract which need to be properly determined 
and relevant factors to be considered by governments to create conditions which 
would allow both getting better VfM to the public sector and making the contract 
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attractive for the private entities to participate and herewith encouraging their 
appropriate incentives within social interest in provision of public infrastructure and 
services (Janssen et al., 2016; Ng et al., 2012; Song et al., 2015; Andreas; Wibowo 
& Alfen, 2015). This primarily requires a well-established legal/regulatory 
framework which could effectively regulate the field of public and private sectors’ 
contractual relations and facilitate the contracting of partnerships with private 
entities (Carranza et al., 2014; Clark & Root, 1999; Galilea & Medda, 2010; Janssen 
et al., 2016; Mota & Moreira, 2015; Mu et al., 2011; Savas, 1999; Šutavičienė, 
2011a; Yin Wang, 2015; Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen, 2015). However, the decisions 
for IPs’ implementation under long-term contracts with private entities and the 
finding of mutually acceptable contractual agreements usually have to be made on a 
case-by-case basis. The reason is individual risk allocation between the public and 
private parties in every IP the optimization of which, as disclosed by Abednego & 
Ogunlana, 2006; Chang, 2014; Chou et al., 2012; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Ng & 
Loosemore, 2007; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014 is challenging and demanding. 
Therefore, GAs are responsible for the development of effective risk allocation and 
mitigation strategies as well as application of models, tools and techniques enabling 
to achieve proper contractual arrangements (Carbonara et al., 2014; Hwang et al., 
2013; Kurniawan et al., 2015; Y. Zhang, 2014). Moreover, considering the goals of 
both parties to maximize their economic position, explained by preference theory 
(Stasiukynas, 2011), GAs’ role in negotiation is also important, where the balance of 
interests between the parties as well as the best VfM for the public sector could be 
achieved (Fernandes et al., 2015; Ke et al., 2010; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; L. 
Shen et al., 2007; Thomas Ng et al., 2007). 
A number of studies (Gordon et al., 2013; Hwang et al., 2013; Ng et al., 2012; 
Song et al., 2015; Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015; Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen, 2015) 
have been conducted to identify the CSFs for successful cooperation between the 
public and private entities under long-term agreements, which refer to the key areas 
of activity where favorable results are necessary for the success of such contracts 
and which have to be assessed in advance. Herewith, scientists unanimously state 
that the GAs as a procurer are responsible for their identification as well as, 
considering them, play a leading role in formulating and building effective 
partnerships with the private entities. This allows stating that the more efforts 
governments put on creating a favorable environment for alternative ways of 
implementing investments, the higher potential there is to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure by involving the private entities. However, from the perspective 
of the public sector, the optimization of investments in public infrastructure can be 
analyzed from the perspectives of the social-economic and financial aspects. 
1.1.1.1. Economic aspects of optimizing investments in public infrastructure 
The economic aspects of optimizing investments in public infrastructure reveal 
mostly in the context of economic performance in respect of its productivity and 
efficiency. Mamatzakis (2003) defines productivity growth as the part of output 
growth that cannot be explained by an increase in the use of inputs. It is attributed to 
the development of technology, scale effects and increase in the efficiency of 
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resource used. There is a substantial amount of literature on economic growth, 
where it is explained by public infrastructural expenditure. However, scientific 
discussions disclose (Mamatzakis, 2003; E. C. Wang, 2002) that the effect of public 
infrastructural investments on economic growth is still controversial and, therefore, 
requires more extensive analysis in order to analyze the economic aspects of 
optimizing investments in public infrastructure. 
Infrastructure as an investment object is easier to recognize than define. 
According to Frischmann (2005), the term ‘Infrastructure’ generally conjures up the 
notion of physical resource systems made by humans for public consumption. While 
investments in infrastructure are thought to provide basic services to the industry 
and households. It is a key input into the economy, which is crucial for its operation 
and growth. However, according to Grimsey & Lewis (2002) and Zangoueinezhad 
& Azar (2014), what is considered as ‘basic’, ‘key’ and ‘crucial’ varies between 
countries and depends on time, i.e. coal mining and steel production were 
considered as essential infrastructure several decades ago (Betz, Partridge, Farren, & 
Lobao, 2015), whereas the broadband network is considered as necessary 
infrastructure in the digital era (Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer, & Woessmann, 2011). 
Grimsey & Lewis (2002) provide the most commonly found classification of 
infrastructure, which is based on different economic activities: 
• Transport, such as highway systems, railways, airline systems, and 
ports; 
• Communication, such as telephone and broadband networks and postal 
services; 
• Energy, such as power generation, transfer and supply; 
• Water, such as sewerage, waste water treatment and water supply; 
• Health, such as hospitals and clinics; 
• Social infrastructure, such as prisons, courts, museums, schools, 
government accommodation, etc. 
Literature could also provide a more detailed classification, however, typically, 
this so-called traditional infrastructure can be divided into two broad categories: 
economic infrastructure and social infrastructure, depending on whether it is 
gathered revenues from direct users for services provided in the appropriate 
infrastructure, what, in turn, makes a business activity feasible or not, respectively 
(Ng & Loosemore, 2007). The economic infrastructure includes drainage systems, 
sewage treatment plants, telecommunications networks, toll roads, bridges, railways, 
air transport facilities, etc. The social infrastructure includes assets that usually 
accommodate social services, such as education, prisons, justice, library, public 
safety, health, etc. 
A distinction can also be made between ‘hard’ infrastructure, which is obvious 
and involves the provision of physical infrastructure, such as buildings, roads, 
bridges etc. and ‘soft’ infrastructure, involving the provision of services, either for 
economic infrastructure e.g. street cleaning, utility network repairing, catering, 
security, etc. or for social infrastructure e.g. education, health, social, public security 
services, etc. (Fung, Garcia-Herrero, Iizaka, & Siu, 2005; Hellowell, 2013; Portugal-
Perez & Wilson, 2012). 
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Despite various classifications, investments in public infrastructure share a 
number of common characteristics (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002): 
• Duration – infrastructure is long-lived and has a long gestation process; 
• Illiquid – the lumpiness and indivisibility of infrastructure IPs makes it 
being limited in the secondary market; 
• Capital intensive – infrastructural IPs are large in scale and highly 
geared (Sanderson, 2012); 
• Valuation – IPs are difficult to evaluate because of taxation, pricing 
rules, embedded options and guarantees. 
The last characteristic is associated with the issue which attracts the most 
interests of scientists, since public infrastructure is viewed as an input in economy 
that can reduce private sector’s cost of production. Many studies have attempted to 
measure the productivity of public infrastructure, mostly adopting a methodology 
based on one of three main approaches: The Cobb-Douglas production function 
approach, the cost function approach, and the causality approach. Most of them 
mostly focused on the transport sector, have found high returns on infrastructure 
investments, or emphasize an important role of infrastructure in ensuring sustainable 
growth of local economy (Agbelie, 2014; Agénor, 2010; Anwar, 2006; Berawi et al., 
2014; Bin & Quan, 2012; Bom & Ligthart, 2014; Chandra & Thompson, 2000; 
Duran-fernandez & Santos, 2014; Glomm & Ravikumar, 1999; Gupta & Barman, 
2010; Heijdra & Meijdam, 2002; Hickford et al., 2015; Hosoya, 2014; Mamatzakis, 
2007; Percoco, 2014; Pradhan & Bagchi, 2013; Sambrani, 2014; Shi & Huang, 
2014; Zawawi et al., 2014). Melo et al. (2013) also found that the productivity effect 
of transport infrastructure can vary across the main industry groups. It tends to be 
higher in the US economy than in European countries, and are higher for roads 
compared to other modes of transport. 
However, the robustness of the results has been questioned in other empirical 
studies and surveys. Some findings claim that the effect of public infrastructure on 
the economic growth is statistically insignificant (Herranz-Loncán, 2007; 
Mamatzakis, 2003) or, among those that are significant, are more negative than 
positive, both in the short- and long-run periods (Crihfield & Panggabean, 1995; 
Moreno et al., 2002), or state about the absence of direct effects on outputs (Holtz-
Eakin & Lovely, 1996). Rioja (2003) presents empirical results supporting the 
positive effects of public maintenance’s expenditures but adverse effects of capital 
expenditure on GDP in developing countries. He concluded that more attention 
should be paid to the evaluation of effects of maintenance of public infrastructure on 
GDP growth. 
Additionally, scientists such as Esfahani & Ramírez (2003), Pradhan & Bagchi 
(2013), Wang (2002) concern with the issue of how to determine the direction of 
causality between infrastructure investments and aggregate output. They argue that 
public infrastructure may affect productivity and output, while economic growth can 
also shape the demand and supply of infrastructure, which is likely to cause an 
upward bias in the estimated returns to infrastructure. 
Although the above-reviewed results are controversial, it is fair to state that 
scientists, especially in the later studies, generally support the notion that public 
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capital is productive and, as an additional factor alongside the labor and private 
investments, is a must for the economic development. When public infrastructure is 
planned and maintained well, it plays a vital role in supporting a high standard of 
living, encouraging private investments and facilitating commerce and trade, 
enhancing the attractiveness and competitiveness of economy, thereby it extends a 
nation’s global wealth. Accordingly, this is one of the main arguments for incentive 
of such international economic bodies as the World Bank (WB), the European 
Investment Bank, the EU, etc. to provide loans on easy terms or grants, respectively, 
for infrastructure policy financing. 
According to Olalekan & Hashim (2014), the cost of maintaining and 
expanding the existing public infrastructures in the developed countries is about 7% 
of their GDP. While public spending in the developing countries to deliver 
infrastructural facilities is about 3%. Bom & Ligthart (2014) state that most of the 
OECD countries currently operate public investment ratios below 5%. This indicates 
that the developing countries need to increase their funding on infrastructure so that 
those economies could improve and achieve higher economic development. 
However, the developed countries also face serious challenges to ensure high-
quality infrastructure, especially under the conditions of economic and financial 
crisis (Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009; Hellowell, 2013; Martins et al., 2011; Felix; 
Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; Whiting, 2013). This discloses the inability of 
governments to satisfy all infrastructural needs, which, in turn, requires optimizing 
public investments in a way that would allow achieving optimal combination of the 
whole costs and social-economic benefits to meet the society’s requirements. 
Historically, CBA is the most prevalent method for assessing and comparing 
direct and indirect social-economic benefits and the costs of possible alternatives of 
IP’s implementation, and allows to select the optimal one as well as to appraise the 
potential investment decisions (Pradhan & Bagchi, 2013). Economic performance 
indicators such as Economic Net Present Value (ENPV) and Economic Rate of 
Return (ERR) are the main indicators allowing comparability and ranking of 
competing IPs or alternatives of IP (European Commission, 2014b). The economic 
benefits and costs ratio (EBCR) (CPVA, 2014a) is also used. The option with the 
highest positive ENPV3 and other above-mentioned relative indicators is the most 
beneficial to implement from the social-economic perspective, accordingly. 
The above-mentioned arguments allow stating that from the economic 
perspective, the optimization of investments in infrastructure can be distinguished 
into the strategic and operational levels. The former, based on econometric 
calculation, focus on the selection of the most productive sectors for investment and 
formation of sectorial investment portfolios, accordingly. While the later refer to 
social-economic VfM maximization at the project level. Considering the aim of the 
research, the operational level of investments’ optimization in infrastructure is 
mostly considered further in the dissertation. 
                                                 
3 Accordingly, ENPV is rational to use when the scope of comparative options is the same, 
otherwise EBCR as a comparative indicator should be more prioritized for the assessment. 
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1.1.1.2. Financial aspects of optimizing investments in public infrastructure 
The financial aspects of optimizing investments in public infrastructure reveal 
mostly through the requirement to efficiently use public financial resources available 
for building and maintaining infrastructure. Here, efficiency refers to the ability to 
implement investments without wasting materials, energy, efforts, money and time 
(Serrador & Rodney Turner, 2014; Sundqvist, Backlund, & Chronéer, 2014). This 
dissertation mostly focuses on such financial aspects as cost-efficiency, optimization 
of capital structure and risk allocation. 
According to Hanák & Muchová (2015), efficient use of public resources is one 
of the main challenges related to public investment. This concerns the entire life 
cycle of infrastructure, starting from the preparation of design documentation to 
demolition of infrastructure at the end of the investments’ lifetime. Economic theory 
suggests that the bundling of IP’s components may provide cost-efficiency. 
Therefore, the efficiency of investments should be considered from the perspective 
of life-cycle costs, i.e. all costs related to the design, construction, operation and 
maintenance need to be considered, evaluated and compared to other options so that 
a solution characterized by the lowest possible costs could be found (Carmona, 
2010; Cruz & Marques, 2013; Daito & Gifford, 2014; Heralova, 2014; Iseki & 
Houtman, 2012; Maskin & Tirole, 2008; Mota & Moreira, 2015; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016; Li Yin Shen et al., 2006). 
However, according to Hanák & Muchová (2015), and Heralova (2014), the use 
of Life Cycle Costing (LCC) in the construction sector is rather rare in the public 
sector of many countries. The PPAs often select the winning bidder simply based on 
the lowest bidding price rather than on the basis of the most economically beneficial 
tender. Even in the case of multi-criteria evaluation, which enables to deal with 
multiple dimensions of evaluation aspects (Tamosaitiene, Zavadskas, & Turskis, 
2013; Turskis, Zavadskas, & Peldschus, 2009; Zavadskas, Turskis, Ustinovichius, & 
Shevchenko, 2010), the criterion of investment costs often weight double all 
remaining criteria together, e.g. costs related to operation and maintenance, and, 
therefore, have a very significant influence in most infrastructure IPs’ tenders 
regarding their overall efficiency. This results in lower possibilities to minimize life 
cycle costs of the IP. This especially concerns the concessions and other long-term 
contractual agreements between the PPAs and private entities, whose costs and 
benefits can be rationally evaluated against CP as a form of public services’ 
provision, only if the life cycle approach is applied (Carmona, 2010; Daito & 
Gifford, 2014; de Jong et al., 2010; Wang, 2014; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014). 
Therefore, the application of LLC approach is one of the most important aspects of 
cost optimization. However, it is also important to recognize that literature still 
shows a lack of empirically-grounded evidence of cost savings from bundling of IP 
tasks, when they are transferred to the private entities4. 
                                                 
4 According to Daito & Gifford (2014), data are limited mostly due to two reasons: 
their long concession durations, and proprietary nature of project data that are necessary for 
conducting such analysis. 
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Since the private sector participates in the development of public infrastructure, 
the optimization of IP’s costs requires to develop conditions encouraging the right 
incentives from the private entities to perform within cost-efficiency goals. There 
are many dimensions which revolve around appropriate incentives. However, from 
the financial perspective, scientific literature mainly emphasizes two incentive 
elements: performance payments or rewards, and risk allocation. 
Literature shows (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Gordon et al., 2013; Parker & 
Hartley, 2003; Saam, 2007; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; Yinglin 
Wang & Liu, 2015) that the incentive payments and bonuses or their opposites, such 
as penalties and abatements, are especially effective and better than fixed payment 
schemes to ensure good performance in terms of outputs, if they are directly linked 
to measurable indicators (e.g. on-time performance, operating cost efficiencies; 
service frequency and reliability, etc.) that are likely to lead to the desired results of 
services. On the other hand, inputs such as increased spending or outputs such as 
more trains and buses, by themselves, are not desirable. Therefore, the details of 
incentives in every IP must be carefully worked out and defined by adequate 
specific indicators; otherwise, if poorly designed, they can lead to substandard 
outcomes and, herewith, a failure to reach optimal costs (Martins et al., 2011; N. 
Wang, 2014). Moreover, beside a complex of conceptually sound indicators, a 
robust process for measuring whether outcome targets are being met is vital, as well 
as an adequate system for reporting results in a timely manner and to the parties 
most interested in optimal performance. Typically, this includes the users of 
infrastructure or service and the public authorities which directly or indirectly are 
financing IP’s implementation (Gordon et al., 2013). 
Other incentive element is risk allocation, which also is crucial for IP’s cost 
optimization (Chou et al., 2012; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; 
Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014). Since it is considered as the third stage in risk 
management (after risk identification and risk analysis and assessment) (Fischer et 
al., 2010; Hwang et al., 2013), obviously risk allocation is a complex task which 
includes a number of aspects from previous stages; therefore, according to Chang 
(2014), Jin & Zhang (2011), Medda (2007), Ng & Loosemore (2007), Parker & 
Hartley (2003), Yin Wang (2015), it is challenging, demanding and one of the most 
pivotal issues in the complex procurement of infrastructure and services. However, 
appropriate risk allocation is also recognized as being critical to a successful long-
term contractual relationship between the PPAs and private entities (Gupta et al., 
2013; Hwang et al., 2013; Yin Wang, 2015). Accordingly, literature is rich in papers 
addressing risk allocation. However, since more attention is paid to uncertainty and 
risk in other parts of this dissertation, only key findings are presented here. They 
allow stating that the entity from which the risk emanates and which is thus best able 
to control it may not always be able to control risk in the most efficient way and at 
the lowest costs (Ke et al., 2010). Therefore, a principle to allocate each of the risks 
to the party best able to manage it at least costs is commonly accepted 
(Alexandersson et al., 2008; Daito & Gifford, 2014; Demirag, Khadaroo, Stapleton, 
& Stevenson, 2011; Desgrées du Lou, 2012; Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2011; 
Gordon et al., 2013; Hwang et al., 2013; Iseki & Houtman, 2012; Jin & Zhang, 
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2011; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; Wang, 2014). In other words, the goal of 
optimal risk allocation is not to transfer as many risks as possible to the private 
sector, but to find a solution which would allow minimizing life cycle costs of IP 
implementation to the entities of both the public and private sectors, because all 
costs have to be covered by the same general public or direct users in the end. 
Additionally, the ability to manage appropriate risk depends on how much of 
information about the risk is held by the party: the more information it holds, the 
better abilities it has to manage it. In the case of symmetric information, risks should 
be shared between the PPA and the private entity depending on their relative risk-
aversion or on their portfolio of tasks. 
Equally important financial aspects related to risk allocation/sharing is the 
optimization of capital structure, which also effects the efficiency of public 
investments and mainly concerns financial sources, ratios of different types of funds 
and the timeframe of fund usage (Cruz & Marques, 2013; Gasiorowski & Moszoro, 
2008; Khmel & Zhao, 2015; Moro Visconti, 2014; Mu et al., 2011; Short, Keasey, 
& Duxbury, 2002; Andreas Wibowo et al., 2012). There are three general categories 
of funds used in financing public infrastructure: public funds, debt and equity. 
Public funds are provided mostly in a form of grants by the central and regional 
governments. Debts can come from state-owned or commercial banks, while equity 
is mostly pure private capital from private entities. Besides, in some special cases, 
such as in the less-developed countries, it can also be funds available from 
international lenders, such as loans from the WB or regional development banks. In 
some countries, as in a case of the EU, there are direct financial contributions 
available in the form of subsidies. There is also an alternative to finance IPs by 
issuing government or project bonds, as well as many variations of sophisticated 
financing instruments can be used. Each of these potential financial sources has its 
own financing costs and appropriate features, and the optimal capital structure has to 
be formed considering them. This suggests that to optimize capital structure, many 
factors should be evaluated when choosing a source of funds and developing the 
financial strategy, allowing to raise the necessary funds for the IP’s implementation 
by minimizing the costs of capital. 
However, money usually comes in along with the development of project life 
cycle, therefore the target capital structure of the IPs can change over time. 
Accordingly, the optimization of capital structure includes the time factor i.e. when 
appropriate money has to come in (Khmel & Zhao, 2015; Mu et al., 2011). For 
example, in the construction period, the IP may be first financed with loans, the 
interest rate of which is typically higher than the interest of loans got in the 
operation period. Therefore, after completing the construction period, refinancing 
can be rational. This illustrates that the optimal capital structuring is a complex 
continuous exercise requiring to assess various available financing schemes. 
Moreover, Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski (2013) conclude that the choice 
of an appropriate financing model is one of the key issues with public investment. 
Since IPs are faced with demand-related uncertainties, risk allocation/sharing 
cannot be rational without the assessment of requirements for financial assistance in 
the form of guarantees, subsidies and other forms of aid the governments can offer 
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to enhance IPs’ financial viability and attractiveness for the private sector (Chen et 
al., 2012; Hanaoka & Palapus, 2012; Huang & Chou, 2006; Khmel & Zhao, 2015; 
Kokkaew & Wipulanusat, 2014; Roll & Verbeke, 1998; Shaoul et al., 2012; Andreas 
Wibowo, 2004). Also, in the case of revenue gathered from direct users, it is not 
rational to save public interest without determining of the excess revenue sharing 
ratio (Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015). Typically, to deal with demand risk, governments 
consider the provision of two types of guarantees: demand or revenue guarantee 
(RG) and loan repayment guarantee (LRG). Asao et al. (2013) describe the RG as 
consisting of two variables: the trigger variable and the compensation mode. They 
define the trigger variable as the state which initiates the guarantee. When a trigger 
variable exceeds a predetermined minimum threshold, the guarantee is activated and 
the compensation from the government is carried out. The trigger variable can be 
classified into three types: annual revenue, cumulative revenue, and profits/internal 
rate of return. The compensation mode is defined as the manner of compensating a 
private entity when required (e.g. a defined tariff is not high enough to make the IP 
financially viable from the perspective of the private entities). This compensation 
mode can also be classified into three types: payment/subsidies, toll, and contract 
period extension. Theoretically, the use of both variables allows getting nine 
different combinations from which the government can choose the most appropriate 
depending on the requirements. However, according to the above-mentioned 
scientists, the combinations of payment-based annual revenue guarantee (PARG) 
and the period-extension-based cumulative revenue guarantee (PCRG) are the most 
widely adopted in practice. They concluded that, since payments are the main issue 
under strict budget constraints, the PCRG, as not requiring paying any monetary 
compensation from the government, is usually preferred. However, the optimal 
solution depends on the government’s return-risk preference. It is also important to 
consider that, due to research limitation, these findings are not robust and require 
further researches. The lower are the possibilities to extend the period (e.g. a 
maximum allowed length of period in long-term agreement between the private and 
public entities can be determined by law), the more PARG becomes the optimal 
option to attract private investments. 
LRG allows making an IP viable from the perspective of financiers, whose cost 
of financing is lower than private capital, but who also have their own expectations 
within the IPs (Khmel & Zhao, 2015; Kurniawan et al., 2015; Zhang, 2014). 
Typically, this includes the insurance of repayment of interest and principal amount 
before the agreement period between the public and private parties ends, which, in 
turn, also determines the final characteristics, content, and payment mechanisms of 
IPs (Shaoul et al., 2012). 
Since the government provides investors with certain RG to reduce the market 
risk taken by them, considering the same principle that benefits one receives should 
be equal to the risks taken, governments have the right to share any excess revenue 
the investors gain equal to the difference between the actual revenue gained by the 
investors and the cap of the expected earnings. Yinglin Wang & Liu (2015) analyzed 
the factors allowing the PPA to determine the optimal sharing ratio of excess 
revenue. Regarding the behavioral theories which suggest that the excess revenue 
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sharing ratio influences the behavior of investors whose efforts to increase the 
efficiency of IP depends on their belief about the fairness of the distribution ratio. 
The afore-mentioned scientists concluded that the optimal excess revenue sharing 
ratio is related to the fairness preferences and the effort cost of the investors. The 
higher fairness preferences are, the lower ratio is considered by the private entity as 
satisfying to put efforts, described by the cost function, for efficiency. However, 
considering the psychological factor, the excess revenue of the investors cannot be 
lower than the amount which the government receives, since the satisfaction and 
investment enthusiasm of the investors has to be ensured. On the other hand, the 
PPA as a representative of the public sector has to prioritize maximizing public 
utility while determining the ratio. Therefore, the determination of optimal 
allocation of excess revenue has to be based on the fairness preferences of the 
investors as well as their effort costs to ensure investors are willing to put high 
efforts, while also maximizing public interest. This requires detailed information 
about the investors’ fairness preferences and effort costs, and considering the earlier-
mentioned P-A problem, it obviously is not an easy task in practice. 
Beside the above-mentioned guarantees, the following forms of guarantees 
offered by governments or their representatives are also found in literature: 
• Restrictive competition, which makes the investor perform in a limited 
form of monopoly with all the following benefits (Bin & Quan, 2012; 
Martins et al., 2011; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; Silvestre, 2012; 
Zitron, 2006); 
• Price adjustment, which makes the IP viable in terms of financial 
viability and profitability (Hanák & Muchová, 2015; Qiu & Wang, 
2011; Xu et al., 2012); 
• Exchange rate and interest rate, which reduce uncertainty related to the 
costs of currency exchange and interest rate (Du & Li, 2008; Hanaoka 
& Palapus, 2012); 
• Tax relief, which, at least temporarily, exempts the investor from 
taxation and, therefore, results in cost reduction (B. L. Chen et al., 
2012); 
• Land lease, which means the allotment of land for the implementation 
of IP under preferential terms (Chen et al., 2012; Yinglin Wang & Liu, 
2015), etc.; 
However, all of these guarantees are primarily designed not for cost-efficiency, 
but to increase the investors’ willingness to invest as well as enhance credit 
worthiness of the IP facing high revenue risks (Roll & Verbeke, 1998). Therefore, 
since they are not without costs to the public sector and society, the provision of 
these guarantees always has to be assessed considering the VfM approach. 
The analysis of all the above-mentioned financial aspects allows concluding 
that the optimization of investments in public infrastructure is focused on the total 
cost-efficiency including three main aspects: determination of optimal capital 
structure, choice of alternative of IP’s implementation characterized by minimal life-
cycle costs, and optimal sharing/allocation of risks between the public and private 
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parties. The later one, through the appropriate incentives, enables the PPA to 
maximize public interests. 
The private sector can significantly contribute to the efficiency of the 
objectives. Therefore, the factors stimulating collaboration between the public and 
private sectors are more extensively analyzed in the following part of this 
dissertation. 
1.1.2. Factors encouraging collaboration between the public and private 
sectors 
Considering the existing phenomenon of collaboration between the public and 
private sectors, it is relevant to analyze the factors encouraging these two parties to 
collaborate. The analysis is divided into two sections: the first one is intended to 
analyze the factors from the perspective of the public sector, while the second one 
from the perspective of the private sector. 
1.1.2.1. Factors encouraging the public sector to go into partnership with the 
private sector 
Historically, the provision of infrastructure has been the government’s 
monopoly. But with the problems of high re-investment costs to replace or 
modernize the ageing infrastructure which result in an increasing gap between a 
growing demand for public services and infrastructure and resources available for 
government to finance it, private investments have emerged as a preferred mode of 
financing public infrastructure. Many scientists (de Jong et al., 2010; Giedraitytė & 
Raipa, 2012; Grubišić Šeba et al., 2014; Gudelis & Rozenbergaitė, 2004; Mota & 
Moreira, 2015; Olalekan & Hashim, 2014; Percoco, 2014; Sambrani, 2014; 
Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 2013; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014) 
emphasize a shortage of public funds to address the infrastructural needs and 
unanimously state that it is highly difficult and often impossible by governments to 
bring together all the infrastructure elements depending on their resources. In such 
cases, borrowing is often seen as one of the easiest methods for governments to 
cover the budget deficit and collect the necessary financing needed for the 
development of public infrastructure. However, these attempts cannot be seen as 
separate from the state fiscal and monetary policy (Karazijiene, 2009). Therefore, 
since the debt level is growing in many countries, borrowing for public investments 
is becoming a serious issue, especially in countries where the level of budget deficit 
and borrowing is restricted by artificial rules e.g. SGP in the EU5 (European 
Commission, 2014c). A survey combining the afore-mentioned fiscal constraints 
and publicly available local budgetary data revealed that the room for budgetary 
capital investments is rather small in a significant part of the EU countries. To look 
                                                 
5 The EU Treaty defines an excessive budget deficit as one greater than 3% of GDP. 
Public debt is considered excessive under the Treaty if it exceeds 60% of GDP without 
diminishing at an adequate rate (defined as a decrease of the excess debt by 5% per year on 
average over three years). Available on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm 
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further, there are unexceptional cases when cities and municipalities cannot even 
cover their current expenditures with regular public revenues collected from taxes 
and administrative fees6. Therefore, the lack of budgetary funds is the predominant 
reason for the involvement of the private sector in the provision of public 
infrastructure. The private sector can provide access to substantial capital and 
optimal financial structuring, and, in turn, can speed up the necessary investments. 
Another highly important motivation to increase the use of private entities is the 
expectation of LCC savings in delivering infrastructure and services, since private 
participation is able to improve efficiency through the introduction of incentives to 
reduce wasteful costs and collect revenues. Although some studies claim that there 
is no significant difference between public and private investments regarding 
efficiency (Daito & Gifford, 2014), most of scientists (Čiarnienė & Vienažindienė, 
2005; Kateja, 2012; Mota & Moreira, 2015) state that private participation can 
provide higher efficiency and substantial welfare gains, i.e. better VFM.  
Besides a lack of sufficient financial resources and objectives to increase the 
use of their efficiency, there are also plenty of non-financial factors encouraging the 
private sector’s involvement in the provision of public infrastructure. Among these, 
there is the lack of the capacity in the public sector in respect of both quantity and 
quality of manpower to deliver a vast amount of infrastructure (Sambrani, 2014). 
Private entities coming to the partnership, beside the additional workforce, can bring 
many other motivations to collaborate, described by Desgrées du Lou (2012), 
Giedraitytė & Raipa (2012), Mu et al. (2011), Xu et al. (2012), Zangoueinezhad & 
Azar (2014), such as specific expertise and experience; they can provide creativity 
and appropriate technological innovation, which enhance the government’s abilities 
to maximize added-value of the IP, herewith reducing the risks borne by the 
government, since a part of the risks, e.g. construction, availability, technological, 
management, financing etc. can be transferred to the private entities.  
The above-mentioned factors allow summarizing that the spectrum of reasons 
to collaborate with the private sector is very wide. However, without denying the 
importance of other factors, financial ones, such as the possibility to get additional 
financing and achieve higher LCC efficiency, are predominant in literature for the 
involvement of the private sector in the provision of public infrastructure. 
1.1.2.2. Factors encouraging private subjects to participate in partnerships 
with the public sector 
Scientific literature on the factors encouraging private subjects to participate in 
long-term contractual relationships with the public sector in the development of 
public infrastructure is scarce and, in this regard, disclosing an important, but, 
nonetheless, only a supporting role of the private entities in the decision to launch a 
program of collaboration between the public and private entities. Therefore, the 
factors related with the incentive of the private entities to participate in such 
                                                 
6 There are basically two mechanisms for funding the development of public 
infrastructure: public budget that eventually is supported by tax payers, and direct charges to 
users (Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016). 
44 
relationships can be analyzed more from the perspective of interest of general 
business rather than from something specific arising from these relationships. 
Accordingly, since the shift of investment policy towards private provision has 
opened the market for the private capital to participate in sectors traditionally 
considered as a domain of the public sector, it provided private actors with an 
enlarged market. Normally, the private entities utilize their professional skills and 
competence, selling them at a profit. Therefore, the enhanced opportunities to 
collaborate with the public sector also provide private entities with more 
possibilities to make a profit. 
Moreover, considering the above-mentioned guarantees provided by the 
governments to encourage incentives of the private entities to participate in the 
provision of public infrastructure, long-term contractual relationships with the public 
sector can be considered as relatively less-risky investments from the perspective of 
the private sector. They often provide a long-term return, while most risks can be 
sub-contracted (Mu et al., 2011). In contrast to the conventional business IPs, here 
the private entities are exposed to market risks only to a limited extent (e.g., 
governments can ensure a part of revenue by purchasing a predetermined quantity of 
services or award the private entities with an exceptional right to provide monopoly 
services). Moreover, the demand for public infrastructure and services is usually 
quite stable, while the scope of IPs can be significantly more extensive than in the 
case of commercial IPs. The public sector also has higher credit rating due to lower 
credit risk. Therefore, these investments are especially attractive for those investors 
who are focused on investments emphasized by relatively lower profitability but 
stable revenue stream over many years.  
In summary, the main incentives of the private entities to participate in 
long-term contractual relationships for developing public infrastructure and services 
are focused on pure financial aspects and, primarily, one more possibility to get a 
profit. This shows that to make investment in public infrastructure attractive for the 
private sector, the key efforts should be concentrated on developing conditions 
which could increase the financial viability of IPs and ensure a reasonable profit in a 
market. 
1.1.3. Conception of evaluating the private sector’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure 
According to Buškevičiūtė & Raipa (2011), in modern society, 
decision-making stands out in one important aspect, i.e. the use of analytical models 
and methodologies which are intended to streamline decisions. The conception of a 
good decision is usually identified with efficiency, effectiveness, rationality and 
optimality. All of them are widely used within the context of public investments, 
although not always exactly according to their definitions. However, in scientific 
literature, the attention to purifying their interpretation is also comparatively low; 
sometimes they are mistakenly used as synonyms, especially the concepts of 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
In general, efficiency is considered as the state of being able to accomplish 
something with the least waste of materials, energy, efforts, money, and time i.e. 
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having competency in performance. Accordingly, efficiency regarding public 
investments should be considered from the perspective of LLC: construction, 
operation and maintenance costs need to be taken into account (Hanák & Muchová, 
2015). The effectiveness of investments is considered to be the degree to which 
objectives of IP are achieved or the extent to which the targeted problems are solved 
by implementing investments. In contrast to efficiency, effectiveness is determined 
without reference to costs. Effectiveness means ‘implementing right investments’, 
whereas efficiency means ‘implementing investment right’. The concept of 
rationality is mostly related to the means which are used to decide the most efficient 
alternative of investment implementation and the implementation of the investments 
itself. It refers to the state of being reasonable, based on facts or reasons. Combining 
all three concepts, efficiency in the public sector is considered as an efficient 
investment policy, efficient and effective decisions for its implementation, rational 
use of public resources and effective performance results. Therefore, one of the most 
important priorities in the public sector is as efficient and rational use of resources as 
possible (Carbonara & Pellegrino, 2014; Gordon et al., 2013; Janssen et al., 2016; 
Kateja, 2012).  
This, in turn, requires rational behavior. According to Buškevičiūtė & Raipa 
(2011), rational behavior is a criterion of efficiency. Being efficient means to choose 
the shortest way and the cheapest means to achieve the desired goal. An efficient 
decision is identified with being implemented on time and impartially, considering 
public interests, rationality, efficient allocation of resources, minimal costs, also 
ensuring openness and transparency of its making and solving the problem fully 
with regards to the determined goals. Therefore, the concept of efficiency is 
concurrent with the assessment of alternative means used to achieve appropriate 
goals. The assessment of alternatives is usually based on measuring the ratio 
between inputs and outputs, efforts and results, expense and revenues, benefits and 
costs. Here, the last of the above-mentioned concepts, optimality can be defined, 
which is considered to be the state of having the maximized ratio between benefits 
and costs. However, unlike efficiency, this concept, having a link with rationality, 
additionally includes the aspects of affordability and viability, since the most 
beneficial alternative should also be financially affordable and financially, legally, 
technically, etc. viable to be implemented in practice. 
Figure 1.1. discloses the context in which the concept of optimization regarding 
the research topic has been developed accordingly. As it is shown, optimization as a 
process is based on an integrated implementation of the concepts of efficiency, 
effectiveness, rationality and affordability. Their specific application in the context 
of public investments where optimization is identified with financial and economic 
aspects of investments’ implementation as well as matching of different interests of 
the public and private entities determines that in this dissertation the optimization of 
public investments is considered as the comparative assessment of all available 
options of investments’ implementation in order to find the optimal one, i.e. an 
affordable and viable option providing the highest ratio of benefits and costs (VfM) 
for the public sector. 
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• Strategic level - based on 
econometric calculation, 
focused on selection of the 
most productive sectors for 
investment and formation of 
sectorial investment portfolios 
• Operational level - social-
economic VfM maximization 
of the IPs.
Economic aspects
Financial aspects
• Determination of optimal 
capital structure.
• Choice of IP implementation 
alternative with minimal life-
cycle costs.
• Optimal sharing/allocation of 
risks between the public and 
private parties.
Factors motivating the Pu. S.
• Long-term contractual 
relations -lower-risk 
investments
• Profit 
OPTIMIZATION
• Gap between growing 
demand for public services 
and infrastructure and 
resources available with 
government to finance it, 
• LLC savings and efficiency.
• Innovation, know-how and 
other non-financial factors 
Factors motivating the Pr. S.
Theoretcal relations 
between the concepts
Motivation factors for 
collaboration
Aspects of optimization in the 
context of the research topic
Figure 1.1. Context of the concept of optimization regarding the research topic 
(prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Beside the CP, the long-term cooperation with private entities is also one of the 
alternatives which is rational to assess for the purpose of optimizing public 
investments. In the section above, multiple factors encouraging the private sector to 
get involved in the provision of public infrastructure show the potentiality of private 
entities to provide additional benefits to the public sector. However, private entities 
also have their own expectations, which can result in higher costs for the public 
sector. Therefore, rational behavior requires an ex-ante assessment of the private 
sector’s possibility to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
Since private participation is an available alternative, firstly, the traditional 
option of the public sector needs to be assessed in order to evaluate additional 
benefits and costs, which may arise due to the participation of private entities. Then, 
different collaboration models and schemes have to be compared, among which the 
most beneficial with the available resources can be compared against the best 
conventional option. In theory, it is logical to go into a long-term partnership with 
private entities, if the comparative results of both options are in favor of the private 
one; otherwise, if public budget is available, the conventional option of public 
investments’ implementation is the optimal solution7 (Ball, 2011; Fernandes et al., 
2015; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Gupta et al., 2013; 
                                                 
7 The availability factor determines the most critics on this method presented above; 
however, it is discussed in more detail in Section 1.3.1. 
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Khadaroo, 2008; Tsamboulas et al., 2013; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 
2016; Yin Wang, 2015). 
All of the above-analyzed factors of investment optimization allow defining the 
concept of the evaluation of the private sector’s possibilities to optimize investments 
in public infrastructure as the comparison of the best available options of both the 
conventional implementation of investments and one with the private entity in a 
long-term relationship, the results of which, considering the financial possibilities of 
the PPA and other restrictions, allow making rational decisions for the optimal 
option of investment implementation in public infrastructure. 
Accordingly, the next section of this dissertation presents the theoretical 
analysis of the PPP as a possibility to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
1.2. PPP as a possibility to optimize investments in public infrastructure 
The PPP is globally accepted as a potential alternative to the traditional way of 
implementing public investments as well as delivering public infrastructure and 
services by the public sector alone. Thus, this section begins the analysis of PPP as a 
theoretical possibility to optimize investments in public infrastructure with an 
analysis of PPP conception and definition. Further, the evolution of PPP is shortly 
reviewed and a comparative analysis of its forms and schemes mostly used for 
collaboration between the public and private entities is provided. Later, the 
advantages and disadvantages of PPP against CP are analyzed. Finally, the structure 
of PPP is described, and the interests and expectations of all parties are reviewed.  
1.2.1. The conception and definition of PPP 
The concept of PPP is not consensual. The uncertainty regarding the concept is 
primarily determined by a broad content of the very word ‘partnership’, under which 
lie dozens of collaboration forms and mechanisms especially in the last two decades 
appeared. Dūda (2010) has identified five different groups of PPP conceptions: 
• PPP as institutionalized cooperation between the public and private 
sectors for a joint delivery of public goods and sharing all the risks 
involved; 
• PPP as long-term infrastructure IPs, in which strict requirements for the 
outcome of the contract are determined; 
• PPP as the public policy and management networks, which emphasize 
free mutual relationships of stakeholders; 
• PPP as the development of civil society and sociality; 
• PPP as urban renewal and economic development. 
Each of these coherently-mentioned conceptions emphasizes a gradually 
widening approach to the relationship of the public and private sectors and herewith 
complement each other. They reveal the aspects of cooperation, mutual interest, 
durability, risk allocation, benefit sharing and others that allow to primarily perceive 
PPP as a complex multidimensional phenomenon, which is also emphasized by 
many scientists (Ball, 2011; De Clerck & Demeulemeester, 2015; Desgrées du Lou, 
2012; Janssen et al., 2016; Kokkaew & Wipulanusat, 2014; Martins et al., 2011; 
Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; Shaoul et al., 2012; Felix; Villalba-Romero & 
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Liyanage, 2016; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014). Kavaliauskaitė & Jucevičius 
(2009), and Urbonavicius (2010) also provide an appropriate classification of 
conceptions, depending on their scope. They conclude that some of the conceptions 
are very broad, i.e. when on a contract, privilege and grant basis the public and 
private sectors decide on the relatively short-term and very specific purpose to 
provide public goods or services, organized by public authorities, provided by 
private entities and funded by tax payers or/and paid with the direct charges from 
users. In other case, PPPs can be considered as complex infrastructure IPs, 
terminated by a certain type of their privatization. However, the narrowest and most 
accurate group of PPP conceptions includes innovative ways of developing public 
services and infrastructure. This discloses the broad nature of PPP conception and 
allows stating that the PPP fills the space between pure public provision on the one 
hand, and outsourcing or total privatization on  the other hand, which embodies a 
broad range of possible applications. 
The existence of many conceptions determines that the scope of PPP 
conception is still a subject to considerable debate. It should be mentioned that the 
terminology in respect of PPP is also not consensual. There are many alternative 
names for PPP: 
• Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is a term originating in the Great 
Britain, and now also used in Japan and Malaysia. It is also considered, 
as it is revealed in the following section of this dissertation, as a certain 
form of PPP; 
• Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) is a term used by the WB 
and rarely met outside the development-financing sector; 
• Privately-financed Projects (PFP) is a term used in Australia; 
• Private-Sector Participation (PSP) is a term used in the development-
banking sector; 
• P3 is an acronym mostly used in the US and Canada. 
However, PPP and ‘Public-Private Partnership’, originating in the UK, are the 
umbrella acronym and term covering all the above-mentioned names, respectively. 
They became popular in the early 1990’s (Babatunde et al., 2015; Bernardino et al., 
2010; Khadaroo, 2008; Parker & Hartley, 2003; Pauliukevičiūtė, 2010; Shaoul, 
2011; Urbonavicius, 2010) and generally have been used to define a wide range of 
working relationships between the public and private sectors ranging from an 
informal dialogue to a complex service agreement to design, finance, build, operate 
and maintain public infrastructure. 
In a broad sense, the PPP is considered as cooperation between the public and 
private sectors for providing public services and/or implementing the IPs of public 
infrastructure. However, the absence of unanimous conceptions of PPP also 
complicates various attempts to develop a univocal and unchallenged definition of 
PPP which would be more precise. Moreover, there are multiple PPP models and 
schemes that change from country to country, are applied to different sectors of 
activity, which, in turn, creates additional difficulties in establishing a universally 
accepted definition (Liu et al., 2015; Mota & Moreira, 2015). The approach to PPP 
also varies in every country, depending on the settled relationship between the 
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public and private sectors and developed legal framework determining economic 
sectors, activities, forms and schemes available for their cooperation8 as well as 
other aspects of PPP’s implementation (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Viegas, 2010). All 
the above-mentioned reasons determine the existence of dozens of PPP definitions 
across the practical guides and scientific literature.  
Appendix 1 provides a list of PPP definitions found in scientific literature. 
Their content analysis disclosed that PPP is mostly defined through such keywords 
as long-term partnership and cooperation, contractual agreements, transferring the 
delivery of infrastructure and services to the private sector, and risk sharing and 
allocation. There are also such keywords as financing, delegation of functions, 
innovation, competence, expertise, procurement and some others, however, they are 
used relatively less frequently. These results allow emphasizing the following 
common aspects related to the definition of PPP. 
One of the most important aspects is naming the public and private sectors as 
cooperating partners (Roll & Verbeke, 1998; Rudžianskaitė–Kvaraciejienė, 
Apanavičienė, & Gelžinis, 2015; Urbonavicius, 2010; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & 
Trojanowski, 2013; Xu et al., 2012; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014). They are 
divided into the public partner and the private partner, respectively. The public 
partner is responsible for the assurance of public infrastructure and services for a 
society and seeks welfare maximization. While the private partner is a business 
entity to which, depending on the form of PPP, appropriate tasks are transferred in 
return for periodic payments from the public budget or/and the possibility to earn 
from the revenue gathered from direct users for the provision of services. Different 
purposes of these entities, as discussed in Section 1.1.2., lead to a conflict of interest. 
According to Bao et al. (2014), Carbonara et al. (2014), Hanaoka & Palapus (2012), 
Yu & Lam (2013), and Spackman (2002), although before signing the agreement the 
public entity usually has greater bargaining power to make good decisions for itself, 
the private entity also has to be offered such conditions of collaboration which are 
attractive and encourage to participate in the PPP. Therefore, most definitions 
emphasize the aspect of mutual (contractual) agreement, based on which the benefits 
and risks for both partners are allocated (Ashuri et al., 2012; Gordon et al., 2013; 
Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Gudelis & Rozenbergaitė, 2004; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Mu et 
al., 2011; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Roehrich et al., 2014; Rudžianskaitė–
Kvaraciejienė et al., 2015; Sambrani, 2014; Sharma, 2007; Tamosiunas & 
Zilakauskyte, 2010; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; Xu et al., 2012). 
According to Kurniawan et al. (2015), Li, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle (2005), 
Sambrani (2014), Zhang (2014), only mutual beneficial PPP can be successfully 
implemented due to the synergy effect. Therefore, the cooperation aspect of the PPP 
concept is crucial in its definition. 
Regarding the definitions of PPP, great attention is also paid to determine the 
cooperation period which is characterized as long-term (Carbonara et al., 2014; 
Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Roehrich et al., 2014; Rudžianskaitė–Kvaraciejienė et al., 
2015; Shaoul et al., 2012; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014; Xueqing Zhang, 2011). A 
                                                 
8 What is considered PPP in one countries can be not considered in others. 
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PPP lasts on average 20–30 years (Cruz & Marques, 2013; Qiu & Wang, 2011; 
Wang, 2014; Zhang, 2014); however, according to Viegas (2010), there are also 
examples of PPP agreements which cover a period of 60 or even 99 years. A long 
period is usually required to make the IP financially viable. However, this aspect 
also suggests that due to the difficulties to objectively foresee all possible changes 
which may occur during the planned period of PPP, the contracting of PPP is a 
challenging process. 
The aspect of risk transferring to the private partner or its sharing and allocation 
between the public and private partners is also often emphasized (Molen et al., 2010; 
Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Roehrich et al., 2014; Sambrani, 2014; Sharma, 2007; 
Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014). This 
allows stating that transferring a part of risks to the private entity, at least that 
associated to building and maintenance of public infrastructure and provision of 
public services, is considered an integral characteristic of PPP. Moreover, the 
definitions also disclose that beside the transfer of risks, the PPA also can expect to 
get better financial accessibility in the PPP, as well as specific private partner’s 
knowledge and to be provided with innovations, which, in turn, highlight the aspect 
of public sector’s reform. 
Beside risk sharing and allocation, the aspect of investments needed to be 
financed from the private partner in the PPP are also frequently mentioned (Liu et 
al., 2015; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Roll & Verbeke, 1998). This indicates that 
private capital participation in the development of public infrastructure is one of the 
integral features of PPP. However, this is not a strict rule, e.g. a particular type of 
management contracts, in which the private entity does not provide capital 
investments, are also sometimes considered as a form of PPP (de Jong et al., 2010; 
Devapriya, 2006). However, due to the same characteristics, this attribution of 
management and similar contracts is more prevailing in the scientific literature, 
where different forms of PPP are analyzed considering different allocation of risk 
between the public and private entities than those in legal documents. 
Many authors (Ahmed & Ali, 2006; Dūda, 2010; Hellowell, 2013; Khadaroo, 
2008; Valila, 2005) emphasize that the PPP is becoming an important means for 
reforming the public sector and transforming it according to the principles of the 
market. The public entity, cooperating with the private partner and absorbing its 
experience, can learn to perform more efficiently and use the acquired competence 
in other fields of the public sector. In this way, the development of PPP affects not 
only the sector where it is implemented but also may indirectly contribute to the 
total efficiency growth of the public sector. 
Considering all the above-mentioned aspects revealed in the definitions of PPP, 
the author of this dissertation generally defines PPP as a long-term contractual 
cooperation between entities of the public and private sectors, based on which the 
provision of public infrastructure and services is transferred to the private partner 
by rationally using each of the partners’ competences and optimally allocating 
resources, costs, risks and benefits; due to the transfer of the private sector’s 
knowledge, innovation and experience, creating possibilities for higher efficiency of 
these public infrastructure and services’ provision. Such definition precisely 
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describes the nature of PPP; however, due to the above-mentioned complexity it can 
be not accurate in all cases. This, according to Viegas (2010), is a problem of all 
definitions of PPP. 
Therefore, instead of trying to find a unanimous definition of PPP, many 
researchers concentrate more on the description of its forms and their features. Some 
scientists simply describe the PPP as one alternative structure or tool for 
implementing IP’s public infrastructure and services, i.e. the mid-way between the 
CP and outsourcing or privatization9 (Karlavičius, Karlavičienė, & Grigonienė, 
2006; Skietrys & Raipa, 2009; Yin Wang, 2015). Hall (2008) generally doubts the 
existence of PPP as an independent form of public infrastructure and services’ 
provision. According to Dunn-Cavelty & Suter (2009), and Parker & Hartley (2003), 
the title of PPP appeared in use in the UK as a softer alternative for compromised 
privatization in order to mitigate the negative reaction of society to the aims of 
Margaret Thatcher’s investment policy to attract the private sector to participate in 
the provision and development of public infrastructure and services. Despite the 
different idea and content of PPP, it was defined as a specifically flexible form of 
privatization which can become a convenient means to mask the actual goals of 
governments, i.e. privatization, decrease of the public sector and contribution to the 
private suppliers by, in most of cases, transferring them the provision of monopoly 
services. There is an agreement that the PPP has some elements of privatization; 
however, generally it cannot be identified with it for the following reasons: 
• In the PPP, the public asset is not sold, but only transferred to the 
private entity to manage and operate it for a determined period. At the 
end of the period, the fully operational asset is transferred back to the 
host government, usually at nominal or no cost10. 
• In PPP agreements, public responsibility is still retained, i.e. the PPA, 
as a distinction from privatization, can influence the process of public 
services’ provision, control the performance of tasks transferred to the 
private partner and determine the main service standards. 
• The public sector, even in the absence of direct participation in the 
provision, is responsible for the public infrastructure and services 
provided in the PPP. Therefore, the PPP can be applied for the 
provision of monopolistic services. 
All the above-mentioned reasons allow stating that the main distinctions of PPP 
compared to outsourcing or privatization assert in the preservation of the public 
sector’s influence on the decision-making and property rights, which, as leverage of 
power, can be used to defend public interest in the PPP. Herewith, they can be 
identified as significant characteristics of PPP. In addition to these, various scientists 
                                                 
9 Outsourcing and privatization are different policies to provide the public infrastructure and 
services. In comparison with traditional procurement from the perspective of possible-to-
transfer activities, both are at the opposite sides of the spectrum. 
10 In PPP-based economic interest, a newly built infrastructure can also be left for the private 
entity at the end of the cooperation period, if this was agreed between the parties before 
signing the PPP contract. 
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(Benito et al., 2008; Bernardino et al., 2010; Karlavičius et al., 2006; Ke et al., 2008; 
Lawther & Martin, 2005; Li et al., 2005; Macário, 2010a, 2010b; Meunier & Quinet, 
2010; Reeves, 2005; Urbonavicius, 2010; Wang, 2014; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & 
Trojanowski, 2013), as well as the (European Commission Directorate General 
Regional Policy, 2003) also highlight the following general characteristics of PPP: 
• It involves several participants, among which one is a public entity and 
another one is a private entity in a long-term relationship; 
• Multiple tasks are integrated in one contract. Such tasks as design, 
construction, maintenance, operation are integrated in one contract; 
• Along with the integration of multiple tasks, there is a substantial 
transfer of risks to the private party, e.g. the risks of cost overrun, 
delays in construction, weight of operational and maintenance 
expenditures, availability to use, etc. may be transferred to the private 
party. This distinguishes the PPP from more traditional forms of 
procurement, when most of the risks are borne by the public party. 
However, this also does not necessarily mean that the private party 
assumes all the risks in PPPs. In a PPP, risks are allocated between the 
public and private parties case by case that, in turn, determines which 
of the parties will own the developed assets, what are the liabilities of 
all parties, the restrictions in operation and guaranties for the private 
party. 
• The private partner is responsible not only for delivering the asset, but 
also for providing the appropriate services during the contractual 
period. The PPA determines the quality standards, quantitative 
requirements, pricing policy, etc. of the services provided as well as 
monitors and controls the results of their realization. 
• Only the results of services are purchased, i.e. a process is established, 
which enables to provide the necessary and conditioned services over 
the entire life cycle of the IP. The private partner undertakes the design 
and construction of an asset based on the output specification prepared 
by the procurer and designed to meet broad performance targets.  
• At least partly, investments are financed by private capital, while all 
financing for the IP can be raised by means of complex arrangements 
between various players from the private sector, such as investors, 
banks, pension and insurance funds, EU structural funds, international 
donors, etc. However, public funds, in some cases rather substantial, 
may also complement the private funds. 
• Despite different interests, the communication between the PPA and 
the private partner is based on collaboration and partnership, not 
confrontation. Both partners have wide discretion, but work 
harmoniously. 
Each of these characteristics complements and elaborates the earlier-provided 
definition of PPP. Their generalization allows stating that each partner plays an 
important role in the achievement of common goals of PPP. This is visible in the 
invested both tangible and intangible resources as well as mutual intentions to 
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cooperate and compromise, which is the essence of partnership. In a mutually 
beneficial relationship based on rational allocation of risks, which efficiently uses 
the competences of each party, the tasks are performed efficiently and the 
predetermined results are achieved. 
Since the main features of PPP have already been analyzed, the key differences 
between CP and PPPs are explained in Table 1.1 for a comprehensive disclosure of 
PPP conception. These differences determine the advantages of PPP against CP, 
which are analyzed in Section 1.2.3. 
Table 1.1 A comparison of CP and PPP (prepared according to Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2008; HM Treasury, 2012) 
CP PPPs 
Short-term design and construction 
contracts. The PPA manages multiple 
contracts over the life of the facility 
One long-term contract (usually 15–30 years) 
integrating design, building, finance and maintenance 
of the facility. 
Purchase of an infrastructure asset Purchases of services and availability of infrastructure 
Requirements tend to be specified on an 
input basis. 
Requirements are specified as outputs to maximize 
private sector innovation. 
The government operates the facility The government may or may not operate the facility 
The PPA usually holds the risk on 
construction delays and cost overruns. 
The private sector party holds the risk of construction 
delays and cost overruns to provide incentives for 
delivery to time and to cost. 
The PPA pays the costs of construction, 
maintenance and services as they arise. 
All costs are included in a “unitary” payment which is 
fixed and inflation-adjusted over the life of the contract 
and is not payable until construction is complete and 
services have commenced to an agreed standard. 
The PPA pays the capital costs at the 
beginning of the project through capital 
budget. 
The capital costs of construction are financed by the 
private sector borrower, and the costs are amortized 
over the life of the project. 
Borrowing is financed through the 
issuance of government gilts, managed 
on a government portfolio basis. 
Borrowing is financed by the private sector on a 
project-by-project basis. 
Payment for maintenance and services is 
not generally linked to performance. 
The unitary charge payments are linked to a 
performance regime. Deductions may be made if 
services are not delivered to contractual requirements. 
There is no long-term contractual 
commitment for the provision of 
maintenance. Authorities can flex their 
requirements and the costs of 
maintenance. Only a small number of 
authorities put in place planned 
maintenance regimes. 
The public sector pays for ongoing maintenance and 
life cycle replacement costs as part of the annual 
unitary charge, and the costs are, therefore, smoothed 
across the contract term. This means that the asset is 
appropriately maintained over the project’s life, but the 
costs of maintenance are effectively locked in over this 
period. 
 
The analysis of PPP’s conception and definition has explained its essence, 
content and differences from the CP. However, this analysis is not sufficient to 
reveal all details associated with the differences between the main forms of the 
public and private sectors’ cooperation in PPPs. Therefore, to further analyze the 
PPP as a possibility to optimize investment in public infrastructure, it is relevant to 
analyze its development and main forms. 
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1.2.2. Development and forms of PPP 
Although the concept of using private capital to provide public infrastructure 
facilities and services is not new anymore11, the intense development of PPP and its 
application in the public sector, which resulted in a significant increase in the 
volume and number of PPPs across the globe, has started only since the early 1990s, 
when the UK had developed a systematic program of PPP (Babatunde et al., 2015; 
N. Wang, 2014). For years, the prevalence of PPP was limited and its potential was 
not envisaged until 1979, when the elected conservative government with Margaret 
Thatcher ahead started to implement a new policy of public infrastructure and 
services’ provision. This policy emphasized the changed preferences of politicians 
about the proper role of government, resulted in a reduction of the public sector’s 
size, and an increase of the private sector’s role in the delivery of public 
infrastructure and service, including the participation of a private equity (Baker & 
Burdman, 1996; Lawther & Martin, 2005; Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015; Whiting, 
2013). 
The main drive12 to attract private capital into the provision of public 
infrastructure and services was government’s need to control public spending and 
deficit of the budget. For this purpose, in 1981, the so-called “Ryrie Rules” were 
issued13, which, according to (Clark & Root, 1999; Hall, 1998; Heald, 1997) 
determined that: 
1. decisions to provide public funds for investment have be taken under 
conditions of fair competition with private sector borrowers, which in 
turn, means that private finance could only be used if there were no 
favorable risk terms, such as government guarantees or commitments, 
or monopoly power, schemes offering investors a degree of security 
greater than that available on private sector’s IPs; 
2. such IPs should yield benefits in terms of improved efficiency and 
profit from additional investment commensurate with the cost of 
raising risk capital from financial markets;  
3. public expenditure would be reduced in comparison with the 
hypothetical PSC, even if budget constraints would mean that the 
public sector’s alternative would not be feasible. 
All the above-mentioned conditions were determined upholding the view that 
there is little macroeconomic difference between government borrowing from the 
market to finance public expenditure, generally, and the private sector borrowing 
for, essentially, IPs, the primary objective of the Ryrie Rules was to stop the 
ministers from insulating private finance from risk so that it could be used to 
                                                 
11 See Section 1.1.1 
12 Among other aspects encouraging the public sector to go into a long-term partnership with 
the private sector, provided in Section 1.1.2.1 
13 These rules were named after Sir William Ryrie, Chair of the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC) Working Party that formulated the ‘Report of the NEDC 
Working Party on Nationalized Industries Investment’. The Report defined the terms on 
which private capital could be used in nationalized industries in the 1980s. 
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circumvent public expenditure constraints. Practically, investments into public 
infrastructure could be implemented in a way of CP, only if the results of VfM 
assessment for PPP implementation were not in favor of this route. However, despite 
the significantly higher cost of private finance, the vast majority of assessed IPs was 
found to be in favor of the PPP option. Accordingly, this disclosed that PPAs are 
subject and biased towards the PPP methods as well as VfM assessment is subject to 
manipulation and financial assessment; more specifically, it is unlikely to be 
fundamentally sound. Therefore, since all assumptions used in the VfM assessment 
which favor PFI could not be based on objective and high-quality evidence, the 
support of Ryrie Rules started to gradually decrease until it was abolished in two 
stages in 1989 and 1992 so that VfM assessment would no longer be required, if 
either the IP could be financed with user charges or there was no real possibility to 
implement the IP by using public resources (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Hall, 1998). 
Nevertheless, it was the increasingly growing general understanding that the 
private sector can offer better VfM in the provision of public infrastructure and 
services. In addition, a lack of government budget to finance all infrastructural needs 
has encouraged the incentives to look for non-governmental resources, i.e. the 
private capital. Therefore, to attract additional financing, in 1992 the PFI was 
initiated. It introduced “Universal Testing Rules”, according to which every IP had 
to be tested against the PFI before being allowed to be implemented in a 
conventional way. This encouraged to start many PFI IPs; however, the application 
of UTR has been also widely criticized for clogging the system and delaying the 
approval for important IPs. Moreover, at that moment, the legislation for private 
participation in the provision of public services had not been clearly defined yet. 
Therefore, the incoming Labor government abandoned the UTR, and introduced a 
new and now globally well-known concept of PPP in 2000, primarily based on a 
mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation between the private and public sectors 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Gudelis & Rozenbergaitė, 2004). 
In parallel, however, at different speed and lower scope, the collaboration 
between the public and private sector has also developed in other countries. Many 
scientists (Acerete et al., 2011; Ball, 2011; Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2008; Benito 
et al., 2008; Bernardino et al., 2010; Burke & Demirag, 2015; Carbonara & 
Pellegrino, 2014; de Jong et al., 2010; English & Guthrie, 2003; Galilea & Medda, 
2010; Gudelis & Rozenbergaitė, 2004; Gupta et al., 2013; Harada & Ogunlan, 2015; 
Hwang et al., 2013; Yescombe, 2007; Mu et al., 2011; Sambrani, 2014; Šutavičienė, 
2011b; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 2013) analyzed the practical 
experience of PPP implementation and development in the UK, the USA, Australia, 
France, South Korea, Spain, Poland, India, Germany, Belgium, China, Singapore, 
Japan, Italy, South Africa and other countries. Their review disclosed that there is no 
unique PPP implementation framework among the countries. In every country PPPs 
tend to be structured and performed case-by-case, while the very process is 
influenced by various economic, financial, legal, institutional, political and other 
factors, due to which it is complicated to generalize the framework. However, a 
tendency was observed that the transport sector and the road sector, more 
specifically, was one of the first which involved private participation more 
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extensively. Over time, many countries have also established the PPP units (World 
bank, 2016a), the overall objectives of which were to be an integral part in 
developing and implementing the policy and regulatory reforms as well as building 
the institutional, legal and social foundation needed to enable, promote and facilitate 
efficient and sustainable private investments in public infrastructure. Their 
importance is still growing, since a tendency is observed to centralize the process of 
PPP implementation because the development of PPP’s skills and competence in all 
public institutions requires more public resources and, therefore, tends to be less 
cost-efficient (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016). 
Currently, the PPP is widely applied in the global public construction and 
service market. It is implemented in many areas: developing, maintaining and 
operating the infrastructure in the sectors of health, education, transport, tourism, 
public security, communication, energy, public defense etc., as well as providing 
public services and utilities, such as water and sanitation, electricity, gas, heating, 
etc. Among these, the sectors of electricity, information and communication 
technologies (ICT) are relatively dominant all over the world (World bank, 2016b). 
In the EU the majority of PPP are implemented in the sectors of transport, education 
and health (EPEC, 2014, 2015a, 2016). However, despite these general tendencies, 
the level of PPP market development and sectors in which this way of public 
infrastructure and service delivery is applied highly differ among countries. 
According to Grimsey & Lewis (2005), this depends on many factors, such as the 
prevailing relationships between the public and private sectors, public investment 
policy, the level of government’s debt, general economic situation, etc. 
Considering the observed tendencies of similarities between economic growth 
and development of PPP market in the member states of the EU14 (EPEC, 2014, 
2015a, 2016), the latest of above-mentioned factors has been analyzed in more 
detail. More specifically, the author of this dissertation (Jasiukevicius & 
Vasiliauskaite, 2013) has analyzed the impact of GDP growth on PPP market’s size 
in respect of both the number of PPP deals and the amount of capital investments. 
The statistical analysis disclosed that GDP growth as a factor can alone clearly 
explain the general changes in the PPP market, though the general tendency of PPP 
market to reflect the changes of GDP growth was observed. However, only in the 
longest period, in respect of available data of 16-years correlation (R2 = 0,795), was 
estimated as statistically significant (Sig. 0,000). While among the member states 
with the most developed PPP market, the correlations of GDP growth with the 
number of PPP deals were statistically significantly stronger than with the amount of 
capital investments. However, in both cases, the relationships can be considered as 
conditionally no stronger than medium level, R2 = 0,426 and R2 = 0,603 (Sig. (2-
                                                 
14 Over two decades starting from 1995, the total number and value of PPP deals contracted 
in the member states of the EU, irrespective of the dates when they joined the EU, have 
increased more than one hundred times. Especially, the PPP market increased in the period 
of rapid economic growth and, after reaching its peak in 2006–2008, has considerably 
declined in the period of economic crisis in 2009–2012 and, though it returned to positive 
growth later, the PPP market remained quite modest and similar to the general development 
of economy in the EU. 
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tailed) = 0,000), respectively. Moreover, it was also found that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the strength of correlation of the PPP 
market development with the predictive and current data of GDP growth. Therefore, 
although stronger relationships with prognosticated data were estimated, it cannot be 
confirmed that the prognosis of GDP growth has any impact on the decisions to 
launch PPP as well as determine a certain amount of capital investments than the 
data of a current situation. Since PPP frameworks are mostly developed in the most 
economically advanced member states, such as the UK, France, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, etc. the strength of relation of above-mentioned variables 
between the states net contributors and net recipients was also analyzed. However, 
no statistically significant difference was found, except for the case of correlation 
between GDP growth and the amount of investments in the analyzed group of 25 EU 
states (Sig. (2-tailed) = 0,014). However, the correlations are conditionally very low, 
R2 = 0,384 and R2 = 0,603, respectively, thus makes the relevance of these results to 
be treated with caution. Accordingly, more results are presented in this research. 
Returning from the research to the development of PPP in the world, it is 
observed that the most advanced countries in the field of PPP are the UK, the USA, 
Australia, France, Spain, Japan, Germany, Turkey. They established not only 
particular authorities responsible for PPP framework development, but also 
developed special legislation clearly regulating contractual relationship between the 
public and private entities. 
Meanwhile, the development of PPP market in Lithuania in comparison with 
other member states of the EU is relatively modest. The PPP as a way of delivering 
public infrastructure and services is still applied only in individual IPs. There are no 
economic sectors where the systemic application of PPP is applied. Data of the WB 
(World bank, 2016b) show that only 13 PPPs have reached financial closure over the 
period of 1990–2015, most of them are concessions in the sectors of electricity and 
information and communications technologies. The European PPP Expertise Centre 
(EPEC) has counted 3 PPPs during the period of 2010 and 2016 (EPEC, 2010, 
2015a, 2016). Meanwhile, the PPP Unit of Lithuania (PPP Unit of Lithuania, 2016) 
has highlighted 24 PPPs from many different sectors; however, most of them have 
been in various phases of procurement. A relatively small number of PPPs discloses 
that the potential of PPP as an alternative way of delivering public infrastructure and 
services are not fully used in Lithuania. The reasons determining this situation are 
analyzed in more detail in the latter section of this dissertation. 
Over the last two decades, the intense development of PPP as an alternative 
way of delivering public infrastructure and services has determined the rise of a 
broad spectrum of forms and schemes of its implementation from the municipality’s 
contract with the private subject from the management of infrastructure on the one 
hand, to the establishment of common capital joint venture of the public authority 
and private firm for the implementation of a major IPs. For the purpose of 
classification, scientists draw a line between various forms of PPP depending on 
whether they are established on a contractual or institutional basis (Grubišić Šeba et 
al., 2014; Tang, Shen, & Cheng, 2010; Valila, 2005). Accordingly, among different 
possible classifications, scientific literature distinguishes two main types of PPP 
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forms: the PPP of purely contractual nature (the contractual PPP), and the PPP of 
institutional nature (the institutional PPP). Both types involve transferring the 
traditional public sector’s tasks to a private entity; however, each of them also 
emphasizes certain characteristics. 
The institutional PPP is cooperation between public and private partners by 
establishing a joint-stock entity15, which is responsible for ensuring the delivery of a 
particular public infrastructure and/or services on behalf of the public sector. The 
institutional PPP can be implemented either through a new entity established 
especially for the delivery of predetermined services, or through an existing public 
entity, a part of which shares is transferred to the private entity in exchange for 
predetermined obligations. The PPA, as a shareholder, usually having a major part 
(50% plus one) of shares or special rights (golden share) controls the private entity 
(Martins et al., 2011). The rights and obligations of the private entity are guaranteed 
by the shareholder agreement between the public and private parties. Depending on 
the sharing ratio of benefits and risks, each of the partners invests an appropriate 
part of resources. This type of PPP forms can be characterized by a high degree of 
formalization of the relationship between the public and private entities (Batran, 
Essig, & Schaefer, 2004). However, it is useful, if the public entity wants to 
strategically control the delivery of public infrastructure and services, since it 
provides some flexibility over time according to the changing needs (Dūda, 2010). 
Moreover, it allows solving conflicts internally as well as acquiring the know-how 
for the public partner from the joint activities performed with the private party. 
The contractual PPP is characterized by, in comparison, a lower level of 
formalization and adaptation of each partner. It confines cooperation only on 
contractual basis without establishing a joint-stock entity for the implementation of 
an IP (Batran et al., 2004). In other words, in the contractual PPP, the mutual 
relationship between the public and private partners is regulated solely by 
contractual links, and each of the partner’s rights and obligations are determined by 
one or series of contracts. 
In the scope of both types, depending on the characteristics of the contractual 
relationship and delegation of tasks to the private partner, many different forms of 
public-private provision of infrastructure and services are distinguished16 (Dūda, 
2010; Hall, 2008; Hemming, 2006; Karlavičius et al., 2006; Kavaliauskaitė & 
Jucevičius, 2009; Tang et al., 2010; Valila, 2005; Y. Zhang, 2014). The following 
forms of PPP are best known: 
                                                 
15 According to Grubišić Šeba et al. (2014), in the institutional PPP, the public partner 
usually has minority ownership stake. However, in such countries as Lithuania, minimum 
share of government capital is regulated by the rule that the public sector must own at least 
50% of ownership plus one i.e. the public sector must have the control power (“LR 
Valstybės ir savivaldybių turto valdymo, naudojimo ir disponavimo juo įstatymas (2014 m. 
kovo 25 d. Nr. XII-802, 22 str. 9 d.),”). 
16 Depending on the country, not all forms of collaboration between the public and private 
entities are acknowledged as PPP. 
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Service contract17 is relatively the simplest form of cooperation between the 
public and private entities, also emphasized by the lowest level of each entities’ 
integration for ensuring the delivery of public infrastructure services. Under the 
service contract, a public authority hires a private entity to carry out specified tasks 
or services for a determined period. The public authority remains the organizer of 
service and the primary provider of the infrastructure service; it is also responsible 
for funding any capital investments required to expand or improve the service 
infrastructure and contracts out only portions of its operation to the private entity, 
which, in turn, has to ensure the efficiency of performance. The public authority 
decides, which services18 are provided by the private entities and sets standards of 
their quality. Meanwhile, the private entity must perform the service at the agreed 
cost and must meet the quality standards set by the public authority. In return for the 
provided services, it is paid a predetermined fee, which may be based on 
performance time, unit cost, or other basis. Therefore, the profitability of a contract 
depends on how much the private entity can reduce its operating costs, while 
satisfying the required standards of service. To increase cost efficiency, PPAs use 
competitive bidding procedures to award service contracts. Usually, the service 
contracts are the shortest in terms of duration among other forms of PPP, typically 
1–3 years. The examples of the form could be contracts of maintenance and 
operation of water pipes, electric lines, etc. 
As a form of PPP, the service contract is suitable where the specification of 
services can be clearly defined, the demand of services is clear and stable and the 
performance can be monitored easily. Due to transferred technologies and provided 
managerial capacity, it can have a quick and substantial impact on the efficiency of 
performance of particular tasks. However, the service contract is not suitable to 
attract capital investments because under this arrangement the private entity has no 
obligation to provide capital financing. Since private entities participate only in the 
performance of one or several tasks needed to provide services, it is difficult to 
expect a broader or deeper impact on the total performance, mostly discrete and 
limited improvements, instead. Moreover, there are little low-risk options to expand 
the role of the private entity. As a result, the public sector remains in charge to set 
tariffs and develop infrastructure, both of which are crucial to sustain the provision 
of services. 
Management generally is a short-term, usually 2–5 years, contract under which 
the provided infrastructure and services remain public, but some or all tasks related 
to operational management in order to increase their efficiency are assigned to a 
private entity which is also usually engaged to interact with the customers. Although 
under this arrangement the private entity has to finance discrete tasks, in most cases, 
it provides only the working capital, but no financing for capital investments. The 
private entity, as a manager, is paid a predetermined fixed rate for labor and other 
operating costs. It can also be paid additional amounts, if the prespecified targets are 
exceeded or/and is the parties participate in a profit sharing scheme. The PPA is 
                                                 
17 Service contract is not considered as PPP in Lithuania. 
18 Usually, these are services where the private partner does not interact with consumers. 
60 
responsible for the provision of major capital investments as well as sets the tariffs. 
The examples of forms could be the management of hospitals, utilities, ports, etc. 
As a form of PPP, the management contract has such advantages as allowing 
many operational gains as the results of management on commercial basis without 
transferring the assets to the private sector. This makes it relatively easy to develop 
in comparison with other forms of PPP. Moreover, due to staff optimization and 
efficient management, lower costs can be achieved. It is used as an arrangement for 
modest improvements until more comprehensive contracts are developed. However, 
this arrangement makes it challenging to combine the private entity’s objectives of 
efficiency and the public authority’s plan of expansion as well as determine the 
optimal level of private entity’s autonomy required to achieve deep and long-lasting 
change. 
Operation and management (O&M) is an expanded arrangement of 
Management, additionally including tasks related to operation and maintenance, 
which are assigned to the private entity. This form can vary in a broad range of 
contracts from technical assistance contracts to full-developed operation and 
maintenance agreements and, therefore, it is difficult to generalize them. However, 
the public entity always retains ownership and overall management of the public 
facility or system. As a distinction from the management contracts, which tend to be 
task-specific and input-focused, O&M agreements may have more outputs or 
performance requirements. O&M is mostly applied in the provision of utilities, such 
as electricity, gas, water, heating, etc. 
Lease (also known as service concession or franchise), is a contract whereby 
the service provision is transferred from the public sector to a private entity which 
undertakes obligations relating to quality and service standards and herewith bears 
the financial risk for operation and maintenance. Specifically, it is responsible for 
operating losses and for consumers’ unpaid debts. To manage these risks, it tends to 
employ staff directly. To provide services, it rents infrastructure from the public 
authority, for which it is charged a fixed rental or lease fee irrespective of the level 
of tariff collection that is achieved and so the operator takes a risk on bill collection 
and receipts covering its operating costs. The initial and later major investments in 
infrastructure are financed by the public authority, which bears investment risks and 
can recover investments, at least in part, from the rental payment of infrastructure. 
The duration of the leasing contract is typically between 8 and 15 years. 
Affermage is a contract similar to lease. Differences among these contracts are 
in how the receipts collected from consumers are shared between the entities. Unlike 
a lease, where a fixed amount of the receipts goes to the awarding PPA as the owner 
of assets as a lease fee, in the case of the affermage, the private sector collects 
revenue from the customers, pays the contracting authority an affermage fee, 
typically an agreed rate per every unit sold, and retains the remaining revenue. This, 
in turn, allows reducing the risks associated with low-cost recovery in sales. 
However, in both forms, a portion of the receipts going to the public authority goes 
into an account that will fund future investments in the assets. Lease and affermage 
are usually used to operate airport terminals or seaport containers, provide central 
heating, etc. 
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In comparison to the above-mentioned forms of PPP, the key advantages of 
both lease and affermage is that they allow passing the commercial risk to the 
private entity, since its profits depend on the utility sales and costs and, in turn, 
provides incentives for the operator to achieve higher levels of efficiency and higher 
sales. Moreover, under this arrangement a lease/affermage fee is collected, which 
allows the PPA to cover capital expense when private equity and commercial debt 
are not available. The potential weakness is related to a complex tariff arrangement, 
which is usually a very sensitive topic for the society. Moreover, the public authority 
remains with responsibility to mobilize financial resources for capital investments. 
Concession is the right awarded to a private entity (the concessionaire) to 
manage the state or municipality-owned resources or infrastructural objects and 
collect payments from user charges in exchange of transferring responsibilities 
related to designing, financing, building, maintaining, operating of these objects. 
The private entity gets revenues from the direct users of service. The tariffs and their 
changes over time are established by the concession contract, respectively. While 
the PPA is responsible for determining the performance standards and ensuring that 
the private entity (concessionaire) meets them. It can also provide additional capital 
financing or subsidies to make IPs financially viable, if the tariff or demand is not 
sufficient. Since the private entity has to ensure capital investments, the concession 
contract is typically valid 20–30 years in order to recover the capital investments 
and to earn an appropriate return over the life of the concession. If the contract is 
very profitable, various compensation mechanisms, e.g. revenue, profit sharing, to 
ensure public interest, are usually used. At the end of the concession period, the 
rented infrastructure is transferred back to the government, while the newly built 
infrastructure can also be left for the private entities. 
Concession is one the most common forms of PPP in the world (Auriol & 
Picard, 2013; Carbonara et al., 2014; Yu & Lam, 2013; Xu et al., 2012). In 
comparison with other contracts, concession has some advantages, since it provides 
incentives to the operator through innovation and management to achieve an 
improved level of efficiency and effectiveness, which, in turn, results in increased 
profits and return to the private entity. Moreover, it allows attracting the private 
financing required for building new infrastructure or rehabilitating and upgrading 
the already existing one. Concession is most often applied in the development of 
roads, air maritime, public transport, water, solid waste, smart development, other 
energy sectors where user charges can be applied. A potential weakness of 
concession contracts is that they are complex in nature, therefore requiring special 
competence from the PPA to be prepared and managed. Moreover, long-term 
duration implies the difficulties to anticipate all circumstances which would have 
impact on the result of concession’s performance, which aggravate the assessment 
and sharing of various risks. 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is an arrangement whereby the private entity 
finances, manages and completes IPs and then delivers the appropriate services and 
maintenance functions over a determined period, for regular availability payments 
from the public entity. The private entity provides capital financing; however, the 
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property rights of assets may belong to the public (in most cases) or private entity19, 
but, in any case, at the end of the cooperation period, which usually lasts 20–30 
years, the government keeps the ownership of the asset. As the concession, it is also 
one of the most prevailing forms of PPP, mostly applied in the development of 
healthcare (Acerete et al., 2011; Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2008), education 
(Khadaroo, 2008), prisons, public administration and social house infrastructure 
(Grubišić Šeba et al., 2014; Wang, 2014) and other sectors, i.e. in those sectors 
where such tasks as construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure are 
transferred to the private sector, while the very provision of the main services 
typically remains with the public sector. The key advantage of PFI is that the private 
entities, combining tasks of building infrastructure and its operation, can achieve 
lower life cycle costs of the IP as well as provide capital financing, which can be 
critical factors determining whether an IP is financially viable for the public 
authorities under budget constraints. A potential weakness of PFI is related to the 
same complexity of contract as in the case of the above-mentioned concession. 
Joint venture (JV) is an arrangement, under which the public and private parties 
share the responsibility, financing, losses and profits as shareholders, by forming a 
shareholding company so called the SPV for a determined or open-ended period to 
provide public services. The public and private sector partners can either form a new 
company or assume joint ownership of an existing company through a sale of shares 
to the private investors. In a JV, a lot of different tasks are implemented, the 
distribution of which between the partners can be very different. However, usually 
the private partner assumes such tasks as construction, operation and maintenance 
and others which require to ensure life-cycle cost’s efficiency, while the public 
partner is more focused on strategic control and remains with those tasks the aim of 
which is to provide services rather than to generate profit, or which, due to legal 
constraints, can be performed solely by the public sector or the public sector has 
more competence to perform them (Tamosiunas & Zilakauskyte, 2010).  
This characteristic is inherited in all forms of cooperation between the public 
and private entities. For example, the private entity is responsible for tasks related to 
design, building, maintenance of museum’s infrastructure as well as sales of tickets, 
while the public entity prepares expositions; or the private entity designs, builds, 
operates and maintains the education infrastructure, while the higher or secondary 
education is provided by staff of the public sector. For strategic reasons, the public 
sector prefers to keep control of the entity, particularly if the joint venture company 
owns the assets. The private sector also wants to be sure that it, managing the day-
to-day operations, can have the powers of veto or weighted voting rights on certain 
issues. To specify responsibilities between the public and private entities, the JV 
contract may be accompanied by additional contracts (subcontracts), such as 
concession, OM, etc. 
As a weakness of JV, the public authority is both the owner and regulator, 
which, can lead to a conflict of interests. Therefore, this form requires good 
                                                 
19 Only the public ownership of assets is allowed in PFI under the legal regulation of 
Lithuania. 
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corporate governance, which would not allow meddling in the company’s business 
to achieve political goals. On  the other hand, the JV emphasizes relatively one of 
the highest levels of each entities’ integration ensuring the delivery of the public 
services. 
Divestiture is the ultimate level of private engagement in public services’ 
provision, when the public sector abandons the service delivery, transfers ownership 
of the existing facilities and responsibilities for their future expansion and, in most 
situations, keeps only a regulatory role in the form of a license granted to the private 
entity to deliver the service to the public. Without this license, the private entity 
cannot operate the assets. Since the license can be terminated by the PPA for serious 
breaches or, on predetermined years notice from the date of agreement for no cause, 
the PPA has leverage to control the provision of public services. Depending on the 
needs to control the provision of services, the private investors can acquire partial or 
full ownership through the stock market or purchase of public assets. However, 
since the divestiture is partial, it is considered as PPP, while, in the case of 
transferring 100% of the equity of a state-owned company to private entities 
(operator, institutional investors, and the like), is considered as full divestiture, also 
known as, privatization, which are not forms of the PPP. As a form of PPP, it allows 
the public sector to transfer all responsibilities related to the provision of services, 
which is an advantage, if their provision can exist without significant public 
intervention. However, in the conditions of delegating all tasks and transferring 
partial ownership to a private entity, it is complicated to ensure public interest, 
which makes the divestiture a rather controversial form of PPP. 
All these forms of PPP, depending on the requirements, can be modified. 
Therefore, there are various hybrid arrangements in practice. This aggravates their 
classification because individual arrangements under the same name of form, due to 
various legal and financial considerations as well as mutual agreements may 
significantly vary. For example, in concessions, the ownership of the newly built 
assets can be kept by either the public or private entities. As a solution to this issue, 
there is also a classification related to procurement models, the typologies of which 
are based on specific tasks, such as Design (D), Build (B), Maintain (M), Operate 
(O), Own (also O), Finance (F), Transfer (T) and Rehabilitate (R), which the private 
entity has to perform under the contract. Besides the main ones, there are also Bid 
(also B), Develop (also D), Lease (L), Upgrade (U), Purchase (P), etc. By using 
these components, it is possible to construct various schemes of arrangement 
between the public and private partners. For example, the rather traditional way of 
IP’s implementation described by components Design-Bid-Build would be 
abbreviated to the simple acronym DBB, while the procurement model focusing on 
the entire infrastructure’s life cycle (such as, e.g. concession) reads as Build-operate-
transfer (BOT). An arrangement (e.g. the same concession) where the ownership 
permanently remains with the private entity would be Build-operate-own (BOO), 
and if it is transferred back to the state at the end of collaboration period, it would be 
Build-operate-own-transfer (BOOT). Based on the same logic and considering the 
variety of components, many schemes of PPP can be constructed accordingly. A list 
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of PPP schemes found in literature is presented in Appendix 220. Most common in 
practice are schemes21 that combine traditional public investment and private sector 
operation of government-owned asset. Sometimes this arrangement takes the form 
of operating lease, which can also be considered as PPP, if the private operator has 
responsibility for the maintenance and improvement of the asset. However, this 
dissertation does not seek to explicitly exclude any type of possible arrangements of 
PPP, but rather focuses on attempts to disclose consistency among the different 
arrangements instead. 
Since PPP is considered as an agreement for dividing appropriate tasks between 
the partners, a detailed classification of schemes can be based on the degree of 
private involvement in the provision of public infrastructure and services, i.e. 
depending on the ownership of capital assets, as well as the responsibility for 
investment and assumption of risks allocation between the public and private 
partners. Moreover, for the scientific and practical purpose, it is important to 
determine links between the forms and schemes. Accordingly, Appendix 3 
summarizes different forms and schemes of PPP and their positions on the public–
private spectrum depending on the scale and scope of private and public 
responsibility. It does not purport to show all possible structural variations, but the 
most common usage has been followed. 
A variety of forms and schemes of public and private provision allows the 
public sector to choose the optimal one depending on the circumstances and 
requirements. Although the conception of PPP in this dissertation is related to the 
tasks of investment and operation, which have to be performed by the private entity, 
not all of these arrangements are considered as PPP in different countries22. 
However, this does not mean that, in general, the application of appropriate public–
private provision is impossible to apply in practice23. Despite the classification, the 
general tendency is that the more tasks are delegated to the private sector, the less 
risks are left with the public authority; however, with transferring responsibilities 
there are also less possibilities for the public authority to control the efficiency of 
process and the quality of results of service provision. Moreover, the private entity 
costs every borne risk. This allows concluding that the determination of the optimal 
form and scheme of PPP has to be a result of VfM assessment, considering various 
legal, financial, economic and market restrictions as well as potential possibilities. 
                                                 
20 Since PPP, due to Lithuanian legal constraints, is defined by characteristics of 
infrastructure needed to be invested and operated or maintained by the private entity, not all 
found schemes are considered as PPP or generally applied in the public sector of Lithuania 
e.g., the form of a design-build-finance-transfer (DBFT) scheme or a financial lease is not a 
PPP because it does not involve service provision by the private sector. 
21 An analysis of Lithuanian practice disclosed the Design-build-operate-transfer (DBOT) 
tends to be the most commonly used schemes of PPP in Lithuania. 
22 This is in harmony with the Lithuanian legal system. 
23 Application of appropriate schemes of public–private provision can be limited, due to legal 
constraints, e.g. in Lithuania, the existing public infrastructure cannot be transferred to a 
private entity on ownership basis at any time, if it is not privatized. 
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Accordingly, the choice of an appropriate form and scheme determines the 
contractual and financing aspects of relationships between all stakeholders in the 
PPP. To further examine this aspect of PPP, the interest of different stakeholders as 
well as structuring of PPP are further analyzed in the next section of this 
dissertation. 
1.2.3. Advantages and disadvantages of PPP 
Given that the overall advantages of private participation in the public sector 
has already been analyzed in the previous section of this dissertation, this section 
focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of PPP as an alternative way of 
implementing investments in public infrastructure and services. Accordingly, 
literature is rich in articles addressing pros and cons for the application of PPP. This 
aspect, under the keywords of advantages and disadvantages, merit, benefits, 
positive and negative factors of PPP has been analyzed at various levels of depth by 
many scientists (Akhmetshina & Mustafin, 2015; Andreas, Mong, Bjørberg, & 
Støre-valen, 2016; Carbonara et al., 2014; Desgrées du Lou, 2012; Gordon et al., 
2013; Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Gudelis & Rozenbergaitė, 2004; Harada & 
Ogunlan, 2015; Hwang et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2015; Martins et al., 2011; Mota & 
Moreira, 2015; Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Sambrani, 2014; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016; Sharma, 2007; Li Yin Shen et al., 2006; Wojewnik-Filipkowska 
& Trojanowski, 2013). An analysis of their articles disclosed that the main drive for 
use the PPP is that it allows the public sector to avoid limitation on the public sector 
budgets. However, the more detailed debate on this and other advantages of PPP are 
highly complex because the PPP also has particular issues. 
Returning to the positive argument for PPP, it is explained that in the case of 
providing at least a portion of private financing, the public sector is not required to 
immediately fund all initial capital investments. They can be spread over the life of 
the PPP contract instead and have to be repaid only when the investment stage is 
finished (Auriol & Picard, 2013; Liu et al., 2015; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; 
Shaoul, 2011; Shen et al., 2007) (Figure 1.2). This decreases the risk of construction 
delay for the public sector (Bin Yang et al., 2010; Kokkaew & Wipulanusat, 2014; 
Li Yin Shen et al., 2006) as well as puts a lower pressure on the annual budget, 
which enables the public sector to break free from short-term constraints on 
investments in public infrastructure imposed by insufficient tax revenue and limits 
of public sector borrowing, and to achieve more results with the same annual 
budget. Therefore, in PPP against CP, capital investments of the developed 
infrastructure are either funded by unitary payments (UPs) from the public budgets 
or paid by direct users, or by using a mix of these two funding ways becomes more 
financially affordable (Asao et al., 2013; Burke & Demirag, 2015; Khadaroo, 2008; 
Valila, 2005). This is especially relevant in areas where these constraints are created 
by artificial rules, such as the Stability and Growth Pact’s limitations on budget 
deficits in the EU (Benito et al., 2008; Morales et al., 2013). If such capital 
investment financing scheme is not considered as public sector borrowing and can 
be shown as expenditure of the public budget, there are advantages of PPP which 
provide the possibility of “off-balance sheet” borrowing, i.e. the PPP is viewed as an 
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alternative mechanism to address fiscal challenges (Carmona, 2010; Gouveia & 
Raposo, 2012; Hodges & Mellett, 2012; Moro Visconti, 2014; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016). This enables the public sector to make or accelerate investments 
in infrastructure, which otherwise would not have been possible or would have been 
delayed. Therefore, if, considering budget constraints, public borrowing reaches the 
limits, the realistic choice is generally not between the PPP and CP of the facility, 
but between the PPP and no investments at all. Accordingly, there is a frequently-
used argument that the PPP allows investing in public infrastructure and services 
more quickly (Skietrys & Raipa, 2009). 
Estimated operating cost
Operating cost overruns Payment based on availibility and/or usage
Years       5               10               15                20               25   
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Figure 1.2. Payment profiles for the public sector at different routes of 
procurements (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
However, there are also negative aspects related to the financial possibilities 
provided by the PPP. It should be noted that, despite how the future payments from 
the government to the PPP are going to be recorded in public accounting, they are 
long-term liabilities, which have an eventual impact on the public budget in much 
the same way as borrowing and can threaten the sustainability of public finances 
(Benito et al., 2008; Grubišić Šeba et al., 2014; Morales et al., 2013). Therefore, 
“off-balance sheet accounting” advantage embeds a potential danger; namely, the 
temptation to avoid budget constraints, which may lead to a debt overhang, i.e. a 
condition of the government under which the debt level is so high that it is no longer 
able to attract more debt, even if the debt conditions are favorable to new 
investments. This requires attention when relatively small countries enter into large 
PFI programs, e.g. Portugal and Greece have established many PPP IPs over a short 
period of time, raising concerns about their affordability, given the future impact on 
liquidity and even state solvency. Accordingly, this was an argument for changing 
the rules of public accounting in such way which would not distort the approach of 
PPP, as e.g. the Eurostat in the EU has tried to do in 2016 by tightening the 
regulation on accounting of government deficit and debt (Eurostat, 2016). According 
to Eurostat, public liabilities of the PPP, and PFI, more specifically24, can be 
excluded from the government balance sheet of assets and liabilities for statistical 
treatment, only if all construction, availability and major part of demand risks are 
                                                 
24 Manual on Government Deficit and Debt (Eurostat, 2016) is applied only for PFIs, 
however a similar manual is planned for concessions. 
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transferred to a private entity as well as a number of minor requirements are 
satisfied. Although these rules still have some practical issues of application, the 
general tendency to move to more transparent accounting of public liabilities is 
obvious. Therefore, the so-called advantage of “off-balance sheet” borrowing is 
decreasingly mentioned in the context of PPP. 
Another advantage of PPP is that it allows the public sector to transfer risks to 
those who are best able to manage them, at the least cost which is a key element of 
VfM (Alexandersson et al., 2008; Ball, 2011; Galilea & Medda, 2010; Iseki & 
Houtman, 2012; Jin & Zhang, 2011). Risks related to the design, construction, 
maintenance, finance, availability, performance, operation, etc. can be transferred to 
the private sector, which is traditionally believed to be more efficient in their 
management and, therefore, the costs of provision of infrastructure and services can 
be lower than if the risks were retained by the public sector. Cruz & Marques (2013) 
have found that the hospital PFI IPs have a better track record in on-time and on-
budget delivery: 76% and 79% for PPP IPs against 30% and 27% for conventionally 
procured IPs. Similar results are presented by the National Audit Office in the UK 
(National Audit Office, 2009). According to EIB, 85% of its financed PFI IPs have 
been delivered within budget, 63% on time or earlier and this proportion increases to 
80%, if allowance is made for minor delays (up to four weeks), and 85% in-line with 
their original specification (Bain, 2009). The example in France shows that in PPP 
schools on average 15% saving in capital expenditure  was achieved compared to 
the traditionally-procured schools (World Bank, 2013). However, these reports on 
cost overruns are incomplete and suffer from inconsistencies in respect of PPP’s 
definition, described in the previous sections, which also similarly challenges the 
process of data collection and analysis. Therefore, the reality of lower costs through 
risk transfer and private sector efficiency in the PPP remains disputed (Clark & 
Root, 1999). 
Regarding risk transfer, despite of how risks are allocated between the partners, 
the public sector, having to ensure the provision of public infrastructure and 
services, remains the last guarantor who assumes and covers all risks in the case of 
PPP’s collapse. If the PPP goes wrong, the private investors may lose their 
investments but they have no obligation to put further money in to rescue the IP. 
Therefore, it is likely that the public sector, due to its responsibility to provide the 
appropriate functions, will incur extra costs to maintain the public services. This 
reveals that risk transfer fails anyway to this extent, therefore the PPP is criticized 
for the privatization of profits and socializing losses. Moreover, it is complicated to 
quantify the transferred risks, which makes the determination of adequate reward 
and guarantees to the private party a complex process (Carbonara et al., 2014; Du & 
Li, 2008; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Jin & Zhang, 2011). 
Regarding the efficiency of the private sector, there are practical examples 
demonstrating that many PPPs do not always achieve these benefits, which discloses 
that private participation does not immediately mean lower total costs (Ahmed & 
Ali, 2006; Benito et al., 2008; Clark & Root, 1999; Daito & Gifford, 2014; Gordon 
et al., 2013). For example, according to Carmona (2010), road construction costs are 
24% higher in a PPP in comparison to CP. On another hand, this difference is of 
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similar scale as there are cost overruns that can be observed under CP. The author of 
this dissertation has found that among the IPs implemented in a traditional way in 
Lithuania, the investment budget was overrun on average by a quarter (Jasiukevicius 
& Vasiliauskaite, 2015a). Therefore, higher construction costs under bundling could 
reflect a price that the public sector is ready to pay for avoiding time and possible 
additional cost overruns. 
Attempts to achieve lower costs are aggravated due to the fact that private 
financing for PPP costs more than if an IP was procured in the public sector and 
financed with public borrowing, which is one of the most significant disadvantages 
of PPP (Alexandersson et al., 2008; Mota & Moreira, 2015). Even for those PPPs 
where revenues are derived from regular payments from the public sector, the cost 
of capital, due to greater risks of lenders, are typically around 2–4% higher than in 
the case of public funding (Yescombe, 2007)25. This allows arguing that the PPAs 
have to provide guaranties to lenders to make the costs of capital in the PPP lower 
and competitive against the capital cost of pure public financing, which increases the 
contingent liabilities of the public sector. 
In order to overcome higher cost of capital in the PPP, the private entity has to 
elaborate all specific skills and experience as well as provide innovation allowing 
the public sector to get benefits which are not available to the public sector and, 
therefore, are the key features and advantages of PPP (Ahmed & Ali, 2006; 
Jefferies, 2006; Silvestre, 2012; Wang, 2014; Willoughby, 2013), since a procurer, 
by calling the private bids, specifies outputs rather than inputs, i.e. what is required 
in respect of facilities and services, but not how the service has to be delivered (Ball, 
2011; Desgrées du Lou, 2012; Kurniawan et al., 2015; Moro Visconti, 2014; Parker 
& Hartley, 2003; Reeves, 2005; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; Wang, 
2014). Such output specifications provide greater flexibility for the private entity to 
come up with innovative solutions. Regarding innovation coming from the private 
sector, an important aspect is that doing something different or innovative inevitably 
involves risk, therefore the natural behavior is to avoid taking such risks, unless 
there is an incentive to do so. The public sector, as being a natural monopolist in 
many sectors, typically prefers to use what has worked in the past as this involves 
less risk.  
However, for the private entities which provide bids, the use of innovation can 
make the difference between securing or losing a PPP contract. In this case, the 
innovations are heavily incentivized. Therefore, PPPs are more likely to generate 
new or improved ways of delivering public infrastructure and services, which may 
result in a better quality of infrastructure and services or/and their more efficient 
delivery that ensures VfM (Khadaroo, 2008; Xueqing Zhang & Chen, 2013). This is 
also supported by the fact that the private entity is typically engaged to do several 
consistent tasks, therefore they have strong incentives to focus on the lifetime of the 
asset, thus the least whole-life costing can be applied, which is also one of the most 
important elements of VfM for PPPs (Fernandes et al., 2015; Martimort & Pouyet, 
2008; Maskin & Tirole, 2008; Wang, 2014). Moreover, the PPP contract is agreed 
                                                 
25 The tendency is also observed from practical experience of the author of this dissertation. 
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with one entity or consortium for all transferred tasks, therefore the results of 
infrastructure and services provision become easier to manage and control; 
moreover, one contract provides more transparency on the final responsibilities 
between the entities participating in the implementation of the IP (Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016). Finally, among other advantages of PPP, there is an argument 
that in some types of PPP, such as concessions, partially PFI, etc. the SPV can be 
allowed to generate additional revenues from commercial services when the 
infrastructure is foreseen to be not fully utilized by the demand of the public sector, 
which may help to reduce payments form the public sector and/or price of the main 
services for their direct users, thus also improving VfM to the public sector. 
The negative factors related to the same features of PPP are that it requires 
strong procurement skills enabling the PPA to prepare conditions for the private 
entity encouraging its proper incentives. This requires to accumulate specific 
competence, which determines higher transaction costs of PPP in comparison to 
those borne by the public sector for CP (Acerete et al., 2011; De Clerck & 
Demeulemeester, 2015; Mu et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2012). They are also high for the 
private sector. According to Schepper et al., (2014), increasing reluctance from the 
private partners to engage in PPP-bidding is observed. Up-front costs that PPP 
bidders make in the pre-contractual stage are considered too high compared to the 
bidding chances, and may result in less bidders in the future. Moreover, long-term 
agreements with private entities reduce the flexibility of the public sector in the 
management of transferred public services during the period of contract, which 
requires to anticipate long-term requirements for infrastructure and services for 
many years, which is usually not easy (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Mota & 
Moreira, 2015). 
Table 1.2 below summarizes the above-mentioned key advantages and 
disadvantages of PPP against the CP from the perspective of the public sector. Many 
arguments from both sides show that the PPP does not mean only benefits for the 
public sector. Therefore, its application must be well-reasoned, requiring complex 
assessment where both the advantages and disadvantages of PPP have to be 
considered. 
From the perspective of the private sector, the PPP as compared to CP provides 
a more stable, long-term contract, based on which the private entity is less 
dependent on the public sector’s annual budget. Since the public sector specifies 
only the outputs and applies proper incentive mechanism, the private entity has 
flexibility in determining the specifications of how the final products or services 
should be provided, which, through the incentives for good performance and 
delivery of quality services, allow maximizing the gains. Moreover, in the PPP, 
there is also a possibility to generate additional revenues from the third parties 
(Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 2013). The negative factors of PPP are 
related to the limitation of profitability and higher participation costs. However, if 
the conditions of PPP do not allow the private entity to get sufficient profit, it simply 
does not provide a bid or can refuse to go into partnership at any moment of 
procurement. Since the PPP is primarily considered as an alternative way of 
implementing investments in public infrastructure and services for the public sector, 
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pros and cons of PPP from the perspective of the private sector are not analyzed in 
this dissertation in more detail. 
Table 1.2. The main advantages and disadvantages of the PPP against the CP 
(prepared according to the scientists mentioned in this section of the dissertation) 
PPP advantages PPP disadvantages 
Avoidance of initial investment cost 
Reasons for advantages: Better affordability for 
the public sector 
Affordability concerns debt overhang 
Reasons for disadvantages: Reduces fiscal space 
for future years 
Off-balance sheet debt 
Reasons for advantages: Increases fiscal space 
in the investment years 
Future payments may threaten public finance 
sustainability; Liabilities may not be known until 
payments arrive; Government guarantees 
represent future liabilities 
Reasons for disadvantages: Low budget 
transparency 
Acceleration of infrastructure development 
Reasons for advantages: Economic and social 
externalities from new infrastructure 
VfM is complex and difficult to measure; VfM is 
based mainly on risk transfer; Risk is a complex 
process; Lack of public sector’s experience or 
appropriate skills 
Reasons for disadvantages: It is not clear that 
PPPs are more efficient than alternative models 
Risk transfer to the private sector 
Reasons for advantages: Risks allocated to the 
party which is able to manage them at the lowest 
costs. 
Lack of clear public policies and objectives; 
PPP planning is complex  
Reasons for disadvantages: Long-term and 
complex contracts 
Higher service quality 
Reasons for advantages: More benefits for users 
through higher value of provided services 
High percentage of renegotiations 
Reasons for disadvantages: Incomplete 
contracts lead to little flexibility and remote 
renegotiations; Asymmetric information reducing 
competition and efficiency 
Increased innovation in service provision 
Reasons for advantages: Better accessibility to 
innovation, specific skills and competences 
Higher transaction costs; 
Reasons for disadvantages: Decrease VfM 
Considering full lifetime of assets 
Reasons for advantages: More efficient use of 
assets 
Higher cost of capital; Higher participation costs 
Reasons for disadvantages: Increases the costs 
of service provision 
Greater operating efficiency; Reduction of total IP 
costs and more efficient use of public money; 
Achievement of VfM 
Reasons for advantages: Lower total cost of 
provided services; Better use of public resources 
 
Public sector focuses on strategy, rather than 
operational tasks 
Reasons for advantages: Enables public 
managers to address key issues and not disperse 
with non-significant problems 
 
In conclusion, the PPP, if properly structured, can provide many benefits; 
however, usually not without compromises. Therefore, the public sector has to make 
a well-grounded decision for the expediency of PPP’s application in every particular 
IP. This requires to properly assess whether the PPP can optimize investments in 
public infrastructure. 
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To evaluate the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure, it is important to construct a rational PPP option as the best 
alternative for comparison with the CP option. Theoretical aspects of structuring 
PPP are analyzed in the following section of this dissertation. 
1.2.4. Structuring of PPP 
There are two main entities in the PPPs: the public sector entity, which 
organizes procurement, and the private sector entity, which is delegated to perform 
certain tasks on behalf of the public sector. Both parties usually consist of a group of 
stakeholders. The public entity can be a single PPA or a partnership between several 
public entities of the same or different administration levels, e.g. municipality and 
national government, which may also represent the interests of other public sector 
institutions. While the private entity is typically a consortium, which, depending on 
the scheme of PPP, may consist of a bank/financial institution and some 
combination of construction, maintenance and facilities management and operation 
companies organized as an SPV to run the IP (Chowdhury, Chen, & Tiong, 2012; 
Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Sanderson, 2012; Shaoul, 2005; Li Yin Shen et al., 2006; 
Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014). As discussed in Section 1.1.2., both public and 
private parties have their own interests and expectations within the PPP, among 
which an equilibrium has to be achieved in order to sign the PPP agreement. This 
requires a rational structure of PPP, i.e. as it is analyzed be analyzed in Section 
1.3.3., much of the success of PPPs depends on how the responsibilities and risks 
are allocated and shared between the partners. The PPA, having the results of an ex-
ante VfM assessment, defines the overall structure of PPP as well as the 
fundamental conditions of cooperation with the private entity before launching 
procurement. However, only negotiation with the elected private entity allows 
reaching a final bargaining situation, when both parties have the possibility of 
concluding a mutually beneficial agreement, which determines the final conditions 
of collaboration in the PPP (Boyer & Newcomer, 2015; Cheah & Liu, 2006; Huang 
& Chou, 2006; Kurniawan et al., 2015; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016; Shen et al., 
2007; Xu et al., 2012; Xueqing Zhang, 2011). 
Typically, when structuring the PPP, depending on the transfer of tasks to the 
private entity, the PPA sets quality standards and capacity requirements of service 
and infrastructure delivered to the customers. In order to encourage proper 
incentives for the private entity, the PPA determines the appropriate mechanism of 
payments and compensation, including various penalties, if the availability, adequate 
safety levels, and performance standards of the infrastructure are not maintained, or 
rescission of the contract, if the SPV does not manage the infrastructure and 
provides services inappropriately (Burke & Demirag, 2015). To make the PPP 
financially viable and reduce the downside of the financial failure of high-risk 
investments to make the IP attractive, the PPA may provide at least a portion of 
equity and subordinated debt or, on a more frequent occasion, subsidies in the forms 
of investment grants, guarantees, tax reduction and other contribution (Chen et al., 
2012). It is also a frequent practice to compensate at least a portion of equity 
investments in case of the failure of the SPV. This is based on the conception that if 
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the business financial model does not work in practice, the PPA, as in the CP, should 
reward the private entity for the built infrastructure, which accrues to the ownership 
of the public sector. At the same time, to ensure public interest, a mixture of means 
not allowing the private entity to get unreasonably high profit in the monopolistic 
market is also applied or it would not be compensated more than the alternative 
costs of infrastructure development. Besides, under the PPP contract, the PPA also 
predetermines the aspects of risk allocation, price variations, flexibility and 
renegotiation, contract duration, subcontracting, and a few miscellaneous issues, 
such as the procedures of dispute resolution (Gordon et al., 2013). For specific tasks, 
especially in the planning stage and at the public bidding, the PPA may also involve 
external financial advisers, lawyers, and other types of consultants as well as ask 
advice and contribution from the local PPP unit, if such institution is established in 
the country. Finally, in case of the institutional PPP, the PPA may also participate in 
the management of the SPV. However, in most of the cases, it concentrates on 
strategic objectives and controls the results of services and infrastructure provided 
by the private entity. 
Meanwhile, under the structure of PPP, the private entity is typically engaged to 
provide the services of technical assistance or/and directly for the customers. 
Obligation to perform other tasks depends on the applied scheme of PPP, i.e. a 
combination of the delegated tasks with the associated responsibilities and risks 
depends solely on the PPA’s requirements reasoned by the results of ex-ante VfM 
assessment. Usually, such tasks as design, construction, maintenance, etc. are passed 
on to the subcontractors, who also assume the management of associated risks under 
subcontractor agreements. In any case, the private entity is required to insure assets 
and performance against various negative impacts. Depending on the scheme of 
PPP, the private entity can be asked to ensure all or a portion of financing, which is 
usually a mix of equity, subordinated debt and senior debt. Investors provide equity, 
usually between 7%–15% of the IP financing requirement (HM Treasury, 2011), and 
subordinated debt. Other debt financing, up to 93% of total financing, may be 
obtained either through a bank debt or bonds, the first of which is more prevalent in 
practice, while the attractiveness of the second one increases under the conditions of 
a financial crisis, when commercial bank debt has become more difficult to secure 
and lending terms have deteriorated significantly, affecting the bankability and VfM 
of PPP IPs (EPEC, 2012).  
In any case, to reduce the cost of capital, as high as possible financial leverage 
is sought. However, when bank debt financing is used, a lender approves the 
maximum amount of debt for an IP, usually up to 60–90% of total capital 
investments, and drawdowns occur over the construction period until the planned 
maximum is reached (Fernandes et al., 2015; Khmel & Zhao, 2015; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016). Interest is accrued periodically on the outstanding balance as the 
debt is drawdown over the construction period, with a commitment fee applied to 
the unused portion. When construction is completed and the developed assets are 
available for the users, the PPA begins payments to the private partner or/and allows 
the private entity to charge users for the delivered services, which allows the debt to 
be repaid via fixed payments of principal and interest. All conditions of the provided 
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loans, such as pricing, tenors, loan volumes, etc. are defined in a tripartite loan 
agreement between the investors, the lenders and the PPA, the signing of which 
refers to the financial closure of PPP. Under this agreement, the banks are provided 
with step-in rights allowing them to take control of the infrastructure project, if the 
SPV becomes insolvent. It is also ensured that cash flow (CF) after operating profit 
is used firstly for debt service and then to pay distributions to the investors. 
Moreover, bank loans are usually secured via a government-backed revenue stream, 
therefore in the case of failure of the SPV, the PPA has to repay the banks, which 
significantly reduces the financing risk for the banks. If the return on equity or 
revenue stays within the predetermined bounds, CFs after debt repayment are left for 
equity return. Otherwise, revenue or profit sharing with the public sector or other 
mechanisms restraining the profitability of the private entity are applied. 
Figure 1.3 generalizes the above-described relationships between different 
shareholders and shows the main contractual and financing building blocks for a 
typically developed PPP. The arrows show the direction of CFs or influence, while 
the solid and dotted lines represent elements which are constant or potentially 
possible, depending on the PPP forms, schemes and financial structure of IP, 
respectively. The key elements in the structure of PPP are: 
 
Figure 1.3 Generalized PPP transaction and contractual structure (prepared by the 
author of this dissertation) 
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• PPP agreement signed between the investors and the PPA, under which 
the responsibilities and allocated risks are shared between the partners 
as well as the mechanism of payment, pricing and compensation are 
determined for the infrastructure or/and service provided by the private 
entity or infrastructure provided by the public sector in a case of lease 
and similar arrangements. 
• A project company, the so-called SPV, which runs the IP and is usually 
owned only by private investors; however, under the institutional basis, 
the ownership can also be shared between the private investors and the 
PPA. 
• Financing for IP’s capital costs through shareholder equity and project 
finance debt. Debt financing may be provided by commercial and 
development banks, pension funds or other institutional financiers with 
which the investors and PPA sign a trilateral loan financing agreement.  
• Operating subcontracts, under which the operation subcontractors 
provide services or/and manage infrastructure for a fixed period. While 
other subcontracts related to the design, construction and maintenance, 
etc. of infrastructure depend on a share of risk transferring to the 
private entity. 
Beside the mentioned elements, the diagram above shows that the structure of 
PPP may also include services of insurance, external advisors from both the private 
entities, such as financial, engineering advisors, lawyers, etc. and the public entity, 
such as the national PPP unit as well as the participation of the undertakers, 
controllers and auditors, whose functions are related to the insurance of public 
interest. The particular structure of PPP depends on the specific PPA’s requirements 
and the results of procurement, i.e. the elected participant determines which 
structure of entities represents the private party in the PPP.  
Considering the above-mentioned aspects, it is obvious that the structuring of 
PPP may be a challenging process. However, a well-structured PPP can also provide 
many advantages, which have been analyzed in Section 1.2.3. Therefore, since the 
PPP is considered as a possibility to optimize investments in public infrastructure, it 
is important to analyze the aspects related to the assessment of these possibilities. 
Accordingly, the theoretical aspects of the of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure are analyzed. 
1.3. Theoretical aspects of VfM assessment 
Since PPP is one of the ways to implement investments in public infrastructure, 
the expediency of its application requires to be properly assessed: PPP proposals can 
be justified to proceed, if they are proven as a better delivery option against CP. 
VfM is the main justification for choosing public or private provision for delivering 
public infrastructure and services (Liu et al., 2015; Moro Visconti, 2014; Shaoul, 
2005; Wang, 2014). Since there is no single more important exercise than carrying 
out a transparent “cost comparator” for a government, in many countries VfM 
assessment is used as the main decision-making tool not only to support the 
decisions on whether to deliver public infrastructure IP through PPP or other CP 
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means, but also for the choice among PPP bids for a particular IP as well as other 
selections within the context of public investment (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011).  
In the context of PPP, the general conception and objectives of VfM assessment 
are widely acknowledged: it is a comparison of total cost of IP’s delivery options in 
a structured manner to identify the best one delivered by traditional government 
means versus the private sector means. However, there is no a unique approach to 
VfM assessment as well as its precise objectives and therefore related 
methodologies. The existing differences disclose that the VfM assessment within a 
context of PPP is subject to considerable issues both in the academic and political 
debates. 
Accordingly, this section of the dissertation is primarily committed to an 
analysis of VfM conception within the context of PPP. Further, descriptive and 
comparative analyses of different approaches of VfM are performed. Finally, a 
review of factors increasing the VfM for the public sector is provided. 
1.3.1. The conception of VfM assessment 
VfM is a widely-used term that has intuitive plausibility; however, its 
substantive meaning is ambiguous. In the context of public finance, it is associated 
with general objectives of the public sector entities, the so-called the three Es: 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Shaoul, 2005). Due to a variety of 
conceptual and methodological reasons, the focus is on economy, indicating the 
price paid for provided service at best value, taking the price and quality into 
account, rather than the remaining concepts discussed in the previous sections of this 
dissertation. Its meaning in the context of PPP is also no more precise and 
fundamentally focused on the disclosure of net positive gain to society in respect of 
cost of inputs, allocation of efforts and achievement of the goals which are greater 
than they could be achieved through any other alternative procurement route. In this 
case, the private option beside pure public provision is considered additionally. 
As a concept, VfM generally emphasizes the objective to capture the best 
proportionality between value and cost. This discloses its relative nature, i.e. 
knowing the VfM of a particular option in itself does not take full meaning, if there 
are no comparative options (Ball, 2011). Accordingly, in the context of PPP, where 
the concept of VfM is further analyzed, VfM can be gauged and realized only by 
comparing values and costs to society, when the public authorities carry out IPs in a 
traditional way to the benefits and costs of developing otherwise similar IPs using 
the PPP. It is rational to compare the best of both CP and PPP options. Here, cost 
usually means whole-life costs of the IP to deliver value for the users, including the 
costs of managing the associated risks in doing so. While value comprises the 
quality and quantity of service provided for users or the performance level over the 
length of the same IP.  
Since both the value and cost are included in the comparison, there it is logical 
to assume that the cheapest option may not necessarily be the best option. 
Accordingly, the best VfM is considered as the most advantageous combination of 
value and cost to meet users’ requirements (Jackson, 2012; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 
2014). However, since, in practice, a constant quality of infrastructure and services 
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or the same operational level at least satisfying the minimum performance 
requirements is mostly assumed (FWHA, 2012), the comparison is focused not on 
the CBA but on the difference between expenditures on public service provision by 
the public sector using conventional methods of provision versus the private sector 
through PPP (Harada & Ogunlan, 2015). Therefore, although the provision of 
higher-quality services, including such intrinsic benefits as earlier service delivery, 
avoidance of damage to society, etc., with the same expenditure also conceptually 
fits the stipulation of VfM increase, VfM is generally based on expenditure 
reduction. Therefore, VfM assessment is often considered as a systemic comparison 
of whole-life cost of financing and delivering an infrastructure IPs by traditional 
government’s means versus private sector’s means. 
As a result, VfM is usually measured using the concept of net present costs 
(NPC), which is a variant of the net present value (NPV) technique developed in the 
1950s (Fernandes et al., 2015; Shaoul, 2005). According to the general practice, the 
standard investment appraisal consists of a comparison of discounted life-cycle costs 
(NPC) of IP, financed under CP methods known as the PSC, with the NPC of the IP 
procured as the PPP (Gouveia & Raposo, 2012). Here, the novel and herewith the 
most controversial feature of the technique is that, as well as the expected financial 
costs, the costs of the risks associated with the appropriate schemes of PPP are also 
included. In the PSC, all risks are entirely assumed by the public sector, while in 
contracting the PPP at least a part of risks, depending on the scheme, are transferred 
to the private sector, respectively (Martins et al., 2011). Based on the NPV rule, the 
investments with the highest NPV are preferred as maximizing wealth for society, 
therefore the option with the lowest NPC is selected as yielding the greatest 
financial benefit. VfM is calculated as the difference between NPC of the CP option 
and the PPP option. If NPC of the PPP option is lower than PSC, then it delivers 
VfM and, therefore, the PPP route can be approved. 
The above-provided general principles of VfM assessment technique discloses 
that the PSC is one of the key parameters allowing the PPA to decide for expediency 
of PPP adoption. Through comparison with the outcome of competitive bidding 
process, it, as a ceiling on private firms’ bids, enables to determine whether there is 
an advantage in establishing a PPP by providing an aggregate estimate of the 
economic advantages or disadvantages of IP considered to be implemented as the 
PPP. The lower PSC is, the higher pressure is on bids of the private firms to 
minimize costs as well as the lower possibilities are to maximize the gains from 
using PPPs that can be a significant issue, if the ceiling, e.g. due to optimistic bias is 
mistakenly determined below the efficiency level of the private sector. While the 
higher PSC gives more space for the PPP to be economically justified and socially 
desirable which becomes especially relevant for the PPA to move ahead with PPP in 
the cases of IP not being financially affordable as a CP option or/and if this can be 
done off-balance. Although both of these marginal cases are examples of strategic 
misrepresentation, they, disclosing a central role of PSC, allow arguing that the 
situations where the PPAs introduce biases pushing them below or above the right 
value cannot be refused. Moreover, the assumptions used in the assessment, due to 
the complexity of IP’s structure, insufficient or unreliable available data, difficulties 
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in dealing with uncertainty and predicting IP’s input variables, ranging from the 
specialized types of labor to energy and raw materials, the lists of which can be quite 
long and it may not be obvious what the relevant market prices are, or what the right 
amounts should be for some of these inputs, even due to the optimism bias, are 
likely to be subjective (Gouveia & Raposo, 2012; Khadaroo, 2008; Moro Visconti, 
2014), and since usually a long reference period of 20–30 years is used, even their 
small changes highly effect the final VfM analysis. Therefore, it is obvious that, in 
practice, the estimates of the PSCs can easily become a subject of controversy with 
accusations of being biased and not transparent enough. This determines the 
requirement for solutions, which could increase the openness and transparency of 
the public commitment to optimizing VfM. 
Many scientists, such as Ball (2011), de Jong et al. (2010), English & Guthrie 
(2003); Gouveia & Raposo (2012), Grimsey & Lewis (2005), Liu et al. (2015) have 
analyzed the issues related to PSC and, herewith, VfM assessment, respectively. 
They argue that a major issue with PSC is that if the CP scheme is not financially 
affordable, it becomes a hypothetical scheme rather than an actual set of costs from 
a comparative scheme. Fernandes et al., (2015) claim that, in most cases, the PPP is 
the “only game in town”. As a result, project promoters have real incentives to 
achieve a positive VfM, therefore the PSC can be manipulated to show “whatever its 
users require it to show”. This, as the following aspects also disclose, creates an in-
built bias in favor of PPP. 
Another point of criticism is that while in the feasibility stage the VFM analysis 
is traditionally based on a comparison of identical IPs, which differ only in respects 
of financing, risk allocation, etc. However, bids can differ substantially depending 
on received approval, because of different requirements in terms of higher taxation, 
additional works, higher quality standards, etc. for the private entity (Desgrées du 
Lou, 2012; Fernandes et al., 2015; Khadaroo, 2008). There is also a critique 
regarding PSC that its calculation is based on the assumption that the costs of public 
sector investment are met in the year when they occur, ignoring the fact that the 
public sector can spread costs over time through financing. Since the discounting 
methodology favors options which defer expenditure over those which have high 
costs in the beginning of the period, it creates an artificial advantage for PPP 
options. However, the loan-financed public sector option can also have a similar 
payment profile as in the case of PPP, while bond-financing allows principal 
payment to be deferred until the date of maturity which makes it lower from the 
perspective of NPV. This allows arguing that since the VfM assessment is based on 
a comparison of public sector option’s costs, where their actual reimbursement differ 
from the records of accounting, and actual expenditures in the PPP option, there is 
an inherent advantage for PPP. 
In literature, beside the above-mentioned critiques to PSC, the main disputes 
regarding the assumptions used in the VfM assessment are concerned with the 
following aspects: application of discounted CFs technique as well as determination 
of the appropriate FDR (Ball, 2011; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Khadaroo, 2008; Moro 
Visconti, 2014; Shaoul, 2005), risk transfer and allocation between the partners, 
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competitive neutrality (CN), NFBs, expediency for the involvement of additional 
transactional costs of PPP. The arguments of both sides are further discussed. 
Regarding the discounted CF technique, the main arguments against its 
application is that NPV, as a technique for evaluating investment proposals reflects 
the degree to which cash inflows or revenue equals or exceeds the amount of 
investment capital also considered as the opportunity cost required to fund it and, 
therefore, is applied to maximize shareholders or owners’ wealth. Thus, its use in the 
public sector implies that the public interest is restricted to that of a shareholder, 
despite the fact that most of public sector organizations are not wealth maximisers in 
a financial sense (Gordon et al., 2013; Marcelin & Mathur, 2014; Martins et al., 
2011; Maskin & Tirole, 2008; Müller & Turner, 2005; Shaoul, 2005; Wright et al., 
2001). Moreover, the discounting concept is more rational where investment 
opportunity instantly disappears, if not immediately undertaken. While, in practice, 
usually there is a time period over which the investment can be undertaken. On the 
other hand, each of these procurement options, as presented in Section 1.2.3., has 
different expenditure profile over time. Therefore, discounting plays an important 
role putting them on a comparable basis that is in favor of the NPV technique. Based 
on this argument, discounting is a dominant technique in literature in the context of 
VfM. However, although the NPV approach is widely used, it is by no means used 
as the sole criterion – nominal CFs remain important estimates when the 
affordability of PPP is analyzed. 
Since the discounting procedure is applied, a crucial aspect of its methodology 
is setting an appropriate FDR used to reflect time preference in the VfM 
assessment. The FDR refers to the interest rate by which future cashflows (CFs) 
need to be reduced to express them in today’s current value. Beside the time value of 
money, it also reflects the risk or uncertainty inherent in future CFs: the greater the 
uncertainty of future CFs, the higher the discount rate. Since the FDR fundamentally 
effect the NPV of an option, the choice of FDR can have a heavy influence on which 
option appears to be more attractive in respect of cost and, herewith, the final results 
of VfM analysis. Therefore, the determination of FDR attracts much consideration 
from both the academicians and the practitioners. However, the review of a number 
of scientific articles (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Shaoul, 2005) as well as the guides 
(EPEC, 2015b; European Commission, 2014b; FWHA, 2012; Infrastructure 
Australia, 2008) reviewing the current practices in different countries allow arguing 
that there is no consensus on the methodology for calculating FDR. 
The main debates focus on questions of whether and to what extent the 
corporate finance valuation theory can be applicable in the context of public 
investment. A key aspect within the debate is whether the assumption to equate FDR 
to market information on the cost of capital, which also reflects investment risk, may 
be considered as a superior to any other basis for assumptions to derive the FDR. 
The argument in favor of applying this valuation approach is based on the 
assumption that actual cost of financing for the government is not the correct basis 
for discounting because this is not sufficiently accurate and does not reflect actual 
opportunity cost of capital (Hanaoka & Palapus, 2012), while the best alternative 
79 
investment should, in principle, produce higher earnings than the interest rate paid 
on public or private loans. 
On the other hand, as discussed previously, the public sector usually is not a 
profit maximizer and from the financial perspective mostly seeks only to cover 
debt/loan obligations that supports the approach for FDR to be closer to the public 
sector’s average borrowing rate rather than opportunity cost. From this approach, the 
FDR can be equated to one of three reference rates (EPEC, 2015b): 1) the standard 
borrowing rate of the PPA for a loan, whose maturity would be equal to the PPP 
project’s life; 2) the approximate average loan life, which in the 25-year IP typically 
is between 10 and 15 years, rate26, and; 3) the rate of PPP IP loan maturity, which is 
linked to equivalent maturities in the market. This discloses the possibility to choose 
accordingly. 
If the corporate finance valuation is accepted as applicable to the public sector, 
a subsequent questionable aspect is whether, in order to reflect IPs risks premium in 
the results, this valuation approach should be followed in setting the FDR or/and 
reflected in the adjustment of the IP’s CFs (Khadaroo, 2008; Martins et al., 2011; 
Dimitrios a. Tsamboulas & Kapros, 2003; Xu et al., 2012). In the first case, the 
expected CFs are estimated across all scenarios, multiplying the probabilities of each 
scenario by the likelihood of that scenario unfolding, and then discounting those CFs 
by using the risk-adjusted FDR. Here, the choice of an appropriate FDR depends on 
the chosen perspective: narrower financial or wider social-economic, from which the 
VfM assessment is performed (Shaoul, 2005). From the financial one, the FDR 
equates to the cost of borrowing for the PPA during the period of PPP. While, from 
the socio-economic perspective, the FDR is closer to the cost of private capital for 
the IP, which, in comparison with the financial one, includes a risk premium to the 
extent that risks are not otherwise reflected in the adjustments of IP’s CFs. In the 
second case, the risk adjustment process through the replacement of the uncertain 
expected CFs with the certainty equivalent CFs is akin to the one to adjust FDRs, 
however, those certainty equivalent CFs are discounted at a risk-free rate. Both 
approaches are alternative to adjusting for risk, if the risk premiums from risk and 
return models to compute certainty equivalents and the value obtained from both 
approaches is the same. However, each of these approaches to estimating risk 
adjusted value of an IP also have some advantages and associated problems. 
When risk is adjusted through such risk-adjusted FDR methods as the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), the arbitrage pricing model or the WACC etc., the 
effect is transparent and can be easily estimated by adding IP’s specific risk 
premium to the risk-free rate (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Macário, 2010b). If there is a 
requirement to assess the results at a different level of risk, the FDR can be changed 
quickly and comfortably. To make the discounting process as simple as possible, the 
practice to use the FDR which is fixed for a certain period, usually from five to ten 
years, is also observed. This special case was found in the UK, where the FDR was 
equal to SDR which is the same used in the CBA, and the  calculation of which was 
based on the social time preference rate approach (HM Treasury, 2006, 2011, 2012). 
                                                 
26 The average loan life period observed in practice of PPP implementation in Lithuania. 
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This also could be equal to social opportunity cost of capital or based on weighted 
average cost of capital approach or shadow price of capital approach, which are 
analyzed by Freeman & Groom 2016; Kazlauskienė (2015) Kossova & Sheluntcova, 
2016). However, the STPR approach, as a review of literature has disclosed (Evans, 
2009; Kazlauskienė, 2015; Moszoro, 2010), is prevailing due to its mathematical 
simplicity and availability of data. 
However, although the use of risk-adjusted FDRs in computing value is 
widespread in practice, there are also some unresolved issues in their usage. First, 
although most of PPPs consist of several periods when the exposure for risk is 
different, e.g. construction and operation, also despite the fact that actual cost of 
capital is constantly changing, CFs are usually discounted at single period FDR, 
compounded over time and, therefore, are not accurate at a particular moment 
(Zawawi et al., 2014). Second, in most discounted CF valuations all CFs are 
assumed to be equally exposed to risks and, therefore, are discounted at the same 
rate. But this assumption is not always true; e.g., the level of uncertainty related to 
the CFs of revenues and variable operating expenses is higher than fixed operating 
expenses, such as pre-committed payments. Therefore, there is a question of whether 
these types of CFs could be discounted at different risk-adjusted FDRs depending on 
their riskiness and whether the risk differences are large enough to make a 
difference (Brandao & Saraiva, 2008). Finally, since riskier assets are assessed by 
increasing FDR, this presupposes that the CFs are positive. Therefore, in the case of 
CFs being negative, e.g. in the construction period, the higher FDR has a perverse 
impact of reducing their present value. As a solution, negative CFs could be 
separately discounted at a lower rate e.g. risk-free rate. However, this would also 
determine the internal inconsistency in how the CFs deal with risk (Damodaran, 
2007). 
The advantages of certainty equivalent CFs’ approach are that it counts only 
those CFs which are “safe” from risk, therefore, it allows calculating a guaranteed 
return that someone would accept rather than taking a chance on a higher, but 
uncertain, return. In comparison with the risk-adjusted FDR, certainty equivalent 
approach provides more precise estimates of value  when risk-free rates and risk 
premiums change from time period to time period (Brandao & Saraiva, 2008; 
Choudhry, 2015). Moreover, as distinct from the previous approach, the certainty 
equivalents are computed from utilities functions, and when they are negative, they 
become more negative as the risk increases, which is more consistent with intuition. 
This approach is also preferable in the cases where risks occur infrequently but can 
have a large impact on values, because it may be easier to adjust the expected CFs 
than determine an appropriate risk-adjusted FDR. This approach also harmonizes 
better with cases where the public sector is not a profit maximizer, as it was 
discussed in Section 1.1.1. However, a disadvantage of this approach is that it is 
problematic to convert uncertain expected CFs into guaranteed certainty equivalents. 
Despite a number of models developed to get certainty equivalent CFs, such as 
utility models, risk and return models, CF “haircut” models, etc., their estimation 
remains a challenge (Damodaran, 2007). 
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For the VfM assessment, in most of cases, the same FDR is applied to the CFs 
of both the CP and PPP options27. However, depending on the above-presented 
assumptions about the perspective of the VfM assessment, the ways risk is reflected 
and the approach applied as a basis to reflect relevant risks and time preference, 
there are many different approaches used to determine the FDR for VfM assessment. 
The most significant methodological differences are mostly observed between 
separate countries (EPEC, 2015b). Accordingly, the differences among 
methodologies of VfM assessment in different countries regarding aspects of FDR 
application and others are presented in the following sections of this dissertation. 
Since the optimal allocation of risk is one of the key objectives of all PPPs28, it 
is important to determine the appropriate value of retained risk needed to be 
included in the PPP option. For this purpose, initially all the risks associated with 
appropriate tasks such as design, construction, maintenance, operation, finance, etc. 
over the life-cycle of IP must be identified (Ernest Effah; Ameyaw & Chan, 2015; 
Ernest Effah Ameyaw & Chan, 2013; Bowers & Khorakian, 2014; Hwang et al., 
2013; Martins et al., 2011; Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 2013) as well as 
their analysis in terms of likely impact and probability of occurrence has to be 
performed (Demirag et al., 2011; Kokkaew & Wipulanusat, 2014; Lehtiranta, 2014; 
Dimitrios a. Tsamboulas & Kapros, 2003). Once this is done, risk needs to be 
allocated between the PPA and the bidder. Each transfer of risk to the private sector 
should be considered from the VfM perspective. Therefore, VfM, as a relative 
concept, requires the comparison of total cost of both PSC and various PPP options, 
where the PPP option with the best VfM could be found through the modelling of 
different risk transfer scenarios. For comparison, PSC conceptually includes full risk 
adjustment which helps to get an overall picture of the IP’s cost, if it was 
implemented under CP. While in the PPP it is necessary to deduct the risks 
transferred to the private subject, retaining only the risk added to the PPP cost. Here, 
the more risk is transferred, the more expensive the PSC becomes relative to the PPP 
option. As a result, the transferred risk largely determines whether or not the PPP is 
VfM (Burke & Demirag, 2015; Jin & Zhang, 2011; N. Wang, 2014), and, as a key 
determinant, may need to be updated as negotiations proceed and economic balance 
between the entities has to be preserved. 
Since there is no unique method how to allocate particular risks between the 
public and private sector, there is a real challenge to calculate the optimal values of 
retained and transferred risks as both involve subjective and qualitative judgements 
(Khadaroo, 2008). Changes of the assumptions regarding the allocation of risks can 
easily shift the balance between the CP option and the PPP option. This discloses 
that risk transfer in the PPP is conceptually flawed. Several reasons can be excluded 
accordingly (Burke & Demirag, 2015; Shaoul, 2005). 
First, risk transfer as well as the entire VfM assessment methodology depends 
upon the possibilities to determine and attach probabilities and values to a range of 
                                                 
27 An exception is the approach used by Infrastructure Australia (FWHA, 2012). See Section 
1.3.2. 
28 See Section 1.2.1 
82 
outcomes, which, given the lack of sound prior evidence to base the risk estimates 
(REs), is inevitably a subjective process (Burke & Demirag, 2015; Daito & Gifford, 
2014; Wang, 2014). Although there are increasingly sophisticated systems for the 
evaluation of risk transfer (Kokkaew & Wipulanusat, 2014), whey can only be as 
good as there are the basic estimates of probability and costs of risky events. If these 
are unrealistic, then all calculations of risk transfer become unreliable. While, 
according to Ball (2011), there is an often practice when risk is assessed and 
allocated by the project team in the workshop environment by using very amateurish 
ways. A review of literature regarding risk assessment discloses that the probability-
impact (P-I) risk assessment model is prevailing in practice, while the models based 
on historical or benchmark data are in comparison less used (Jasiukevicius & 
Vasiliauskaite, 2015a). Despite this practice and, therefore, potential huge 
subjectivity in the results of risk assessment, real money is paid for these risks. 
Second, irrespective of how much risk is transferred to the private sector, it 
should not be forgotten that the public sector, as earlier explained29, is a final 
guarantor and at the end bears all risk related to the provided public infrastructure 
and services. 
Third, risk methodology does not necessarily align risks, outcomes and 
penalties correctly e.g., if infrastructure or services is unavailable for its direct users, 
the private subject is typically punished by reduced payments and/or compensation 
from the PPA, however, the direct users as victims, are usually not compensated for 
their loss (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Shaoul, 2005). 
Forth, there is no unanimous opinion whether the PPP creates additional risks 
to the PPA (Yin Wang, 2015), and, if it does, whether their cost has to be included 
in the PSC. On the one hand, the PPP may cause the costs of the PPA being locked 
into a long-term inflexible contract (Poulton & Macartney, 2012; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016; Wang, 2014) or, in case of the failure of PPP contract, create 
transitional period costs (Fernandes et al., 2015; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Parker & 
Hartley, 2003; Schepper et al., 2014; Vagliasindi, 2004) that is in favor of cost of 
these risks to be included in the comparison. On the other hand, the assessment of 
these risks makes the already highly complex risk analysis even more complicated 
and, usually due to a lack of data available to systematically evaluate whether the 
PPP schemes provide effective risk transfer and represent VFM compared to other 
forms of procurement, subjective (Burke & Demirag, 2015). 
Fifth, if the costs of risk premium are included in FDR, it is complicated to 
allocate the risk between the public and private entities by adjusting different FDR 
for the PSC and the PPP option, since FDR reflects opportunity cost, while 
allocation of risk is mostly based on division of tasks (Shaoul, 2005). Finally, risk 
allocation has to be based not only on the minimization of costs, but it also has to be 
ensured that risks are transferred in ways that are legally and practically enforceable 
(Gupta et al., 2013; Tamosiunas & Zilakauskyte, 2010; Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen, 
2015). However, since the PPP contracts are usually not in the public domain due to 
                                                 
29 See the section 1.2.3. 
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commercial confidentiality, it is difficult to analyze this aspect based on actual 
contract (Khadaroo, 2008; Shaoul et al., 2012). 
In certain cases of PPP, there is an obligation for the private sector to pay 
certain additional taxes and insurance premiums that do not exist in the reference IP 
(PSC), because the entities of the public sector can be exempted from certain taxes 
and undertakes all risks. Moreover, there is a fact that some of the costs of the PPP 
represents tax revenue, which returns to the government. This determines the 
distortion that often exists between the same tasks of the private sector and those of 
the public sector and aggravate their comparison. The issue usually concerns taxes 
related to land, property, payroll, local government and capital transaction. 
Therefore, there is a need to set out the necessary policies or legal measures to 
ensure CN, that would enable a comparison of both options on an equal and 
objective basis. As a solution, this requires an increase of cost in the PSC to 
represent a true “apples-to-apples” comparison. However, regarding CN, there is no 
unanimous opinion on whether to distinguish among the various levels of 
government to whom taxes are paid, since the taxes paid to the national government 
could be treated differently from the state and local taxes (EPEC, 2015b; Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005; Tsamboulas et al., 2013; Xueqing Zhang & Chen, 2013). For example, 
taxes, certain indirectly counted in payments from the local government to the 
private subjects, paid to the national government may not return as revenues to local 
government. Therefore, the realization of CN from the perspective of local 
government can differ from those of national level, which discloses the potential 
principal-agent problem between the different levels of government discussed 
earlier30. On the other hand, from the perspectives of the consolidated public sector 
accounting and benefits for society, the distinction between different levels of 
government vanish and competitive advantages of the public sector against the 
private one in respect of taxes is evident. As a result, regarding the calculation of 
CN, there is no unanimous point of view on whether to draw such a distinction 
between different levels of government. 
Usually, VfM assessment is focused on efficiency, i.e. the risk-adjusted 
financial costs of providing what is assumed to be an equivalent output. However, 
since not all the benefits of a particular option can be conveyed through financial 
costs, NFBs may be not less important for rational comparing of the options (Mota 
& Moreira, 2015). The features and advantages of PPP described in Section 1.2 
allow arguing that a PPP is specifically intended to deliver greater NFBs than CPs. 
Therefore, it is theoretically believed that NFBs under the PPP can be greater than 
under CP. However, each case requires individual assessment. 
Considering the incremental basis VfM of PPP NFBs can be in principle 
captured through three key aspects (EPEC, 2011): accelerated delivery (Bin & 
Quan, 2012; Liu et al., 2015; Parker & Hartley, 2003; Wang, 2002), enhanced 
delivery (Ng et al., 2012; Zawawi et al., 2014) and wider social impact (Abednego 
& Ogunlana, 2006; Hellowell, 2013; Hwang et al., 2013; Silvestre, 2012). 
Regarding the first aspect, PPPs can accelerate the delivery of an infrastructure and 
                                                 
30 See the section 1.1.1. 
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related services in two main ways: 1) through various financial incentive mechanism 
incorporated into the terms of the contract, it encourages the private entities to 
deliver infrastructure on time, which decreases the potential social cost related to 
infrastructure and services being inaccessible to society in case of delay, and; 2) due 
to the involvement of private capital, the PPP can provide additional financing for 
the public sector that can help to accelerate investment programs and make 
infrastructure and services accessible earlier than under CP, which is a social-
economic benefit with all associated externalities for society. Considering the 
second aspect, the enhanced delivery may be achieved due to at least four features of 
PPP: 1) application of life-cycle approach resulting in better asset conditions and 
higher residual values at the end of PPP contract; 2) development of contractual 
commitments in such a way that both better designed and higher quality of 
infrastructure and service delivery is achieved, and; 3) potential to achieve the 
benefits associated with increased external scrutiny by lenders and investors, better 
management of infrastructure and service delivery, and more possibilities for the 
public sector to concentrate on its core tasks, and; 4) higher amount of infrastructure 
and services being available for the same annual budget due to the payment profile 
under the PPP. Regarding the third aspect, NFBs of PPPs are related to the positive 
externalities of using the PPP, i.e. the benefits to parties which are not the direct 
users of an infrastructure or services delivered under the IP. These benefits can be 
divided into two categories: 1) Wider public sector benefits, which can be very 
diverse and are particularly difficult to quantify or value, e.g. benefits of potential-
to-replicate design, management and technology innovations in the future IPs, better 
understanding of specific risks in the IPs, better allocation of public resources 
because of application of whole life-cycle approach, lower costs of CPs’ bids 
because of higher competition from the PPPs, etc.; 2) Wider macro-economic 
benefits, which are the same for both PPPs and conventional IPs; however, if, due to 
e.g. financial constraints, PPP is the only real option to implement an IP , they can 
be included based on time preference as far as they do not duplicate NFB related to 
the first aspect in the VfM assessment as PPP ensures their earlier delivery, e.g. 
investments encourage employment in the private sector, development of 
infrastructure increases economic competitiveness, etc. 
The majority of the above-mentioned NFBs are based on the assumption that 
the private sector in general has advantage in respect of technology and efficiency 
against the public sector as well as, the PPPs allow getting benefits earlier than in 
the case of CP due to budget constraints that, as discussed in Section 1.2.3, both are 
not necessarily true in individual cases. Moreover, the budget constraints for 
particular investments under CP are also conditional, since they depend on the 
priorities of the public sector to allocate the resources for particular fields of 
investment. Financing can be found for a CP, if it is prioritized accordingly. Thus, 
since the application of NFB is quite subjective, every IP requires case-by-case 
assessment. 
Regarding the comparison of costs associated with both procurement methods, 
beside investment, operation and financing costs which are the base for evaluation, 
there are also transaction costs, which, according to Parker & Hartley (2003), 
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Schepper et al. (2014), have not always received much attention in evaluating 
procurement methods, although they can also make a difference between the 
options. In the context of PPP, transaction costs refer to costs of establishing and 
maintaining the PPP or establishing and monitoring several contracts under CP that 
are usually accompanied by legal, technical and financial costs incurred by both the 
public and private sectors in the procurement and operational phases of the IP. Since 
the PPP contracts are traditionally more complex and it is time consuming to arrange 
them as well as to organize tendering, evaluating, negotiating and selecting bids, it is 
argued by many scientists (Fernandes et al., 2015; Gudelis & Rozenbergaitė, 2004; 
Mota & Moreira, 2015; Mu et al., 2011; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016) that 
transaction costs of PPPs, as discussed in Section 1.2.4, are likely to be higher than 
in the case of CP. This implies that for objective and transparent VfM assessment 
these additional costs occurring in the PPP option have to be added to this option or 
deducted from the PSC. However, since there is no reliable systematic study on the 
comparison of transactional costs between the PPPs and CP options that was also 
stated by Schepper et al. (2014), it cannot be strictly stated that transactional costs of 
PPP are significantly different from CP. Moreover, the development of PPP market 
allows accumulating the best practice of such IPs’ procurement, that, in turn, enable 
the public sector to develop the standard PPP procurement documents and 
frameworks which have a potential to decrease transactional cost of other PPPs 
(Janssen et al., 2016). Therefore, since there are no summarized results on 
transactional cost in different procurement options31, whether transactional costs 
have to be included in the comparison, the decisions require case-by-case 
assessment and are likely to be subjective. 
Beside the above-discussed aspects related to what has to be included in the 
PSC for rational VfM assessment there is also a need to ensure that the PPP option 
is financially affordable given the future impact on the PPA’s liquidity and even 
state solvency (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016). If future payments under the PPP 
threaten the sustainability of public finances or/and the price for direct users is too 
high, even if the PPP may have a lower NPC, it becomes unaffordable, resulting in 
inaccessibility of improved infrastructure and services to the society. Therefore, 
affordability is crucial. As a result, the PPP needs to be structured as well as 
negotiated in such a way that it would remain within the government’s and users’ 
affordable range (Yinglin Wang & Liu, 2015). However, according to Gupta et al. 
(2013), Moro Visconti (2014), Shaoul (2005), Yinglin Wang & Liu (2015), despite 
the importance, relatively little attention is given to affordability, determining the 
potential risk of affordability gap and the negative consequences for public finance.  
While affordability as a concept is no less problematic than VfM (Rossi & 
Civitillo, 2014; Felix Villalba-Romero, Liyanage, & Roumboutsos, 2014). It is very 
flexible and since there is no its prescribed methodology or criteria, it is identified 
only by affordability ‘ceiling’, beyond which the PPA should not go. However, 
                                                 
31 Thomassen, Vassbø, Solheim-Kile, & Lohne (2016) have provided a case study of a new 
primary school in Norway, which showed that ex-ante transaction costs are equal around 7–
8% of total project cost. 
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typically, there are also no precise procedures for justifying the “ceiling” in the 
public sector. Since it is presumed that private participation increases cost-efficiency 
and allows spreading costs over the life of the PPP contract32, it is logical to 
associate affordability with identifying the services to be provided, compare their 
costs against the current costs and overall budget assigned to these services, and 
identify what, if anything, is displaced by the new arrangements. Here, if the PPA 
provides UPs for private subjects, for rational (apple-to-apple) comparison, it is 
important to distinguish separate elements of payment according to its individual 
structure. For example, the availability fee for infrastructure may be compared, at 
least conceptually, to the capital costs and charges (interest and dividends on the 
public capital), and the maintenance costs currently incurred by the public entity 
which provides services. While the facility management fee for the operation of 
infrastructure may be compared to costs that are incurred by the same public entity 
or its sub-contractors via outsourcing contracts. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
budget available for payments also depends on the priorities of the PPAs, and can be 
higher or lower in comparison with the current limit. Therefore, without knowing 
the maximum amount of budget available for financing commitments under the PPP, 
it is impossible to directly assess whether the payments from the public sector is 
affordable. Since there is no systemic study on how affordability is assessed in 
practice, there is no solution outlined in this dissertation. 
Finally, regarding the VfM assessment in the context of PPP, not all benefits of 
a particular option can be captured in monetary terms (EPEC, 2011; Khadaroo, 
2008; Mota & Moreira, 2015). For a complex assessment, there is also a need to 
assess non-valued effect (NVE)s. Since research is mostly focused on qualitative 
analysis and mostly scored only qualitatively (namely ‘yes’ or ‘no’), the options 
under the quantitative VfM assessment are not conceptually included in the 
comparison, they are important as additional criteria allowing deeper and wider 
assessment to be carried out and ensuring the rational decisions to be made 
throughout the process of the VfM assessment (EPEC, 2015b; FWHA, 2012). For 
example, it might be important to assess whether the IP in respect of investment 
amount, integration with existing assets or networks, consistency over time, 
possibilities to measure performance, asset lifetime, maintenance and refurbishment 
requirements, factors influencing or limiting transferability of IP’s maintenance and 
operation tasks, innovation requirements, scope for the private subject to generate 
additional ancillary revenue, etc. has potential for deeper quantitative analysis for 
expediency of its implementation under the PPP, or whether there is any interest in 
the market for the PPP option, resulting in a qualitative competition of bidders and, 
herewith, delivering VfM. These criteria for an IP can involve many aspects, e.g. 
safety, capacity, reliability, service quality, legal feasibility, etc. (Burke & Demirag, 
2015; Gupta et al., 2013; Hickford et al., 2015; Janssen et al., 2016; Khan & 
Mushtaq, 2009; Martins et al., 2011; Ng et al., 2012; Sambrani, 2014; Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016; Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016; Xu et al., 2012). For 
the VfM assessment, the checklists of these criteria are usually used. 
                                                 
32 See Section 1.2.3., where the advantage of PPP is explained. 
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The existing variety of criteria differing in their emphasis, point of nature in the 
IP development cycle discloses the existence of a wide range of approaches applied 
to assess non-valued effects and combine them with the overall VfM assessment. 
According to EPEC (2015b)33, these approaches can be divided into six main 
categories. The main differences between them are revealed through the stage of IP 
development when the VfM assessment is performed, which determines what non-
valued effects at a particular point are relevant and can be evaluated as well as how 
they can be combined with the results of quantitative VfM assessment. The main 
features of different approaches are presented below. 
Under the approach such as in Australia (Australian Government, 2008), the 
assessment of the non-valued affects is performed only in the early phases of the 
procurement, therefore, since there is no quantitative analysis yet, the qualitative 
factors alone are used to perform the analysis and are not weighted against monetary 
outcomes in this stage. Instead of this, the positive results of qualitative assessment 
give reasonable arguments for the quantitative VfM assessment needed to be carried 
out in the next stage. 
In Germany, where a basic qualitative approach is a supplement to a valuation 
assessment, it is more focused on non-valued effects only if the results of the 
quantitative analysis are too close to unambiguously assess the best one. Herewith, 
there is no standard list of criteria and the assessment is structured according to 
particular requirements every time. A similar approach is used in France; however, 
to proceed, there is a legal requirement to demonstrate the PPP as the most efficient 
option to deliver public infrastructure and services. While the comparative analysis 
is focused on the qualitative impact of each procurement option in terms of 
performance and sustainable development and disclosure of additional benefits and 
possible disadvantages possible of the PPP option. The results of the qualitative 
assessment are usually weighted more heavily than the results of the quantitative 
assessment when the differences between the quantitative results for the 
conventional option and the PPP option are small as well as when there is a high 
level of uncertainty around the input variables used in the quantitative assessment, 
while the outputs are highly sensitive to them. 
The most extensive qualitative approach combined with the quantitative 
assessment is applied in the UK, where the assessment of non-valued effects, 
alongside the quantitative assessment, is performed both in the early and later stages 
of the IP’s development with the emphasis tailored to the relevant stage of the IP, 
accordingly. For example, the interest from the market and the quality of 
competition, the abilities of PPA to efficiently manage the procurement process is 
more emphasized at the initial stage of procurement. While the criteria related to the 
assessment of the PPA’s satisfaction regarding its chosen funding and contract 
structure, the benefits of PPP outweighed the expected higher cost of capital and 
                                                 
33 No scientific studies have been found in which different approaches of non-valued effects 
in VfM assessment are analyzed. The study presented by the European PPP Expertize Center 
(EPEC, 2015b) is the first, in which the different approaches concerning VfM assessment, 
although rather fragmentary, are analyzed. 
88 
achievability of procurement program are usually assessed in the later stages. They 
can be separated into three the main parts: 1) viability, which addresses the question 
of whether the IP is suitable for long-term contracting; 2) desirability, which 
overlaps with the financial analysis as it addresses the question of whether the 
expected benefits outweigh the additional cost factors, and; 3) achievability, which 
includes the analysis of the market interest as well as timing issues, the capacity and 
capability of the PPA to manage different delivery options. As in Germany and 
France, the positive results of the assessment of non-valued effects must be 
demonstrated for the IP to be considered for implementation under the PPP 
procurement. The viability and achievability of the PPP option is a precursor to 
determine whether there are real PPP options that can be compared for VfM. 
Therefore, their assessment can be separated from the VfM analysis itself. 
In the UK, the approach to assess non-valued effects is used not only at the 
procurement stage, but also when bids are actually received from the market to 
assess whether the procurement still involves sufficient competition to achieve a 
competitive price. This is relevant since there is a risk that a theoretically derived 
PPP option may look cheaper, it may still not represent the best VfM, since the 
quality of the competition at the initial procurement stage is unknown. It may be 
revealed that, in fact, due to an incomplete analysis and/or absence of competition, 
e. g. where because of a poorly run competitive process, only one competitive bid 
from the market was received, the CP option was overpriced, resulting in an 
overvalued VfM. Therefore, at any point during the procurement process, it should 
be carefully considered whether the PPP option, including the non-valued effects, 
still provides the best VfM and it is worth to proceed. Unfortunately, the qualitative 
assessment at the later stages of IP’s development process is rarely used among the 
countries. 
The approach as a supplement to quantitative valuation, as applied in Belgium, 
distinguishes the quantification of results of qualitative assessment, where the 
outcome of analysis consisted of three components, such as social, operational and 
financial values which are got by asking whether the choice for a PPP procurement 
option leads to a different outcome for that component, and are scored, summed up 
and translated into a generalizing index. Weights of each components’ outcome 
included in the generalizing index are determined considering an appropriate 
formula, where the factors of financial and social indexes are prevailing 0.5 and 0.4 
respectively. While, the remaining factor applied to the operational index is 0.1. The 
general index represents how much the outcome of PPP generally differs from the 
conventional option in terms of non-valued effects. However, the individual 
outcomes for each of the three elements are also often presented. 
The last approach distinguishes the ex-post analysis of VfM, which is not 
always conducted through a predetermined structure. Typically, it involves the 
qualitative assessment and focuses on the processes that were followed when 
conducting the preparation of the procurement of the IP and related assessment tasks 
and risk allocation. 
Despite different approaches, in most countries, the qualitative assessment is 
considered as a vital element in the comparative complex analysis of both delivery 
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options. However, not all methodologies include non-valued effects specifically as 
part of the VfM assessment. This does not mean their complete exclusion from the 
decision-making for PPP’s implementation. In these cases, the non-valued effects 
are usually assessed in a separate analysis or through other mechanisms of decision-
making. The difference of the main approaches regarding the assessment of non-
valued effects are more deeply analyzed in the following section of this dissertation. 
To conclude this section on the conception of VfM assessment, VfM 
assessment is highly complex, including many elements of both quantitative and 
qualitative assessment, which are widely discussed and can be used differently, 
depending on the approaches applied. This discloses VfM assessment for PPP as a 
very flexible concept which can be adopted depending on the requirements. 
However, this also shows that the results of VfM assessment are rather subjective, 
since they highly depend on the assumptions used and the preconceptions applied. 
Therefore, for greater objectivity and reliability of the results, it is important to 
ensure consistency between the separate aspects of VfM assessment resulting in a 
complex systemic model provided, which is pursued to be the results of this 
dissertation. The following section provides a more detailed analysis of some 
prevailing practices regarding separate aspects of VfM assessment, possible to adapt 
for this purpose. 
1.3.2.  Comparative analysis of VfM assessment practices 
Since the concept of VfM assessment and its main elements were analyzed 
previously as well as the major disputes concerning the methodological assumptions 
used in this assessment, this section of the dissertation is intended for a deeper 
analysis of the prevailing methodologies of VfM assessment among different 
countries. More specifically, it is focused on comparative quantitative analysis of 
VfM assessment at the preparation stage. Since the scientific literature concerning 
VfM assessment, despite constant development of VfM assessment practices, still 
remains very fragmentary, a comparative analysis is mostly based on information 
gathered from various guides on VfM assessment across the countries (Burger & 
Hawkesworth, 2011; Commonwealth of Australia, 2008; EPEC, 2015b; FWHA, 
2012; HM Treasury, 2006; Infrastructure Ontario, 2015). The analysis focuses on 
methodologies of the countries where the PPP market is comparatively the most 
developed, such as the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Australia. 
The analysis disclosed that the VfM assessment is not strictly regulated in any 
of the above-mentioned countries and, concerning the quantitative VfM assessment, 
the guides are more likely to present various approaches concerning the main 
elements of the assessment instead, most of which have also been discussed in the 
previous sections of this dissertation, than they are likely provide a clear description 
of how to practically perform the assessment. On the one hand, this suggests that 
every case of assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in the public 
infrastructure and services is fairly individual and, therefore, requiring particular 
adjustment every time. On the other hand, since the initial analyzed resources are 
primarily guidelines for practitioners, they, in their nature, usually do not go into 
deep methodological analyses and systemization of various approaches where the 
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most rational one could be discussed and found. Despite this, some important 
differences among the methodologies can be noticed. They reveal through three 
main aspects: cost identification, risk reflection and present value calculation 
(Appendix 4). 
Regarding cost identification, typically, cost and revenue estimations for the 
PPP option and the CP option are not identical, since there is a notion that the 
private partner is likely to generate life-cycle cost optimization. In France and 
Germany, it is presumed that, in comparison with the CP option, the raw costs of 
PPP will be lower, thus they are adjusted by the predetermined efficiency factor. 
Similar prejudice concerning efficiency is met in the UK; however, it is asserted in a 
particular adjustment of costs to assess the risks. While in other countries, such as 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada, the assumptions about the efficiency of the 
private sector are applied only if there are reasoned arguments, i.e. from previous 
similar examples, to do so and by a particular percent considering various potential 
aspects. 
All analyzed methodologies assume that risk adjustments for both the CP and 
PPP options are identical, except for those risks for which specific differences can 
be identified. Although a way to reflect risk through the adjustment of FDR is also 
presented, the alternative way of risk adjustments through the CFs is prevailing. For 
risk assessment, various methods from a simple P-I matrix to sophisticated Monte 
Carlo simulations are used. In the UK, as mentioned above, the CFs are adjusted 
based on the expected optimism bias and expected risk-adjusted values. This 
increases cash outflow in the CP option as well as the expected availability fee 
required by the private partner that makes the PPP option relatively cheaper. 
The most significant differences among methodologies appear in determining 
and using the FDR for VfM assessment. Regarding this aspect, three different 
approaches can be distinguished. 
Under the first approach, such as the one applied in Canada, Germany and 
France, the FDR equals the actual public sector’s cost of financing, where no 
additional project-specific risk premium is added to the FDR. However, there are 
some differences among these countries with regards to how the FDR is determined. 
In France, FDR equals the standard borrowing rate of the public sector’s entity, 
since the assessment is focused on the financial assessment from the microeconomic 
perspective, i.e. from the PPA financing level. Canada uses the approximate average 
loan life method. While in Germany, the FDR equals the cost of loan, the maturity 
of which is equivalent to PPP project’s period. In all these modifications, the FDR 
varies with market interest rate. Therefore, if the market interest rate goes up, both 
the CP option and the PPP option becomes affected34. 
Under the second approach, which is used in the UK, the FDR is fixed at a 
certain period of time and equals to STPR where, as in the previous case, no project-
                                                 
34 If the unitary payments from the public sector are paid for the private partner, the changes 
in market interest rates do not have an equal impact on the NPC of the options. The effects of 
higher and lower DR on the NPV of the option are disclosed in Section 1.3.1 of this 
dissertation. 
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specific premium is included. Since the FDR is fixed, it does not vary with changing 
market interest rates or sector-specific risk. This means that, if the market interest 
rate or sectorial risk increases, the FDR remains unchanged. 
The third approach is used in such countries as the Netherlands and Belgium, 
where the FDR equals to market-based government borrowing rate including full 
project-risk premium. This means that all costs included in the private cost of capital 
represent cost to the economy that is also borne by the public sector. Since under 
this approach the FDR for both options is equal, the changes in market interest rates 
lead to an adjustment in the FDR but, in general, there is no difference in the 
outcome, if the effect of time preference is not considered. 
Irrespective of which of the approaches is used to determine the appropriate 
FDR, for VfM assessment usually the same FDR is applied to the CFs of both 
procurement options. Therefore, since the actual cost for PPP option is equal to the 
weighted cost of private capital, the differences between the cost of PPP option and 
the public sector’s FDR have to be reflected through the adjustments of CFs of the 
PPP option ensuring that there is no double counting or omission of the related risks. 
The exception is the approach used in Australia and Belarus where different FDRs 
are applied to PSC and PPP options, utilizing the CAPM only for the PPP option to 
account for systematic risk within the IP’s CFs. According to this approach, to 
discount “risky” CFs beside a risk-free FDR a risk premium is added, while for 
“non-risky” CFs risk-free FDR is used. As a result, the FDR of the PPP option is 
compared with the PSC. This practice is based on the theory that since the public 
sector transfers its systemic risk to the private sector, the latter should be 
compensated through a higher rate of return. However, this approach can be also 
criticized for making artificial advantages for PPPs. 
The analysis of quantitative VfM assessment methodologies allows concluding 
that the main methodological reasons for differences in the results between the CP 
and PPP options are determined by differences between the public entity’s FDR and 
the cost of private capital and the preconceived assumptions about higher efficiency 
of the private subject expressed in lower costs of the PPP option or higher costs of 
the PSC. There is also the effect of time preference, which also makes the cost of the 
PPP option lower. However, this, in general, has the same impact on CFs despite 
which of the approaches is adapted. Other differences in the results between the 
procurement options are mostly determined by the individual assumptions used in 
every IP. 
Literature is very limited in the analyses of how different VfM methodologies 
have been developed and why particular approaches have been chosen to be applied 
in different countries. The fragmentary articles of Ball (2011), Grimsey & Lewis 
(2005), Harada & Ogunlan (2015), Khadaroo (2008), and Tsamboulas et al. (2013) 
allow concluding that the development of VfM assessment methodologies is 
determined by individual political, economic, financial factors as well as various 
incentives and lessons learnt in every country. There are also countries where VfM 
assessment is not officially defined and applied only fragmentarily. Lithuania is also 
among those countries where full standardized VfM assessment methodology is still 
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not developed as well as VfM assessment is not applied as an official procedure in 
the process of PPP procurement35.  
Despite different approaches applied for VfM assessment it is relevant to 
analyze factors that increase VfM for the public sector to get the most benefits from 
the private sector’s participation in the provision of public infrastructure and 
services, especially where the experience of PPP procurement is still small, which is 
done in the following section of this dissertation. 
1.3.3. Factors increasing VfM 
The success of an IP is typically associated with the goals to complete it within 
the budget, time schedule and quality standards (Medda, 2007; Ng et al., 2012). The 
PPP IPs are no exception, and they also strive to achieve better VfM in comparison 
with the CP. Since the results of VfM depend on an appropriately constructed PPP, 
whether it will be achieved successfully or not relates primarily to the purpose of 
formulating and building a viable, stable, and effective PPP. This determines the 
requirement to analyze CSFs as well as “barriers” for PPP’s implementation. 
Gordon et al. (2013) define CSF as “the limited number of areas, the result of which, 
if they are satisfactory, will ensure successful competitive performance for the 
organization. They are the key few areas where ‘things must go right’ for the 
business to flourish”. Logically, barriers are considered to be anything that interferes 
with the CSFs (Khan & Mushtaq, 2009). 
A number of CSFs or drivers to the success of PPP have been explored by 
various researchers (Bao et al., 2014; Desgrées du Lou, 2012; Gordon et al., 2013; 
Kavaliauskaitė & Jucevičius, 2009; Moro Visconti, 2014). Among them Andreas; 
Wibowo & Alfen (2015) and Gupta et al., (2013) have distinguished 30 CSFs, while 
Ng et al. (2012) have identified as many as 36 CSFs. Since they cover many aspects 
of PPP IPs’ implementation, there is a requirement for their systemization. Yin 
Wang (2015) conducted an extensive review into the CSFs and classified them 
considering three perspectives from which the PPP development can be analyzed: 
external environment, internal IP’s characteristics and partnership-related factors 
(Table 1.3). 
Table 1.3. CSFs for PPP development (adopted from Yinglin Wang & Liu (2015)) 
External environment Internal IP’s characteristics Partnership-related factors 
• Infrastructure demand • Resource availability • PPP-related PPA capacity 
• Financial situation • Financial viability • Private partner selection 
• Political ideology • IP type and complexity • Role division 
• Relevant legislation • IP requirements • Risk allocation 
 • IP design  
 • Contract documents  
 • Project management  
Regarding the external environment, the scientist included the following factors 
as important for the development of an effective PPP: 1) Overall infrastructure 
                                                 
35 It is expected that the results of this dissertation will be a basis for the development of 
VfM assessment methodology in Lithuania. 
93 
demand, which matters as large aggregate demand bringing good chances of 
investment returns and, therefore, attracting private investments; 2) Financial 
situation, which asserts in a way that PPP allow the government to meet the growing 
demand of public infrastructure in the context of fiscal constraints and deliver 
improved public services at lower costs; 3) Political ideology, which has a strong 
impact on the development of favorable environment for PPP framework 
implementation or, due to concerns about the loss of public can restrict the 
participation of the private sector in the public one; 4) Relevant legislation, which 
shapes the legal and regulatory environment within the jurisdiction for PPP 
formation, operation, and sustainability that, if it is strong and effective, allows 
decreasing the uncertainties of legal regulation and increase the chances of success 
for PPPs. 
From the perspective of internal IP characteristics, it is widely considered that 
the success of a PPP strongly depends on factors such as the availability of financial 
and other resources, IP’s financial viability, IP’s technical complexity, IP’s 
requirements regarding government permission, quality, environment protection, 
safety and others, completeness of project design, completeness of contract 
documents, and effectiveness of project management functions, such as planning, 
coordination, monitoring, and controlling. All these factors have impact on PPP’s 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
From the perspective of relation between the public and private sectors, four 
important factors can be distinguished: 1) PPP-related government capacity, which 
refers to its expertise, knowledge, decision-making mechanisms, administrative 
systems and credibility to manage the process of procuring and supervising PPPs; 2) 
Selection of the right private partner, which is crucial for building a successful PPP 
and getting the advantages from the participation of the private sector, analyzed in 
Section 1.2.4.; 3) Division of roles and responsibilities among the public and private 
parties, which is crucial in respect of reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, and 
for which the PPA is mostly responsible; 4) Risk analysis and allocation which 
refers to proper assessment of risks and, as discussed in Section 1.1.1.2., allocation 
of risks to the parties best able to manage them at the least costs, which allows 
reducing the costs of IP and improving the potential for success of PPP. 
Literature also provides other classifications of CSFs, which differ depending 
on the aspects of PPP’s implementation to be distinguished. Ng et al. (2012) have 
provided several classifications. Considering the key aspects of improving PPP’s 
procurement, they have provided a package which contains five main CSFs: 1) 
favorable investment environment; 2) economic viability; 3) reliable concessionaire 
consortium with strong technical abilities; 4) sound financial package, and; 5) 
appropriate risk allocation via reliable contractual arrangements. Considering the 
viability of PPP, the scientists present a classification which divides CSFs into four 
main groups: 1) financial and commercial factors; 2) political and legal factors; 3) 
technical factors, and; 4) social factors. They also provide a classification based on 
the characteristics of different aspects of risk involved in the PPP IPs, under which 
CSFs are divided into six categories: 1) technical; 2) financial and economic; 3) 
social; 4) environmental; 5) political, and; 6) legal. Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen 
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(2015) have classified the government-led CSFs in PPP infrastructure development 
into six groups: 1) legal and regulatory provisions; 2) policy framework; 3) public 
sector capacity; 4) IP preparation and planning; 5) IP procurement, and; 6) 
contractual arrangement. Gupta et al. (2013) have distinguished the CSFs for 
successful implementation of BOT IPs, which were divided into six groups of 
aspects: 1) prevailing environment; 2) financial viability; 3) concessionaire 
consortium; 4) financial package; 5) risk allocation, and; 6) technical solution. A 
comparative analysis of these classifications has disclosed that for a successful PPP, 
which is considered the initial assumption for the achievement of VfM, many 
different areas are important which are related to various technical, financial and 
economic, social, political and legal, and management aspects. This correlates with 
the approach that the VfM assessment has to include both quantitative and 
qualitative assessments. 
Since there are many factors determining the success of PPP, it is important for 
decision-makers to identify factors, the impact of which is considered as the most 
relevant for VfM achievement. Accordingly, the above-mentioned scientists (S. T. 
Ng et al., 2012) have presented research performed in Hong Kong, where the most 
relevant CSFs for the success of PPPs amongst three types of stakeholders, such as 
the public sector, the private sector and the community were ranked. Its results, 
provided in Appendix 5, disclosed that, in general, all factors have a mean rating 
higher than midpoint 4 in the 7-point Likert scale, indicating the importance of the 
identified factors to ensure the feasibility of PPP. The difference among these 
factors regarding this aspect is not considerable, since 28 of 36 factors have been 
rated between the scales of 5 and 6, the “acceptable level of toll/tariff” of which 
(mean = 5,78) as well as “available experience, strong and reliable private 
consortium” and “long-term demand for the products/service” (means of both = 
5,72), “government’s strategic and long-term objectives” and “stable and reliable 
delivery of services (means of both = 5,71) were among the most important factors. 
Although the differences among the priorities of different stakeholders are not 
significant, the tendencies to distinguish factors related more to cost efficiency from 
the public sector, match the government’s strategic and long-term objectives, 
possibilities of an effective control mechanism over the private consortium are 
observed. The private sector emphasizes the factors related to the financial interest 
of IP to the private sector, bankability of IP, and long-term demand. The differences 
from the perspective of the community assert by emphasizing the factors of 
acceptability of toll/tariff level, understanding and supportive from the community, 
stable and reliable delivery of services. The survey of Andreas; Wibowo & Alfen 
(2015) performed in Indonesia has disclosed that among the top five most important 
factors were a sound legal basis, an irrevocable contract, sensible, and manageable 
risk-sharing arrangements, clearly defined coordination mechanisms, and strong 
political support. The findings of Gupta et al. (2013) from India have shown that a 
concession agreement, short-construction period, selection procedure of 
concessionaire, sufficient long-term demand and sufficient net cash inflow emerged 
as the top five factors critical for the success of the BOT IPs. Specifically for the 
VfM achievement, Moro Visconti (2014) distinguished key drives, such as financial 
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innovation, institutional/legal stability, performance monitoring, proper allocation 
and management of risk, proper balance of conflicting public versus private 
interests, etc. Harada & Ogunlan (2015) have provided positive evidence from Japan 
of the relation between the number of private subjects providing the proposals and 
the bidding results. The higher number of competitive private subjects, the lower 
procurement price drop that is also argued by Zitron (2006), Link & Scott (2001). 
Regarding this factor Hanák & Muchová, (2015) also state that the number of bids 
in the tender plays a significant role in the context of the overall efficiency of the IP. 
This suggests that increasing the number of participant firms could contribute to 
raising the VfM. 
The factors decreasing VfM come from the general barriers to PPP IPs’ 
implementation. Janssen et al. (2016) identified 37 barriers to PPPs in the IPs of 
road development, four of which are: 1) difficulties for local governments to adopt 
new working methods related to the application of PPPs; 2) belief of local 
government employees that the application of PPPs might effectively exclude local 
contractors from the involvement in projects; 3) lack of government experience with 
the whole PPP approach, and; 4) the PPP contracts as being too complicated, 
consistently stand out. Babatunde et al. (2015) identified 58 barriers as seriously 
influencing PPP IPs in Nigeria. Their findings disclosed that potential conflicts of 
interests among the stakeholders, politicization of the concessions or political 
interference in the procurement process, uncertainty of political environment or 
political instability, lack of transparency and accountability, poor financial 
projections and access to funds, inability of local institutions to provide long-term 
financing or equity financing, perceptions of a country or nation as high risk 
economy by foreign investors, difficulties in securing credit facility from banks, and 
poor evaluation, monitoring, and due diligence by the public sector were the nine 
top-ranked barriers for the PPP IPs’ implementation. These and many other barriers 
that interfere with the above-mentioned CSFs which can be found in both of these 
researches, have to be considered in decision-making and planning towards PPP IPs’ 
implementation. 
All the above-mentioned factors allow summarizing that VfM is a result which 
depends on many technical, economic, financial, social, political and managerial 
factors. Since they have to be evaluated and compromised by various stakeholders, 
the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure 
and services is a demanding and challenging task. 
1.4. Summary of theoretical research on the assessment of PPP’s possibilities 
to optimize investment in public infrastructure 
Regarding the purpose of the research, this part of the dissertation analyzes the 
theoretical aspects of the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments 
in public infrastructure. It consists of three major sections which analyze and 
summarize the theoretical premises of collaboration between the public and private 
sectors, PPP as a possibility to optimize these investments in public infrastructure 
and, finally, the theoretical aspects of assessing PPP’s possibilities to do so. 
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The analysis of theoretical premises for collaboration between the public and 
private sectors allowed distinguishing the main reasons determining the appropriate 
services and infrastructure being unable to be delivered or trust to be delivered 
entirely by the private sector and, therefore, under the name of “public”, remaining 
with the responsibility of the public sector, which makes the appropriate 
interventions. Since this requires constant investments to ensure a positive net 
impact on economic development and social welfare, a task and responsibility of the 
GAs to maximize these values to society available to get from the public resources 
was emphasized. Considering the identified financial and budgetary constraints in 
the public sector, the rationality for the GAs to create opportunities and conditions 
for the private sector and to participate in the delivery of public goods was stated, if 
it can suggest a greater value and/or efficiencies additional to those obtainable from 
purely the public sector. It was found out that the more benefits can be suggested 
from the private sector, the more tasks can be transferred to them at a valuable price, 
the more, instead of being a provider, the public sector can remain the guarantor and 
retain only the overall operational responsibility, while the provision can be 
committed to the private sector. Growing private participation in public 
infrastructure and services delivery discloses an appropriately changing role of GAs 
in the provision of public facilities and services from the provider to a strategic 
investor which, by focusing more on strategic planning and regulation functions, 
also gets more possibilities through the investments for maximizing social-economic 
benefits. 
An analysis of historic development of collaboration between the public and 
private sectors revealed this process as being especially pushed by various neoliberal 
ideologies. The developed concept of NPM encouraged GAs to adopt business and 
market principles, management techniques and rationalities from the private sector 
as well as rely more on private provision. 
However, it was also revealed that private participation in the provision of 
public services and infrastructure determines the challenge for the GAs to overcome 
specific issues explained by the agency and related theories. Accordingly, the 
importance of GAs’ role in solving it and decreasing possible inefficiencies related 
to the cooperation with the private sector through a well-designed tender procedure 
was emphasized as well as the formulation of a contract that contains adequate 
incentives, strict monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in the contract. 
However, the analysis allows stating that the proper fulfillment of these conditions 
remains a relevant issue since there are many problematic elements of the contract 
needed to be properly determined and relevant factors to be considered; this requires 
a well-established legal/regulatory framework and a developed market which could 
effectively regulate the field of public and private sectors’ contractual relationships, 
enable and facilitate the contracting of long-term partnerships with the private 
entities. Moreover, this includes individual risk allocation between the public and 
private parties, the optimization of which, as it was disclosed, is challenging and 
demanding, once again determining the responsibility of the GAs to develop models, 
tools and techniques as well as to create a favorable environment, enabling to 
achieve proper contractual arrangements, emphasized by the balance of interests 
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between the parties and the best achievable VfM for the public sector. Accordingly, 
the analysis allowed summarizing that the more GAs put efforts in creating a 
favorable environment for alternative ways of implementing investment, the higher 
potential there is to optimize investments in public infrastructure by involving 
private entities. 
The analysis of literature concerning the optimization of investments in public 
infrastructure allows summarizing that this process is mostly analyzed through the 
social-economic and financial aspects. Regarding the economic aspects, it is mainly 
discussed in the context of economic performance, more specifically, its 
productivity and efficiency. Here, the findings, especially in the later studies, 
generally support the notion of investments in public infrastructure being productive 
and contributing to the economic development. They also allow arguing that a well-
developed and well-maintained infrastructure, including properly implemented 
investments, plays a vital role in supporting a high standard of living, encouraging 
the private investments and facilitating commerce and trade, enhancing 
attractiveness and competitiveness of economy, thereby extending nation’s global 
wealth. Regarding the financial aspects, the optimization of investments in public 
infrastructure focuses on cost-efficiency, which includes three main dimensions: 
determination of optimal capital structure, minimization of life-cycle costs, and 
optimal sharing/allocation of risks between the public and private parties. Literature 
reveals them being critically important for the VfM achievement but typically 
complicated both in theory and practice, since only fragmentary solutions for 
associated issues are provided. 
The analysis of interests of the public and private entities regarding public 
investments allowed distinguishing a number of factors stimulating both parties to 
collaborate in a long-term partnership. Since the entities of the public and private 
sectors have different interests within the public IP, the collaboration between the 
public and private sectors is feasible if the compromise between all parties’ 
requirements can be found. 
Since it is important to find the optimal parity between all parties’ interests, the 
first major section was concluded by defining the conception of evaluation of the 
private sector’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure. When 
it comes to the role of GAs, the premises and motivators of collaboration between 
the public and private sectors, optimization is considered as a comparative 
assessment of all available options of implementing investments to find the optimal 
one to proceed, i.e. the affordable and viable option providing the highest ratio of 
benefits and costs (VfM) for the public sector. 
The second major section committed to the analysis of PPP as a possibility to 
optimize these investments in public infrastructure allows stating that the concept of 
PPP is not consensual. Due to the existence of multiple cooperation forms of the 
public and private sectors, the scope of PPP conception is still subject to 
considerable debate. Moreover, the approaches to PPP also vary in every country 
depending on the settled relations between the public and private sectors and 
developed legal framework, determining the economic sectors, activities, forms and 
schemes available for their cooperation, as well as other aspects, determining the 
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existence of dozens of PPP’s definitions across the normative and scientific 
literature. Nevertheless, their systemic analysis based on the most often identified 
aspects of PPP in them allowed forming the definition of the PPP. Considering the 
complexity of the definition, the main characteristics of PPPs have also been 
distinguished.  
A retrospective analysis of development of PPP as alternative way of 
implementing IP and providing services discloses that it started to be more widely 
adopted only several decades ago; however, during this period, it significantly 
increased both in the volume of investments and the number of IPs across the globe. 
The main drive to attract private capital into the provision of public infrastructure 
and services in the UK gradually determined the rise of various cooperation forms 
between the public and private sectors in many other countries. The PPP has become 
an acknowledged way of investment implementation widely applied in the global 
public construction and service market. The variety of developed forms, considering 
their features as well as different amounts of transferred risks, allows the PPAs to 
choose the right one, depending on the requirements. This allows arguing that the 
PPP can be flexibly applied in various cases from providing secondary services to 
designing, building, maintaining and operating infrastructure in many economic 
sectors. However, since the selection of the most appropriate form and scheme 
should be the result of VfM assessment, this is still a complicated task and requires 
facilitated solutions, which the scientific literature is still very limited to provide. 
An analysis of the advantages of PPPs allows stating that they are mainly the 
same factors encouraging GAs to involve the private sector in the provision of 
public infrastructure and services. Among them, private financing releasing the 
public sector from commitment to fund all initial capital investments and allowing to 
spread them over the life of PPP contract instead as well as requiring to be repaid 
only when the investment stage is finished is substantial argument in favor of PPP as 
making investments in infrastructure for the public sector more financially 
affordable and allowing to accelerate them. Other identified potential advantages 
depend on the existing competition in the market, the quality of provided bids, 
experience of the private entities and the results of negotiation with the selected 
private entity. This allows arguing that many advantages of PPP are dependent on 
many factors, require appropriate knowledge and strong procurement skills from the 
PPAs to be assessed properly. Literature is rich in examples demonstrating a lack of 
competence in the public sector to procure PPP. Moreover, there are a number of 
analyzed disadvantages of PPP, which must be offset by the benefits available to get 
from private participation, to make the PPP valuable to proceed. Unfortunately, the 
analysis allows stating that literature provides only fragmentary solutions to how 
this task can be solved as well as how the possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure can be properly assessed. 
Since the developed conception of optimization primarily requires comparing 
the best available CP and PPP options, the main aspects of structuring of PPP 
needed to be analyzed. The analysis revealed that, since PPP as a structure which 
combines PPA, investors, subcontractors and financiers and has to compromise their 
different interests, is very complex and includes many analyzed aspects to be 
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assessed and structured in such a way that would provide VfM for the public sector, 
it can be called a challenging and demanding process. The analysis of literature 
allows stating that it is limited in solutions which could suggest tools allowing to 
complexly solve the issues related to structuring of the best available PPP and 
rational-to-compare CP options. 
The third major section, which discussed the theoretical aspects of VfM 
assessment allows stating that VfM assessment, which compares the value and cost 
of IP’s delivery options in a structured manner, is used as the main decision-making 
tool to support decisions on whether to deliver the IP of public infrastructure and 
services through the PPP. However, the very conception of VfM assessment is 
highly complex, including many elements of both quantitative and qualitative 
assessment, from setting of the appropriate FDR to non-valued benefits, which are 
highly discussed and can be used differently, depending on the approaches applied, 
which also have their advantages and disadvantages. This allows arguing that, on the 
one hand, this determines the concept of VfM assessment for PPP as being very 
flexible and able to be adapted depending on requirements. On another hand, this 
means that the results of VfM assessment, since they highly depend on the 
assumptions used and the preconceptions applied, are rather subjective and, 
therefore, highly criticized for these aspects. For greater objectivity and reliability of 
the results, the analyzed literature demonstrates how important it is to ensure 
consistency and logic validity throughout the entire process of VfM assessment and 
its separate elements. However, the same literature regarding the application of a 
complex approach and, especially, the development of a practical solution is very 
limited, mostly focusing on separate elements of VfM assessment instead. 
The analysis of fragmentary literature regarding the quantitative VfM 
assessment methodologies allows concluding that the main methodological reasons 
for differences in the results between the CP and PPP options are due to such aspects 
as the adoption of different FDRs for the CP and PPP options, the assumptions about 
higher efficiency of the private subject expressed in lower costs of the PPP option or 
higher costs of the PSC and the effect of time preference making the PPP option 
cheaper from the perspective of present value. Which of them effects the results 
depends on the approach applied. However, the analysis allows arguing that all 
approaches regarding VfM assessment at the stage of preparation tend to apply 
assumptions which determine particular artificial advantages of PPP against the CP 
and effect VfM accordingly.  
Finally, the third major section concludes with an analysis of the factors 
important to increase VfM. It reveals that the complexity of PPP as a procurement 
option and the very concept of VfM determine the existence of many various CSFs 
need to be considered to achieve VfM. They cover many different aspects and can 
be distinguished into at least five main groups as well as different perspectives of the 
public sector, the private sector and the society, or users, regarding their preferences 
can be identified. Since these different priorities are difficult to be compromised 
from various stakeholders and there are many aspects to be evaluated, the 
assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure 
and services is a demanding and challenging task. 
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The first part of the dissertation, which analyzed the theoretical aspects of the 
assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure, 
allows the conclusion that, although the PPP as an alternative way of implementing 
public investment and deliver public infrastructure and services is becoming more 
and more acknowledged both in theory and practice, many aspects related to its 
implementation and assessment and maximization of its benefits are still explored 
only fragmentarily which aggravates its practical adoption and further development. 
The existing literature focuses on the analyses of separate aspects and on the 
maximization of individual goals. However, the PPP, being very complex in nature, 
requires applying a complex approach asserted by assessment of multiple aspects, a 
combination of many different interests and finding halfway solutions, which makes 
it challenging and demanding to be successfully implemented and at VfM, what is a 
serious lack in the existing literature. The analysis of literature allows stating that 
there is a lack of analyses where these particularities would be fully disclosed and 
converted into integrated solutions demonstrating a complex approach to the 
assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure 
and allowing to maximize VfM for the public sector. Regarding the complexity, 
there are no papers which would complexly analyze the structuring of a rational-to-
compare model of the public sector and the optimal PPP model as well as the very 
VfM assessment. It is also limited in the analysis of aspects concerned with finding 
paths of information acquisition and processing towards win-win solutions 
acceptable to both the public and private parties as they are crucial aspects for the 
construction of a successful PPP. Accordingly, the results of theoretical analysis 
allow concluding that the existing methods and tools are limited in possibilities and 
insufficient to complexly assess the PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure and maximize its benefits for the public sector. 
As a result, the scientific problem raised in this dissertation could not be solved 
entirely by the theoretical analysis provided in the first part of the dissertation and 
requires further actions of research. Therefore, to decrease the gap between the 
existing theory and practical needs, the second part of the dissertation, considering 
the theoretical background, is intended for the development of a methodology and 
the model for assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure. 
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2. FORMATION OF A MODEL FOR ASSESSING THE POSSIBILITIES OF 
PPP TO OPTIMIZE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
Given the results of literature review, this part of the dissertation, is committed 
to the development of the model for assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure with regards to the identified issues. It focuses 
on factors that have been previously identified as important to be assessed or 
considered in order to understand the costs and revenue streams of potential PPP IP, 
so that it would allow making reasoned long-term decisions by answering questions 
of whether a particular IP is viable, and if so, whether the government or the private 
sector should finance and implement it; and if the private option is chosen, how to 
maximize the benefits available to get from such partnership to the public sector. 
Since there are many factors which have impact on the possibilities of PPP to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure, the methodology and model are 
developed through various analyses along the overall PPP’s project cycle, where the 
possible solutions for problematic aspects of assessment at different stages are 
discussed. Table 2.1 summarizes the methodological gaps identified in literature 
regarding the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure, which require to be fulfilled by performing new researches and 
providing appropriate insights to reach the aim of this dissertation. Moreover, it 
shows the scientific novelty of the dissertation regarding the research topic. 
Table 2.1. Identification of requirements for further analyses (prepared by the 
author of this dissertation) 
No. Limitations found in literature  
(considering I part of the dissertation) 
Requirements for further analyses and 
researches 
1. The PPP is a complex way of IP 
implementation; however, literature is 
fragmentary regarding the initial aspects 
needed to be satisfied for rational and 
reliable assessment for PPP’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public 
infrastructure. 
The analysis of preparatory conditions and 
assumptions for the assessment of PPP’s 
possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure. More specifically, it needs to be 
focused on the determination of proper FDR 
and the assessment of risks. 
2. In the research field of PPP, literature is 
mostly focused on the very PPP IP, leaving a 
shortage of analysis regarding the transition 
from the public option of IP implementation 
to the delivery of infrastructure and services 
as PPP. 
Identification of expediency criteria for the 
analysis of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure. 
3. Fragmentary literature on how to structure 
the public sector’s IP which are rational to 
compare against the PPP option. 
Development of methodology for proper 
structuring of the PSC model which is rational 
to compare against the PPP option. 
4. Literature is full of analyses of various 
aspects of PPP structuring; however, it is 
weak in their systemization regarding a 
successive structuring of the PPP option. 
 
Development of methodology for structuring 
the financially viable and optimized PPP. 
 
Continuation of the table is on the next page 
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Continuation of Table 2.1 
5. Literature is mostly confined to the VfM 
assessment in social-based PPP IPs, leaving 
aside the economic-based PPP IPs. 
Moreover, there is a lack of analysis 
regarding the assessment of VfM for 
different beneficiaries. 
 
Development of methodology for VfM 
assessment for both social- and economic-based 
PPPs also considering different beneficiaries. 
6. Literature discloses a lack of tools allowing 
the PPA to assess the possibilities of PPP to 
optimize investments in public 
infrastructure.  
Development of integrated model allowing the 
PPAs to assess possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure and 
maximize the befits for the public sector. 
Considering the above-identified the requirements for further analysis, this part 
of the dissertation continues with two major sections; the first one is intended to 
provide methodological justification for the development of an integrated complex 
model for assessing PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in a public 
infrastructure. While the second one, based on results of the methodological 
analysis, develops a model enabling to do this assessment. 
2.1. Methodological reasoning for the model for assessing the possibilities of 
PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure 
Methodological justification for the model for assessing the possibilities of PPP 
to optimize investments in public infrastructure starts with the analysis of a process 
of selecting PPP IP, where the preparatory conditions which need to be satisfied are 
reviewed in order to identify candidate IPs for PPP potential, and the criteria 
enabling to understand whether additional funds should be spent on a full analysis 
and preparation of these IPs are provided. Further, the aspects and steps of designing 
the PSC model and the shadow bid PPP model are analyzed. Finally, methodological 
aspects of the VfM assessment are analyzed. 
2.1.1. Preparatory conditions for the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure 
As disclosed in Section 1.3.1, since the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure generally seeks to compare the CP 
option of delivery of public infrastructure and service against the PPP option, and 
find the most beneficial for the public sector to proceed, this primarily requires 
constructing the CP option which would be rational to compare against any other 
option with the appropriate involvement of private participation. It determines that 
choosing the best quality public IPs which offer the most socio-economic benefits is 
a key element for any further rational analysis for their PPP potential and, therefore, 
requires a lot of attention and efforts from the PPAs to do right. 
Given the above-mentioned requirements, the CBA or cost effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) is usually used as a systematic approach for calculating and 
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comparing all benefits and costs36 of possible alternatives to find the one that 
provides the best approach to achieve benefits while preserving savings. Both of 
these analytical frameworks refer to the following list of underlying concepts 
(CPVA, 2014a; European Commission, 2014b): 
Opportunity cost. Since the opportunity cost of good and service in the public 
sector is defined as potential gain from the best alternative forgone, it is rational to 
assess inputs, outputs and external effects of IP’s alternatives at their social 
opportunity costs in order to evaluate the return calculated as a proper measure to 
assess IP’s contribution to social welfare. 
Long-term perspective. In the context of infrastructure investments, usually the 
long-term perspective is applied ranging from 10 to 30 years or more, depending on 
the economic life of investments and the sector of intervention. This requires setting 
a proper time horizon, adopting the appropriate FDR for calculating the present 
value of future costs and benefits and considering the uncertainty by assessing the 
IP’s risks. 
Monetary-based. All positive and negative welfare effects of the intervention 
are expressed in monetary values, discounted and then totaled for calculating a net 
total benefit measured by indicators expressed in monetary values, which allow 
comparability and ranking of competing IPs or alternatives of IP’s implementation. 
Microeconomic approach. The assessment of the IP’s impact on society and 
economics is confined by the measurement of direct employment or external 
environmental effects reflected in the ENPV and ERR, while indirect or, in other 
words, secondary market and wider effects are excluded for potential risks of 
double-counting the benefits. 
Incremental approach. All scenarios with-the-IP are compared against the 
counterfactual scenario presenting what would happen in the absence of the IP, since 
both assessment frameworks only consider the difference between CFs in the with-
the-project and the counterfactual scenarios. 
The integrated application of these concepts generally enables the PPAs to 
prepare an IP, which allows assessing the welfare changes attributable to it. As basic 
concepts, they are listed and explained in the CBA guides (CPVA, 2014a; European 
Commission, 2014b; New Zealand Treasury, 2015). The reasons why these concepts 
have also been reviewed here is, first, to emphasize that the reliability of the 
assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments highly depends on the 
early phases of IP’s development, where the use of inappropriate principles or 
mistakes can have significant negative impact on the reliability of the results of 
future assessment for PPP’s potential, and the second reason is that for the 
comparison of the CP option with the PPP option, some changes of these concepts 
have to be implemented. But they can be rationally discussed only when the main 
steps of conceptual framework of a standard CBA are reviewed in respect of 
selecting the most rational alternative to assess for PPP potential. 
                                                 
36 In case of CEA, only the relative costs of different courses of action at a determined level 
of outcomes (effects) are compared. The determined effects are the main feature of CEA 
which distinct it from CBA, which assigns a monetary value to the measure of effect. 
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The standard framework of CBA consists of 6 main steps, which are as follow: 
1) Description of context; 2) Description of content; 3) Option analysis; 4) Financial 
analysis; 5) Economic analysis, and; 6) Risk assessment, which are reviewed in 
more detail. 
Description of context. Typically, the description of IP’s context starts with 
the requirement to describe the social, economic, political and institutional context 
in which the IP will be implemented. Accordingly, the analysis is focused on 
appropriate aspects which are described, e.g., in the CBA guide issued by the 
European Commission (2014b). They are mostly related to IP’s external 
environment that is important to disclose the overall context of IP; however, they are 
lacking concentration on the analysis of services, their quality and conditions of 
provision, with regards to the development of which, in respect of their accessibility, 
quality and efficiency of provision, the IP is prepared and implemented. This 
determines that under these methodologies a lot is required from the analysis of 
external environment, but with relatively little explanation on how they are linked to 
the analyzed services and how they affect them. They are lacking focus on the links 
of IP’s problem to the services, i.e. their insufficient accessibility, quality and 
inefficient provision. As it is disclosed in Section 1.1.1.1, this aspect is very 
important, since the developed infrastructure and obtainable items are considered as 
only means for problem-solving, but not the problem, as what might seem in case of 
them being aged and obsolete. When the problems are related to services, it is 
analyzed which means can suggest the most advanced ratio of benefits and costs, 
which creates a basis for efficiency in the public sector. If IP’s problem arises from 
an aging infrastructure, then, considering a causal relationship between the problem 
and the objective, the latter has to be focused on the improvement of infrastructure, 
which can be ineffective, if other means, e.g. even those not requiring any 
investments, can provide more benefits in comparison. Therefore, the analysis of 
external environment through the prism of services as well as the rise of problems 
from them are the key elements in the first part of CBA framework for the 
development of an efficient IP and further assessment for its PPP potential. 
Description of content. The second major step of appraisal aims to describe 
the internal content of an IP. It consists of such elements of an IP as the purpose, 
objectives, links with other IPs, limits, results, etc. Since their description can be 
found in various CBA guides, only the elements to which specific insights regarding 
the PPP are provided are reviewed in more detail. They are IP’s purpose, objectives 
and results. 
Considering the importance of analyzing IP’s external environment through the 
context of services, the purpose is logically required to be focused on the 
improvement of service provision in respect of accessibility, quality and efficiency. 
Developing a coherent logic, the objective of an IP should be to ensure the 
infrastructure needed for the provision of appropriate quality and accessibility of 
services, because such formulation of the objective does not block the way for a 
rational assessment of alternatives for IP implementation. Finally, the main results 
should be related to the minimum requirements for the delivery of services and 
minimum IP’s impact on society, which must be achieved or exceeded in all 
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analyzed alternatives. The proper formulation of all elements lay the foundations for 
rational solving of the problems and possibilities to form rational alternatives, from 
which the one with the highest social-economic value can be chosen, which is a 
basis for any comparative analysis against the PPP option. 
Option analysis is a crucial element of appraisal for finding the solution which 
could provide the most benefits for society and, therefore, be rational to be 
considered for PPP potential. Considering the difficulties of the public sector to 
ensure sufficient competence regarding the preparation of IPs, (see Section 1.1.1.), a 
good practice to systemize this analysis by enforcing a pre-defined list of the must-
analyze alternatives37is observed. Since this compulsory requirement is included in 
the methodology, there is a lesser chance that available useful solutions are not 
considered for solving of the appropriate problems. Various lists of alternatives can 
be suggested depending on the starting position regarding the means envisaged to 
solve a problem. Alternatives for buildings, engineering infrastructure, equipment, 
transport equipment and intangible asset depending on whether they are wanted to 
be built or obtained rehabilitates and improves, changed, rented, etc. at the 
beginning can be asked to be analyzed for finding the best one in respect of socio-
economic value. The results of option analysis directly affect what is rational to be 
assessed against the PPP potential and what forms and schemes of PPP, analyzed in 
Section 1.2.2., could be the most rational for cooperation with the private sector. 
This can mean that the best solution for problem-solving and implementation of an 
IP may not require investments in any infrastructure. This is the reason why the 
assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure 
has start from the beginning of IP preparation and why the preparatory conditions of 
analysis for PPP potential are analyzed in this dissertation. 
Financial analysis. Since all the options rational for further analysis are 
identified, their financial analysis should be performed. The forth major step of 
appraisal aims to calculate and compare the total costs of different options of IP 
implementation. Since they are characterized by different CF profile over time, the 
DCF method is usually used. This requires adopting an appropriate FDR as well as 
other appropriate rules. Since they highly affect the results of assessment, there is 
great attention paid to them in this dissertation. 
Reference period. Since the CBA assesses the impact of investments on the 
provision of services, CFs of IP need to be forecasted considering the IP’s time 
horizon (reference period). Accordingly, the selected time horizon highly affects the 
appraisal results. Since the government usually does not seek profit, the most 
                                                 
37 European Commission (2014) has issued a guide to CBA where only an explanation 
regarding different levels of option analysis as well as recommendation with good practices 
and common mistakes are provided. This determines that there is a responsibility of 
developers of IPs to select those options for analysis, which enable them intentionally or 
unintentionally not to include some options into the analysis and in this way to manipulate 
the results of assessment. Considering this issue, a list of must-analyze alternatives for IP 
implementation was decided to be developed in Lithuania (CPVA, 2016), one of the 
developers of which is the author of this dissertation. However, this example is still more an 
exception than a rule in public sector among the countries. 
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rational way is to equate the reference period to economic life of investments. For 
example, the European Commission (2014a) provides recommendable guidelines for 
determination of the appropriate reference periods at different economic sectors, 
which, depending on the sector, can range from 10 to 30 years. The determined 
period is the maximum period rational to use for the assessment of PPP’s 
possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
Adoption of appropriate FDR. As it is indicated in Section 1.3.1., the adoption 
of the appropriate FDR is a complicated task and has to be accomplished, since there 
is no a single solution regarding this issue, considering the particular requirements 
and/or the approach applied, under which the advantages and disadvantages of lower 
or higher FDR could be assessed as well as solutions regarding its adoption could be 
made. Although the adoption of proper FDR is one of the most discussed scientific 
topics in the context of public investments, the practicians usually have low 
possibilities for individual initiatives and calculations, since the entire process of 
appraisal is determined by strict rules in various CBA guides and regulations, which 
have to be considered to get financing from the public funds. This determines that 
the promoters usually apply the FDR provided by governments instead of being 
concerned with calculating the individual FDR of IPs. The CBA guides (CPVA, 
2014a; European Commission, 2014b) typically are very weak in methodological 
justification of the appropriate FDRs suggested and are more focused on the 
practical aspects of its application instead. Their analysis allows arguing that: first, 
despite of which of the approaches is applied, the FDR varies in the range between 
3%–6% that can be considered as a particular guideline for orientation; second, in 
order to decrease the uncertainty related to future CFs, the financial analysis is 
recommended to be carried out in constant (real) prices, although the nominal prices 
could also be used, since a forecast of consumer price index (CPI) is not a problem, 
and; third, for practical reasons, the same FDR is usually applied to the entire 
country’s public sector or, at least, to one of the economic sectors. In the latter case, 
in the sectors marked by higher risk, mostly these are the sectors where income from 
the direct users is collected, the higher FDR is emphasized in comparison with the 
sectors where demand risk is lower. These aspects show the context and some 
rational practices of adopting FDR in practice; however, they are lacking 
methodological guidelines of how the suggested FDR has been grounded and how to 
calculate it, if some adjustments, e.g. for the calculation of specific FDR for the 
appropriate economic sector, need to be done. 
In some countries, e.g. in the member states of the EU, under Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 480/2014 (European Commission, 2014a), the same 
real FDR of 4% is used as an indicative benchmark for public investment operations 
co-financed by the European structural and investment funds (ESI funds in the 
period 2014–2020. There are also examples such in Lithuania, where this FDR 
provided by the EC is used in each of the cases, irrespective of whether IP is 
financed from the EU funds or exclusively from the country’s national funds. On the 
one hand, such practice when the same FDR is universally applied during an 
appropriate period can be justified for reasons of administrative simplicity and 
convenience. Since the technical analysis of public sector discounting is complex, 
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for its successful application, the discounting conventions should be expressed in 
simple terms, which could be understood by officials even with no technical 
background. According to Spackman (2001), the best approach, if it is politically 
feasible and technically defensible, is to have a single number expressed in real 
terms, which is the government’s discount rate and would represent its cost of 
capital. Accordingly, it is observed that countries are more likely to use one FDR, 
than to have several FDRs for different economic sectors because it is difficult to 
manage a system, in which more than one number is used by any single organization 
(except for occasional special cases). This number is usually used for the 
government and public enterprises. 
On the other hand, since the FDR of 4% is generally applied for all EU 
countries, it does not reflect the particularities of individual countries. Therefore, to 
develop a reliable framework for the IPs’ preparation and appraisal, it is relevant to 
adopt the country-specific FDR. Moreover, considering the tendency of decreasing 
the financial support to the new member-states from the EU, there is a need to 
develop long-term financing and evaluation instruments, which in the future would 
be independent from the ESI funds38. One of these instruments is the effective IP 
appraisal framework. Since the FDR is one of its key elements, it is important for 
the member states to determine reasonable FDRs, which would reflect each of their 
particularities accordingly. 
The scientific literature basically distinguishes two main approaches to 
determine the FDR: first, based on long-term borrowing rate of the government, and; 
second, based on alternative cost of private capital (market price). Both methods are 
further analyzed in more detail. 
When the FDR is equated to government’s borrowing rate, it reflects a risk-free 
rate of return. The main argument supporting this method is that, since governments 
hold a large and diversified portfolio of IPs, the systemic risk has no or relatively 
insignificant impact on their return, i.e. the marginal return from public investment, 
overall, is virtually risk-free and, hence, can be evaluated at the risk-free rate rather 
than the higher market rate demanded by less diversified individuals (Lucas, 2012). 
Therefore, government’s cost of borrowing capital can be used as the FDR of the 
public sector. Since a pure risk-free rate of return is considered as a rather 
theoretical rate, i.e. even the safest investments carry a very small amount of risk, 
both in theory and practice a risk-free interest rate is usually equated to interest rate 
on government securities. Here, it should be noted that not all national securities can 
be considered as risk-free. Once again, this lesson has been learned during the 
financial crisis of 2009–2011. The existence of government default risk can 
aggravate the application of this method based on government’s borrowing rate. As 
a result, it can be used if there are no default and reinvestment risks. This determines 
                                                 
38 Moreover, as set out in Article 19 (Discounting of cash flows) at Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 480/2014, every country can determine its own DR if it is justified 
properly. Accordingly, values other than 4% may be justified on the grounds of: (a) the 
Member State’s specific macroeconomic conditions and international macroeconomic trends 
and conjunctures; or (b) the nature of the investor or the implementation structure, such as 
public private partnerships; or (c) the nature of the sector concerned. 
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that the risk-free rate will vary only depending upon the period over which the return 
wants to be guaranteed. Both academicians and practicians usually equate it to the 
interest rate of long-term government bonds. There is a practice to choose securities, 
the maturity of which would be as close as possible to the IP’s reference period. 
According to Damodaran (2008), a rate of 10 years government bond is most 
prevailing. Since over the past several years 10-year bond yield hit record low 
interest bond, to determine the individual FDR, it is expedient to use not the latest 
available data, but the average of government bond yield during a 10-year period 
(Eurostat, 2017). 
The proponents of FDR equated to alternative cost of private capital argue that 
public borrowing rate and country’s alternative cost of capital are two separate 
things and, therefore, should not be equated in respect of discounting risky 
investments. The main argument is that when a government funds risky investments 
by selling safe debt securities, risk is shifted onto the current and future taxpayers 
and other government stakeholders, who effectively become equity holders in a 
risky investments (Fleurbaey & Zuber, 2015; Kellermann, Fleurbaey, & Zuber, 
2007; Lucas, 2012). From the perspective of a taxpayer, the gain is offset by the cost 
of the associated market risk. If the stock market performed well, the government 
would be able to pay back the debt and use the surplus to lower taxes or increase 
other spending. If the stock market did wrong, the debt would still have to be repaid, 
either by raising taxes or cutting other spending. Hence, government debts are 
hedged by tax payers’ money. Moreover, the taxpayers who make the same 
investments on their own would expect the positive return as compensation for the 
assumed risk. Therefore, for the determination of FDR, an alternative cost of tax 
payers’ capital should be used rather than the cost of government borrowing. 
Especially when government’s investments also have private sector analogues and 
are subject to aggregate risk, e.g. government-owned central heating for houses 
facilities have a similar exposure to demand shocks as do private utilities. Therefore, 
government’s investments have to assess the factor of systemic risk (Lucas, 2014).  
Accordingly, the absence of this factor determines the main critics to the 
application of cost of public borrowing for discounting. According to Lucas (2012, 
2014), the most significant hazard for governments using a risk-free rate (or their 
own borrowing rate) for discounting is that it creates a money machine for 
politicians who benefit from being able to show government investments that are 
popular among constituents as profitable. The same scientist appeals to the 
knowledge of government analysts, who, due to various reasons mentioned in 
Section 1.1.1., do not appear to recognize the physical impossibility of financing 
risky investments with risk-free government debt, thereby failing to realize that the 
taxpayers are equity holders in risky government investments. This problem can be 
partly explained by the insight that, since the regime of cash-accounting is dominant, 
interest is visible cost but the risk-bearing by taxpayers is not. 
For the realization of requirement to apply market price for discounting, 
literature (Armstrong, Knif, Kolari, & Pynn?nen, 2012; Baek & Bilson, 2015; 
Majumder, 2013; Pandey & Sehgal, 2017) suggests various models: the model based 
on Arbitrage pricing theory, Gordon growth model, Fama–French three-factor 
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model, etc. However, the CAPM, due to its simplicity and relative easiness to use, is 
the most prevailing both in theory and practice. For example, a survey in the USA 
disclosed that even 15 years ago 73.5% of respondents calculated the cost of equity 
capital with the CAPM (Harvey, 2005). While the literature review disclosed that in 
theory there are many different approaches/methods of CAPM, in countries like the 
USA, all these different methods often yield similar results. However, the problem is 
that when it is moved outside of the USA, particularly into developing markets, 
different methods can produce widely varying results. Therefore, the questions 
related to the investigation of the most appropriate method of discounting, in 
particular cases, still attract much attention in the context of FDR determination. 
Since extensive reviews of CAPMs and their internal assumptions have been 
provided by Copeland (2014), Gözen (2013), Harvey 2005, Tomaševič (2010), only 
the main aspects of its application are discussed in this dissertation. 
The CAPM describes the relationship between systematic risk and expected 
return on risky assets. According to Tomaševič (2010), for the adoption of CAPM 
the following assumptions have to be satisfied: 1) Investors are reluctant to take 
risks and seek to maximize gains of assets; 2) None of the investors have a dominant 
position in the market; 3) All investors have the same time horizon of investment 
decision; 4) All decisions are taken by the investors considering only two criteria: 
return on investment and risk; 5) There is a risk-free rate of return and each investor 
can borrow or lend an unlimited amount of funds in accordance with the rate 
charged; 6) Capital can be invested to all types of investment at a desired ratio; 7) 
There are no transaction costs, taxes or other restrictions for purchasing and selling; 
8) Information is equally receivable to all market participants. 
The general idea behind CAPM is that investors need to be compensated in two 
ways: time value of money and risk. Accordingly, the common CAPM formula 
(Formula 1) for calculating the expected return of an asset given its risk consists of 
two main parts: the first one assesses the time value of money and is represented by 
the risk-free rate (Rf), which is considered as a rate of return on investment with zero 
risk, and the second one represents risk and calculates the amount of compensation 
the investor needs for taking on additional risk regarding particular investments. 
                                 (1) 
here: Rf – risk-free rate; βi – beta of security (risk measure); Rma – expected 
market average return. 
The second part of the formula attracts the most scientific attention. It is 
calculated by taking a risk measure (βi), which compares the return on an asset to the 
market over a period, and the market premium (Rma - Rf), which is considered as the 
excess return of the market above the risk-free rate.  
βi coefficient is one of the most important factors of CAPM and reflects how 
risky an asset is compared to the overall market risk. The higher βi is, the more 
return depends on the systemic risk factor (RF) on particular investments. 
Accordingly, CAPM is based on the internal assumption that investors emphasize 
rational behavior and can eliminate non-systemic risk by diversifying their 
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investment portfolios. CAPM assesses only systemic risk which affects the entire 
market and cannot be eliminated.  
Generally, βi is a function which can be expressed as covariance of expected 
return on the capital asset and expected return of the market divided by a variation 
of expected return of the market, or as correlation of expected return on the capital 
asset and the market divided by a ratio of standard deviations (SDs) of the same 
expected return on the capital asset and the market (Formula 2). 
;                      (2)  
here: Ri – expected return on the capital asset; Rma – expected return of the 
market; σi – standard deviation of expected return on the capital asset; σm – standard 
deviation of expected market return. 
Since the classical CAPM, due to its assumptions that more reflect the idealized 
rather than real situation, has been highly criticized, over the past few decades, 
various scientists have developed many alternative CAPM-based models. The 
choice of the most appropriate model largely depends on the integrity of the national 
security market with the global market. Based on the correlation level between 
national security market index and global security market index, CAPM-based 
models can be classified into three main groups (Thapa, 2007): 
1. Totally-segmented – only the factors of a particular country are 
assessed; 
2. Partially-integrated – factors of a particular country and global market 
are assessed; 
3. Fully-integrated – the assessment is based on the global market’s 
factors. 
In case the market is totally segmented, the investors assume risk that is 
affected only by the factors of a particular country where investments are 
implemented. In contrary, when the integrity of national market with the global 
market is high, investors cannot be expected to compensate for particular country’s 
risk, because it is fully diversified. In this case the investors face the factors of the 
global market. However, since both cases are rather marginal, i.e. nowadays markets 
usually are neither totally segmented nor completely integrated, the problem of how 
to assess cost of private capital in a partially integrated market attracts the most 
attention from both the theoreticians and practicians.  
Scientists have developed many versions of CAPM-based models fitted to use 
in a partially integrated market. However, their application in practice is already 
rather complicated in the private sector. The attempts to apply them in the public 
sector at the level of a country are even more challenging. For example, Gözen 
(2013) has reviewed 16 versions of CAPM-based models for developing countries, 
and Harvey (2005) has provided an analysis of 12 different versions of CAPM-based 
model. 
On the one hand, since there are many versions, as provided in Appendix 6, it is 
a difficult task to choose the most appropriate one, especially, if the choice is done 
at the level of CAPM elements. On the other hand, there are some fairly universally-
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accepted practices. The analysis of these models disclosed that, regarding a risk-free 
rate, it is usually equated to the rate of national government securities denominating 
in one of the global currency (e.g. USD, EUR, JPY). Regarding the expected return 
on market, it is equated to the average return of one of global market indexes (e.g. 
S&P 500, FTSE, Nikkei). 
The most variations regarding CAPM-based models are related to β, although 
in principle, most scientists use Formula 2. The issue related to the calculation of β 
is that most of these models are primarily adjusted for calculation of return rate of 
particular investments and, therefore, are complicated to apply country-wide. 
Considering this issue, Reyent (2008) suggests to use average return rate of national 
stock market index. Then β can be calculated by using Formula 3. 
                                 (3) 
here: rl – local market index return; rg – global market index return; σi – 
standard deviation of local market index return; σg – standard deviation of global 
market index return. 
Gözen (2013), who quoted other researches, states that most of developing 
countries’ βs are lower than 1, since their level of capital market integrity with the 
global market is lower and, therefore, the correlation between the indexes of national 
capital market and global capital market is lower. This determines that risk premium 
becomes unjustifiably low. Considering this issue, the same scientist provides a 
modification of Formula 3 where only the ratio of σi and σg is left (Formula 4), 
which, considering the fact that β and country risk premium can at least partially 
duplicate to each other, is adjusted by the coefficient equated to 0.6. This value is 
grounded by the research according to which capital market fluctuation can explain 
no less than 40 percent of risk. 
                                               (4) 
In contrary to the developed countries, the developing ones are riskier. 
Therefore, to calculate the FDR for the developing countries an additional country 
risk premium Rc has to be added, as suggested by most scientists whose CAPM-
based models are provided in Appendix 6. Damodaran (2017), and Naumoski (2012) 
distinguish the following alternatives to measure country risk premium: 
1. Country’s sovereign credit ratings assigned by a relevant credit rating 
agency. These ratings measure the default country risk rather than 
equity risk. On the one hand, since both risks are to some extent 
influenced by the same factors (e.g. currency stability, budget and trade 
balance, political stability), this measure can be considered as an 
approximately correct measure of country risk. On the other hand, the 
focus on default risk by ignoring the rest of the factors that could 
influence the equity market is also a major issue with this option. 
Moreover, the rating agencies often do not completely reflect 
expectations about the future. Their decisions are more based on 
historical data; therefore, they lag to reflect the changes in country’s 
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default risk. Their assessment methodology is also not publicly 
available, which determines a lack of transparency with these ratings. 
Finally, credit rating agencies do not provide ratings for all countries. 
2. Bond default spread. This measure reflects the spread between the 
yield to maturity of an emerging market sovereign bond denominated 
in US dollars or EUR and the yield of a comparable USA or euro bond, 
respectively. For rational comparison, both securities must be issued in 
the same currency and have equal maturity. This method to measure 
country risk premium is widely considered to be a comprehensive 
measure of a country’s overall risk premium, stemming from market, 
credit, liquidity, and other risks. However, the issue with the 
application of this method is that both measures lack data, since not all 
countries issue sovereign bonds denominated in one of global currency. 
3. Credit default swap (CDS) spread. This is a measure similar to the case 
of bond, however, since CDS markets are, in comparison, more 
updated and more precise, which the advantage of this method. 
However, since it is sensitive to market information, and even 
investors’ sentiments that are unrelated to the underlying country risk 
fundamentals, it can be also more vulnerable. Moreover, this measure 
also faces the problem related to the lack of data, especially with 
regards to the emerging countries. 
4. Equity market volatility is also sometimes seen as a good measure of 
country risk premium, where volatility is usually higher in the market 
of the developing countries than in the market of the developed 
countries. However, market volatility is to a large extent a function of 
market liquidity. Markets that are risky and illiquid often have low 
volatility. Therefore, due to low liquidity in some period, volatility 
could be understated and, by contrast, volatility could be overstated in a 
period of great liquidity that, in turn, determines the reliability issues of 
this measure. 
The pro and con arguments related to each of the above-mentioned methods 
allow arguing that the possibilities and rationality to use an appropriate method to 
evaluate country risk premium depends on many aspects, such as the level of 
country’s development in respect of the economy and financial market, availability 
of data about the issued government bonds as well as other particular requirements. 
The analysis of all the above-mentioned aspects related to calculation of FDR 
allow finally concluding that, if the CAPM approach is taken, the FDR for the 
developing countries and for the developed countries can be calculated by using 
Formulas 5 and 6, respectively. 
                             (5) 
                          (6) 
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here:  – risk-free rate equated to country’s sovereign bonds denominated in 
one of global currency,  – average return of global market index, Rc – country 
risk premium, rl – local market index return, rg – global market index return, σl – 
standard deviation of local market index return; σg – standard deviation of global 
market index return. 
Considering the analyzed features of both major approaches for the calculation 
and application of FDR, the process of choosing the most appropriate FDR can be 
represented by developing the following model (Figure 2.1).  
Preferable NPM 
approach?
Long-term borrowing rate 
of the government approach
Alternative cost of private 
capital approach
Need to 
discount
Totally-segmented 
market 
Partially-integrated 
market 
Fully-integrated 
market 
Rate of 10-years 
government bonds
Developed 
market?
5 formula
(Country risk premium included)
6 formula 
 
Figure 2.1. The model for calculating FDR of a country (prepared by the author of 
this dissertation) 
The model shows that the way to calculate FDR depends on the subjective 
approach of government in respect of its policy of investment appraisal, since both 
approaches of long-term government’s borrowing rate and the approach of 
alternative cost of private capital have their own arguments. Considering these 
arguments, the attitude of this the author of this dissertation is that if the government 
seeks to implement NPM methods and increase the involvement of the private sector 
in the provision of public infrastructure and services, then there are more arguments 
to apply FDR equal to the alternative cost of private capital. And, conversely, if the 
government is conservative regarding the methods of IP appraisal, then the 
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determination of the individual FDR has to be based on government’s borrowing 
rate. 
Calculation of financial indicators. Since the main options of IP 
implementation are identified, their financial analysis has to be done. There are six 
main CFs used for the calculation of key financial indicators: 
1. Investments, which include the capital costs (capex) of all fixed assets, 
e.g. buildings, land, plant, machinery, equipment, cars, software, 
furniture, etc. and non-fixed assets, e.g. design/planning, project 
management and technical assistance, construction supervision, 
publicity, etc. Since investments into infrastructure wear out, a 
depreciation process must be assumed to account for replacement. 
Therefore, replacement costs occurring during the reference period to 
replace short-life machinery and/or equipment also have to be included. 
2. Residual value, which reflects the capacity of the remaining services 
potential of fixed assets, whose economic life is not yet completely 
exhausted. It is included in the assessment at the end of reference 
period. 
3. Revenues, which are cash in-flows directly paid by users for the goods 
or services provided. 
4. Operating costs, which include all costs (opex) to operate and 
maintain the new or upgraded service from, e.g., labor costs and 
materials needed for maintenance and repair of assets to waste disposal 
costs or even environmental taxes, if applicable. 
5. Taxes, which include VAT, customs duties and excise duties, if 
applicable. 
6. Sources of financing, which include different sources of financing that 
cover the investment costs and operating costs to make the IP 
financially sustainable. The main sources of financing are grants, loans 
and bonds.  
7. Financing arrangement costs are the costs associated with arranging 
the financing for the IP, generally with loans and bonds. However, it 
can also include items such as arrangement fees, commitment fees, and 
“swap” credit premiums. The processes of arranging financing and 
servicing the debt over the loan period can represent significant costs 
which, depending on the applied accounting standards, can also be 
incurred as part of the investment costs. 
8. Procurement costs, which include costs related to public procurement. 
9. Public oversight costs, which include costs related to the oversight of 
IP in order to protect the public interest. 
When the above-listed FCs are determined regarding the assessment of 
financial profitability of the IP, financial NPV on investment (costs) (FNPVC) is 
calculated which is defined as the sum that results when the expected discounted 
investment and operating costs of the IP are deducted from the discounted value of 
the expected revenues (Formula 7). 
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            (7) 
here: CF – cash flow, r – discount rate, I – investments, RV – residual value 
calculated at the end of reference period, OM – operating and maintenance costs, RE 
– revenue, FAC – financing arrangement costs, PC – procurement costs, POC – 
public oversight costs. 
Considering the particularity of the public sector, there are many non-revenue 
generating IPs whose FNPVC is certainly negative and, to be financially sustainable, 
they require to be financed from the public funds, i.e. grants and subsidies have to be 
foreseen to make the IP financially sustainable. Accordingly, the IP is considered as 
financially sustainable, when the cumulated CF (CCF) balance between inflows and 
outflows remains equal to or above zero for all the years considered (CCF ≥ 0). 
Inflows may include operating revenues from the provision of goods and services 
from direct users, various sources of financing, grants, subsidies, etc., while 
outflows are related to investments, replacement costs, operating costs, 
reimbursement of loans and interest payments, as well as taxes. They have to be 
managed in a way that would ensure that there is no risk of suffering from a shortage 
of budget. 
Economic analysis. To be socially-economically justified, an IP has to be 
assessed with regards to whether it contributes to welfare. This requires the 
following steps: 1) convert market prices to shadow prices; 2) assess direct benefits 
and externalities, and; 3) assess economic performance, which finally provides the 
answer whether, in general, the IP provides socio-economic benefits (ENPV > 0) 
and, if yes, which of the options is emphasized by the highest value. Accordingly, 
this option is chosen for the implementation of the IP and becomes rational for 
further analysis for its implementation under the PPP. 
Risk assessment. As it is disclosed in Section 1.2.3, the implementation of IPs 
often faces the problem of planned cost overruns. Therefore, risk assessment is a 
crucial part of CBA to deal with the uncertainty and risks. It may consist of the 
following steps: 1) sensitivity analysis; 2) scenario analysis, and; 3) calculation of 
REs. The first two are widely acknowledged as assessment methods. However, the 
calculation of REs remains challenging and is widely discussed among both 
scientists and practicians in the context of assessing cost overrun risk in public IPs. 
Since the public sector tends to be criticized for a lack of accountability and 
transparency regarding the estimation of IP costs (Mutiganda, 2013) and, therefore, 
there is a demand for application and systemization of various techniques which 
would enable to increase the accuracy of cost estimation in the IPs, the assessment 
of cost overrun risk (Risk) is further analyzed in more detail, as the results of risk 
assessment are critical for a reliable assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure. 
Many authors, such as Jorgensen et al. (2012), Tang, Wang, & Ding (2012) 
discussed the complexity of cost estimation process, especially in the construction 
IPs. Generally, the more complex the IP is, i.e. the amounts of investments are 
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larger, the number of investment objects is higher, technologies to be used are less 
proven, the duration of the construction phase is longer, etc., the more difficult it is 
to accurately estimate the investment costs. All these aspects determine the 
uncertainty, due to which there is always a risk that the estimated investment costs 
will be overrun. Therefore, the widely used method of cost estimation, i.e. predicting 
the construction costs and simply calculating that the total is deterministic and 
insufficient (Okmen & Oztas, 2010). The risk-adjusted cost have to be estimated 
(Zavadskas et al., 2010). 
This Risk is related to a fact that, due to increased investment cost, the price of 
an IP can become so high that the promoter may face problems to secure additional 
financing to implement the IP and/or it may become financially and economically 
not worth to implement. According to Okmen & Oztas (2010), Tamosaitiene et al. 
(2013); Xu et al. (2010), Risk can be determined by various RFs, such as weather 
conditions, labor productivity, underground conditions, mistakes in the construction 
plan, changes of public sector requirements, etc. There is also a possibility that their 
variation may create and a positive effect, i.e. actual costs may be lesser than the 
forecast costs. Therefore, one of the major steps in cost estimation is to assess the 
potential risks and their RFs (Marhavilas, Koulouriotis, & Gemeni, 2011; Mousavi, 
Tavakkoli-Moghaddam, Azaron, Mojtahedi, & Hashemi, 2011). 
Literature is rich in papers addressing risk assessment. Traditionally, despite the 
difficulties to obtain the objective probabilities and frequencies it is focused on 
quantitative risk assessment (Carr & Tah, 2001; Taroun, 2014), where investment 
costs are estimated usually using such simulation methods as Monte Carlo (Almarri 
& Blackwell, 2014; Du & Li, 2008; Loizou & French, 2012), at a particular level of 
probability, usually 70% (Mirdamadi et al., 2013)39. Funding of the public 
investment programs at this confidence level or above certainly raises the 
probability of a project being implemented successfully, but, naturally, requires a 
higher level of funding. These additional resources could be used for the 
implementation of other potential IPs. Therefore, to use resources efficiently it is 
important to accurately assess the potential overrun of estimated costs. This aspect is 
even more relevant in cases when the public sector goes into the PPPs and seeks to 
assess the value of transferred risks to the private subjects (Chen & Chiu, 2010; 
Demirag et al., 2011; Phang, 2007). The more accurately Risk is assessed, the better 
possibilities there are to rationally allocate it between the partners as well as arrange 
the financial conditions of partnership (Demirag et al., 2011; A. Ng & Loosemore, 
2007). Also, the importance of accurate risk assessment for efficient risk 
management is acknowledged (Carr & Tah, 2001; Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; 
Marhavilas et al., 2011; Taroun, 2014). 
During the last several decades, the theoretical models and computerized tools 
used for quantitative assessment of risk were developed widely enough (Marhavilas 
et al., 2011). However, there is still a wide gap between theory and practice. 
According to Muthuveloo, Pulenthiran, & Teoh (2013), many IP promoters simply 
                                                 
39 Confidence level, that varies in the interval between 60% and 80% usually is used 
(Tecolote Research, 2007). 
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rely on subjective probabilities and in many cases risk is subjectively dealt with 
through adding an approximate contingency sum. Summarizing the studies about the 
actual practice of cost estimation in construction projects Taroun (2014) concluded 
that, in the managers’ point of view, personal experience and subjective judgments 
were considered as the most effective and widely used technique for managing risks. 
According to the author, most promoters have not performed any form of statistical 
analysis of risk or used any sophisticated quantitative tools. Such reasons as: 1) the 
unique nature of every construction IP, due to which it is complicated to apply 
general probabilities; 2) the difficulties to get reliable inputs, and; 3) limited 
understanding as well as a lack of experience in such methods, were revealed as an 
explanation. This shows that although the quantitative methods of risk assessment, 
in principle, have a high potential to make them more usable, in practice they have 
to be easier understood and more convenient. Therefore, the simplicity and 
facilitation of practical experience are considered to be the key element of future 
development of quantitative risk assessment tools. 
The development of a quantitative methods is also relevant in the context of 
researches, which disclosed that experts who use their personal experience usually 
underestimate the risk (Veres, 2009) and rarely can identify 60% of the possible 
uncertainty range and never did better than 70%, i.e. approximately one sigma 
(Capen, 1976). This shows that although the actual practice of risk assessment is 
very much based on qualitative methods and tools, their accuracy is rather limited. A 
complex application of quantitative and qualitative methods would the best solution 
in most of the cases. 
Considering the above-mentioned issue related with the unique nature of every 
IP, the application of quantitative risk assessment methods in the public sector can 
be more pragmatic in respect of accuracy and transparency than in the private sector. 
In the public sector, a lot of IPs are implemented through various Public capital 
investment programs (PCIPs) and can be divided into separate project types. In each 
type, the nature of risk is very similar and the number of IPs is usually large enough 
to collect empirical data and apply general probabilities as well as the statistical 
tools for the assessment of Risk. For instance, the public sector implementing a 
certain number of typical secondary school renewal IPs under one of the programs is 
able to collect data from former IPs and use them as inputs for the quantitative 
assessment of Risk in the latter projects (Wu, Huang, Zhang, & Zhang, 2012). While 
in the private sector, the diversity of IPs is much higher and the number of the same 
or very similar IPs is usually lower. Therefore, in this respect, the public sector 
usually has more opportunities to use the advantages of the application of 
quantitative risk assessment tools. 
Although the use of quantitative risk assessment techniques in practice is 
wrapped by many problems, literature is still poor in researches where they would 
be analyzed in the context of public investments. The particularities of Risk as well 
as the application of probability distributions (PDs) for the assessment of Risk in the 
IP are not the exceptions. One of the rare examples is the United Kingdom National 
Audit Office’s reports, which revealed that only from a quarter to nearly a half of all 
IPs, depending on the year, have been implemented within the estimated budget 
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(National Audit Office, 2003, 2009). However, this fragmental information did not 
provide any quantitative data about the probabilities and values of risk. In most 
papers, such as those prepared by Acebes, Pajares, Galán, & López-Paredes (2014), 
Chou (2011), Jiang, Zhang, & Ji (2003), Scherer, Pomroy, & Fuller (2003),analyze 
the features of the so-called “traditional” PDs such as normal, triangular, lognormal, 
beta etc. to assess various uncertainties, but not their appropriateness to assess the 
Risk. The lack of these empirical data determines the problems to estimate the 
amounts of risk-adjusted investment costs as well as the choice of PDs enabling to 
describe Risk the best. Considering poor knowledge about the particularities of Risk 
and the PDs the best enabling to assess it as well as the requirement to facilitate the 
use of quantitative risk assessment tools, this dissertation focuses on finding the 
solution for the issue of what PDs are the most suitable to assess the Risk of public 
IPs. 
Literature analysis allows arguing that the assessment of investment costs is 
more a forecasting exercise than a simple calculation of total investments. Numerous 
researches disclose a diversity of problems related with forecasting. Many factors, 
such as imperfect information, misleading assumptions, various errors, 
unpredictable changes in the IP, new or unproven technology, tendency for humans 
and organizations to favor optimism, etc. may cause deviations from the initial 
prognosis, due to which actual investment costs may vary in either an adverse or a 
favorable direction (Fischer et al., 2010; Hameed Memon, Abdul Rahman, Yasmin 
Zainun, & Abd Karim, 2014; Ke et al., 2010). Usually, this variation consists of a 
spectrum of respectively distributed potential values. The larger uncertainty is, the 
broader the spectrum may be. Therefore, Risk as a quantitative concept can be 
assessed by PDs indicating the likelihood of a variable of the forecast investments 
falling within the stated limits. As a result, although there is still some attempts to 
deny that risk can be quantitative, even in theory (Campbell, 2005), it is usually 
expressed in quantitative measures at a certain probability level or in the probability 
of occurrence of the desirable result, e.g. a particular probability that the IP will be 
implemented within the estimated costs. 
The realized value and its probability of occurrence are two parameters needed 
to transform simple uncertainty into a defined risk. To do that, the PD of variables, 
i.e. a cumulative distribution function (CDF) has to be known. Depending on the 
particularity of risk and data available, several techniques can be used to get 
variables. In literature, the probability-impact (P-I) risk model is prevailing (Taroun, 
2014). Such reasons as simplicity, flexibility, tendency to be cheap, empowerment 
to visually compare the risks and as a result easy understanding enable to explain its 
popularity (Bowers & Khorakian, 2014; Kmec, 2011). However, despite these 
advantages this model is also strongly criticized. Due to mostly used qualitative 
categorization, subjective ranking and impossibility to maintain perfect congruence 
between the qualitative and quantitative rankings, by using it for most of risks 
neither the probability nor the impact can be accurately quantified (Cox, 2008). Due 
to these reasons, the P-I model is flawed and should be used with caution. 
The alternative way to estimate potential investment costs is the use of 
historical data, which can help to assess the risk more accurately, though this also 
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has some pitfalls. Mostly because historical data are not always available and firstly 
allows disclosing the risk experienced in the past. Meanwhile actual values may lie 
outside the range of historical records, thus critical risks may be ignored (Bowers & 
Khorakian, 2014; I. T. Yang, 2005). However, due to the same reason, it is 
justifiable to use historical data for the assessment of risk which may occur in the 
future, if it is expected that the observed past behavior will continue in the future 
(Makovšek, 2014). The papers by Gokiene (2010), Macário (2010a), and Tang et al. 
(2010) disclose that this assumption may be difficult to apply for the ex-ante 
assessment in the case of whole life-cycle costs, which consist of the investment 
costs as well as the long-term operating costs needed to forecast, e.g., in the complex 
IPs implemented as the PPP. But this might be much easier in the case of 
implementing very similar IPs, as in the example of renovation of the secondary 
school IPs mentioned earlier. In these cases, data obtained from former IPs allows 
envisaging the tendency of success in implementing this kind of IPs within the 
estimated budget which can be described by the appropriate PD (Rostami et al., 
2013). 
When historical data is used to assess risk, it involves an attempt to fit 
theoretical PD to the data and verify its goodness-of-fit statistically. For this 
purpose, usually such statistics as Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson Darling, 
Cramer-von Mise, Shapiro-Wilk, Filiben, X2, etc. (Beaulieu, Dufour, & Khalaf, 
2014; Heo, Shin, Nam, Om, & Jeong, 2013; Jiménez-Gamero, Alba-Fernández, 
Muñoz-García, & Chalco-Cano, 2009) are used, and the fitness is measured by 
quantifying the distance between the empirical and appropriate theoretical CDFs. 
The closer the distance is, the better the theoretical PD reflects a sample. In some 
cases, there can be many potentially suitable PDs; therefore, to avoid wasting time 
looking for the most suitable PD manually, the fitting process is usually done with 
software packages, such as Crystal Ball, EasyFit, @RISK, etc. A typical result is a 
list of statistically “good” PDs and their associated parameters, based on which the 
estimator of risk can select the most proper one.  
However, although nowadays the derivation of PD is largely computer-assisted, 
the results can be widely different depending on inputs used. The estimator has to 
ensure the appropriate methodology to get meaningful results. In the estimation of 
costs there is a logical lower boundary of uncertainty, i.e. investment costs cannot be 
negative. Therefore, in practice it is discouraged to employ PDs that have values less 
than zero or to truncate the lower limit at zero for all PDs (Jiang et al., 2003). The 
second way is even less recommended because such truncation moves the mean of 
the PD to the right, making it a more conservative estimate. However, the estimator 
can be free to choose the best PD depending on specific requirements. 
There is a rather limited number of studies which analyze the suitability of 
appropriate PDs under various conditions. In the papers of Acebes et al. (2014), 
Chou, Yang, & Chong (2009), Chou (2011), Jiang et al. (2003) such well-known 
PDs as normal, beta, triangular, lognormal, uniform, etc. are met and their suitability 
to reflect historical data is usually analyzed in the context of whole life-cycle costs 
estimation of the IP. These studies suggest that the lognormal PD could be the most 
appropriate and universal in this case. However, there is no more significant 
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information about PDs which are best able to describe the tendency of the public 
sector’s success to implement IPs within the estimated budget and to assess the Risk. 
Considering the above-mentioned issue, the author of this dissertation, in order 
to find the most suitable PDs to assess Risk in the IPs, has performed a research, in 
which a total of 853 public IPs implemented in Lithuania have been included for 
quantitative analysis. The research was based on a comparison between the 
estimated costs and actual costs of IP implementation, which resulted in an analysis 
of peculiarities of Lithuania-specific Risk40 and finding the most accurate PDs with 
appropriate parameters for the seven following financial statements: 1) land (A1); 2) 
real estate (A2); 3) construction and other repairs (A3); 4) equipment and 
machineries and other assets (A4); 5) projection, technical maintenance and other 
services related to investment into A1–A4; 6) reinvestments into A3 and A4, and; 7) 
other services (A7), respectively. The research methodology is described in detail in 
the article prepared by Jasiukevicius & Vasiliauskaite (2015a). Since the results of 
the research are properly analyzed in the same article, only the main results related 
to the peculiarities of investment costs overrun in Lithuania and PDs allowing to 
describe the Risk are presented in the dissertation. 
The research revealed that among various public IPs, the estimated investment 
budget was overrun by a quarter on average (25,6%), while the results in different 
groups of IPs have varied in a range from one-sixth to a little bit more than a quarter 
of the estimated investment costs with the marginal results in the group of 
equipment and machineries on the lower side, and construction on the higher side, 
respectively (Appendix 7). The results disclosed the presence of different levels of 
Risk in every group; however, only the difference of the results between the 
mentioned marginal groups was statistically significant among all 21 possible 
comparison options41. Therefore, only the phenomenon of IPs of procurement of 
equipment and machineries are likely to be less overrun than the IPs of construction 
can be statistically confirmed ((p = 0,004) < (α = 0,05)). All results are based on the 
Mann–Whitney U test. These findings correlate with the results of 258 large 
transport infrastructure IPs covering 20 countries presented by Li Yin Shen et al. 
(2006), which note that cost overruns occurred in almost 90% of the IPs examined, 
with the highest cost overruns of 86% and 28% on average. 
The analysis of peculiarities of Risk disclosed that the observed tendency of 
estimated costs overrun is not unambiguous. The results in quantiles show that a 
little bit more than 2/3 of all analyzed public IPs have been implemented within the 
estimated budget, 4/5 of which by fully using all planned assignations (Figure 2.2). 
On the one hand, these results could be explained by public sector’s great efforts to 
                                                 
40 The Risk was analyzed by calculating R (the ratio) between Ir (actual investment costs) 
and Ip (estimated investments costs) in the public IPs, where values, R = (Ir/Ip), can vary in a 
range [0; +∞), where: R=0 means that no actual costs have been experienced; R=1 shows 
that the implemented IP has fully used all estimated budget, and; R>1 shows an overrun of 
the estimated budget. R<1 can imply savings in the IP or the result of underfinancing. 
41 Kruskal-Wallis test has indicated at least one statistically significant difference among the 
groups of IP in respect of their investment costs overrun tendencies (X2 = 12,865, (p = 0,012) 
< (α = 0,05)). 
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properly estimate the investment costs and implement the IPs within the estimated 
budget. On another hand, usually IPs cannot expect to get higher financing than 
planned assignations and, therefore, can be actually finished without full 
completion. This aspect of IPs is poorly analyzed and requires more detailed 
analysis in the following researches. 
 
Figure 2.2. Distribution of ratios of actual and estimated costs (prepared by the 
author of this dissertation) 
The remaining 1/3 of IPs are characterized by an excess of estimated budget. 
The descriptive statistics revealed that the excess was not greater than 1/5 (21,05%) 
in 3/4 of the cases; however, the values between IPs were widely distributed. Within 
one standard deviation, the values were distributed in the range of R ϵ (0,6389–
1,8733), whereas the asymmetry is positive. Considering these statistics, it is 
assumed that it is more likely that the estimated investment costs will be exceeded 
than that the IPs will be implemented within the limits of the estimated budget. The 
results in different groups of IPs are analyzed in the article prepared by 
Jasiukevicius & Vasiliauskaite (2015a). 
The results of analysis based on Kolmogorov–Smirnov test revealed a list of 
statistically the best PDs which enable to define Risk in public IPs. Appendix 8 
presents the top 5 PDs in each group as well as in a general sample, with Loglogistic 
(3 parameters), Gen. Pareto and Cauchy PDs have been the most often listed, 
respectively, 6, 4 and 4 times. Cauchy was distinguished as “the most suitable” in 
4/6 of the groups, while Loglogistic was the only one listed at the top of every 
group. Considering the fact that the estimated distances between these theoretical 
and the empirical samples in each of these PDs are very similar, the PDs have been 
matched only statistically and their significance of congruence is identical, in order 
to choose the most appropriate one, the peculiarities of all PDs have to be 
considered, since the parameters of theoretical PDs are such that total distances 
between PDs and samples would be the smallest. However, the theoretical PDs 
formed in such a way can be very receded from the samples in their separate parts. 
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This shows the requirement to complement quantitative risk assessment techniques 
by qualitative evaluation under these circumstances. 
Cauchy is a symmetrical PD which, in comparison with normal PD, is 
characterized by a very high excess, i.e. a high concentration of values around the 
mode (Figure 2.3). This feature in a great part of its range could reflect the observed 
tendency of a considerable part of the projects to be implemented within all 
estimated budget. However, due to the same feature, the REs calculated by this PD 
are very small, i.e. in 70% of the cases, the excess of the most expected value did 
not exceed 0.1–4.4% depending on the group, which is too low for a recommended 
minimum 10% level (Eliasson & Fosgerau, 2013). Therefore, Cauchy was not the 
best option in this case. The application of Gen. Pareto, whose mode consists of the 
lowest value in the sample also was not the solution, since the assumption that the 
most expected value of estimated investment costs equals the lowest possible value 
is unacceptable.  
 
Cauchy Gen. Pareto Loglogistic (3P) 
Figure 2.3. Graphs of probability density functions (Jasiukevicius & Vasiliauskaite, 
2015a) 
Loglogistic consistently reflected the empirical samples in most of its range: 1) 
high excess and concentration of values around 1 reflect the fact of a great part of 
public IPs is to be implemented within the estimated budget; 2) the positive skew 
illustrated the observed tendency of the public IPs to be overrun in respect of the 
estimated investment budget in the general case, and; 3) the PD also reflects a small 
possibility of public IPs to be implemented with lower costs than it was estimated. 
Moreover, high ranks in the lists disclose its universality to be applied for risk 
assessment in different long-term asset classes. These features determine Loglogistic 
as the most suitable PD to assess Risk in public IPs. 
Considering the literature where such PDs as normal, triangular and lognormal 
are mostly mentioned in the context of risk assessment in the IPs, the results of 
research were unexpected. However, the observed PDs of real values have been 
moved far away from these theoretical PDs, ranking them only in the places of 
thirty-fifth and lower (Appendix 8), disclosing the high potential of Loglogistic. The 
use of this PD would allow expecting to get the most accurate results of evaluation 
123 
of Risk in IPs, especially in the case of Lithuania. Table 2.2. presents the estimated 
parameters which allow assessing Risk in all seven groups.  
Table 2.2.The parameters of Loglogistic enabling to assess Risk in IPs 
(Jasiukevicius & Vasiliauskaite, 2015a) 
Group Title Parameters 
A1 
Land 
α = 2,1121; β = 0,30732; γ = 
0,74111; Mode = 0,9299 
A2 
Real estate 
α =2,1121; β = 0,30732; γ = 
0,74111; Mode = 0,9299 
A3 
Construction, major and other repairs 
α =1,9673; β = 0,32927; γ = 
0,74202; Mode= 0,92827 
A4 
Equipment and machineries and other assets 
α =2,7906; β = 0,28554; γ = 
0,72694; Mode = 0,945188 
A5* Projection, technical maintenance and other 
services related with investment into A1-A4, 
α = 1,8405; β = 0,25464; γ = 
0,75111; Mode = 0,88251 
A6 
Reinvestments (into A3 and A4) 
α =2,1274; β = 0,30981; γ = 
0,73931; Mode = 0,931093 
A7 
Other services 
α = 1,9247; β = 0,23155; γ = 
0,7493; Mode = 0,876598 
In summary, the satisfaction of preparatory conditions for a reliable assessment 
of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure primarily 
requires preparing an IP which represents the public scenario, which includes many 
steps to be coherently accomplished to determine the best option for IP 
implementation and calculate its costs. The assessment of financial aspects plays one 
of the most significant roles in this process; however, it is also one of the most 
discussed. Determination of FDR and assessment of risks are in the center of these 
discussions; however, as the analysis of literature disclosed, they are not particularly 
productive in outputs which could provide practical solutions. Considering this 
issue, the appropriate practical solutions are provided. 
2.1.2. Expediency criteria for the analysis of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in infrastructure 
Since the transaction costs of PPP’s procurement can be significant in respect 
of the total investment costs, it is important to find criteria which would allow 
selecting those IPs which could be characterized as having PPP potential and, 
therefore, would be justified for additional funds spent on their full analysis and 
preparation. 
Considering the conception and features of PPP, analyzed in Section 1.2.1., its 
advantages and disadvantages, described in Section 1.2.3., and the factors 
motivating the public sector to go into a PPP with the private sector, mentioned in 
Section 1.1.2.1., the following criteria can be distinguished to assess the expediency 
of an IP to be fully analyzed for its implementation as PPP: 
Requirement to invest in infrastructure. Since the shortage of public funds to 
finance the infrastructural IP is one of the important arguments to look for 
alternative ways of IP implementation and service delivery, primarily the question of 
whether the IP requires enough large new capital investments is relevant and, if yes, 
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how many. The threshold for investments cannot be determined, since this can be 
affected by many different aspects. However, this amount by default has to be large 
enough that it would provide a fiscal challenge for governments to implement the IP 
under CP. In other words, the decision for expediency of full analysis of PPP mostly 
depends on the financial possibilities of the PPA which, in case of budget 
restrictions, are constrained to take interest in alternative financial arrangements to 
cover capital investments. 
A long-term demand of infrastructure and services. When a private entity 
comes into a PPP by investing an appropriate amount of investments, enough time is 
necessary to recover them, which determines the length of cooperation period with 
the private entity and requires appropriate demand of infrastructure and services to 
be ensured so that these investments would be justified regarding fundamental 
public interest. Since, considering the above-mentioned criterion, capital 
investments in PPPs are usually relatively large, there is a logical solution to try 
making the cooperation period long enough to make the PPP financially affordable 
in respect of funding from the public budget or/and the price for the end-users. 
Therefore, there has to be clear indication that a sufficient level of demand for 
infrastructure and services can be forecast and will be ensured for an appropriate 
period of time, which can continue until the end of useful lifetime of assets and until 
the private subject recovers its capital investments. 
Complexity of transferred services. The PPP can be the most beneficial in 
respect of efficiency and quality when it integrates various interrelated tasks from 
projection and construction to operation and maintenance, which may result in the 
optimization of whole life-cycle costs of IP implementation and service delivery. 
Therefore, it is important whether there are any indications that the PPP can provide 
additional benefits, e.g. cost savings, higher quality, less chances for delays, etc. 
from the complex transfer of service delivery to the private entity. 
Possibility to measure output of services. To encourage efficiency and 
innovation from the private entity, it is important to focus on the outputs rather than 
inputs regarding the requirements of infrastructure and service delivery. The output 
specification sets out the range of services the government is seeking to procure and 
the performance levels required for each of those services. Therefore, it is important 
whether the results of infrastructure and service delivery can be measured in clear 
output specifications and key performance indicators. This can be challenging, if the 
public sector does not have any determined standards of services considered to be 
transferred to the private entity to deliver, which creates an issue when defining 
what the private entity should do and what can be later considered as good results of 
its performance. Therefore, the possibility to specify output specifications is crucial 
for the selection of the best bid and successful monitoring of the private entity’s 
performance (Liu et al., 2015; Felix Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016). 
Possibility to share or allocate risks. Since the possibility to transfer at least a 
part of risks is one of the main arguments in favor of PPP, it is important to know, 
whether there are no significant restrictions on sharing or transferring risks to the 
private entity, which could result in a loss of possibility to allocate risks between the 
parties, depending on which of them can manage them at the least costs. These 
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restrictions are usually related to legal requirements, which can allow the 
appropriate services to be provided solely by the public sector, e.g. convoying 
prisoners, maintenance of facilities containing top-secret information, etc. The 
indications of reluctance from the market of the private sector to bear the 
appropriate risks, such as the construction and availability, would also be considered 
as a barrier for further establishment of PPP. 
Possibility clearly to identify revenue streams. Since the private entity comes 
into PPPs for profit, revenue streams for the delivery of infrastructure and services 
to the private partner have to be clearly identified. Revenues can come from the 
government, direct users or a combination of both. In any case, there should be clear 
indication that the financial sustainability of the IP will be ensured. 
Interest of the private sector. The PPP is worth to be considered, if there are 
clear indications of the private sector being interested in the IP. It is relevant to 
assess whether there are the private entities which would be able to ensure sufficient 
technical, operational, financial capabilities to implement the IP. This usually 
requires market research and a good communication plan. 
All these criteria based on a qualitative analysis and mostly scored only 
qualitatively (‘yes’ or ‘no’) are equally important for making a decision of whether 
it is worth to spend additional funds for fully analyzing the possibilities of PPP to 
invest in public infrastructure. Since they cover the main assumptions for successful 
PPP structuring, they all require positive assessment. A particular exception could 
be the criterion related to the requirement to invest in infrastructure, since there are 
some forms of PPP, under which the private entity is not required to invest in 
infrastructure. On the other hand, these forms are not everywhere considered as 
PPP42. 
Since the main criteria allowing the PPA to select the IP emphasizing by PPP 
potential are identified, the methodological aspects of designing of IP rational to 
compare against the private bids are further analyzed in the following section. 
2.1.3. Designing the Public Sector Comparator 
As mentioned in Section 1.3.1., a reliable assessment of possibilities of PPP to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure primarily requires developing the PSC 
model which would be rational to compare against the shadow or actual private bids, 
where VfM could be assessed and rational decision for the best way of IP 
implementation could be made. Considering the discussed aspects of VfM 
assessment, this section is devoted to analyzing the methodological aspects of 
designing a proper PSC cost model which would enable to make the above-
mentioned decisions. 
The PSC, considered as an alternative to the public sector, conceptually 
requires including an overall picture of the IP’s cost, if it were to be implemented 
under the CP. As a tool used by governments to determine the proper provider of 
infrastructure and services for the public IP, it is rational, if the results of initial IP, 
whose stages of preparation have been analyzed in Section 2.1.1., allow conforming 
                                                 
42 See Section 1.2.2. 
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its technical and environmental feasibility and demonstrating socio-economic 
benefits. When these conditions are satisfied, the option with the highest socio-
economic benefit is rational to further analyze for the purpose of finding the most 
efficient way of implementation. Accordingly, the PSC allows the PPA to figure out 
whether the PPP would be more cost-effective than the most efficient option of CP. 
To get reasonable results of comparison, it is important to structure the appropriate 
public sector’s alternative so that it is rational to compare against any other option 
from the private sector. Accordingly, this process requires the following steps: 
Definition of the scope of PPP IP and formulation of output specification. To 
rationally assess the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure it is important to define the appropriate scope of the IP in respect of 
the number and scope of tasks to be transferred to the private entity, which would be 
considered as the procurement object of the PPP. Literature is very poor regarding 
this aspect, but the existence of various forms of PPP where the most suitable one 
has to be chosen implies this process as being iterative in nature. At the end of this 
analysis, the results of PPP can be completely different from the scope of the initial 
IP. 
The following aspects should be considered to define the scope of PPP, for 
which the PSC is prepared. First, a set of particular transferring tasks to the private 
entity can be lower in comparison with the scope of the initial IPs and depend on the 
legal framework regulating the possibilities to transfer particular tasks to the 
appropriate public sectors to the private one, abilities to achieve VfM in the scope of 
transferring tasks and possibilities to keep the delivery of infrastructure and service 
financially sustainable throughout the whole life-cycle of the IP, in respect of 
financial affordability from the PPA or/and prices to the customers. Second, in order 
to clearly allocate risks between the partners, tasks are usually transferred to the 
private entities at a full scope including those CFs, which, since they have been 
prepared on incremental basis, have not been included in the initial IP. Therefore, 
the scope of the PPP in monetary terms can be larger in comparison with the scope 
of the initial IP. Third, to make the IP attractive to the private sector, the PPP may 
include the CFs exceptionally related to commercial activities of the private entity 
and which, therefore, have not been included in the scope of the initial IP, which has 
been prepared purely from the perspective of the public sector. These activities also 
expand the scope of the IP in the PPPs. 
Table 2.3 provides a general example of differences between the scopes of IP 
and PSC/PPP in a case of building new infrastructure for delivering services. It 
shows that under the traditional approach the government has to perform all tasks 
throughout the whole project life-cycle. In the case of PPP, the government remains 
with the provision of main and complementary services, since it is a function of the 
municipality. While, all other tasks related to the development, operation and 
maintenance of infrastructure are transferred to the private sector. Moreover, it can 
also perform additional commercial activities in the developed infrastructure outside 
of the main education hours, if this allows decreasing the public sector’s payments 
for the availability of infrastructure to the private entity. Depending on the 
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distribution of tasks among the entities, risks are allocated accordingly as it is 
explained later in this section. 
When the scope of PPP is defined, a particular output specification can be 
formulated, by following which the government can develop the procurement 
conditions defining the performance level in respect of the scope and quality for 
each of the transferred services. 
Table 2.3. Example of possible differences among the scopes of IP and PSC/PPP 
(prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Task IP PSC/PPP 
Development of Assets 
Design + + 
Construction + + 
Equipment + + 
Main service delivery 
Main services + - 
Complementary services + - 
Other service delivery 
Secondary services + + 
O&M 
Operation of infrastructure + + 
Maintenance and repair + + 
Additional activities 
Commercial activities - + 
Identification of Raw PSC components and assignation of costs. The Raw PSC 
can encompass various components from direct costs that can be traced or assigned 
to particular services (direct capital costs, capital receipts, direct maintenance costs, 
direct operating costs, etc.) to indirect costs, the occurrence of which is not directly 
related to the delivery of services (partial usage of administrative buildings, partial 
commitment of plant and equipment, corporate and administrative overhead, etc.). If 
the scopes of the initial IP and PPP are identical, most CFs can be taken from the 
initial IP. Otherwise, CFs allowing to represent a full scope of transferred tasks have 
to be added. In other words, since the PSC has to present full costs of infrastructure 
and service delivery, the incremental approach has to be refused and full CFs are 
used instead. Moreover, in order to avoid any distortion in the results, any CFs 
related to the third parties’ revenue have to be excluded from the calculation. 
Accordingly, the Raw PSC can be calculated by modifying Formula 743, where full 
CFs are used instead and the residual value is usually equated to zero if a part of the 
newly developed asset is not left to the private entity (Formula 8).  
            (8) 
                                                 
43 See the section 2.1.1. 
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Assessment of competitive neutrality. Competitive neutrality is an important 
part of PSC, since it allows removing the net competitive advantages that accrue to 
government business due to the virtue of its public sector ownership. This allows 
like-with-like VfM assessment between the PSC and the private bids, by removing 
the effects of public ownership and including equivalent costs that would otherwise 
be incurred. These costs are related to different taxation of the public and private 
entities regarding land, property, payroll, local government and capital transaction 
taxes. However, as discussed in Section 1.3.1., the differences between different 
levels of government representatives, such as national, regional, business unit have 
to be also considered when assessing competitive neutrality since the costs spent by 
an institution to pay the appropriate taxes can be treated differently, depending on 
which part of them are regained as budget income. Accordingly, the results of PSC 
as well as VfM assessment can be different depending on the perspective from 
which the assessment is done. Therefore, for better understanding of VfM results, 
the PSC at different levels for governing has to be calculated. 
Calculation of risk values. All material-retained risks should be included and 
evaluated to provide a comprehensive measure of the full cost to the government 
under the PSC. The evaluation of risks conceptually requires three elements: 1) 
identification of all material risks; 2) quantification of risks impact (loss), and; 3) 
estimation of their occurrence. Their interdependence is shown in Formula 9. 
                                             (9) 
here: R – total risk value, i – individual risk event, L – loss, p(L) – probability 
of loss occurrence. 
The formula shows that the value of risks is a sum of individual risks which are 
the result of estimated loss and probability of loss occurrence. Therefore, the 
objectivity of evaluation directly depends on how clearly the assumptions of 
potential loss and probability of occurrence can be presented. This can be very 
difficult to measure, since the chance of error in measuring both concepts is usually 
high. 
The traditional approach to risk assessment suggests to start this process by 
identifying relevant RFs (Lehtiranta, 2014). Then, potential loss is determined and 
probabilities of their occurrence are estimated, and the result of multiplication is a 
value of risks, accordingly. However, when this technique is used, the reliability of 
results, besides the aspects discussed in Section 2.1.1., highly depends on whether 
RFs are independent from each other, i.e. the occurrence of one RF can affect the 
occurrence of another which, unfortunately, is difficult to avoid in most cases. For 
example, a potential error made in the technical project, which can be considered as 
a design risk, can heighten the total costs of construction, operation and 
maintenance, which, in turn, can be considered as construction risk and availability 
risk, respectively. The longer list of RFs is included in the quantitative assessment, 
the more difficult it is to avoid the error of double counting, which may cause the 
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overestimation of IP’s risk. It is complicated to determine REs, since they are 
difficult to link to appropriate CFs which require expert-based evaluation and, 
therefore, determine the high subjectivity of the results. Moreover, starting the risk 
assessment from the identification of RFs and subsequent calculation of their values 
causes another issue of proper arrangement of REs over the whole life-cycle period 
of an IP, since financial consequences of risks can appear much later in the 
comparison with the occurrence of actual reasons which could explain them. For 
example, loss caused by the same error of design can be actually experienced in the 
later phases of IP implementation, such as construction or operation. As a result, 
since this approach is used with the appropriate technique, reliable risk assessment is 
a significant issue in practice. 
Considering the research results of cost overrun risks in a public IP, presented 
in Section 2.1.1, the author of this dissertation suggests solving the above-mentioned 
issues by adopting an inverse approach to risk assessment, the main principles of 
which can be explained as follows. To assess an IP’s value of risks, firstly, PDs 
reflecting the tendencies of possible CF changes from the estimated values should be 
applied to all direct CFs resulting in calculated REs for each of them. Secondly, each 
direct CF with their REs has to be attributed to one of the appropriate risk groups 
(RGs), where they also have to be summarized. Finally, the values of RGs have to 
be equally divided into relevant RFs identified in the appropriate RGs regarding IP 
implementation. 
This quantitative approach to risk assessment is reliable as long as suitable PDs 
are applied and their parameters accurate to reflect potential risks, since it primarily 
focuses on the calculation of risk values of the specific CFs and only later these 
values are allocated among various individual RFs. This requires collecting data 
from actual experiences of IP implementation, so that the general tendencies could 
be envisaged and shaped into appropriate PDs. Since only the data related to IP 
implementation could be found, the author of this dissertation could provide only 
PDs suitable to assess the Risk44. However, if the statistics of estimated and actual 
CFs were available, a similar methodology, described in the paper of Jasiukevicius 
& Vasiliauskaite (2015), could be also applied to calculate REs for CFs of revenues, 
and O&M costs. Since the data related to these CFs is unavailable, considering the 
results of literature analysis performed in Section 2.1.1., besides the PD provided in 
the Table 2.4, it is suggested to use the following PDs to measure risk asserted in the 
appropriate CFs. 
Table 2.4. PDs applied to CFs of IP (prepared considering Tecolote Research, 
(2007)) 
CF PD 
Investment cost Table 4 
Revenue Normal 
O&M costs Triangular, PERT 
Financing Normal 
Residual value Normal 
                                                 
44 See the Table 2.2. 
130 
The suggested approach calculates risk values on CFs at the time when they are 
planned to be experienced that, in this sense, makes it less subjective, since it is 
assumed that all risks can be managed in time but at different costs.  
Regarding the allocation of REs into the RGs, the author of this dissertation, 
considering the nature of the main CFs in a public IP, has distinguished eight RGs, 
among which REs of CFs can be allocated. Table 2.5 shows the links between RGs 
and the appropriate CFs. Design RG materializes in the overruns of costs related to 
the preparation works of IP implementation, such as feasibility studies, design 
project, etc. The financial value of construction RG consists of cost overruns in 
construction works. The requirement to invest more than it was estimated in the 
quality of acquiring equipment, machinery and services can be shown in the increase 
of investment costs of equipment and service, accordingly. Fluctuations of interest 
rates can be expressed in the value of financing RG. The availability RG is directly 
related to O&M expenditures, since deviations from the plan require additional 
operating costs to keep the infrastructure available to use according to the foreseen 
scope and standards. Lower than expected revenues can usually explain the value of 
demand RG. Finally, residual value RG is the result of deviation in the actual 
residual value from the estimated value and the requirement to reinvest more than 
expected to keep residual value at the predetermined level. 
Table 2.5. Assignation of CFs to the RGs (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
No RG CF 
1. Design Design costs, research, studies. 
2. Construction Investments into land, real estate, 
construction works. 
3. Equipment quality Investments into equipment, 
machinery, information technologies 
(IT), furniture, etc. 
4. Service quality Investments into services 
5. Economic (or financing) Interests 
6. Availability (or operation) O&M expenditures 
7. Market (or demand) Revenue 
8. Residual value risk Residual value, reinvestments 
When the values of RGs are known, each of them can be divided into relevant 
RF (Figure. 2.4.). Since the values of all RFs in the RG are the same, the higher 
number of individual RFs the RG is, the lower value of every individual RF is. On 
the one hand, this assumption is rather subjective, since every risk can have a 
different financial outcome; however, it allows avoiding risk of double counting the 
IP’s risk values, which is very important in order to determine the full cost of public 
scenario and further consider the transfer of a part of risks to the private sector. 
The risk value distributed among RFs can be further allocated/shared between 
the public and private entities, since this is the essence of PPP. Literature analysis 
(Ernest Effah; Ameyaw & Chan, 2015; Chou et al., 2012; Chung et al., 2010; 
Hwang et al., 2013; Ke et al., 2010; Martins et al., 2011; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Li 
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Yin Shen et al., 2006) has allowed identifying a list of RFs which are encountered in 
the context of PPP IPs (Appendix 9). It is non-finite and can be expanded or 
narrowed depending on a particular case. The analysis disclosed that the PPP IP, 
beside the RFs inherent in the IPs, may have some additional risks which are 
specific to the PPPs (Appendix 10). Mostly, they are a part of legal risks and are 
related to specific asset ownership, equity investors issues or lack of national PPP 
law to regulate the relationship among the private and public entities in the PPPs. 
Although according to the descriptions of RFs, they may look as inherent to PPPs, 
they are not significantly distinguished from the CP, e.g. disputes among the private 
entities and PPA, issues of financing, cost management, demand, economic 
phenomenon, etc. are inherent in both CP and PPP cases. This conclusion is 
important, since PPP as the way of delivering infrastructure and services is 
developed to share risks between the parties rather than create new ones. 
TOTAL RISK 
VALUE
100€ = 100%
1 RG
30€ = 30%
1.1 RF, 10€ 
2 RG
25€ = 25%
1.2.1 RC 3,3€
1.2 RF, 10€ 
1.N RF, 10€ 
N RG
45€ = 45%
Pu 3,3€Pr 24,3€
1.2.2 RC 3,3€
3,3€
3,3€
12,5€2.1 RF, 12,5€ 
2.N RF, 12,5€ 
10€
10€
6,25€ 6,25€
Pr 18,75€ Pu 6,25€
Figure 2.4. Risk value allocation scheme (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
To develop recommendations for risk sharing/allocation, RFs allocation 
preferences were analyzed with regards to different literature (Appendix 10). 
Although not all identified RFs have been mentioned by the scientists regarding 
their allocation between the partners, the results appear to be rather unequal 
regarding scientists’ preferences. Five out of 65 RFs have been found to be allocated 
to the public sector, which are as follows: “government’s intervention”, 
“expropriation and nationalization”, “government reliability” and “land use”. The 
results also allow indicating 15 RFs which should be mostly allocated to the private 
sector. These include: “financing”, “construction completion”, “construction cost 
overrun”, “operation cost overrun”, “maintenance cost overrun”, “insufficient 
income”, “fluctuation of material costs”, “operator default”, “insolvency of 
operator”, “quality risk”, “availability of labor/materials”, “labor disputes and 
strikes”, “waste of materials”, “protection of geological and historical objects” and 
“low operating productivity”. In between “force majeure” risk was identified as 
preferably shared between the public and private sectors. While other RFs, beside 
those which have not been allocated or allocated just once and showed no tendency, 
had different preferences regarding their allocation among the public and private 
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entities. However, these results have to be evaluated with caution, since the analysis 
was based on names of RFs and not on their descriptions, which could affect the 
results. For further analysis, each of the RFs has to be divided into risk cases (RCs) 
which describe the responsibilities of each partner in the defined scenarios. This is 
partly demonstrated by providing the perspective of the author of this dissertation 
towards the preferences of risk allocation (Appendix 10). A deeper analysis requires 
wider legal studies which is not in the scope of this dissertation. A summarized 
solution is provided below instead. 
Allocation of RFs is easier to explain when they are attributed to the 
appropriate RGs. Literature analysis (Guasch, 2004; Hwang et al., 2013; Ke et al., 
2010; Martins et al., 2011; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Li Yin Shen et al., 2006; Xu et 
al., 2012) allowed classifying RFs into the following RGs: 
1. Legal RG – includes RFs related to procurement and contracting; 
2. Political RG – includes RFs related to political decisions and 
government actions; 
3. Force majeure RG – includes RFs which are extraordinary events or 
circumstances beyond the control of the parties such as riot, crimes, 
war, strike or other event described by the legal term of “act of God” 
(hurricane, flood, earthquake, etc.) 
4. Market RG – includes RFs related to the changes of demand; 
5. Operation RG – includes RFs related to the availability of 
infrastructure; 
6. Design RG – includes RFs related to errors and inefficiencies in design 
of infrastructure; 
7. Construction RG – includes RFs related to investment cost overrun and 
delays in completion. It is comprised of construction, equipment and 
services risks presented in Table 2.4; 
8. Economic RG – includes RFs related to changes in the financial 
market; 
9. Residual value RG – includes RFs related to issues due to which assets 
may not be normally running at the end of PPP. 
Figure 2.5 presents the relationships between the above-mentioned RGs. It 
shows that, in general, risk can be divided into two major groups: related to 
commercial risks and non-commercial risks. The former includes legal, political and 
force majeure RGs, for which, since they do not depend on direct actions of IP 
promoters, REs are not calculated and, therefore, they are not included in the PSC 
model and foreseen only in the PPP contract. Since political risks are related to the 
government and its actions, it is preferable to leave this RG to the public sector. 
Legal risks in the scope of government or PPA officers and their actions are usually 
assumed by the public sector. However, legal consequences associated with the 
failure of the private entity to perform its responsibilities have to be transferred to 
the private entity. The management of force majeure risks, since they are above the 
abilities of both parties, is preferably shared among the parties; there is also a 
tendency to allocate the higher share of this risk to the public sector, since, the 
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public sector is the only party able to bear such risk, given its size and difficulty of 
obtaining adequate insurance (EPEC, 2013; World Bank, 2016). 
The latter major group is comprised of risks directly related to IP 
implementation and service delivery and, therefore, are assessed quantitively by 
estimating REs and included in the full costs of the PSC model. It is comprised of 
market, availability, design, construction, financing and residual risks which, to 
encourage whole life-cycle cost efficiency of IP, are preferable to be mostly 
transferred to the private entities. The exemptions are market risks, which can be 
partially or fully assumed by the public sector, depending on how many guarantees 
are provided by the government, which determines whether the socially-based or 
economic-based PPP is chosen. The archaeological risk, although it is a part of the 
construction RGs, is also preferably allocated to the public sector, since the site of 
construction is usually chosen by the PPA.  
All risk
Commercial 
risk
Non-
commercial 
risk
Legal and 
political risks
Force majeure 
risk
Demand risk
Supply risk
Operation risk
(Availability)
Construction 
risk
Market risk
(Demand)
Design risk
Economic risk
(Financing)
Financial risk
Types of risks Risks in general most 
efficient borne by:
Private entity
Private entity (However, 
archaeological risk is ussualy 
assumed by PPA)
Private entity
Private entity
Private entity (PPA 
may provide guarantee 
to mitigate risk
Share
PPA (Some risks from 
contractor may be 
borne by private entity)
Residual value 
risk Private entity
Figure 2.5. Relations between RGs and preferences regarding their allocation 
(prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The reason for evaluating retained risk for constructing the PSC, which 
includes both retained and transferred risks, is that, to minimize the full costs of IP 
implementation, special consideration should be given to the abilities of government 
to mitigate risks in practice. Since, risk mitigation is considered to be minimization 
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and controlling of either or both the consequences and the probability of risk, risk 
retained by the government can be considered to be transferred to the third-party in 
the form of commercial insurance (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). In this case, 
the cost of the insured risk to PPA is no longer included as retained risk, since it has 
been passed on at a cost to a third party. Instead, the cost of premiums should be 
included in the Raw PSC. However, usually not all risks are likely to be 
commercially insurable in the market. Therefore, a particular part of risks always 
remains with the PPA. Figure 2.6 illustrates the relevance of insurance in the 
evaluation of retained risk. 
Transferable 
risk
Competitive 
neutrality
Raw PSC
Retained risk
Retained risk
Raw PSC
Competitive 
neutrality
Transferable 
risk
Commercial 
insurance premium
Expected 
net present 
cost
 
Figure 2.6. The structure of PSC and the effect of commercial insurance (prepared 
according to Commonwealth of Australia (2008a).) 
Figure 2.6 allows summarizing the above-mentioned steps required to construct 
an appropriate public sector’s alternative which is rational to compare against any 
other option from the private sector, so that the PSC can be considered as the Raw 
PSC adjusted by competitive neutrality costs and the sum of transferred and retained 
risks (Formula 10). This can be considered as the NPV of Maximum Financial 
Obligations of the Public Sector (FOPSmax) in the PPP, above which the PPP does 
not provide financial benefits in respect of cost-efficiency. 
      (10) 
here: PSCRAW – Raw PSC costs, CN – competitive neutrality costs, Riskrtn – 
retained risk, Risktrf – transferred risk. 
Considering the allocation of RFs, other derivate indicators can be calculated:  
• Maximum Financial Retained Obligation of the Public Sector 
(FOPSrtn) in the PPP (Formula 11). Since the scope of PPP includes 
only those tasks which are transferred to the private sector, the 
indicator assesses only the risk which remains with the public sector in 
135 
the PPP. These obligations are later added to the Shadow Bid (SB) 
model. 
• Maximum Payment for the Private Sector (MPpr) in the PPP (Formula 
12) allows determining the maximum payments to the private sectors 
for transferred tasks including the associated risks, above which the 
PPP becomes financially irrational. In this case, the implementation of 
PPP IP, where payments are higher than this value could be justified 
only for reasons of financial affordability and NFBs, discussed in 
Section 1.3.1. and detailed in Section 2.1.5. 
                                             (11) 
     (12) 
Beside obligations of the PPA in the PPP, it has to be considered that the PPA 
may also have other obligations, generally related to the outputs of infrastructure 
and services delivered in the PPP, but outside the scope of PPP procurement. These 
obligations are equally important for the successful implementation of the IP and 
service delivery. Therefore, the financial affordability of the PPA to assume full 
obligations within and out of the scope of PPP procurement should be assessed to 
ensure financial viability of the IP. This is especially important in the case of 
institutional PPP, where the public sector, transferring all or most tasks to the private 
entities, also participates in the formation of capital structure and assumes financial 
risk proportionally by a share of owned assets. The shares are usually paid for by 
providing the existing public assets. 
There is the PPA’s position on how much PSC information should be disclosed 
in the Request for Proposal (RFP). To get rational proposals in respect of apple-to-
apple comparison, financial affordability, etc. the PSC (either in periodic cash flow 
or NPC form) should be disclosed to market unless there are justifiable reasons for 
non-disclosure. As a part of this, other key financial and operating assumptions, 
such as Raw PSC also could be disclosed. However, this should be weighed against 
the expected benefits available to get from the market. The reason of limited 
disclosure of more detailed information can be low competition in the market due to 
which, if the public scenario would be known, it would be difficult to expect 
benefits in respect of higher efficiency and innovation from the private participation 
in the provision of public infrastructure and services. Therefore, the amount of 
disclosed information should be proportional to the expectation of the public sector 
with regards to the potential of the private sector to transform it into more efficient 
and innovative proposals. Market research could help to collect the necessary 
information. 
The methodological aspects of PSC structuring analyzed in this section allow 
arguing that the inclusion of both raw cost and cost associated to risk promotes the 
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understanding of full life-cycle costs of the IP at an early stage of its development 
and creates confidence in the rigor of the further evaluation process to decide 
whether the PPP would provide better value than CP. Although some of its 
elements, such the determination of FDR, assessment and allocation of risk have 
some flexibility in respect of how they can be determined, the suggested systemized 
solutions also provide possibilities for a standardization of this process, which 
creates more possibilities to increase transparency of the assessment process and the 
obtained results. 
2.1.4. Designing the PPP model 
Beside the PSC, the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments 
in public infrastructure conceptually requires estimating the whole life-cycle costs of 
the PPP options, either as proposed by the private bidder or as the hypothetical SB at 
the pre-procurement stage, which attempts to predict the bidder’s costs, financing 
structure and other assumptions. This is also indistinguishable from the assessment 
of whether the PPP is affordable to the government. Since this dissertation is 
focused on the pre-procurement stage, i.e. the issues related to the initial financial 
assessment and feasibility study of an IP to determine the most appropriate 
procurement method, this section is mostly devoted to structuring the SB model 
rationally to compare against the PSC. 
Within the context of public investment, SB is described as the estimated cost 
to the public sector, if the same IP, for which PSC has been calculated, would be 
delivered by the private sector as PPP. It represents the expected bid price that the 
PPA may receive from the market for transferring some predetermined combination 
of tasks such as design, construction, financing, operations and maintenance, 
including the collection of revenues, if it is foreseen to do so, from the direct users. 
To make it rational for comparison, the scope of SB must be identical to the PSC. 
Therefore, since the process of determining the scope of PPP is iterative in nature, 
the changes in the assumptions regarding the scope of PSC require appropriate 
adjustments of the SB to ensure consistency among both procurement options. 
Since the scope of PSC/PPP and the main cost and revenue elements are 
known45, it is important to choose the type and identify the appropriate form of PPP 
to construct a rational SB. The PPP, as an alternative way of implementing IP and 
delivering service, includes a wide spectrum of forms and schemes, analyzed in 
Section 1.2.2; however, literature regarding the issue of how to select the most 
suitable form is weak. The analysis of all possible forms, due to limited resources, is 
not rational, therefore, it is important to narrow the circle of potential to analyze 
forms of cooperation as early as possible. 
When selecting forms of PPP, the line is usually drawn between PPPs 
developed on a contractual basis and those developed on an institutional basis. The 
potential solution is provided by Batran, Essig, & Schaefer (2004) and Dūda (2010), 
who suggested selecting the type of PPP depending on the strategic importance and 
specificity of services foreseen to provide in the PPP. According to the above-
                                                 
45 See Section 2.1.3. 
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mentioned scientists, specificity is one of the most important factors for deciding 
whether tasks of public infrastructure and services’ delivery should be included in 
the internal process of public organization or transferred to the external party, i.e. 
whether the PPP should be implemented on an institutional or contractual basis. 
Specificity can be described as exceptional abilities, processes and particular use and 
management of resources which have such unique value that it is refused to use 
alternative options. Specificity causes the collaborative parties to operate in an ex-
post bilateral dependency after the completion of construction. While the strategic 
importance in the selection of PPP type is determined by the PPA’s political goals 
and strategy. These political goals determine the appropriate operating methods and 
resources which have to be used, define which functions and tasks of the public 
sector are important in respect to the strategy and, therefore, cannot be transferred to 
the external providers of the private sector. Strategic importance is related to the 
core competencies of the public sector. Hence, strategically important tasks are 
highly integrated within the public administration or public companies. 
Figure 2.7 shows that if the specificity is as low as core competencies are not 
contemplated while the strategic importance is high, the PPAs have to set up JV PPP 
as a distinct legal entity (SPV) established from both public and private materials 
and intangible assets. Conversely, if the specificity of public goods and services is 
high while their strategic importance is low, then it is more expedient to establish 
the PPP on contractual basis. In other words, the PPP on a contractual basis stands 
unavoidably for pure market contracting and for non-specific goods and services 
where discrete contracting is sufficient to ensure the public interest. 
PPP on 
institutional 
basis
Vertical 
integration
Traditional 
award of 
contract
PPP on 
contractual 
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Strategic importance, 
degree of integration
Specifity of goods 
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MAKE
BUY
 
Figure 2.7. The field of PPP application and choice of PPP type (according to 
Batran et al., (2004)) 
Considering the above-presented model, the PPA has to choose one of the 
alternative types of PPP, depending on how important it is to not only have impact 
on the outputs, but also influence the process. The more important it is, the more it is 
relevant for the PPA to establish a JV and participate by equity. The larger is share 
of equity owned by the public sector, the larger part of risk it assumes. However, 
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with higher share of equity means stronger power to influence the activity of the JV. 
Therefore, there are more possibilities to ensure public interest in the PPP. All these 
aspects determine the attractiveness of PPP established on an institutional basis. 
However, if public interest can be ensured by controlling only the final outputs of 
PPP, then it is more rational to choose PPP established on a contractual basis. This 
type of PPP, in comparison with the institutional PPP, is less formalized, gives more 
freedom to the private entity for innovation and enables the public sector to transfer 
a significant part of risk to the private sector. However, due to lower possibilities to 
control the process of IP execution, the PPA has lower possibilities to protect public 
interest related to the implementation of the IP, if something goes wrong or/and 
changes are required. 
When the type of PPP most suitable to represent public interest is selected, the 
form of PPP has to be identified. In the scope of both types, there are many forms, 
which have been analyzed and compared in Section 1.2.2. In the case of institutional 
PPP, basically one form is possible – a JV, which can be established for a temporary 
period or be unlimited in respect of time. The former is established to implement IPs 
of specified duration, while the latter, the so-called strategic partnership, is 
emphasized by continuity as long as needed to achieve the strategic purposes (Dūda, 
2010; D. Hall, 2008). 
The choice of contract-based forms is wider and they significantly differ, as 
shown in Appendix 3, depending on transferring tasks to the private sector, what 
mainly determines which forms would be the most suitable for each of the cases. 
However, according to Hemming (2006), Thillai, Siddharth, & Mukund, (2010), 
beside the transferred tasks that define the scope of PPP, it is also important to 
identify revenue streams to the private entity as well as evaluate which of entities, 
the public or private one, will assume greater share of demand risk, since this 
determines whether the social or economic model is applied. If it is planned that 
more than half of demand risk is assumed by the private entity, this means that the 
private entity will also have to collect at least more than a half of revenues from the 
direct users for its efforts. In this case, depending on the scope of transferring tasks, 
concession, lease, affermage would be right decisions. If the social model is 
preferable or the only one available in the market, this determines that all or a 
greater part of demand risk should be assumed by the public sector, which requires 
that more than a half of revenue of the private entity has to be collected from the 
availability payments. In this case, once again, depending on the scope of 
transferring tasks, the forms of service contract, management, O&M and, the most 
complex, PFI could be applied. 
Considering the analysis provided in Section 1.2.2., it is important to emphasize 
that each of the above-mentioned forms can be modified depending on particular 
requirements. Modifications can assert in different allocation of tasks and risks, 
different ownership structure, different guarantees from the public sector, 
obligations of the private entities, etc. This allows the PPA to be flexible and 
construct the PPP depending on the possibilities and particular requirements. This 
may be especially important when the costs and financial sustainability as well as 
the affordability of the SB are assessed. 
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The cost of the SB can be assessed from the private and public perspectives. In 
both cases, the SB consists of the same implicit cost elements: base costs, financing 
arrangement cost and ancillary cost accompanied by the retained risk by the public 
sector; however, with the only exemption related to the same retained risk and a part 
of ancillary costs, there is a difference in respect of their arrangement in the period 
of PPP and structure of CFs. Figure 1.146 and Figure 2.8 show the difference in 
respect of time and structure of CFs, respectively. From the perspective of a private 
bidder, costs are started to experience from the beginning of IP implementation and 
are recognized depending on their actual occurrence (Formula 13). While, from the 
perspective of the PPA, costs are usually experienced only from the beginning of 
service delivery and are transformed into unitary availability payments required to 
be made to the private entity throughout the PPP term (Formula 14)47. In some 
cases, both options can additionally assess the requirement of upfront public 
subsidies48. The retained risk is disembodied from UPs, since its occurrence in 
respect of time depends more on the actions of the private entity rather than 
payments of the public sector. The retained risk is added to the cost of private entity 
to assess the full cost of the IP implementation and service delivery which the public 
sector is expected to cover in the case of a planned scenario at the chosen, usually 
70%, confidence level. While ancillary cost consists of two parts, one of which 
remains with the PPA and the other, experienced by the private entity, is included in 
the UPs. 
               (13) 
 
 
here: BC – base cost, AC – ancillary cost, which includes such cost as 
procurement and other transaction costs. 
                (14) 
 
 
                                                 
46 The differences of CFs under both arrangements are the same as it is the difference 
between CFs of CP and PPP, where CP represents the private entity’s CFs and PPP 
represents the public sector’s CFs, respectively. 
47 If an IP is in general profitable, it also can be transformed into the payments of the private 
entity to the public sector, which can be foreseen in the RFP as a concession fee. 
48 In some cases, as it is in the EU, governments, obtaining subsidies from the ESI fund, can 
provide grants to cover the capex made by the private entity right after fully completing the 
construction phase to make the PPP financially affordable. 
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here: UP – unitary payment, AC1 – ancillary cost of the bidder, AC2 – ancillary 
cost of the PPA. 
Beside the retained risk, other significant driver of results of VfM analysis is 
the assumptions made on the IP costs under the PPP options, particularly, the extent 
to which the PPP is assumed to achieve lower costs through efficiency or 
innovation. On the one hand, the PPA may assume that the private sector’s entity 
does not introduce any value-added innovations to reduce the costs of the IP, then 
the PPP option can conceptually be lower in costs only by the part of transferable 
risk. However, considering the advantages of PPP discussed in Section 1.2.3, the 
PPA may expect innovations which can occur when the responsibilities for design, 
construction, financing, operation, repair and maintenance are assumed by a single 
entity, who will then optimize the trade-offs that are available between these 
different cost elements. Herewith it also should be assumed that such innovation is 
not possible in the case of CP. According to Harada & Ogunlan (2015), the cost of 
IP implementation also drops due to the effect of competition when the number of 
bid-participating firms increases.  
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Figure 2.8. A comparison of the cost elements of SB depending on the public or 
private perspective they calculated (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The assumption about cost savings requires sufficient empirical data regarding 
the probability and magnitude of such expected benefits to be quantified and 
reasonably included in the SB model. Literature, as disclosed in Section 1.2.3., is 
quite controversial regarding this aspect. However, the examples in the UK and 
France, presented in the same section, disclose that it would be rational to expected 
savings not higher than 10%–15% of capital expenditure. Accordingly, there is a 
particular expectation from the market to compensate a relatively higher transaction 
cost of PPP procurement. 
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The particular assumptions are also met regarding other cost as well as revenue 
elements; however, since there are no reliable data, mostly directions of changes are 
only indicative (World Bank, 2013). Regarding the revenue, an experience in Korea 
suggests that tolls on a road IP implemented as the PPP are typically set higher than 
on public roads, resulting in lower traffic, and most likely differing (lower) 
revenues. The revenue from ancillary uses of assets is usually assumed to be the 
same in both cases. However, in such countries as, e.g., France, where 
administrative law makes it difficult for a government entity to engage in 
commercial activities that are not core to its function, such additional revenue 
sources are assumed only in the PPP case. Regarding operational costs, as revealed 
in the analysis of different practices of VfM assessment provided in Section 1.3.2., 
there is a noticeable practice to assume them not being identical and make them 
lower in the PPPs in the countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Australia, since the assumption concerning whole life-cycle cost optimization in the 
case of PPP is applied. While, regarding the cost to the government of project 
management and transaction implementation, two main treatments are distinguished: 
some governments, such as France, adjust both PSC and PPP costs accordingly; 
while Korea excludes contract management costs from both options. The 
assumption of higher transaction cost in the PPP is more rational where the PPP 
implementation framework is relatively poorly developed. All these observations 
allow arguing that each case requires particular attention; however, the more data 
are collected and systemized from the practical experience, the more reliable it is to 
apply the pre-assumptions regarding the adjustment of CFs in the SB model. This 
shows the requirement for development of IP monitoring framework which would 
allow monitoring the implementation of an IP and service delivery and collecting the 
data needed to systemize the general tendencies regarding separate cost elements, as 
have been done by the author of this dissertation in the case of investment costs. 
The above-mentioned assumption related to cost savings is important, since it is 
considered to implement an IP as an institutional PPP, described in Section 1.2.2. In 
this case, since the private sector can provide efficiency innovation but also is 
usually emphasized by a higher cost of capital, the main issue is how to determine 
the optimal proportion of public and private capital investments, which also 
determines the scope of PPP, discussed in the previous section. A potential solution 
is provided by Moszoro (2010, 2014), according to who the optimal capital structure 
in the institutional PPP can be determined considering the difference in the cost of 
capital among of the public and private entities and the savings in investment costs 
which can be achieved if the private sector participates in the implementation of an 
IP and a sufficient level of know-how is transferred. Figure 2.9 illustrates the 
interdependence between these variables, the mathematical relations of which are 
also expressed in Formula 15. 
  (15) 
here: rpr – capital cost (discount rate) for a private investor, rpu – capital cost 
(discount rate) for the public sector (rpr > rpu), J(q) – amount by which development 
outlays (without financial costs) for a privately executed project are lower than the 
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outlays for a publicly executed one, Ɵ – share of a private investor in the joint 
venture, Ɵ ∈<0, 1>, β – discrete variable reflecting the existence of know-how in 
project execution, so that: β = 0 (when there is no know-how transfer (Ɵ < e)); β = 1 
(when there is know-how transfer (Ɵ ≥ e)), e – a minimum share of private capital in 
a joint venture above which know-how is transferred.  
ƒ(q, Ɵ)
I(q) * rpr
(I(q)+J(q)) * rpu
e*I(q)* rpr +(1-e)*(I(q)* rpu
0 e Ɵa 1
β = 1β = 0
Interval [e, Ɵa] for 
efficient public-
private financing
 
Figure 2.9. Interval of efficient public-private financing (according to Moszoro 
(2010)) 
As can be seen from the figure, IP’s investment costs start to rise from the point 
where the IP is realized only by the public sector (θ = 0). The f(q, θ) increases as a 
result of the increase of the share of the more expensive private capital in the PPP. 
The rate of increase for (θ < e) equals I(q)*(rpr – rpu) – J(q)*rpu. At θ = e the transfer 
of knowledge occurs and the f(q, θ) drops by (1 – e)*J(q)*rpu. When θ ≥ e, the f(q, θ) 
increases at the rate of I(q)*(rpr – rpu). When θ = θa, the investment costs f(q, θ) in 
the PPP become equal to the costs in the IP without the participation of the private 
sector. Finally, when θ reaches 1, the project shares are held purely by the private 
entity and costs are equal I(q)*rpr. This allows concluding that the greater share of 
private capital is needed, the smaller potential savings from participation of the 
private sector are, since capital cost and potential savings remain constant. The 
fluxion of Formula 15 allows determining the optimal share of the private sector 
participation in the joint venture (Ɵ*) (Formula 16), while Figure 2.10 shows the 
share of the private capital in the joint venture PPP. 
As Figure 2.10 shows, the know-how starts to be transferred even with little 
share of the private capital in the general structure of PPP. The optimal capital 
structure is reached in interval Ɵ (0, Ɵa), where the total amount of capital cost f(q, 
Ɵ) is lower than the capital cost of the public sector and the private sector, 
respectively. Minimal capital cost of IP is reached at the point where a share of 
private participation is Ɵ*, where all know-how is started to be transferred to the 
public sector. 
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ƒ(q, Ɵ)
I(q) * rpr
(I(q)+J(q)) * rpu
Min f(q,Ɵ)
0 Ɵ* Ɵa 1
f(q,Ɵ)
Interval [0, Ɵa] of 
efficient PPP
 
Figure 2.10. The interval of efficient proportion of public and private capital 
(according to Moszoro (2010)) 
                                   (16) 
The above-described solutions of efficient capital structuring can be supported 
by the proposition of Hemming (2006), who claims that the PPP is an effective way 
of delivering public infrastructure and service only when the benefit received in a 
form of potential cost saving (without financial cost) is higher than the increase in 
the average cost of capital due to participation of the private sector. 
Since the optimal proportion of the public and private capital is determined or 
the PPP is planned to be established on a contractual basis, further, considering the 
above-discussed assumptions related to the values of CFs, it is important to assess 
the affordability of SB model’s financial structure to the public sector from the one 
side and financial attractiveness to investors from the other, where the interests of 
potential financiers also have to be satisfied to make the IP financial viable. This 
requires optimizing the capital structure of the SPV and, in general, developing a 
financial model where, as discussed in Section 1.2.4, interests of all the above-
mentioned parties have to be satisfied. This can be rather challenging, since the SPV 
is a distinct legal entity (the project company), the financial model of the SB is 
based on project finance which refers to the development of a stand-alone IP on a 
non-resource or limited resource financing, where equity and debt used to finance 
the IP are paid back only from the CFs generated by the IP. 
According to Fischer et al. (2010) and X. Zhang (2005a, 2005b), the success of 
PPP largely depends on whether it optimizes the capital structure so that the internal 
rate of return to equity (IRRE) is maximized while satisfying other IP participants’ 
interest and requirements, which are considered to be constraints. The greater IRRE, 
the more the IP becomes attractive to investors, thus, the more likely they are to 
assume relatively larger risk. This partially depends on the equity level, which is the 
most relevant variable that concerns both the public and private sectors. 
Accordingly, three major parties are concerned with the equity level: 1) investors, 
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who are equity holders of the IP; 2) financiers or lenders, who lend money to the IP, 
and; 3) the PPA, which, representing the government, performs procurement as well 
as might provide guarantees or other types of support to the IP. All these parties, 
considering their different risk profile, have different views as to what is an 
appropriate equity level, since their interest are dependent to some extent on the 
equity level. 
For investors, their equity is recovered with an expected level of profit from 
various tasks transferred by the public sector such as design, construction, O&M, 
etc. They consider the PPP IP as financially viable, if IRRE is greater than the 
expected minimum level (IRREmin). Equity providers structure their investments to 
be as efficient as possible. Therefore, they want to maximize IRRE and, keep a low 
level of equity49. Everything that makes risk on equity return is valued with scrutiny. 
Therefore, according to Zhang (2005b), from the perspective of equity providers, the 
assessment of SB has to begin with an evaluation of what part of recovery of the 
equity in the finance of IP will depend on the successful management of long-term 
project risks (equity at project risk – EPR), the market (demand) risk of which is 
usually prevailing and the revenue stream generated over the determined PPP/PSC 
period (Formula 17). Accordingly, the ratio of equity at project risks (REPR) 
defined as the ratio of the amount of EPR to the total amount of equity can be 
calculated (Formula 18).  
                                                    (17) 
                                              (18) 
here: REPR – ratio of equity at project risk, E – amount of total equity, ꙍ – the 
profit margin on the construction activity, CT – total construction cost. 
Since EPR includes only that part of equity that is exposed to long-term IP 
risks, the higher REPR is, the longer the equity holders are intended to be committed 
to the success of the IP. Therefore, the payback period of EPR may be an 
appropriate signal of the underlying interests of equity holders, i.e. the shorter the 
payback period, the less commitment of equity holders. Considering this aspect, the 
PPA has to calculate equity returns in different scenarios and determine the optimal 
period of PPP/PSC in an iteration process, which would allow the PPA to suggest a 
competitive IRRE in the market and, herewith, encourage a long-term commitment 
from equity holders. Accordingly, Formula 19 represents the net present value of 
equity holders’ total net profit at a specific equity level R discounted to the 
beginning of the first year of PPP reference period (NPVP) which, along with IRRE, 
are fundamental financial decision criteria to assess IP’s financial viability. 
                                                 
49 In addition to conventional equity investments, an efficient structure beside equity 
investment may also include subordinated debt, which can be provided by the same equity 
providers. 
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for j = 1, 2, …, N; i = 1, 2, …, M                                    (19) 
here: n – operation period, m – construction duration, NATCIj – annual net 
after-tax cash inflow in the jth operation, R – equity level, DEj – depreciation, TAXj 
– tax, Dj – debt installment, N – operation period, M – construction period, rD – 
interest rate of debt, rtax – income tax rate, Ij – debt interest in the jth year of the 
operation period, ek – construction cost escalation rate for the kth year of the 
construction period. 
To be financially viable, NPVP must be equal or greater than zero, where IRRE 
is equal or greater than IRREmin. Depending on the economic sector, IRRE can be 
different. For example, in Lithuania the desired IRRE in the IPs varies from 9% to 
11% (Invest, 2015). 
For lenders, the equity level is preferred to be high enough to minimize their 
risks, as debt has a higher rank in repayment than equity investment. To be 
bankable, the PPP IP has to satisfy a minimum level of annual Debt Service 
Coverage Ratio (DSCR), which is the ratio of annual cash available to cover annual 
interests and repayment of principal as defined in Formula 20. The DSCR reflects 
the IP’s ability to carry debt, therefore, it is the main criterion of lenders when 
assessment of IP‘s financial viability. The larger revenue stream is during the 
operation period, the higher annual DSCRs are, the stronger is debt carrying ability 
of PPP IP. Generally, the DSCR should be at least equal to or larger than 1.0 to be 
acceptable. However, an IP usually becomes bankable when DSCR is in the rage of 
1.10–1.25, while a comfortable level is above 1.3. Regarding the value of DSCR, it 
is also important to consider that the equity level affects the interest rate of 
borrowing. Depending on the equity level, a risk premium can be added – the lower 
equity level, the higher risk premium – since lower equity level means increased 
risks to the lenders, so that the required level of DSCR may not be satisfied. 
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  for j = 1, 2, …, N          (20) 
here: EBIT – earnings before interest and tax, P.TAX – profit tax, D – debt 
installment, N – debt repayment period. 
Beside the DSCR, another indicator which allows to dynamically check IP’s 
debt carrying ability, is the Loan Life Coverage Ratio (LLCR) (Desgrées du Lou, 
2012; Fischer et al., 2010), which periodically (i.e. annually) measures the NPV of 
the sum of all future income for the life of the loan divided by the outstanding debt 
at a particular point in the time (Formula 21). Generally, to be bankable, the LLCR 
of PPP IP should be at least greater than 1. However, LLCR above 1.3 is preferable. 
                                  (21) 
Like LLCR, there is also Project Life Coverage Ratio (PLCR), the IP CFs go of 
which until the end of the IP. This indicator gives information to lenders to assess 
whether the IP will generate sufficient revenues after the end of loan in case the debt 
needs to be restructured. The PLCR above 1.5 is preferable. 
Figure 2.11 graphically summarizes the above-presented debt cover ratios. It 
shows that, to make the SB financially viable, the annual financial status of the IP 
should be examined, which would ensure that the determined requirement of lenders 
would be satisfied. 
Loan Life
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Net cash flow
 
Figure 2.11. The debt cover ratios considered by lenders in PPP projects (according 
to Desgrées du Lou (2012)) 
The PPAs seek to ensure that IP would be completed on time and within the 
planned costs, service would be provided according to the predetermined quality, 
which would also be financially affordable and the life-cycle cost efficiency would 
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be achieved. According to Zhang (2005b), successful addressing of these issues 
requires a suitable capital structure and a long-term commitment of PPP IP 
participants. As discussed in Section 1.1.1, the PPA, providing the RFP, is 
responsible for the development of such conditions of collaboration with the private 
sector, which could encourage the appropriate incentives from all participants as 
well as ensure the financial viability of PPP in respect of all stakeholders, including 
the general public, whose dissatisfaction of interest can cause significant political 
cost to the government. Therefore, the PPA should ensure that a suitable equity level 
is used to satisfy the interests of equity holders, lenders and the general public.  
However, the PPA primarily has to be assured that, considering the 
requirements of equity providers and lenders, the SB to be rationally compared 
against the CP, in general can be reasonably expected to be financially sustainable, 
affordable and secured in respect of public interest. 
Regarding financial sustainability, there are two aspects, required to be 
examined. First, the Self-Financing Ability (SFA) of the SB, which, as defined in 
Formula 22, is a ratio of the construction cost which can be recovered through the 
net revenues earned in the operation period, subject to the financing conditions of 
the capital market and the equity holders’ requirements of return to their 
investments. The higher SFA, the more the IP emphasizes the revenue generating 
ability that, in turn, discloses a financial status of the IP in operation period. Equity 
holders usually are only responsible for the arrangement of finance (either through 
equity or debt) to amount at the SFA level. The non-self-financing part is paid by the 
government. Therefore, the PPA has to assess the appropriate subsidies, if needed, to 
make the IP financially sustainable. Especially, this is the case in non-revenue 
generated IPs. Accordingly, Figure 2.12 shows the structuring of optimal capital in 
both financially viable and non-viable PPP IPs. When it is self-financially viable, the 
capital structure model examines the optimal financing mix between equity and 
debt. Otherwise, the government-subsidized PPP IP is comprised of three financing 
sources: equity, debt, and government subsidy. For government-subsidized PPP IPs, 
the appropriate government subsidy level must be determined before the optimal 
debt ratio can be determined. 
                                                   (22)  
here: NPVR – net present value of the net revenues in the operation period, 
NPVC – net present value of the construction cost, DR is equal to the risk-free rate 
plus the market price of risk, which is the premium that investors must receive over 
the risk-free rate to incur the market r = rf + rp. 
It is no less important to examine whether in the SB the risk of running out of 
cash in the future in the SB, both during the investment and the operational stages, is 
expected to be nil, that, in turn, which is the second aspect of financial sustainability. 
The sources of financing available (both internal and external) should consistently 
match disbursements year-by-year, where the deficit or surplus is accumulated. The 
IP has to generate a positive cumulative cash surplus over its life (Formula 23). 
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Therefore, in the case of non-revenue generating IPs or whenever negative CFs are 
projected in the future clear long-term commitment to cover these negative CFs 
considered as financial gap must be provided. 
Government 
subsidy level
DebtEquity
Government
(Subsidy, debt guarantee, minimum revenue guarantee, etc.)
Optimal financing mix in traditional 
optimal capital structure
Optimal financing mix in 
financially non-viable project
 
Figure 2.12. The optimal capital structure and government subsidy (according to 
Chen et al., 2012) 
 
 
                           (23) 
here: CI – cash inflows, CO – cash outflows, SF – sources of financing, R – 
operating revenues from the provision of goods and services, S – subsidies and other 
financial gains not stemming from charges paid by users for the use of the 
infrastructure, RV – residual value, which should not be taken into account unless 
the asset is actually liquidated in the last year of the PPP, FC – reimbursement of 
loans and interest payments, TAX – taxes on capital/income and other indirect taxes 
including VAT. 
Once the financial commitment needed from the public sector is evaluated, 
SB’s affordability to the public sector has to be examined, since there is no aim to 
presume that a developed SB represents good VfM, if it is actually not affordable to 
the public sector. Accordingly, the PPA’s capability to cover the expected financial 
commitment (i.e. UPs) to the private entity is one of the most important factors for 
expedience to implement IP as the PPP. 
To check affordability, as distinct from the CP, where the government has to 
fund initial investments and operation, financial commitment to the private sector is 
rearranged by equal parts as service or availability payments through the entire 
operation period of PPP, as has been explained in Section 1.2.1. These UPs have to 
be compared against the financial possibilities of the public sector to cover them 
year-by-year during the appropriate period of PPP. Here it is important to consider 
that the private entities will include the value of risk in their proposals, therefore, 
149 
UPs have to be risk-adjusted50 and the appropriate funding has to be foreseen in the 
budget. Moreover, if an IP requires to increase the price of services which are paid 
by the direct users, the affordability of the increased price to society needs also to be 
evaluated to ensure the viability of PPP IP in respect of the general public. 
Since all the above-indicators are dependent on the number of stochastic 
variables, such as market demand, debt interest rate, O&M cost, inflation rate and 
others described in Section 2.1.3., the above-presented financial commitments of the 
public sector in forms of UPs can be considered as particular guarantees to the 
private sector, which is the common feature of PPP contracts to make PPP 
financially viable (Hemming, 2006). UPs are usually proportionated to the retained 
demand risk of the public sector, i.e. the public sector purchases a particular amount 
of service equivalent to the amount of funding needed to ensure the financial 
viability of PPP IP. This is related to the logic of risk allocation, explained in 
Section 2.1.3., that the demand risk is normally considered to be an operating risk 
that should be borne by the private sector; however, if the government is the sole or 
main consumer of services, it should bear the demand risk. 
Beside the commitment to provide payments, the PPA’s guarantees can take a 
variety of other forms, including subsidies, grants, tax breaks, capital injection, etc., 
which have been analyzed in Section 1.1.1.2. These guarantees, since they can be an 
effective response to the inability of the market to distribute risk optimally, decrease 
the risk of the equity providers as well as lenders. Therefore, it is often necessary for 
the PPA to provide investors with certain guarantees that relieve some of the risk 
shouldered by the private parties to attract investments. However, guarantees also 
increase commitments of the public sector in the PPP, which can be not affordable 
due to the budget constraints. Therefore, it is relevant to primarily use possibilities 
which are provided by determining different duration periods of PPP and tax 
exemption, and only then assess the needs of payment or subsidies from the public 
sector. For rational comparison, any tax exemption due to affordability reasons 
included in the SB has to be consistent with the PSC. However, any payments and 
guarantees from the public sector have to be the object of competition and 
negotiation rather than directly included in the RFP. Otherwise a “guarantee culture” 
can be created, leading the private sector (and, in some cases, international financial 
institutions and bilateral lenders51) to seek guarantees as an alternative to properly 
managing risk themselves. 
Since the public sector provides minimum revenue guarantees for the private 
entity based on the principle that the benefits one receives should be fairly equal to 
the risks taken, the PPA has the right to share any excess revenue the investors gain 
equal to the difference between the actual revenue gained by the investors and the 
cap of the expected earnings. As a result, the excess revenue sharing ratio should be 
determined. While a reasonable risk-sharing system determines whether project 
                                                 
50 The payment to the private entity can also be the object of VAT taxation. 
51 The analysis of RFPs in Lithuania discloses that the lender usually requires guarantees of 
full loan and interests recovering from the public sector, despite of whether the PPA or the 
private entity would be responsible of a cancellation of PPP. 
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financing will be successful. This issue is relevant in concessions, where the revenue 
stream depends on the demand of direct users and their money paid for obtainable 
services. Accordingly, the evaluation of guarantees and excess revenue sharing is 
currently a developing topic in the research field (Asao et al., 2013; Hemming, 
2006; Huang & Chou, 2006; Takashima et al., 2010; Andreas Wibowo et al., 2012). 
However, scientific studies are still quite fragmentary and complicated to be adopted 
in practice, especially regarding the issue of excess revenue sharing. 
Yinglin Wang & Liu, (2015) argue that the excess revenue sharing ratio can be 
determined considering the fairness preferences and effort cost coefficient of the 
investors. This model integrates the fairness preference theory with the traditional 
principal–agent model to calculate optimal incentives when principals 
(governments) employ agents (investors) who have fairness preferences. However, 
the limitation of this model is that it is based on net revenue, which are a result of 
both revenues and costs, and therefore, due to asymmetric information conditions 
and the principal–agent problem discussed in Section 1.1.1., can easily become the 
object of manipulation. Moreover, the PPAs are unlikely to get complete 
information from (potential) investors needed calculate the output results, resulting 
in an asymmetric information condition. Specifically, the effort level of (potential) 
investors cannot be observed. This causes the issue of reliability. However, this 
study, summarizing the researches, suggests that the sharing ratio of private entity 
should be higher than the public one, to increase the proper incentives to the private 
entities. 
Brandao & Saraiva (2008) simply suggest determining revenue floor, to which 
the public sector would provide revenue guarantees, and revenue ceiling, above 
which revenue would accrue to the PPA, considering Formula 24. The determination 
of minimal and maximal revenues is based on the Monte Carlo simulation. 
                                     (24) 
here: Rt – observed level of revenues, Pt – level of revenues of the demand 
floor, Tt – level of revenues of the traffic ceiling. 
Considering the limitation of available researches concerning the determination 
of excess revenue sharing in the PPP in literature, the author of this dissertation, 
summarizing the observed practice, provides the following solutions. First, the 
excess revenue sharing ratio should be applied, since it is not effected by costs and, 
therefore, is more transparent in comparison with ratios related to net revenues 
(income). Second, marginal annual revenue flow (MARF), above which income are 
shared according to the ratio applied, should be the object of competition, where the 
winner proposal could suggest the lowest MAIF, since the ex-ante determination of 
any income threshold would mean that the public sector would retain the demand 
risk. Third, considering the model of Yinglin Wang & Liu (2015), it is 
recommended to determine a ratio where a share of the private entity equals to or is 
greater than 50%. 
Since different views and requirements of all stakeholders concerning financial 
viability of the IP as the PPP are presented, the optimization of the financial 
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structure of the PPP can be considered as a system of appropriate equations where 
all of the following conditions must be satisfied at a minimum level of equity 
(System of inequalities, classified as Formula 25): 
R  ≥ Rmin 
IRRE ≥ IRRRmin 
REPR ≥ REPRmin 
DSCR ≥ DSCRmin 
LLCR ≥ LLCRmin 
PLCR ≥ PLCRmin 
SFA ≥ SFAmin 
 
Affordability of payments – Yes                          (25) 
To solve the system of equations, the results with every Rk ≥ Rmin have to be 
calculated, as it is described more detail in the article prepared by Jasiukevicius & 
Vasiliauskaite (2012). The satisfaction of all above-provided conditions shows that 
the SB, representing the expected cost of PPP, in principle, is financially viable and 
affordable, therefore further VfM assessment is rational. If there are no iterations 
satisfying the above-provided conditions, it is rational to extend the reference period 
and repeat iterative calculations with different levels of equity. If all possibilities to 
extend the reference period reaches the limit and there are not iterations satisfying 
conditions, this means that the SB is not financially viable or affordable. Therefore, 
to continue the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure, the scope of the IP has to be changed or it has to be delayed until the 
public sector has more financial possibilities to ensure the financial viability of the 
IP. 
Summarizing the methodological aspects of SB designing, the financial model 
of the expected PPP is the result of the public sector’s efforts to evaluate 
possibilities of the private sector to provide public infrastructure and services at the 
best available alternative risk allocation and payment mechanisms. It includes the 
assessment of cost as well as financial viability and affordability, the reliability of 
which as well as further decision regarding the procurement of an IP as the PPP 
highly depends on the quality of the PSC which is used to develop the SB models, 
and the assumptions concerning the private sector’s cost efficiency, innovation and 
specific requirements. 
2.1.5. VfM assessment 
Since the structuring of the PSC and the SB model has been analyzed, this 
section is devoted to a methodological analysis of the final step in the assessment of 
PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure, i.e. VfM 
analysis as an assessment tool to compare the impact of PPP IP against those for the 
traditional public delivery alternative. It is important to note that to be rational to use 
it requires an “apples-to-apples” comparison. Therefore, consistency among the PSC 
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and the SB has to be ensured in respect of the scope and main assumptions of IP to 
get reliable results. While, VFM analysis, considering the analysis provided in 
Section 1.3., typically involves a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
assessments, which, as two major components, are analyzed below. 
The quantitative VfM analysis mostly focuses on the comparison of financial 
impact of the estimated risk-adjusted cost elements to the public sector in each of the 
procurement options. As discussed in Section 1.3.1, it is important to consider that 
costs included in the assessment can be different depending on the perspective: the 
PPA or the public sector, from which the assessment is performed, since a part of 
costs related to tax payment may not be directly recovered as revenues by the PPA. 
Differences can be also observed depending on whether the PPA represents a 
national or regional government level. 
As analyzed in Sections 2.1.3–2.1.4., the comparison of the public sector’s cost 
typically includes the procurement cost, retained risk cost, base cost, ancillary cost 
and financing arrangement cost. Beside these costs of financial nature related to the 
IP implementation and service delivery, it can also include NFBs, which represent 
external socio-economic benefits to society raised due to the implementation of IP as 
the PPP. Since the affordability issue which causes the postponement of IP 
implementation is one of the major reasons to initiate the assessment of possibilities 
to implement an IP as PPP, earlier availability of infrastructure and services and the 
resulting benefits are the most common NFBs included in the quantitative 
assessment. 
Figure 2.13 graphically shows a hypothetical comparison between the PSC and 
the SB in the social-based model, i.e. services are free of charge to the direct users 
and all costs are covered from the public budget. 
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Figure 2.13. Calculation of quantitative VfM in the social-based model (prepared by 
the author of this dissertation) 
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As shown in Figure 2.13, in procurement of PPP, the PPA trades away 
significant risks (transferable risk) in exchange for higher baseline and financing 
arrangement costs, which, beside other costs experienced by the private entity, are 
included in UPs paid to the private entity in the PPP scenario. The distance between 
line 1 and line 3 shows VfM1 for the public sector. If VfM is assessed from the 
perspective of the PPA, both options have to be increased by the VAT. The distance 
between lines 2 and 3 shows VfM2 for the PPA, accordingly. When NFBs are 
included in the comparison, the distance between lines 2 and 6 represents VfM3 for 
the PPA, while VfM4 shows the quantitative benefits of IP implementation as the 
PPP for the public sector. Here VfM3 = VfM4. The figure also shows that if risks are 
not included in the comparison, the PPP option costs more for the private sector than 
the implementation of IP in the conventional way. 
Figure 2.14. presents the comparison between the PSC and the SB in the 
economic-based model, where most of private entity’s revenue is received from 
direct users; however, they are insufficient to make the PPP financially viable, 
therefore, subsidies from the public sector are required. In comparison with the 
social-based model, the base costs are lower here, since a part of costs is covered by 
the revenues. The comparison also does not include VAT, since, in this case, the 
activity is taxable by VAT which can be recovered. Here it is also assumed that the 
price of service does not change due to the private sector’s participation in their 
provision. Therefore, the distance between dot lines 1 and 3 shows VfM5, which is 
cost-saving or has lower impact on public budget expected to be caused by private 
participation. The distance between lines 1 and 2 shows this benefit if risks are 
included in the comparison. While VfM6 shows the benefits for the private sector, or 
the PPA, if NFBs are included in the comparison, accordingly.  
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Figure 2.14. Calculation of quantitative VfM in the economic-based model with the 
subsidies to the private entity (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
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The situation similar to the above-presented case is shown in Figure 2.15, 
where the private entity, due to the provided efficiency innovation, gets net revenue 
above the determined level of equity return and, therefore, can be charged a 
concession or another similar fee, which has to be paid to the PPA. It is assumed that 
this fee is equal to the sum of costs which include ancillary costs and costs of 
retained risk (distance a = distance b). Therefore, financial benefit received by the 
public sector/PPA covers the expected costs of IP implementation as the PPP. This 
also means that the PPA is secured by the price of services, which could be lower to 
the users if the PPA would bear the above-mentioned costs a without financial 
compensation asked from the private entity b. Therefore, in this case the PPA can 
generally choose among two options: a) to leave the price level in the RFP as 
determined in the PSC, or: b) to determine a relatively lower price level, if the 
options, especially the last one, are financially viable, as discussed in Section 2.1.4. 
Accordingly, VfM7 shows financial benefit for the PPA/public sector if the price 
level remains the same, and VfM9 if the price level becomes lower. VfM8 and VfM10 
show benefit for the PPA/public sector if NFBs are included in the comparison. VfM 
for the society is equal to NFBs if the price level remains the same as in the PSC, 
and NFB + b if the price level is decreased. This allows arguing that the interest of 
public sectors’ authorities regarding the implementation of an IP as a PPP can differ 
from the interest of users, who directly pay for the services or availability of 
infrastructure. 
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Figure 2.15. Calculation of quantitative VfM in the economic-based model with the 
possibilities to charge the private entity (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Figure 2.16 shows a hypothetical case where revenue is generated in both PSC 
and SB covering other costs of the PPA (a = b and c = d); however, the IP, due to 
financial issues, e.g. budget restrictions on borrowing, is not affordable to be 
implemented by the public sector in the traditional way, or the provision of service 
is simply considered to be transferred to the private sector. Here the revenue is 
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proportional to experienced costs, i.e. the PPA transferring tasks and associated risk 
to the private entity also transfer the possibility to get revenues from the performed 
activity. Therefore, the quantitative VfM of the PPA is equal to NFBs, which are 
caused by the possibility to have services available earlier due to the participation of 
private financing. If the price level in the SB was lower by a distance b, then VfM 
for society would equal NFBs + d, i.e. service would be available earlier and 
cheaper. However, in this case, VfM for the PPA would be equal to zero, because 
NFBs would equal the assumed costs. 
Regarding Figure 2.16, the case where the implementation of the IP as the PPP 
means higher price level for users in comparison with the PSC to make the PPP 
financial viable is also possible. In this case, the cost of PPA remains the same; 
however, higher price level decreases benefits for the users, which are related to 
earlier provision of services. From the perspective of users, the PPP is VfM since the 
sum of NFBs is higher than the sum of additional revenue collected due to a higher 
price of service. If this difference is negative, this means that the PPP does not 
provide quantitative VfM. 
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Figure 2.16. A calculation of quantitative VfM in the economic-based model where 
the activity is profitable (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
However, VfM analysis, as discussed in Section 1.3.1., may be extended 
beyond the quantitative assessment of IP costs and the final outcome is usually 
based on both quantitative and non-valued effect components. VfM may also 
involve substantial qualitative factors that could have a strong impact on the final 
decision. Their examples, covering the aspects of viability, achievability, 
performance, have been provided in the same section. Since they are related to the 
goals and objective of the PPA of increasing service quality, reliability, safety, etc., 
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which guide the developers through the planning and procurement stages, the 
qualitative assessment can be given equal or more importance relative to the cost 
factors. The weight of qualitative assessment especially increases when the 
differences between the quantitative results for the PSC and the PPP option are very 
small, or when there is a high level of uncertainty around the input variables used in 
the calculation of costs and the outputs are highly sensitive to those input variables. 
To get a full view on evaluating the options, Multiple Criteria Analysis (MCA), 
based on numerous criteria, including quantitative VfM, is used. This approach is 
used to evaluate potential investment options against criteria considered as critical 
for the IP’s goals and objectives. It is up to the decision makers to decide which 
criteria are relevant to use and are the most important by applying “importance 
weights”. The main output from the MCA is a matrix that summarizes how each 
procurement option considered scores against the criteria. The option with the 
highest scores is considered as the most beneficial. 
Table 2.6 provides a hypothetical example of the MCA, where the weight of 
quantitative assessment has 60 scores in total, while the qualitative criteria includes 
40 scores. All scores have been calculated, using Formula 26, and compared to the 
PSC and SB/PB. The summarized results show that SB/PD option is emphasized by 
higher costs. However, when the non-valued effects are included in the comparison, 
scores of the SB/PB become 9% higher showing that the PPP option provides more 
benefits than the risk-adjusted CP option. This demonstrates that, in this example, 
the non-valued effects are a critical factor on decision-making regarding the 
implementation of an IP as a PPP. Herewith, given the fact that this is just an 
example, developers are free to choose the appropriate combination of criteria and 
their weights depending on particular requirements. Unfortunately, this determines 
that the use of this technique remains subjective regarding the assessment process. 
However, the results allow the PPA to communicate the decision taken regarding the 
chosen way of IP’s implementation by evaluated arguments, e.g. earlier availability 
of infrastructure in total provides more benefits than in a comparison higher costs of 
these public goods’ delivery, which, in turn, makes the entire process of selection 
and implementation of PPP IP more transparent. 
Table 2.6. Hypothetical MCA framework (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
Criteria 
Scores 
Comparison to 
each other Weight 
in total 
Full 
Scores 
Full 
Scores 
PSC SB/PB PSC SB/PB PSC SB/PB 
Innovation1 6 10 0,60 1,00 15 9,0 15,0 
Service delivery outcome1 7 9 0,78 1,00 10 7,8 10,0 
User satisfaction1 7 10 0,70 1,00 15 10,5 15,0 
Risk adjusted NPC2 45 49 1,00 0,92 60 60,0 55,1 
1Scores of maximum 10, where 10 is the best and 1 - minimum Total: 87,3 95,1 
2cost (m.. Eur) 
    
Diff.   9% 
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here: FS – full scores, NVE – non-valued effects, Xl – criteria weight, Bi – 
socio-economic impact to society, C – risk-adjusted costs. 
The qualitative assessment as well as quantitative assessment of VfM, which 
are the focus of this dissertation, have to be revised at every stage of the IP, 
especially before making a decision for starting the procurement for PPP and when 
bidders’ proposals are provided to find the optimal solution (preferred bidder (PB)) 
for the implementation of the IP, since the actual proposals, e.g. due to different 
assumption of demand, capital investments, can significantly differ from what has 
been assumed by the public sector. The actual proposals can show that the PPA has 
not foreseen some relevant factors which have significant impact on the output 
results of the IP. Therefore, for rational assessment, the PSC, as a benchmark, has to 
be adjusted according to the relevant assumptions used in the actual proposals of the 
private bidders, if needed. Finally, if the IP is implemented as a PPP, an ex-post 
analysis is relevant to get empirically-grounded data which could be used to support 
the assumptions for other ex-ante analyses for the assessment of PPP’s possibilities 
to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
Concluding this section, reliable assumptions regarding the development of 
both the PSC and the SB options is the key factor determining the quality of 
assessment for expediency and benefit of PPP to be chosen instead of CP as a 
delivery option of public infrastructure and services. VfM assessment is complex 
and, to get a full view of options, requires including both quantitative and qualitative 
elements as well as needs to consider that benefits of PPP can be different depending 
on the beneficiary. 
2.2. Formation of the model for assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure 
As discussed in previous sections, the assessment of PPP possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure includes many aspects which need to 
be considered and is more a set of various steps which have to be coherently 
overcome until the expected value of private sector’s involvement in the provision 
of public infrastructure and services can be realized rather than the action of single 
assessment. Considering the complexity of this process, this section is committed to 
systemize all the previously analyzed theoretical solutions into an integrated 
complex model as a solution algorithm enabling the PPA to make reasoned 
decisions for the expediency of IP implementation as a PPP. The model is suitable to 
set up the objective of maximizing benefits of the public sector from the private 
sector’s involvement in the provision of public infrastructure and services, while 
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subjecting this objective to the requirements formulated as constrains of equity 
providers and lenders. This allows achieving win-win results for both public and 
private sectors. 
Considering the analyzed methodological aspects of the assessment of PPP’s 
possibilities to optimize investment in public infrastructure, this process can be 
divided into five major steps, which are considered as the main stages of the 
proposed model. The stages (as shown in Figure 2.17) are as follows: 1) Initial IP 
preparation; 2) IP selection for PPP; 3) PPP structuring and feasibility analysis; 4) 
VfM assessment of actual bids, and; 5) VfM monitoring. Since the methodological 
aspects related to each of these stages have been analyzed in previous sectors, here it 
is focused on the solution algorithm allowing the PPA to achieve the above-
mentioned goals. Besides the general algorithmic-model, some stages are elaborated 
in the more detailed figures. 
Stage 1: Preparation of the initial public IP. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, 
the reliability of results of the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure highly depends on the quality of the IP, based on 
which the PPP is further assessed. Accordingly, this stage, as elaborated in 
Appendix 11, has to be performed on the following algorithm: 
1. Public services’ (PS) context analysis. 
1.1. Definition of PS. 
1.2. Analysis of PS’ socio-economic and legal context, where their unsatisfied 
demand in respect of quality and quantity or/and inefficiency of provision 
would be disclosed. 
1.3. Identification of the main problem from the observed dissatisfaction of 
requirements related to PS’s quality, quantity and inefficiency of delivery. 
2. IP’s content analysis. 
2.1. Determination of the purpose and tasks of IP implementation. 
2.2. Identification of the PPA in respect of administration level, i.e. national or 
regional level. 
2.3. Determination of minimum results which must be the least achieved by 
implementing the IP. 
3. Option analysis. 
3.1. Identification of all possible tasks for IP implementation. 
3.2. Structuring of the options. Each option must achieve at least the minimum 
results of IP implementation determined in step 2.3. 
4. Analysis of option No. 1. 
5. Financial analysis of the option. 
5.1. Development of work breakdown structure. 
5.2. Schedule network building. 
5.3. Calculation of capex. 
5.3.1. Setting of start and finish time of each work activity. 
5.3.2. Determination of IP’s construction period. 
5.3.3. Determination of construction cost of each activity. 
5.3.4. Calculation of It, RVn. 
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Figure 2.17. General model of assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
5.4. Calculation of opex. 
5.4.1. Setting the time of operation period. 
5.4.2. Calculation of REt, OMt, FACt, PCt, POCt, taxes, financing. 
5.5. Determination of FDR, based on the model presented in Figure 2.1. 
5.6. Calculation of FNPVc, according to Formula 7 as well as SFA, IRR, CCF. 
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5.7. Evaluation of financial sustainability of the option, i.e. CCF must be equal 
to or above 0, therefore if CCF >= 0, go to step 6, otherwise go to step 5.8. 
5.8. Change of assumptions or/and specify the option, then go to step 5. 
6. Socio-economic analysis of the option. 
6.1. Conversion of market price into the shadow (economic) prices. 
6.2. Determination of SDR. 
6.3. Calculation of option’s direct socio-economic impact on society and 
externalities. 
6.4. Calculation of ENPV, EIRR, ECBR. 
6.5. The option provides socio-economic benefits to society when its ENPV is 
above 0. If ENPV > 0, then go to step 6.10, otherwise go step 6.6. 
6.6. Checking whether there are possibilities to revise the option left. Then, if 
there is, go to step 6.7, otherwise go to step 6.8. 
6.7. Revision of the option and go to step 5. 
6.8. Evaluation of possibilities to add commercial activities. Then, if there is a 
possibility to do so, go to step 6.9, otherwise, eliminate the option and go to 
step 6.10. 
6.9. Including commercial activities, then go to step 5. 
6.10. Evaluation of whether all options have been analyzed. If there are any 
options left, take another option (option x + 1) and repeat the evaluation 
from step 5. Otherwise go to step 6.11. 
6.11. Evaluation of whether there are options with positive ENPV. If yes, go to 
step 6.12, otherwise the IP cannot be implemented. STOP. 
6.12. Identification of an alternative with the maximum ENPV. 
7. Risk assessment of IP. Here, the approach graphically shown in Figure 2.4 is 
suggested, the graphical algorithm of which is provided in Appendix 12. 
7.1. Identification of relevant RGs. It is suggested to apply the scheme of 8 
RGs proposed in Table 2.5. 
7.2. Attribution of CFs to the appropriate RG as suggested in Table 2.5. 
7.3. Estimation of risk measures of RGs, applying PDs and their parameters 
suggested in Table 2.2 and Table 2.4. 
7.4. Calculation of risk-adjusted indicators: FNPVc, IRR, SFA, CCF. 
All the above-provided steps enable the PPA to prepare the IP which could 
offer the highest social-economic benefit to society, if it were implemented in the 
way of CP. This is an essential condition, since the prepared initial IP is the basis for 
any further analysis of the possibilities to increase its cost-efficiency, innovation or 
better affordability to the public sector due to the involvement of private sector in 
the provision of public infrastructure and services.  
Stage 2: IP selection for PPP. Since the PPP procurement, due to complex 
reasons, can be costlier than CP and requires special conditions to be successfully 
implemented, this stage of the model, as shown in Figure 2.17, is used to select IPs 
characterized as having PPP potential and, therefore, would be justified for 
additional funds spent on their full analysis regarding the possibilities and benefits 
of their implementation as PPPs. Considering the analysis performed in Section 
2.1.2., Table 2.7 summarizes the criteria enabling the PPA to select a suitable 
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candidate IP for further assessment of their possibilities and benefit to be 
implemented as PPPs. 
Since all the above-provided questions are related to the main features of PPP, 
each of them, regarding further assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure, requires a positive evaluation “Yes”52. Here the 
evaluation of question number 5 can require separate legal analysis, while, the 
evaluation of question 7 is usually based on market research. 
No. Criteria Yes/No 
1 Is there a requirement to invest a significant amount in 
infrastructure? 
 
2 Is long-term demand for infrastructure and service planned to 
deliver in the PPP? 
 
3 Is it possible to expect benefits form an integration of tasks of 
infrastructure development and service delivery? 
 
4 Can the outputs of service performance be clearly measured?   
5 Is it possibilities to share and allocate risks between the public and 
private sectors? 
 
6 Can revenue stream to the private entity be clearly identified?  
7 Is there any interest in the IP from the private market?  
Table 2.7. Criteria enabling the PPA to select IPs having PPP potential (prepared by 
the author of this dissertation) 
Stage 3: PPP feasibility analysis. When an IP candidate for PPP is selected, 
feasibility analysis for its implementation as the PPP, has to performed. As shown in 
Figure 2.17, this primarily includes the development of PSC and later the 
development of an SB model. As shown in Appendix 13, the development of PSC 
includes 5 the main steps which can be coherently accomplished through the 
following algorithm of steps: 
1. Adjustment of the initial IP. 
1.1. Evaluation of whether the scope of PPP in respect of the number of tasks is 
different from the initial IP. A comparison of a hypothetical example is 
provided in Table 2.3. If yes, adjust It, RVn, REt, OMt, FACt, PCt, POCt, 
taxes. Otherwise, go to step 3.2. 
1.2. Calculation of adjusted Raw PSC and SFA, IRR. 
2. To enable the private sector to compete on the same-level playing field, 
calculation of CN of the public sector as well as the PPA is necessary, if the 
PPA represents the municipality level. Depending on the case, this can 
include land and asset taxes, PPP monitoring tax, contribution for 
municipality53, etc. 
                                                 
52 The particular exception could be the first three questions in respect of a situation where 
management, lease and similar operating agreements are also considered as forms of PPP. 
However, this is not the case in Lithuania. 
53 A practice is observed in the economic model of PPP (concession), where municipality 
asks the private entity to do additional work for giving a right to the private entity to provide 
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3. Risk assessment. 
3.1. Assessment of risks based on the PDs, presented in steps 7.1–7.4 of stage 
1. If the scope of PPP is the same as in the IP, the same risk estimates can 
be used. 
3.2. Identification of relevant RFs in all RGs, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
3.3. Allocation/sharing of RFs among the public and private entities, based on 
the scheme suggested in Figure 2.5. 
3.4. Calculation of values of retained risk and transferring risk, both of which 
are used in calculation in PSC. 
4. Assessment of NFBs. All NFBs must be monetized. Here the methodology 
developed by CPVA (2014b) can be used. 
5. Calculation of PSC, which is a sum of Raw PSC, CN costs, NFBs and value 
of retained and transferring risks. 
6. Calculation of FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr, based on Formulas 10, 11 and 12, 
respectively. 
The result obtained by following the above-presented steps is used as a 
benchmark for the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure. Accordingly, the other side of comparison, presenting the 
expected PPP option which is considered as the SB model, has to be developed 
based on the following algorithm: 
1. Determination of the scope of tasks used in the calculation of PSC. 
Adjustment of It, RVn, REt, OMt, FACt, PCt, POCt, and taxes according to 
the assumptions regarding cost-efficiency and innovation of the private 
entity. The statistics of past experienced are preferred. 
2. Choosing a basis of PPP according to the algorithm presented in Appendix 
14. Evaluate whether strategic importance is so high and the specificity of 
goods and services is relatively low that it would be rational to establish the 
PPP on an institutional basis. If yes, “Divestiture” as the form of PPP is 
analyzed, go to step 3, otherwise go to step 11. 
3. Comparison of base costs of PSC and PPP. Evaluation whether there is any 
significant cost saving. If yes, go to step 4, otherwise go to step 11. 
4. Calculation of the optimal share of the public and private capital, according 
to the algorithm presented in Appendix 15. 
4.1. Input data: rpu, which is equal to FDR, calculated in step 5.5 of stage 1, rpr, 
Iq and Jq. 
4.2. Calculation of Ɵ* based on Formula 16, which is graphically shown in 
Appendix 15. 
4.3. Determination of Ɵ (share of private capital) and (1 – Ɵ) (share of public 
capital). 
5. Optimization of capital structure of the private entity (Capital structure 
optimization (CSO model)) according to the algorithm provided in 
Appendix 16. 
                                                                                                                              
the appropriate services, i.e. invest into infrastructure of municipality, which is not included 
in the model of CP. 
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5.1. Input data: Emin, IRREmin, DSCRmin, profit tax, rpr, rpu. 
5.2. Let i = 1 and Ei = Emin, which represent a minimum share of equity in the 
capital. 
5.3. Calculation of Ei, Di, IRREi, DSCRi, SFAi. 
5.4. Evaluation whether E = 100%. If yes, go to step 5.5, otherwise go to step 
5.6. 
5.5. Ei+1=Ei + 1% and go to step 5.3. 
5.6. Selection of all iterations, where DSCRi ≥ DSCRmin; IRREi ≥ IRREmin; 
SFAi ≥ SFAmin. Evaluation whether there are any iterations satisfying the 
criteria. If yes, go to step 5.7, otherwise increase by minimum financial 
support from the public sector (grants, subsidies, guarantees, etc.) and go 
back to step 5.2. 
5.7. Finding of E, where E = min(IRRE). 
5.8. Addition of the retained risks, calculated in step 3.4 of stage 3 and go to step 
8. 
6. Analysis of the contractual PPP according to the algorithm provided in 
Appendix 17. 
6.1. Decision whether revenues from direct users can be collected. If no, develop 
a social-based SB model and go to step 6.2., otherwise go to step 7. 
6.2. Depending on the determined scope of PPP, as it has been done in step 1 of 
stage 3, identification of whether investment is needed. If no, develop the 
SB based on the “Management” or “Operate and management” form of PPP 
and go to step 6.3, otherwise go to step 6.7. 
6.3. Optimization of capital structure as explained in step 5 (CSO model) and 
graphically shown in Appendix 16. 
6.4. Evaluation of costs that are expected to be experienced by the PPA in the 
PPP. 
6.5. Addition of the retained risks, calculated in step 3.4 of stage 3. 
6.6. Evaluation whether the SB is viable and affordable. If yes, go to step 8, 
otherwise go to step 11. 
6.7. Development of the SB based on a combinative scheme of tasks: design, 
build, rehabilitate, operate, maintain, etc. where “PFI” is prevailing. 
6.8. Optimization of capital structure as explained in step 5 (CSO model) and 
graphically shown in Appendix 16. 
6.9. Evaluation of costs that are expected to be experienced by the PPA in the 
PPP.  
6.10. Addition of the retained risks, calculated in step 3.4 of stage 3. 
6.11. Evaluation whether the SB is viable and affordable. If yes, go to step 8, 
otherwise go to step 6.12. 
6.12. Evaluation the possibility to collect revenue from direct users. If this is 
accepted, go to step 7.2, otherwise go to step 11. 
7. Development of the economic-based SB model. 
7.1. Depending on the determined scope of PPP, as it has been done in step 1 of 
stage 3, identification of whether investments are needed. If yes, go to step 
7.2, otherwise go to step 7.9. 
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7.2. Development of the SB based on a combinative scheme of tasks: design, 
build, rehabilitate, operate, maintain, etc. where “Concession” is prevailing. 
7.3. Optimization of capital structure as explained in step 5 (CSO model) and 
graphically shown in Appendix 16. 
7.4. Calculation of costs that are expected to be experienced by the PPA in the 
PPP. 
7.5. Addition of the retained risks, calculated in step 3.4 of stage 3. 
7.6. Evaluation of whether the SB is viable and affordable. If yes, go to step 8, 
otherwise go to step 7.7. 
7.7. Evaluation of whether it is possible to extend the PPP period, i.e. ti < tn. If 
yes, go to step 7.8, otherwise go to step 11. 
7.8. Ti+1=ti + 1. Go back to step 6. 
7.9. Development of the SB based on the “Management” or “Leasing” form of 
PPP contract. 
7.10. Optimization of capital structure as explained in step 5 (CSO model) and 
graphically shown in the Appendix 16. 
7.11. Calculation of costs that are expected to be experienced by the PPA in the 
PPP.  
7.12. Addition of the retained risks calculated in step 3.4 of stage 3. 
7.13. Evaluation of whether the SB is viable and affordable. If yes, go to step 8, 
otherwise go to step 11. 
8. Assessment of whether the quantitative VfM is positive. If yes, go to step 12, 
otherwise go to step 9. 
9. Assessment of non-valued effects, if the appropriate approach is applied. 
9.1. Identification of relevant criteria. 
9.2. Assignment of weights to criteria. 
9.3. Calculation of full scores of both the PSC and the SB model, based on the 
framework presented in Table 2.6. 
10. Calculation of VfM, based on quantitative and qualitative assessment. 
Evaluation of whether VfM is positive. If yes, go to step 12, otherwise go to 
step 11. 
11. Implementation of IP in a conventional way. 
12. Definition of conditions of PPP to the private entity in the RFP and launch the 
procurement of the PPP. 
The results of stage 3 allow stating that this stage is the most complex; 
however, it is also the most productive in terms of outputs related to the assessment 
of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure. It allows 
developing both the rational-to-compare public sector option of IP implementation 
as well as the private bid which is the most expected to be proposed from the private 
sector. The viability and affordability of PPP is also assessed, which allows the PPA 
to evaluate the reality of possibilities to implement an IP as a PPP. These results 
allow determining the appropriate conditions of collaboration to the private entities. 
The calculation of FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, and MPpr allows the PPA to form negotiating 
positions. 
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Stage 4: VfM assessment of the actual bids. When the PPA gets the actual 
bids, it is relevant to assess whether they are still VfM, since they, as explained in 
Section 2.1.5., can significantly differ from what has been analyzed by the PPA in 
respect of demand prognosis, risk assessment, elements which have to be included in 
the IP or, due to errors, done by the PPA. Therefore, as shown in Figure 2.17, the 
PPA, depending on the results received from the market, has to accomplish the 
following steps according to the algorithm presented below. 
1. Checking whether the actual bids significantly differ in terms of main 
assumptions from the PSC developed by the PPA before launching the 
PPP procurement. If yes, go to step 2, otherwise go to step 3. 
2. Correcting the PSC according to the assumptions of the preferred bid to 
ensure competition on the same level playing field. 
3. Comparing the PSC with the PPP after negotiation with the private 
entity, as described in steps 9–12 of stage 3. Evaluate whether the PPP 
is VfM. If yes, sign the PPP agreement with the preferred bidders and 
do financial closure, otherwise go to step 4. 
4. Implementation of the IP in a traditional way. 
This stage allows the PPA to evaluate how its assumptions regarding the private 
sector’s efficiency and innovation match the actual bids proposed by the market as 
well as assess whether in the specific case the PPP is VfM. The proposed model 
allows determining which criteria have been decisive in making a decision for IP 
implementation as the PPP. 
Stage 5: VfM monitoring. In summary of Section 2.1.5., the quality of results 
of the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure, especially before making a decision for launching PPP procurement, 
highly depends on the assumptions applied in the development of both the PSC and 
the SB as well as their comparison. Therefore, since the PPP is established, it is 
important to collect information from actual experience of PPP implementation 
which could be systemized and applied to other consideration for PPP 
implementation. This stage is also important for the purpose of monitoring the 
activity of the private entity within the requirements defined in the PPP agreement. 
The features of the above-proposed model allow summarizing that an 
accomplishment of all stages allows the PPA to not only assess the possibilities of 
PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure, but also 1) to develop an IP 
which could provide the best available socio-economic benefits to the society, 2) to 
select IPs emphasized by the highest PPP potential and use public funds rationally 
for its assessment for implementation as the PPP, 3) to develop a rational-to-
compare option of the public sector as well as the option expected to be proposed by 
the private sector, 4) to assess the viability and affordability of PPP, 5) to make 
corrections which allow achieving the best available VfM for the public sector, and 
other things that, in turn, make the very assessment rational and the results viable to 
be implemented in practice. 
Summarizing the theoretical solutions and the model provided in this part of the 
dissertation, the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investment in public 
infrastructure is a set of various steps needed to be coherently accomplished, from 
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the identification of the appropriate problem by developing the initial IP to 
multicriteria analysis for possibilities of the private sector to increase benefits to the 
public sector in respect of cost efficiency, innovation, NFBs and non-valued affects. 
It covers many quantitative and qualitative aspects that make it complex in nature. 
While the reliability of assessment results highly depends on the validity of 
assumptions applied in developing both the PSC and the SB options as well as the 
very comparison of these options, i.e. like-for-like comparison. Considering the 
issue of complexity, an algorithm is developed which systemizes the assessment 
process and enables the PPA to evaluate benefits rising from the participation of the 
private sector in the provision of public infrastructure and services and to maximize 
this benefit. Regarding the difficulties to apply reliable assumptions, the author of 
this dissertation suggests the appropriate approaches and provides the possible 
solutions; however, he also leaves the PPA with possibilities to apply its own 
assumptions in respect of FDR, PDs, risk sharing and allocation, selection of PPP 
forms, etc., which makes the model flexible to the PPA’s requirements. Therefore, 
although the developed model is proposed within the assumptions, it is designed to 
be applied in Lithuania – some of its elements are already applied in practice. such 
as, e.g., from 2015 the PDs are used to assess risk in all EU-funded IPs or from 2017 
to calculate FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr – it can also be applied to solve the same issues 
of evaluating PPP’s benefits in other countries. These examples of its elements 
practical application allow to argue that the proposed model has a great potential to 
be applied as a tool allowing governments to develop an entire framework of 
assessment of IPs to be implemented as the PPPs, where the applied structured 
process of assessment and decision-making regarding PPP implementation would 
provide more trust on government’s actions as well as makes the process of 
assessment more transparent itself. Considering these ambitions, the validity of this 
model to use in practice is analyzed in the following part of this dissertation. 
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3. VERIFICATION OF THE MODEL FOR ASSESSING THE 
POSSIBILITIES OF PPP TO OPTIMIZE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
To verify the suitability of the created model to be applied in solving the 
research problem on how to assess the possibilities provided by the PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure, an empirical research based on the case study 
has been performed. Accordingly, this part of the dissertation is devoted to the 
analysis of possibilities to implement the hypothetical IP as a PPP under various 
simulated scenarios. However, since the developed model, in its nature, is highly 
sensitive to the applied values of FDR and risk estimates, as disclosed in Section 
1.3.1., the beginning of the research is committed to determining the specific FDRs, 
as one of the general assumptions applied in VfM assessment, and the assessment of 
impact of the applied empirically-grounded PDs on contingent liabilities of the 
public sector of Lithuania related to the implementation of public investments in 
infrastructure. Regarding this logic structure, this part of dissertation consists of the 
following major sections: the first presents and discusses the results of FDRs’ 
calculation as well as discloses the effect of the above-mentioned PDs on values of 
investment cost overrun risk, while the second describes the hypothetical IP and, by 
applying the developed model, analyzes its possibilities to be implemented as the 
PPP. 
3.1. Determination of the main general assumptions used in the model 
To be prepared for the assessment of the empirical verification to solve the 
research problem, the developed model, among the other aspects, requires adopting 
the assumptions related to the determination of FDR and the application of PDs. 
Considering the developed methodology, this section provides the results of FDR 
calculation and the effects of the empirically-grounded PDs on values of Risk. 
3.1.1. Determination of individual FDRs of the member states of the EU 
To disclose the features of the model allowing the government to determine the 
suitable FDR for discounting CFs of the IPs and, to facilitate its application in 
practice, individual FDRs for each of the member states of the EU have been 
calculated. Considering the model, FDRs are calculated by using two methods. 
Calculation of FDRs by using the long-term borrowing rate approach 
To calculate FDRs based on the long-term borrowing approach, monthly data 
of 10-years sovereign bond yields in the period 2007–2016 have been used and the 
averages have been calculated for each of 27 EU countries54. Figure 3.1 shows the 
results of calculations. 
The results have disclosed that the average borrowing rates are very different 
among the countries with the ratio between minimum and maximum values equal to 
nearly 4.5. These differences are determined by a complex of various factors, such 
                                                 
54 The exception is Estonia, which has not issued its 10-year bonds, therefore this approach is 
not suitable to be applied for calculation of the FDR in a case of this country. 
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as government debt level, credit rating, etc., considering which the lenders have 
required the appropriate compensation for risk borne for lending money. Here it is 
important to consider that the analyzed data cover a period which is emphasized by 
the rapid economic growth in the beginning, the debt crisis in the middle and the 
record low interest rate environment in the end. Therefore, the average values are 
affected by significant market volatility as the results of standard deviations’ 
calculation show. Relatively the highest FDRs have been determined in countries 
such as Cyprus, Portugal, Hungary, Romania and Greece ahead, which were unable 
or struggled to repay their government debt. However, most countries attributed to 
the developed one emphasized by lower FDRs. 
 
Figure 3.1. FDRs of the EU countries (the long-term borrowing approach) (prepared 
by the author of this dissertation) 
Regarding the EU regulation (European Commission, 2014a), a 4% FDR has to 
be applied as an indicative benchmark for public investment operations co-financed 
by the ESI Funds. However, as the results show, only the individual FDR of 
Slovenia was equal to this benchmark. Nearly half of the analyzed countries are 
marked by lower FDRs. This disclosed that the application of individual FDRs in 
them would result in higher a return ratio expressed in net present values. On the 
other hand, the application of FDR determined by the Commission in the remaining 
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countries, among which there is also Lithuania, would result in an overestimation of 
return indicators, since it actually does not reflect the real situation and is too high. 
Calculation of FDRs by using the CAPM-based approach 
To calculate FDRs under the CAPM-based approach, Formulas 5 and 6 have 
been used, accordingly. Given the fact that the developed formulas are applied to the 
emerging (also frontier) and developed countries, respectively, the classification of 
the countries was based on the MSCI Country classification standard (MSCI, 2014). 
The risk-free rate was equated to US 10-y bond yields (monthly data), the S&P 100 
Global index (10-y monthly return rates) was chosen to calculate rg and σg. Average 
return rates of the local markets have been calculated by using data of national 
security market indices. The longest accessible data covering the period of 2007–
2016 was used. Rc was determined by using the data of rating-based default spreads 
provided in the Damodoran website (Damodaran, 2017). Detailed results of FDR 
calculation are provided in Appendix 18. Meanwhile, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 
show the results of FDR calculation based on the CAPM approach in the developed 
and emerging countries, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.2. FDRs of the developed countries (CAPM-based approach) (prepared by 
the author of this dissertation) 
In the group of the developed countries, the distance between the marginal 
values of FDRs is relatively narrow, i.e. 1% point with the lowest FDR in Sweden 
and the highest in Austria. Since, considering Formula 6, there is no additional risk 
premiums included in the assessment, the beta coefficient is a determinant factor for 
the results obtained. The lower is the correlation and difference between the returns 
on local and global security market indices, the lower is beta. Scandinavian 
countries, which have survived the 2009–2012 financial crisis relatively easier, have 
been considered as a lower risk area for investments resulting in the lowest betas 
and, herewith, FDRs in such countries as Denmark, Finland and Sweden. While, 
Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, Italy and Austria have got into the group of countries 
emphasized by betas higher than 1, which discloses their security markets being 
riskier than the systemic risk. Among the countries with one of the highest FDRs 
there are also such countries as Italy and Spain, which have suffered form debt crisis 
and owed massive debt to the European Central Bank (ECB), which, in turn, at least 
partly allows explaining their higher FDRs. 
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The results in the group of emerging and frontier countries shows that, in 
general, FDRs in these countries are higher than in the developed ones. This mostly 
can be explained not by the values of betas, which tend to be very diverse among 
these countries, and additional risk premiums, Rc, calculations of which are based on 
rating-based default spread. This determines that Greece and Cyprus, which were 
unable to repay or refinance their government debt and, therefore, were bailed out 
through the assistance of third parties including the Eurozone countries, the ECB, 
and the International Monetary Fund, are distinguished by the highest FDRs. 
 
Figure 3.3. FDRs of the emerging and frontier countries (CAPM-based approach) 
(prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
To compare the values of FDRs, Figure 3.4 presents the differences between 
the values of FDRs calculated under both of the above-presented approaches. The 
results show that countries such as Ireland, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Romania, 
the difference in values between different approaches is relatively low, i.e. less than 
1% point. Therefore, the choice of the appropriate approach for FDR calculation has 
relatively little effect on NPVs used as measures for assessing PPP’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure. However, the analysis disclosed that 
FDRs calculated under CAPM-based approach is by on average 2.1 percent point 
higher than calculated under the long-term borrowing approach. This can be 
considered as a significant difference, since it has to be taken into account that in the 
PPP the FDR is usually used for discounting of CFs in the period of 20–30 years. In 
the same problematic countries such as Cyprus and Greece this difference exceeds 
6% and 7% points, respectively. This discloses that the application of CAPM-based 
approach would have significant effect on NPV of PPP’s costs when they are 
experienced as the unitary payments.  
In the case of Lithuania, the distance between the FDRs calculated under 
different approaches is equal to 1.3% point, which is lower than the estimated 
average difference. This determines that despite the approach is chosen, the results 
of quantitative VfM assessment are similar and there is a little chance of FDR being 
a critical factor for decision making for IP’s implementation as the PPP. 
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Figure 3.4. Differences among countries’ FDRs calculated on the CAPM-based 
approach and the long-term borrowing approach (CAPM-based approach) (prepared 
by the author of this dissertation) 
However, regarding the recommendation provided in section 2.1.1 related to 
the choice of an appropriate approach for discounting, the author of this dissertation 
suggests that, despite which of methods, NPM or the traditional one, is more 
prevailing in managing investments in the public sector, it is relevant to assess the 
benefits of IP implementation as a PPP by applying several different FDRs, whose 
marginal values represent the above-mentioned approaches, to evaluate whether the 
application of FDR determine different outcome regarding the choice of the optimal 
way to proceed the IP. If the FDR of an appropriate level becomes a critical factor 
determining whether to go into the PPP, the weight of qualitative assessment’s 
results should be increased by making the decision for the optimal way of 
investment implementation. 
3.1.2. Assessment of impact of the empirically-grounded PDs’ application on 
cost overrun risk estimates 
In the paper prepared by the author of this dissertation (Jasiukevicius & 
Vasiliauskaite, 2015a), empirically-grounded PDs and their parameters which best 
enable to assess the Risk in public IPs were provided. From the beginning of 2015, 
they have been officially applied for Risk assessment in the public sector of 
Lithuania as well as for the development of the former Risk assessment 
methodology (CPVA, 2014), theretofore based solely on theoretical assumptions. 
This resulted in changes of the estimated values of not only Risk estimates, but also 
the related contingent liabilities (CLs) of the public sector. This section of the 
dissertation is committed to provide the summarized results of the research done by 
the author of this dissertation (Jasiukevicius & Vasiliauskaite, 2015b), where the 
impact of the empirically-grounded PDs’ application on the values of the CLs 
previously estimated under the theoretical assumptions was assessed.  
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The research was based on a comparative analysis of both theoretically-based 
and empirically-grounded Risk estimates calculated at the confidence level of 70%. 
The empirically-grounded PDs and their parameters have been presented in Section 
2.1.1. (Table 2.2.), while the theoretical Risk estimates have been calculated based 
on the PDs and their parameters provided in the methodology of IP preparation 
developed by CPVA (2013).  
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of Risk estimates’ results. They disclosed the 
former values of Risk estimates of land, real estate, construction and equipment as 
being lower, and the estimates of various services related to investments as being 
higher in comparison with the empirically-grounded values. Accordingly, this 
revealed over- and underestimation of appropriate ICOR-related CLs prevailed in 
the past. 
The overestimation of Risk estimates in 5 out of 7 investment groups allows 
arguing about the general tendency of the actual ICOR borne by the public sector 
being lower than it has been assumed previously. This disclosed that lower amounts 
of financing are actually needed to be potentially secured by the government of 
Lithuania to cover the Risk-related CLs. Depending on the group of investments, the 
actual Risk financing is lower by from a little bit less than 1/6 in cases of land and 
real estate to nearly 1/3 in cases of equipment and machineries in comparison with 
the values estimated under the theoretical basis. The only exception for general 
tendency is that the Risk estimates related to investments of various services, the 
empirically-grounded values of which are higher more than twice than it has been 
assumed. This revealed a significant underestimation of Risk estimates related to 
these investments as well as disclosed higher financing needed to cover the CLs 
related to these groups of investments. 
Table 3.1. The comparison of ICOR estimates (Jasiukevicius & Vasiliauskaite, 
2015b) 
Gr Cash flow of investments 
Risk estimates* Diff., % 
Based on the 
theoretical approach 
(1) 
Empirically 
grounded 
(2) 
(2 - 1) / 1 
A1 Land 0,400 0,291 -27,40 
A2 Real estate 0,400 0,291 -27,40 
A3 Construction, major and other repairs 0,426 0,345 -18,92 
A4 Equipment and machineries and other 
assets 
0,262 0,178 -31,97 
A5 Projection, technical maintenance and 
other services related with investment 
into A1-A4, (A5 and A7) 
0,131 0,308 135,20 
A6 Reinvestments (A3 and A4) 0,426 0,290 -31,96 
A7 Other services 0,131 0,265 102,15 
* - at a confidence level of 70% 
Since there are no arguments provided regarding the reasoning of theoretical 
assumptions used to calculate the theoretically-based Risk estimates, the author of 
this dissertation does not go into the discussion of possible explanation and confines 
in the comparative analysis instead. 
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However, for the evaluation of practical benefits related to the application of 
the empirically-grounded PDs the results allow arguing that, regarding groups A3 
and A4 of investments to which the most of investments are implemented, the 
empirically-grounded Risk estimates are on average lower by a quarter in 
comparison with the previously calculated ones, i.e. with every million euro of 
investments the actual risk estimates are lower by 82.2 thousand euro. Considering 
the amount of ESI funds foreseen to the public sector of Lithuania in the programing 
period of 2014–2020, which is little bit more than 5 billion euro, the CFs related to 
ICOR is lower than 413 million euro. Accordingly, this amount of financial 
resources can be potentially used for the implementation of other IPs. 
 
Since both the determination of the FDR and application of the proper PDs are 
based on the empirical research, they, as empirically substantiated assumptions, are 
included as the default variables in the developed model, the verification of which to 
be applied for the evaluation of possibilities provided by the PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure is carried out in the following section. 
3.2. Verification of the model for assessing the possibilities of PPP optimize 
investments public infrastructure: a case study 
To accomplish the aim of the research and this dissertation, this section is 
designed to demonstrate the possibilities of the developed model to be applied in 
practice and verify its suitability to solve problems raised in the dissertation, i.e. how 
to evaluate the possibilities provided by the PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure that the results obtained would enable to make reasonable decisions 
for the most efficient ways of their implementation. The section consists of two the 
main parts: the first part describes the hypothetical IP used for the verification of the 
model; the second part simulates the developed model under various the 
hypothetical IP-based scenarios to verify its suitability to be applied in practice for 
solving the above-mentioned problem. 
3.2.1. Description of the hypothetical project 
To demonstrate the possibilities of the developed model to be applied as a 
practical tool for the evaluation of possibilities provided by the PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure, a hypothetical IP covering the development of 
parking infrastructure and delivery of services was developed. In general, there are 
many economic sectors where the PPP, can be applied as an alternative way of 
public procurement and the developed model could be tested. However, the reason 
of choosing this type of IP is that the services of parking infrastructure, as a financial 
structure, in principle can be very flexible in respect of financial mechanism and risk 
allocation and therefore it allows simulating many different scenarios making it as 
one of the most suitable case studies to verify the suitability of the developed model 
to solve the issues analyzed in this dissertation. 
As a business, the operation and management of parking infrastructure, 
especially in the case of developing new multi-storey parking lots, requires the 
appropriate special technical expertise and know-how, in addition to large capital 
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availability depending on the capacity which is needed to ensure. Therefore, the 
assurance of sufficient parking infrastructure availability next to, e.g., planned to 
expand public facilities such as hospitals, airports, stations, etc. can be a significant 
challenge which is often tried to overcome by involving the private sector in a long-
term relationship. Accordingly, such IPs are mainly implemented by the private 
promoters who can ensure capital financing and provide sufficient know-how 
needed to develop and operate the parking infrastructure in the most efficient way. 
The particularity of parking lot operation and management is that, due to the current 
development of technologies such as automatic number plate recognition systems, 
parking guidance systems, electronic payment systems, etc., it requires relatively 
low human workforce, since most operational processes can be fully automated. 
This determines that operation costs mostly consist of electricity, maintenance and 
repair and cleaning costs, and the operation costs of parking lots are usually covered 
by payments from direct users. They are charged tariffs which are regulated by the 
government. However, there are also cases where parking services are partly 
subsidized by the government or are free of charge, depending on their purpose and 
integration into public services. For example, a staff of a public facility to which the 
parking infrastructure is built usually has a significant discount for long-term 
parking. This determines that a part of investment and operation costs has to be 
funded from the public budget, since they are not fully covered by the revenues from 
direct users. Accordingly, various combinations of charging the users and financing 
needed from the budget determine the existence of various potential financial 
structures of IP with inherited the potential risks of revenue stream and further 
possibilities to allocate/share them between the public and private parties in case it is 
implemented as a PPP. Considering this particularity, here the demand risk can be 
argued as the most important. It can assert due to such factors as lower than the 
expected capacity of the main public services or/and a rise of new competitive 
infrastructure which determines a decrease of traffic flow to the parking 
infrastructure and thus the revenue stream to cover all costs. Figure 3.5 summarizes 
the cash-flow critical variable. 
CFs of a Parking Infrastructure 
Investment
• Construction of 
parking lots
• Installation of 
equipments
• Reinvestments 
Revenue
EBITDA
OPEX
• Operation costs
• Maintenance and 
repairs
• Administrative costs 
Price
• Price – regulated and 
fixed tarrif
• Government 
subsidies 
Quantity
• Installed a number of 
parking spaces
• Demand factor 
depending on 
government policy 
 
Figure 3.5. Critical variables of a parking infrastructure IP (prepared by the author 
of this dissertation) 
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Considering the above-described particularity of the sector, a hypothetical IP 
was developed under such circumstances and with the following characteristics. 
 
Description of the hypothetical IP 
Considering the identified shortage of parking infrastructure near a rapidly 
growing institution of public services’ delivery, let’s say, in this case, an airport, 
however, this can also be a bus station, railway station, etc., there is a determined 
need to ensure the availability of 2400 new additional parking spaces (PaSs) to 
satisfy the expected demand in the upcoming years. To fill the gap of infrastructure, 
it is planned to build new and renew the current parking lots in which the total 
capacity of 3000 PaSs will be ensured. 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the infrastructure development plan of the hypothetical 
IP, where P1 and P2 are the renewed current ground parking lots and P3 are two 
newly-built multi-storey parking lots, respectively. Considering the rational use of 
infrastructure, parking lot P1, since it is near the main building of public services’ 
delivery, is dedicated to short-term parking. Parking lot P2 is mainly used as the 
pick-up and drop-off point. While P3 parking lots, which are planned to be built 
away from the main building, are foreseen for long-term parking. 
P1 parking lot 
(VIP): 400 
spaces
P3 (multi-storey) 
parking lot (long-term): 
1200 spaces
P2 parking lot
(short-term): 200 spaces
RoadRoad
Road
R
o
ad
     Airport
Railway
Station
Bus
Station
Hospital
Other scenarios
P3 (multi-storey) 
parking lot (long-term): 
1200 spaces
 
Figure 3.6. The hypothetical IP: parking infrastructure (prepared by the author of 
this dissertation) 
To implement the IP, the tasks of design, construction (build), operation and 
maintenance of parking infrastructure have to be accomplished. Table 3.2 presents 
the key input variables used to prepare the IP (all inputs are provided in Appendix 
19).  
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Table 3.2. Key input variables of the hypothetical IP (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
Economic data 
2% Inflation rate for everything except expense of energy, water and waste disposal 
3% Inflation rate for expense of energy, water and waste disposal 
Taxes   
21% VAT 
15% Profit tax 
Project schedule 
25 Reference period for CFs calculation (number of years) 
150 Days needed to complete the design 
360 Days needed to complete the garage (per contract) 
91 Days needed to install the equipment (per contract) 
8 621 Total days in the operation period 
13 Year at which medium repair is needed 
21 Year at which major repair is needed 
Investments   
2 400 Number of parking spaces built in the multi-storey parking facility 
600 Number of parking spaces built in the ground parking facility 
150 000 Total design costs (€) 
20 157 600 Total investment costs (€) into the parking garage 
151 697 Total investment costs (€) into the parking equipment 
Amortization and depreciation 
15 Depreciation period of garage infrastructure (year) 
5 Depreciation period of parking equipment infrastructure (year) 
Operation costs 
512 849 Annual operation costs 
360 000 Cost of medium repair 
1 050 000 Cost of major repair 
Revenue   
1 003 206 Annual P1 parking revenue (€)  
253 652 Annual P2 parking revenue (€)  
2 174 976 Annual P3 parking revenue (€)  
Loans   
10 Term of permanent loan (years) 
3.0% Interest rate on loan during the construction period 
2.5% Interest rate on loan (post construction) 
Assumptions used in the IP cover the period of 25 years, which is divided into 
the construction and operation periods. The construction period includes the tasks 
of developing design, building and renewal of parking lots and installation of 
equipment, which continues for 601 days in total, i. e. 20 months. The rest of the 
reference period, which starts immediately after the completion of infrastructure, is 
left for the tasks of operation and maintenance of infrastructure. Accordingly, 
annual operation costs as well as maintenance and reinvestments costs starting from 
the beginning of the operation period are regularly included in the schedule of the 
IP. The revenues are also allowed to be collected only when all constructions and 
installations are completed. 
To manage the demand of this infrastructure efficiently, the following 
assumptions for the appropriate parking pricing was determined. Table 3.3 shows 
that hourly price of the short-term parking lots is more expensive than the long-term 
parking, especially in the case of the parking lot (P2), which is mainly devoted to 
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short pick-ups and drop-offs. Here the assumption is made that every hour of 
parking is charged an hourly rate until the accumulated equal to the daily rate is 
reached. Considering the purpose of parking lot P2, the first 15 minutes are free of 
charge. Daily revenues are calculated considering different loads of infrastructure 
during a 24-hour period. Three picks of demand in morning, afternoon and evening 
are included in the assumptions, accordingly. It is assumed that 5% to 65% of PaSs, 
depending on the parking lot, are used for daily parking, while the rest of PaSs are 
occupied on average from 10% to 44% by hourly parking, respectively. 
Table 3.3. Pricing of parking infrastructure (VAT included) (prepared by the author 
of this dissertation) 
Pricing P1 P2* P3 
Hourly-parking 1,03 1,45 0,83 
Day-parking 7,19 7,19 2,52 
*First 15 min. is free of charge (once a day) 
It is also assumed that capital investments are partly financed by loans. Loan, 
the duration of which is 10 years, is repaid by using a linear amortization schedule. 
The loan is capitalized until it starts to be repaid from the beginning of the 
operation period. 
Using the above-presented and other key input variables provided in Appendix 
19, the hypothetical IP will be developed and simulated under various conditions, in 
which it is possible to be implemented as the PPP will be assessed and, herewith, the 
suitability of the developed model to be applied for solving the issues raised in this 
dissertation will be demonstrated. 
3.2.2. Assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure 
To verify the possibilities of the developed model to be applied in solving the 
practical issues of assessing the possibilities provided by the PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure, a hypothetical IP, as a case study, the key input 
variables of which have been presented in the previous section, is used. 
Accordingly, it goes through the stages of assessment. However, since the developed 
model covers ex-ante assessment (stages1–3), actual assessment (stage4) and ex-
post assessment (stage5), only the first three stages have been included in the case 
study. To accomplish stage 4, actual proposals are required. While stage 5 can be 
performed only when the PPP IP is implemented. Therefore, considering the feature 
of the model that stages 4 and 5 are mainly a repetition of the steps included in stage 
3 with the exception that data of actual IPs are used, this case study is focused on the 
ex-ante assessment, i.e. the assessment of possibilities provided by the PPP to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure and the results are used for making 
decision for an efficient way of IP implementation. Moreover, since the whole 
dissertation, beside all factors needed to be considered, is focused on the calculation 
elements and the financial aspects, more specifically, to make the assessment of the 
model more constructive, the following preconceived assumptions were made: 
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• The problem formulated in the hypothetical IP: “shortage of 
infrastructure to satisfy a need of PaSs” is grounded in the analysis 
where a gap between long-term demand and supply of the parking 
service has been determined; 
• There is requirement of 2 400 new PaSs and the infrastructure of total 
capacity of 3 000 PaSs. 
• The option of building 2 400 new PaSs and renewing 600 PaSs is 
assessed among other options as providing the highest socio-economic 
benefit (EGDVmax > 0), therefore, chosen for assessment of its 
possibilities to be implemented as the PPP. 
• The scope of the IP is equal to the scope of the PPP IP. 
• For discounting of CFs, the NPM approach is applied, therefore, the 
CAPM-based FDR equal to 6.2% (the case of Lithuania), which has 
been calculated in Section 3.1.1., is used. 
• The assessment is performed considering the taxation policy in 
Lithuania. 
To reveal the practical possibilities of the developed model to be used under 
various conditions beside the above-presented assumptions, the case study is divided 
into two basic scenarios. The main difference between them is based on different 
risk allocation between the public and private entities, since, as disclosed in Section 
1.2.2., it is one of the most important factors determining which of the forms would 
be the most suitable to implement the IP as the PPP. More specifically, the 
difference reveals in demand risk. In the first scenario, which represents the 
economic-based PPP model, most of demand risk is assumed by the private entity, 
which is rewarded the right to collect revenues from direct users. While in the 
second scenario, which represents the social-based PPP model, all demand risk is 
assumed by the PPA, which pays the private entity for infrastructure availability 
(availability fees), while services are free of charge to the direct users. 
3.2.2.1. Economic-based PPP model 
Stage 1. Preparatory conditions. According to the developed model, to assess 
the possibilities provided by the PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure, primarily there is a need to construct the CP option, which would be 
rational to compare against any other option with the appropriate involvement of 
private participation. This requires preparing the IP, whose detailed schedule and the 
main annual CFs: investments, depreciation, O&M, revenues, financing, etc., 
considering the key input variables of the hypothetical IP, are provided for the 
period of 25 years in Appendix 20, where the summarized statement of total 
revenues and costs also can be found. 
Figure 3.7 shows returns on investments depending on the length of the IP 
period. If the IP, considering the assumptions made and the time VfM, were 
implemented in the traditional way, the payback period required to recover 
investments would be 11 years. This can be considered as a quite long period from 
the perspective of the private sector, but since the price level is determined at a 
socially-acceptable level, this can be acceptable for the public sector. The figure 
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illustrates that the longer reference period, the higher are return indicators, although 
the marginal growth, due to the value of time, is significantly decreasing in the 
second half of the period. Since the case of the 25-year period is considered, NPV(I) 
and IRR(I), the calculation of which is based on Formula 8, are equal to 21m EUR 
and 15%, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.7. Return on investments depending on the length of a period (revenue 
generated IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Stage 2. Expediency criteria. Since the initial IP is developed, the second 
phase is to assess its potential to be implemented as a PPP. Considering the 
expediency criteria provided in Section 2.1.2., Table 3.4 shows the assessment 
results where all criteria are satisfied.  
Table 3.4. Assessment of the hypothetical IP against the expediency criteria 
(prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
No. Criteria Yes/No Justification 
1 Is there a requirement to invest a significant 
amount in the infrastructure? 
Yes 21,3m EUR investments 
2 Is there long-term demand for infrastructure 
and service planned to deliver in the PPP? 
Yes 25 years 
3 Is it possible to expect benefits from an 
integration of tasks of infrastructure 
development and service delivery? 
Yes Integration of design, construction, 
O&M tasks 
4 Can the outputs of service performance be 
clearly measured?  
Yes Output specifications can be easily 
determined 
5 Is it possible to share and allocate risks 
between the public and private sectors? 
Yes Most risks can be transferred to the 
private sector 
6 Can the revenue stream to the private entity 
be clearly identified? 
Yes Direct user payments 
7 Is there any interest in the IP from the 
private market? 
Yes Market research revealed the 
existence of interest from the private 
sector as well as sufficient 
competition in the market 
Stage 3. PSC. Since the assessment of the IP against the expediency criteria 
was positive for the further analysis of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure, the third phase of the model starts with the adjustment of the 
initial IP by risks, which are added to the costs of initial CFs. Accordingly, the risk 
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values, which were calculated by applying the empirically-based PDs and their 
parameters, provided in Section 2.1.1., with the total value of 23,3m EUR expressed 
at present value in the period of 25 years are provided in Appendix 21. 
Then to demonstrate the calculation of retained and transferred risk values, four 
relevant RFs in each of the RGs have been identified and allocated between the 
public and private entities by using the models of risk allocation and risk values 
allocation, which have been provided in Section 2.1.3. The results of allocation of 
RFs among the public and private entities as well as the calculation of values of 
retained and transferred risks are provided in Appendix 22. They allow summarizing 
that, considering the allocation of RFs, the total value of risk equal to 23,3m EUR is 
shared between the private and public entities by proportion of 86% and 14%, i.e. 
20,1m EUR and 3,2m EUR, respectively. As a result, the private entity would have 
to assume most of the risks. 
Figure 3.8 shows the net present values of FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr and risk 
values, detailed of which calculation, based on Formulas 10–12 and considering the 
length of reference period, are provided in Appendix 23. It shows that the longer is 
the period, the lower financing from the public budget is needed to make the IP 
financially viable, because there is more time to recover investments and earn the 
profit from revenues paid by the users of services. However, when the period 
increases, risk value, including the FOPSrtn, also grows significantly, because the 
longer period is, the higher is uncertainty related to future CFs of the IP. This 
determines that FOPSmax, although decreases during the entire period, remains 
positive, even if CN cost is excluded from the calculation. Accordingly, this allows 
stating that, within a 70% confidence level, the PPA would have a loss from the 
implementation of IP. When the period is extended to 25 years, the sum of 5,2m 
EUR, expressed in present value, is a maximum allowed obligation of the public 
sector, above which the PPP as a way for delivering infrastructure and services 
becomes ineffective from the financial point of view to the public sector55. The most 
of this sum consists of risk costs, since the IP is profitable and MPpr is below zero, 
accordingly. While, the sum of 3,2m EUR is the maximum value of retained risk, 
which is rational to assume by the public sector in the PPP, considering the risk 
allocation. 
Since the public sector can have an advantage over the private entities in terms 
of tax payment, the taxes of land rent, asset and monitoring of PPP contract 
implementation, have been additionally included as NC in this case. In the period of 
25 years the sum of NC expressed in present value is equal to 2,9m EUR. 
Calculation of NC is provided in Appendix 24. 
 
                                                 
55 If FOPSmax were assessed from the PPA’s point of view, it has to be reduced by CFs of 
taxes which do not come directly as tax revenue to the PPA. 
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Figure 3.8. FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr, value of risk depending on the length of a 
period (revenue generated IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
To develop the PSC, beside the financial aspects, NFBs have also been 
included in the assessment, since it was assumed that, due to a lack of public budget, 
the implementation of an IP would be delayed by at least 3 years56 until the PPA is 
able to accumulate sufficient resources. The hypothetical analysis of external social-
economic impact57 disclosed that social-economic costs of inaccessibility of 
infrastructure are at the required capacity is 612k EUR per year or 1 676 EUR per 
day. The calculation of NFBs is provided in Appendix 24, the results of which 
allowed summarizing the total value of NFBs expressed in present value which is 
1,7m EUR. 
Considering the above-calculated elements, the costs of the PSC have been 
calculated, and their general values and structure are presented in Figure 3.9, while 
detailed calculations are provided in Appendix 25. The figure shows that, despite the 
fact if the IP becomes profitable from the 11th year, when the values of risk and CN 
costs are included in the calculation, the total cost of PSC remains positive through 
the entire the period of analysis. The line in the figure shows the threshold, above 
which the PPP does not provide any financial and social-economic benefits assessed 
in the quantitative assessment, as this case is theoretically explained in Section 2.1.5. 
In case of the period of 25 years, any obligation of the public sector in the 
implementation of the IP as the PPP higher than 7,5m EUR within the scope of IP 
would be considered as an ineffective way to implement. Accordingly, this and other 
values calculated considering different lengths of period are as benchmarks for 
further assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure. 
                                                 
56 In a real case, the financial affordability analysis has to be done. 
57 External social-economic impact assessment is a part of CBA. Here as one of the best 
methodologies (CPVA, 2014b) could be applied. 
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Figure 3.9. The structure of PSC (revenue generating IP) (prepared by the author of 
this dissertation) 
The SB model. According to the developed model, to calculate the obligations 
of the public sector in the PPP, which could be rationally compared against the PSC, 
there is a need to prepare the SB IP, characterized by the same scope as in the case 
of the PSC model; however, taking into account that it has to be implemented by the 
private sector, i.e. the private entity (or private consortium) under the typical 
contract of concession has to design, construct, operate and maintain the 
infrastructure as well as it is awarded to collect revenues from the users for the 
delivery of services. This requires at least a few additional assumptions. Since it is 
usually assumed that the private entities (see Section 1.1.1.2.) have higher credit risk 
than the government, in this case study it is considered that the rate of loan interests 
is higher in comparison with the pure public option and it is determined to be 
different in the period of construction, as riskier and, therefore higher, and operation, 
as relatively less risky and therefore lower, respectively. Moreover, considering the 
analysis provided in the same section, it was also assumed that 70% of total capital 
investments are financed by loans58 and 60% of equity consists of subordinated 
debts59. These and other key input variables related to the implementation of PPP are 
provided in Appendix 26.  
Considering the methodological practice in some countries, cost reduction can 
also be included in the SB model. This is relevant if there is clear evidence of higher 
efficiency of the private sector. Let say the statistical data of practically-
implemented PPPs discloses that it is possible to expect 10% of total cost savings in 
the PPP. 
Considering the above-mentioned key input variables and assumptions, the 
sheets of investment, O&M, depreciation, revenues, funding, net operating working 
                                                 
58 This requires doing loan market research, where the main conditions of loans for the PPP 
IPs depending on the risk level could be known. 
59 The observed practice in the market. 
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capital as well as financial statements are provided for the same period of 25 years 
in Appendix 27. Considering the characteristics of the IP, to make the PPP 
financially viable, the following requirements from different stakeholders to the IP 
in the PPP must be satisfied (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5. Requirement for IP in the PPP from the stakeholders (prepared by the 
author of this dissertation) 
IRRE ≥ 12,8 proc. 
REPR ≥ 0,3 
DSCR ≥ 1,3 
LLCR ≥ 1,5 
PLCR ≥ 5 
SFA ≥ 1 
 
Considering the above-mentioned requirements from the stakeholders, 
Appendix 28 provides the results of their satisfaction depending on the length of the 
period. Table 3.6 shows indicators, when CFs of a 25-year period are used. The 
results show that the SB model under the above-presented conditions is financially 
viable from the perspectives of all stakeholders, when the period is equal or longer 
than 8 years. From this duration all indicators become higher than the determined 
minimum level and are significantly growing as the period increases. On the one 
hand, this shows the IP as attractive for the market, since it has the potential return 
higher than it is expected to get from the alternative investment options. On the 
other hand, this indicates, that any longer than 8-year period determines the expected 
over profit that is not justified in respect of public interest. Therefore, considering 
the results of indicators, the period should be shortened to 8 years or assumptions 
regarding the involvement of the private sector in the provision of public 
infrastructure and services, which could protect the public interest must be applied. 
Since the first option does not require significant changes and the assessment of 
PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure can be directly 
transferred to VfM assessment, the second one, to disclose more solutions for the 
practical issues related to this assessment, is continued in this case study. It is 
important to set the conditions in the RFP which would not allow giving over a 
profit to the private entity. If the competition between the investors in the market is 
high, it is possible to expect a positive effect of market competition, if the price of 
service and MARF are determined as the competitive criteria to select the most 
beneficial bid. Depending on the weights on these criteria, the actual bids can be 
focused on these criteria, therefore the PPA should set them depending on the 
priorities.  
If the PPA seeks to keep the same price level as, e.g., it is determined in the 
appropriate area, then the strongest competition should be encouraged on MARF, 
which has to be equal to nearly 0,73m EUR at 40% of revenue sharing level with the 
PPA (lower than 50% was used considering the recommendation of revenue sharing 
ratio provided by Yinglin Wang & Liu (2015), to make the SB model financially 
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viable at the period of 25 years and the risk of over profit would be decreased. If the 
priority is focused on the price for users, then it is possible to expect 34% decrease 
of price level60. 
However, if the competition between investors is low, then there is less chance 
that the market itself will adjust the results of public procurement so that the above-
mentioned lower price or higher MARF would be achieved. Therefore, it may be 
more expedient to set the PPP contract monitoring tax at the level which could allow 
the PPA to determine conditions for the equity investors acceptable in respect of 
public interest. Accordingly, the monitoring tax should be increased to 940k EUR, 
i.e. increased by nearly 20 times. 
Table 3.6 shows the results of the above-presented cases of adjustment of 
conditions to the private entities. The comparative analysis of indicators discloses 
that stakeholders’ requirements are satisfied at similar level in all cases, since it is 
determined due to the appropriate adjustment of ratios between revenue and cost. 
However, each of the cases has different VfM that is assessed further. 
Table 3.6. The results of satisfaction of stakeholders’ requirements in the period of 
25 years (revenues generating IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Indicator Req. Eq. 
Initial 
situation 
MARF 
competition 
Price 
competition 
Monitoring 
tax 
IRRE 12,80% ≤ 34,3% 12,8% 12,8% 12,8% 
REPR 0,30 ≤ 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 
DSCR 1,30 ≤ 1,91 1,37 1,37 1,41 
LLCR 1,50 ≤ 6,59 4,58 4,58 4,72 
PPCR 5,00 ≤ 15,22 9,96 9,96 10,66 
SFA 1,00 ≤ 1,73 1,73 1,19 1,15 
CCF 0,00 ≥ Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VfM assessment. Since this is a hypothetical case study, for the evaluation of 
the created model, the VfM assessment confines with the quantitative assessment61. 
Considering the above-prepared PSC and several cases of the SB models, Figure 
3.11 provides the results of VfM assessment depending on the length of period, 
detailed calculations of which, based on the developed model, are provided in 
Appendix 29. 
Figure 3.10 shows the results of VfM when the SB model is prepared on the 
same conditions also applied in the case of PSC. It allows stating that it is expedient 
to determine the length of period equal to 8 years, since from that year all 
                                                 
60 According to Pierce & Shoup (2013), for parking infrastructure up to 0.4 demand elasticity 
is expected depending on the changes of price. Regulation of price is the appropriate means 
for management of parking services’ demand. In this case, the decrease of price can 
encourage higher demand for infrastructure. However, since this analysis is more focused on 
testing of the developed model rather than detailed analysis of the case, this assumption was 
not considered. 
61 The assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure 
consists of both quantitative and qualitative assessments, results of which, as disclosed in 
Section 2.1.5., are combined by the MCA. A numerical example of qualitative assessment 
and MCA is presented in the same section. 
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requirements of stakeholders are satisfied and there is low risk that the private entity 
could get over profit. At that year VfM for the PPA when NFBs are included in the 
assessment is nearly 17,9m EUR expressed in present value. While VfM for the 
users, since the price level remains the same, is 1,7m EUR, which is determined due 
to the assumption that the PPP allows ensuring availability of infrastructure at least 
3 years earlier. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. VfM and financial viability assessment when the same assumptions are 
applied as in the case of PSC (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Figure 3.11 shows the results of VFM when the conditions determined in the 
RFP encourage competition entirely on the level of MARF. If the competition 
between the equity investors is strong, the PPA can expect to get revenues from the 
implementation of the PPP, which is equal to 40% of revenue above MARF. These 
revenues increase VfM for the PPA, which is equal to 19,5m EUR and it is 15,1m 
EUR higher in comparison with the case when the competition of MARF is not 
applied. VfM for users remains the same, since there are no changes related to the 
price level. 
Figure 3.12 shows the results of VFM when the conditions determined in the 
RFP encourage competition entirely on the price. Since the decrease of price level is 
applied in both the PSC and SB model, VfM to the PPA also decreases to 16m EUR; 
however, this increases VfM for the users. At the end of the 25-year period it is 17m 
EUR and consists of both benefits: decrease of price and earlier accessibility of 
services. Hence, the expected benefits got by the users from the implementation of 
the IP as PPP are higher than the benefits expected to get by the PPA. 
The comparison of this and earlier cases discloses possible interest conflict 
between the PPA and the users, since the PPA gets more benefit when the price level 
remains in the same level, contrary to the users, who prefer lower price level. 
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Figure 3.11. VfM and financial viability assessment when competition is focused on 
the level of MARF (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
 
 
Figure 3.12. VfM and financial viability assessment when competition is focused on 
the price (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Finally, Figure 3.13 shows the results of VfM when the PPA, in order to 
determine conditions which would protect public interests, sets the PPP monitoring 
tax at appropriate certain level. Since the monitoring tax is not the object of 
competition, the revenue received from this tax is a guaranteed source of income, 
which increases the VfM for the PPA, while VfM for the users remains in the same 
level, because the determined level of PPP monitoring tax does not leave 
possibilities for decreasing the price level. This case shows that the PPA, to be 
insured, may determine the competition conditions which can be not acceptable to 
the users. Accordingly, the rational decision would be to determine PPP monitoring 
tax at the level that also leave possibilities for price competition. However, the 
187 
proportions should be set depending on the particular IP’s market competition and 
the priorities of the PPA. 
 
 
Figure 3.13. VfM and financial viability assessment when PPP contract monitoring 
tax increases (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The above-made assumptions related to savings raised due to the private 
sector’s participation enables the PPA to analyze the possibilities to implement the 
IP as an institutional PPP, i.e. to determine the optimal ratio of private and public 
capital in the general capital structure. Considering Moszoro (2010, 2014) model, 
this assessment, based on Formulas 15–16, requires knowing capital cost of the 
public and private entities, the amount of capital investments needed to build 
infrastructure and the expected expense savings raised due to private participation, 
which, considering data used to build the PSC and SB models, are provided in the 
Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7. Variables used to determine the optimal share of public and private 
capital (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
  
NPV 
Wacc, % 
Opex Capex Savings 
PPA 7 483 168 19 739 529   3,6 
Private entity 7 357 398 17 398 474 2 466 825 5,1 
Considering the above-provided data, Figure 3.14 shows that the institutional 
PPP is not available in this case. Although private participation allows expecting 
cost savings of nearly 2.5m EUR, they are too little in comparison with the total 
investment costs and ratio of cost of private and public capital. A simulation of 
variables discloses that savings should be more than twice greater to give at least 
10% of total capital structure to the private entity. While a share of 50% or higher, 
which is preferable to the private entity, since they get the possibility to control the 
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IP as discussed in the section 2.1.4., requires savings of nearly 10m EUR, which is 
more than a half of total investment costs. 
If the assumptions would allow getting the institutional PPP, the analysis would 
have to be narrowed to the scope of the private investments, where capital structure 
optimization and financial viability analysis could be assessed as, according to the 
developed model, it is done in the case of the contractual PPP. 
 
Figure 3.14. Allocation of public and private capital (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
Summarizing the results of assessment, the developed model not only allows 
assessing the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure, 
but also allows the PPA to simulate various scenarios where maximum available 
VfM, depending on the goals and priorities of the PPA, can be achieved. It allows 
determining the particular length of period and other tender conditions, which allows 
the PPA to ensure the public interest related to the implementation of the IP as the 
PPP.  
Depending on the CFs of the IP, the developed model also enables to analyze 
other scenarios. Some of them can be discussed by analyzing the case of social-
based PPP model. 
3.2.2.2. Social-based PPP model 
To assess the possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure in the case of social-based PPP model, the same initial key input 
variables are used as have been used in the previous scenario, except the revenues 
are excluded from the analysis. Since it is the non-revenue generated IP, VAT of 
21% is added to the costs of capital investment and O&M. Moreover, since the PPA 
has to cover all costs, it is expedient to release the private entity from taxes such as 
real estate, land rent and PPP contract monitoring. All key input variables, different 
from the previous cases, are provided in the same Appendix 30. As in the previous 
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scenario the CFs of investments, depreciation, O&M, financing, etc., used in 
calculations are provided for the same period of 25 years in the Appendix 31. 
Stage 1. Preparatory conditions. Figure 3.15 shows the returns on 
investments depending on the length of the IP period, if the IP would be 
implemented in the conventional way. Since this is the non-revenue generating IP, 
all indicators are negative. The longer the period is, the larger the costs are. At the 
period of 25 years, NPV(I) is minus 33,5m EUR. 
 
Figure 3.15. Return on investments depending on the length of period (non-revenue 
generated IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Stage 2. Expediency criteria. Since this scenario is the same IP as analyzed in 
the previous section, it satisfied the same expediency criteria for PPP potential. Only 
6th criteria can be argued differently that the private entity would be compensated for 
the delivery of infrastructure and services by payments from the PPA, which will 
start to be paid, from the point when the services are available to the users. 
Stage 3. PSC. Considering CFs of the IP, total risk value, calculated by 
applying the empirically-based PDs and their parameters, is 12,6m EUR expressed 
in present value at the period of 25 years. In comparison with the economic-based 
PPP model, it is lower than 11,3m EUR, because, since services are free of charge, 
there is no revenue stream and risk that changes of revenue stream could affect the 
financial results of the IP. Therefore, despite different allocation of demand RFs, 
when the PPA bears more demand RFs in comparison with the economic-based PPP 
model, the values of transferred and retained risks are shared in a similar proportion 
of 84% and 16%, that is 10,5m and 2m EUR, respectively. The results of risk 
assessment and allocation are provided in Appendix 32. 
Since the private entity, as discussed in the beginning of this section, would be 
released from payment of tax of land rent, real estate and PPP monitoring tax, CN 
costs is equal to zero in this scenario. 
Figure 3.16 shows the net present values of FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr and risk 
values, detailed calculation of which, based on formulas 10–12 and considering the 
length of reference period, are provided in Appendix 33. It allows stating that the 
longer the period is, the larger FOPSmax is, because every additional year determines 
costs which have to be covered by the PPA. In the period of 25 years they are equal 
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to 46m EUR including VAT. Value of FOPSrtn remains stable (2m EUR) despite of 
the length of the period, because the PPA bears only a small part of construction 
task.  
 
Figure 3.16. FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr, value of risk depending on the length of a 
period (non-revenue generated IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Figure 3.17 shows the structure of PSC which has been calculated considering 
the above-provided elements. Since the costs related to VAT, as discussed in Section 
2.1.5., cannot be directly recovered as revenue stream by the PPA, the PSC of the 
PPA is higher by VAT, i.e. 6.3m EUR than it would be calculated to the public 
sector. Accordingly, value of 47.7m EUR expressed at present value is the threshold 
above which tenders with larger obligations to the PPA in a period of 25 years is 
considered as not giving any benefits in comparison with CP in the scope of 
quantitative assessment. A little bit more than 60% of this amount consists of base 
costs, while other costs include procurement and oversight costs, the above-
mentioned VAT costs, risk costs and NFBs costs. In this case, the NFBs is the 
element determining the difference between FOPSmax and PSC. Detailed calculations 
of PSC are provided in Appendix 34. 
 
Figure 3.17. The structure of PSC (non-revenue generating IP) (prepared by the 
author of this dissertation) 
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The SB model. The SB model has been developed on the same assumptions of 
CFs (including cost efficiency of the private entity), capital structure, NFBs and 
stakeholders’ requirements62 as have been used in the previous economic-based 
scenario. 
The only difference is that all costs of the private entity are covered by UPs 
from the PPA, which is the final financier of development of infrastructure and 
O&M. Considering the structure of private entity’s cost, 5 cost groups have been 
identified: equity and credit, administration, maintenance, services and taxes, which 
have to be covered from payments of the PPA. Since the total payment is a sum of 
purposive payments and at the same time the variable allowing the PPA to 
determine revenue stream to the private entity at the level that could satisfy 
requirements of all stakeholders, i.e. make the PPP financially viable, it is 
determined considering the coefficients, which are calculated according to the same 
structure of the expected private entity’s costs. The coefficients are provided in 
Table 3.8. It shows that a major part of total payments is used to cover costs of 
investment and financing, since the particularity of the IP is that it requires a 
significant amount of capital investments while the operation costs are relatively 
low. 
Table 3.8. Structure of payments to the private entity (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
Part of payment Coefficient 
P1 - Equity, P2 - Credit 11,4 
P3 - Administration 0,9 
P4 - Maintenance 1,3 
P5 - Services 1,7 
P6 – Municipality taxes 0,9 
Figure 3.18 shows the expected payments to the private entity expressed at 
present value. They start to be paid when the construction stage is finished and all 
infrastructure is accessible at full capacity to the users. They are growing due to 
costs, which increase every year, and inflation, which has to be included in the 
payments to make the SB model financially viable. At the first full year, the 
payment is equal to 2,9m EUR, while at the end of period it reaches the sum of 4,5m 
EUR. The continuous line in the figure shows the percentage difference between 
costs of the PPA, which would be experienced, if the IP were implemented as the 
PPP and in the way of CP. It allows stating that, on the one hand, the PPP makes the 
IP more affordable to the PPA, since it allows considerable initial capital 
investments exchange to constant payments, which have a lower direct impact on 
annual budget. However, on the other hand, the implementation of the IP as the PPP 
is more expensive, since it requires covering higher capital costs of the private 
entity. 
                                                 
62 The exception is SFA indicator, which, since it is not-revenue generating IP, is not 
relevant in this scenario. 
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If the determined annual payments are not financially affordable to the PPA, 
the possibilities of PPP to implement the IP under lower scope in respect of lower 
capacity or/and lower number of tasks included in the PPP have to be analyzed, 
which determines that the very assessment has to be repeated from the first phases of 
the developed model. 
 
Figure 3.18. Structure of expected payments to the private entity (non-revenue 
generating IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Since the above-presented annual payments are adjusted by the linear 
optimization method at the level which allows to satisfy the requirements of all 
stakeholders when the period of 25 years is considered, Table 3.9 provides 
indicators allowing the PPA to expect that the SB model will be financially viable 
and attractive in the market. 
Table 3.9. The results of satisfaction of stakeholders’ requirements in the period of 
25 years (non-revenues generating IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Indicator Requirement Eq. Result Evaluation 
IRRE 12,80% ≤ 12,9% Yes 
REPR 0,30 ≤ 0,3 Yes 
DSCR 1,30 ≤ 1,36 Yes 
LLCR 1,50 ≤ 4,57 Yes 
PPCR 5,00 ≤ 9,94 Yes 
CIi - COi 0,00 ≤ 
 
Yes 
VfM assessment. Considering the developed PSC and SB models, Figure 3.19 
shows the expected VfM for the PPA, the public sector in general and the users 
depending on the length of PPP period. It allows stating that the PPP allows 
expecting a more beneficial way of IP implementation than CP, since VfM is 
reached from all three perspectives. The PPA gets the benefits from the lower 
financial and socio-economic costs, while the users from the earlier accessibility of 
infrastructure and services. Accordingly, VfM for the PPA is 7,5m EUR, the public 
sector, for which VAT is not included in the assessment, 8,2m EUR and the PPA 
1,7m EUR, that is 16%, 20% and 16%, respectively. This is significantly more than 
the expected additional costs related to the procurement of PPP (150 000 EUR) and 
the accepted rate of 10%. Detailed calculations are provided in Appendix 35. 
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Figure 3.19. VfM and financial viability assessment (non-revenue generating IP) 
Summarizing the results of assessment, the developed model enables solving 
the practical issues related to the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure in the case of the social-based IP, by allowing 
developers to optimize conditions to the private sector for the cooperation in the 
PPP, which enables the financial viability of the IP, and to assess VfM to different 
stakeholders, which allows maximizing the expected benefit from the PPP, if this 
way of procurement is assessed as more beneficial than CP. 
3.2.3. Summary of verification of the model 
Since a hypothetical IP has been used, not all steps of the developed model 
were rational to be numerically tested for the assessment of its suitability to use in 
practice63; however, even in this scope of analysis, its real possibilities to deal with 
the relevant issues related to the assessment of possibilities provided by the PPP to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure have been clearly disclosed. The 
developed model practically enables to form the public sector’s rational to compare 
option against the expected model with the appropriate level of the private sector’s 
involvement, which also, according to the model, can be optimized in respect of cost 
structure, capital structure and financial viability, where the expected benefits for the 
PPA, the public sector in general and the users can be assessed and maximized. 
Moreover, the case study demonstrated the possibilities of the model to simulate 
various scenarios, where conflicts of interest between stakeholders can be analyzed 
and benefits depending on particular priorities and requirements can be maximized 
as well as the most appropriate combination of guarantees from the PPA can be 
foreseen. This allows stating that the methodological guidelines developed in this 
                                                 
63 In respect of methodology, stages 4 and 5 of the model are basically repeating of previous 
steps of stages 3, where the main difference is, that the last two stages work with actual data, 
which are available only in a case of actual procurement of the PPP. Since the research is 
focused on possibilities, i.e. ex-ante analysis of PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure, simulation of current stages would provide low added methodological value. 
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dissertation, practically combining various approaches of capital structure 
optimization, risk assessment and allocation, discounting, welfare maximization, etc. 
and providing new insights based on the performed researches allows having a 
flexible tool enabling to complexly solve the issues related to the assessment of 
PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure and to get 
concrete and measurable results. The application of this tool allows making 
reasonable decisions for implementation of the IP as the PPP, facilitating their 
communication to stakeholders, which allows assuming an increase of transparency 
regarding the decision-making, since their reasonableness can be easy examined. 
Accordingly, this dissertation, enriching the knowledge in the scientific fields of 
project finance and neoclassical economics, decreases a gap in literature on the 
issues related to the assessment of possibilities provided the PPP to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure. 
Regarding the very case study, the assessment of the model covers only those 
stages which are related to the ex-ante assessment, since the dissertation is focused 
on the assessment of possibilities of PPP to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure as the most problematic part of assessment rather than the assessment 
of actual bids. However, since the assessment of actual bids can be assessed by the 
same methods, as it is explained above, it does not require numerical analysis to 
assess the suitability of the model to be applied in practice. The actual VfM and 
reliability of ex-ante VfM assessment results can be assessed when the PPP is fully 
implemented and closed. Since PPPs usually continue several decades there are still 
no actual cases in Lithuania, based on which the appropriate assessment could be 
performed. Moreover, the PPP agreements and related documents usually are not for 
public use, that in turn also determined that, instead of an actual IP, a hypothetical IP 
has been in this case study. Since the dissertation does not seek to assess a particular 
IP, but to develop a model enabling to solve the issues of assessment of possibilities 
provided by the PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure, this does not 
decrease its scientific and practical value. Conversely, simulation of the developed 
model reveals it as being able to be successfully used as a practical tool allowing the 
developers to calculate the acceptable maximum obligation of the public sector in 
the PPP and to evaluate the value of the PPP in each particular case as well as can be 
used as an instrument allowing to determine the reasoned arguments in negotiation 
with entities of the private sector and, herewith, enables to make a reasoned decision 
for the most efficient way of IP implementation. Namely, the hypothetical case has 
given flexibility, which provided possibilities to simulate various scenarios, where 
the appropriate possibilities of the model to find the solutions could be 
demonstrated. The case study also confines to the quantitative assessment since the 
qualitative assessment and integration of both assessment results have been 
demonstrated in section 2.1.5.  
The case study was analyzed considering the taxation policy in Lithuania that 
has to be taken into account by evaluating the results of the research. However, in 
general this consideration had no significant effect on development of the model, 
since the costs determined due the appropriate taxation system are the inputs but not 
features of the model. Therefore, in respect of these aspects, the model could be 
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used in other countries without any significant adjustments. According to the model, 
the promoters are free to calculate the costs of IP considering relevant taxation 
policies in both the scenario of the public sector and the private sector, where NC 
also have to be assessed if relevant. 
The developed assumption model of calculating FDR in respect of developed 
formulas with the appropriate coefficients is more specifically designed to the 
member states of the EU. This has to be considered by applying the model outside of 
the EU, for which no prepared coefficients in the scope of this research are 
provided; it may also be relevant to revise the developed formulas to form rational 
assumptions for discounting.  
Since the results of the case study highly depend on the assumptions applied 
and, more specifically, on the assessment of risk, it is important to collect data about 
the expected and actual costs of IP implementation, based on which the parameters 
of the PDs could be adjusted, which could be a part of further regular researches. 
Moreover, since the created model enables to simulate various cases of collaboration 
between the public and private entities, beside its practical purpose, it can be also 
used for further researches related to the collaboration of the public and private 
sector in the context of project finance: determination of optimal structure of 
payment mechanism and government guarantees to the private entities participating 
in the PPP and determination of typical developed model’s parameters for groups of 
typical IPs. The first one is perspective for the determination of financial conditions 
encouraging right incentives from the private entities in PPPs as well as defending 
the interests of the PPA and the users. While the second one would allow 
standardizing these conditions, which, in turn, would facilitate the very assessment 
in various economic sectors. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. The analysis of theoretical premises of the public and private sectors’ 
collaboration in optimization of investments in public infrastructure allows 
making the following conclusions: 
• Market failures, the existence of natural monopolies, the presence of 
economies of scale in production and expectation for positive externalities 
are the main arguments against the provision of certain infrastructure and 
services being trusted to be delivered entirely by the private sector and, 
therefore, under the name of “public”, they remain with the responsibility 
of the government, which, performing the assigned function, makes 
appropriate interventions. 
• Since it is a task and responsibility of governments to maximize benefits 
for disposable resources to society, it, usually facing with budgetary 
constraints to satisfy all social-economic needs, is encouraged to create 
possibilities for the involvement of the private sector’s entities in provision 
of public infrastructure and services in cases they can provide the 
additional benefits in respect of quality and efficiency in comparison to 
those available to obtain from the conventional procurement. Accordingly, 
the more benefits can be expected to get from the private sector, the higher 
proportion of tasks of the operational level can be transferred to the private 
entities, herewith the more there are opportunities for the public sector to 
focus on its core functions: strategic planning, monitoring and regulation. 
Growing private participation in the public sector determines a changing 
role of governments and bodies on its behalf from the provider of public 
infrastructure and services to the strategic investor, for which the private 
sector, providing bigger choice of IP implementation ways, also provides 
more possibilities to maximize social-economic benefit to the society. 
• Involvement of the private sector in the provision of public infrastructure 
and services has been especially encouraged by the spread of neoliberal 
ideologies and the developed concept of NPM, which emphasized the 
importance of government’s role in the adoption of innovation, efficiency 
and rationality of the private entities in the public sector. Along with 
increasing private participation in the sectors earlier exceptionally 
considered as the domain of the government this also highlighted the 
importance of its strong role in overcoming specific issues explained by 
the agency and related theories. This requires creating economic, legal and 
institutional environment favorable for the public-private cooperation and 
allowing to ensure effective regulation of relation between the public and 
private sectors as well as to create practical tools enabling to achieve the 
contractual arrangements, emphasized by the balance of interests between 
the stakeholders and best able to achieve positive VfM for the public 
sector. 
• Optimization of investments in public infrastructure is mostly explained 
through the social-economic and financial aspects. In respect of the socio-
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economic aspects, it is mostly discussed in the context of economic 
performance and, more specifically, its productivity and efficiency, by 
emphasizing the importance of a well-developed and -maintained 
infrastructure in economic growth and increase of welfare. In respect of 
the financial aspects, it is focused on cost-efficiency including such 
aspects as the determination of optimal capital structure, minimization of 
life-cycle costs and optimal sharing/allocation of risks between the public 
and private parties. Both of them are critically important for VfM 
achievement, however, they are also both complicated in theory and 
practice.  
• Collaboration between the public and private sectors is feasible, only if a 
compromise between all stakeholders’ requirements is found. Accordingly, 
a shortage of public funds to satisfy the infrastructural needs, expectation 
of cost savings as well as specific expertise and experience, creativity and 
innovation from the private entities and possibility to transfer at least a part 
of risk are the main factors encouraging GAs to involve the private sector 
in the provision of public infrastructure and services. While the main 
motivators for the private entities to participate in a long-term partnership 
with the public sector are the possibility to get long-term and relatively 
steadier and less risky revenue that also allows expecting higher credit 
rating. 
• The conception of evaluation of the private sector’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure can be defined as a 
comparative assessment of all available options of investments’ 
implementation to find the optimal one to proceed forward, i.e. the 
financially viable and affordable for the public sector option providing the 
highest available ratio of benefits and costs (VfM) to the public sector. 
2. The analysis of PPP as the possibility to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure allows concluding the following statements: 
• Due to a complex of reasons, the concept of the PPP is not consensual; 
however the systemic analysis allowed defining it as the long-term 
contractual cooperation between the subjects of the public and private 
sectors, based on which the provision of public infrastructure and services 
is transferred to the private partner by rationally using each of the partners’ 
competences and optimally allocating resources, costs, risks and benefits; 
also, due to a transfer of the private sector’s knowledge, innovation and 
experience, creating possibilities for higher efficiency of these public 
infrastructure and services’ provision. Besides, it is characterized by the 
following features: involvement of public and private entities in a long-
term relationship, integration of multiple tasks in one contract, transferring 
of at least a part of risks to the private sector, private investments in 
infrastructure and provision of the private sector’s specific knowledge, 
skills and experience to the public sector. 
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• Increasing acknowledgment of the PPP encouraged the rise of a wide 
variety of forms determining it as being able to be flexibly applied in 
various cases depending on particular requirements from providing 
secondary services to integrated bundle of designing, building, maintaining 
and operating the infrastructure in many economic sectors. However, since 
the selection of the most appropriate form and scheme of PPP has to be 
based on results of VfM assessment, this is a complicated task, which 
requires the facilitating solutions, which literature is lacking to provide. 
• The advantages of PPP assert in a way which allows satisfying the same 
expectations that have been identified as the factors encouraging 
governments to collaborate with the private sector. The PPP can suggest the 
potential for cost-efficiency, higher quality and increased innovation in 
provision of public infrastructure and services. However, the possibilities to 
get them depend on a number of analyzed factors, which require 
appropriate competences from the PPAs to assess properly. Moreover, 
typically higher cost of capital, higher transaction costs and requirements 
for guarantees from the PPA and others are those disadvantages of the PPP 
which must be offset by the benefits to make the PPP valuable to be 
implemented. Therefore, the proper assessment of benefits and costs related 
to the implementation of IP as the PPP is critical to make a reasoned 
decision for the most efficient way of IP implementation. The very PPP 
should be considered as a well-founded decision to implement the IP in this 
way, by assessing all related advantages and disadvantages to it. 
• The PPP as a structure by its nature is complex and includes many aspects 
needed to be assessed to structure it so that it could provide higher VfM for 
the public sector that makes this process challenging and demanding. 
Nevertheless, literature lacks solutions which could suggest tools allowing 
to complexly solve the issues related to the structuring of the best available 
PPP option. 
3. The analysis of theoretical aspects of VfM assessment within the context of PPP 
allows making the following conclusions: 
• Although VfM assessment as a technique considered as the main decision-
supporting tool regarding whether to implement the IP as the PPP, its 
conception due to complexity remains highly discussed and, depending on 
the applied approaches, can be used differently along with the particular 
advantages and disadvantages that comes with this circumstance. On the 
one hand, the concept of VfM assessment is very flexible and can be 
adjusted depending on particular requirements. However, since the results 
of VfM assessment highly depend on the applied assumptions, they can be 
rather subjective and, therefore, are highly criticized. For greater 
objectivity and reliance of the results it is relevant to standardize the 
assessment tool, which, in turn, would reduce possibilities for 
manipulation, whereas the results could be easily examined. 
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• The main differences in methodological approaches related to quantitative 
VfM assessment reveal in the determination and use of FDR and the 
preconceived attitude towards the efficiency of the PPP. However, despite 
these differences, all analyzed approaches tend to apply ex-ante 
assumptions determining the artificial advantages for the PPP in respect of 
higher cost efficiency of the private sector. Nevertheless, this discloses the 
programmed expectations from the private sector, if the private entities 
want to be awarded with a PPP contract, rather than the higher cost 
efficiency of the private sector can be considered is a rule. 
• The complexity of the very PPP determines a huge variety of factors having 
impact on the success of PPP and results of VfM. They can be 
distinguished into five the main groups: technical, financial-economic, 
social, political-legal and management. Although scientific studies do not 
allow confirming that there are statistically significant differences in the 
importance between underlying factors in respect of different stakeholders, 
cost effectiveness, match of government’s strategic and long-term 
objectives of the PPP, possibilities of an effective control mechanism over 
the private consortium are among those factors which are considered as the 
most important for the public sector. The entities of the private sector 
emphasize the factors related to financial interest of IP to private sector, 
bankability of IP, and long-term demand. While acceptability of toll/tariff 
level, understanding and support from the community, stable and reliable 
delivery of services are among those factors which are distinguished as the 
most important in respect of society. Considering both difficulties in 
compromising the interests of different stakeholders and the above-
mentioned complexity of the PPP, the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure and services at the current 
level of researches remains a complicated task and requires significant 
scientific impulse. 
4. Considering the results of structuring the methodological approaches of 
assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure, 
the following summarized statements can be provided: 
• The assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure primarily requires preparing the public IP with the option of 
the highest socio-economic value. Further assessment for the PPP is mostly 
focused on this option’s cost optimization, therefore the assessment of the 
financial aspects plays one of the most important roles in this process as 
well as it is the most discussed. The determination of FDR and assessment 
of risk is the center of these discussions; however, they are low-productive 
in methodological tools. Therefore, the methodologies for calculation of 
FDR and assessment of risk in public IPs have been developed. The first 
one suggests two approaches of determination of FDR: based on 
government’s long-term borrowing rate and the alternative cost of private 
capital. Although both have equal arguments to be applied in practice, if 
government seeks to implement NPM methods and increase the 
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involvement of the private sector in the provision of public infrastructure 
and services, then there are more arguments to apply FDR equal to 
alternative cost of private capital rather than the approach based on long-
term borrowing. By developing the second one, it was found that 
loglogistic (3P) with the determined parameters for the particular 
investment groups was determined as the most suitable PD to assess the 
Risk in the public IPs. 
• Criteria such as requirement to invest in infrastructure, long-term demand 
of infrastructure and services, complexity of transferred services, 
possibility to measure the out of services, possibility of sharing and 
allocation of risk, clear revenue stream to the private entity, interest of the 
private entities with the IP were distinguished as enabling to assess the 
expediency of IPs to be fully analyzed for its possibilities to be 
implemented as the PPP and to justify usually higher transaction costs of 
this assessment. 
• To be rational to compare against the private bids, the PSC needs to include 
a variety of cost elements covering both financial and socio-economic 
costs. Depending on the perspective, the PPA or the public sector, in 
general, the PSC is calculated, it may differ in respect of taxes, since not all 
costs related to tax expenditure directly come as revenue stream to the 
PPA. Therefore, PSC’s cost as a benchmark can be higher in the case of the 
PPA than in the case of the public sector. Nevertheless, the structuring of 
PSC not only assists in analyzing VfM, but also promotes the 
understanding of importance of whole life-cycle cost assessment to make 
the reasoned decision for the most efficient ways of IP implementation. 
• The structuring of the SB model reflects the best efforts of the PPA to 
evaluate the expected life-cycle cost of IP implementation for the PPA or 
the public sector in general, if it were implemented with the determined 
level of the private sector’s involvement. For rational comparison against 
the PSC, it requires to be financially viable and affordable as well as to be 
characterized by efficient sharing/allocation of risk, optimal capital 
structure and efficient payment mechanism. 
• VfM assessment may consist of both qualitative and quantitative 
assessment, the results of which are combined by using MCA framework. 
The larger uncertainty with the results of quantitative assessment is, the 
more important qualitative assessment becomes. This discloses the 
technique of VfM assessment being able to be flexible depending on 
requirements. However, the quantitative assessment remains a fundamental 
part of assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public 
infrastructure. Considering the features of the PSC model and the SB 
model, the developed methodology of VfM assessment mostly focuses on 
the comparison of financial impact of estimated risk-adjusted cost elements 
to the PPA or the public sector. However, it also allows assessing VfM for 
the users who may assert in the form of decrease of price level or/and 
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additional external socio-economic benefits due to IP implementation as 
the PPP.  
• According to the theoretical aspects of assessment of PPP’s possibilities to 
optimize investments in public infrastructure, a complex model enabling to 
perform this assessment was developed, which consists of five main stages: 
1) preparation of the initial IP; 2) selection of IP for PPP; 3) PPP feasibility 
analysis; 4) VfM assessment of actual bids, and; 5) VfM monitoring. The 
created model reflects the integrated complex approach to assessment of 
PPP’s possibilities to optimize investments in public infrastructure and 
characterizes the actions (process) of this assessment, by including the 
structuring of both rational to compare the PSC model and the optimal PPP 
model as well as their rational comparison, where VfM assessment could 
be evaluated. 
5. The results of the empirical verification of the developed model allow making 
the following conclusions: 
• Depending on the applied approach, the FDR may significantly differ 
which, in turn, affects the results of VfM assessment. Therefore, it is 
relevant to evaluate whether the application of different FDRs determines 
a different outcome regarding the choice of the optimal way to implement 
the IP. Accordingly, if the FDR of appropriate level becomes the critical 
factor determining whether to go into the PPP, the weights of qualitative 
assessment’s results have to be increased by making decision for the 
optimal way of investment implementation. 
• In the public IPs of Lithuania, the planned capital costs are exceeded on 
average by a quarter, which discloses a certain tendency of cost overrun 
risk. The results differ between investment groups, but only the differences 
in risk estimates between investments into construction and equipment can 
be confirmed as statistically significant, which allows clearly stating that 
cost overrun risk related to investments into construction is significantly 
higher than into equipment. Meanwhile, a comparative analysis of 
empirically-grounded REs with the theoretical ones revealed the cost 
overrun risk being on average overestimated by a quarter in Lithuania. 
• To verify the suitability of the created model to solve the particular issues 
arisen in this dissertation, the assessment of PPP’s possibilities to optimize 
investments in public infrastructure was performed in the case study. The 
results of verification allow persuading the suitability of the created model 
to assess the possibilities provided the PPP to optimize investments in 
public infrastructure and to get reliable results in every step of the 
assessment. The created model enables to structure the best public sector 
option which is rational to compare against the private bids, to determine 
maximum allowed obligations of the PPA in the PPP, to structure the 
optimized IP’s option with the appropriate level of the private sector’s 
involvement, to assess its affordability to the PPA as well as VfM of IP‘s 
implementation as the PPP. 
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• Verification of the created model was based on a hypothetical case study, 
since the dissertation does not seek to assess a particular IP, but develop a 
model enabling to solve the issues of the assessment of possibilities 
provided by the PPP to optimize investments in public infrastructure. 
Accordingly, the hypothetical case study enabled to simulate various 
scenarios, where the possibilities of the model to solve a variety of 
practical issues could be examined. 
• Two further research directions in field of assessment of PPP possibilities 
to optimize investments in public infrastructure are recommended: 
formation of optimal model of payment mechanism and government 
guarantees to the private entities participating in the PPP, and 
determination of standardized parameters of the created model’s elements 
for the typical IPs.  
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Appendix 1 
Key aspects in definitions of PPP (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
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(Ashuri et al., 2012) “A contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or 
local) and the private sector entity”. 
 1          
(Carbonara et al., 2014) “the agreements where public sector bodies enter into long-term 
contractual agreements with private sector entities for the construction or management of 
public sector infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the provision of services 
by the private sector entity to the community on behalf of a public sector entity”. 
1 1  1 1       
(Gordon et al., 2013) “A contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or 
local) and a private sector entity”. 
 1     1     
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002) “The agreements where public sector bodies enter into long-term 
contractual agreements with private sector entities for the construction or management of 
pubic sector infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the provision of services 
(using infrastructure facilities) by the private sector entity to the community on behalf of a 
public sector entity”. 
1 1  1 1  1     
(Gudelis & Rozenbergaitė, 2004) “A collaboration of the public and private sectors, of which 
essence is to provide services traditionally attributed to competence of the public sector and 
develop infrastructure needed for their delivery”. 
 1  1 1       
(Liu et al., 2015) “The relationships formed between private sector and public bodies often 
with the aim of introducing private sector resources and/or expertise in order to provide and 
deliver public sector assets and services”. 
   1 1   1 1   
(Molen et al., 2010) “A risk-sharing relationship based upon an greed aspiration between the 
public and private (including voluntary) sectors to bring about a desired public policy 
outcome”. “An innovation-based relationship, that involves, at least partly, a significant effort 
in research and development’. “Risk-sharing and innovation-based relationship between 
public and private actors to bring a desired public policy and involving a significant effort in 
     1    1  
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research and development”. 
(Mu et al., 2011) “Cooperative institutional arrangements between the public and private 
sectors”. 
 1          
(Poulton & Macartney, 2012) “Cooperation of some sort of durability between public and 
private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs, and 
resources which are connected with these products” 
 1  1 1 1  1    
(Roehrich et al., 2014) “A long-term contract between a private party and a government 
agency, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant 
risk and management responsibility”. 
1 1  1 1 1      
(Roll & Verbeke, 1998) “A tool for financial and administrative cooperation between 
Member States’ governments or the EU and private investors”. 
  1     1    
(Rudžianskaitė–Kvaraciejienė et al., 2015) “A collaboration between public and private 
sectors based on a long term agreement which aims to provide services traditionally assigned 
to the competence of the public sector and to maintain the infrastructure necessary for the 
development of those services”. 
1 1 1 1 1  1     
(Sambrani, 2014) “An agreement between the government and private sector for the purpose 
of provisioning of public services or infrastructure”. 
 1   1 1      
(Shaoul et al., 2012) “A long-term relationship between a public sector procurer and multiple 
private sector companies exists to design and construct infrastructure, maintain it and provide 
some related services”. 
1   1 1       
(Sharma, 2007) “An agreement between government and businesses or non-government 
organizations (NGOs) for the provision of services by sharing of risks and rewards of the 
venture”. 
 1   1 1      
(Skietrys & Raipa, 2009) “Intermediate normal procurement option through the public 
authorities and the full privatization”. 
          1 
(Tamosiunas & Zilakauskyte, 2010) “An agreement between public and private sectors in 
developing public infrastructure, in meeting the vital needs of the community or in providing 
other related services”. 
 1  1 1       
(Urbonavicius, 2010) “One of the procurement form, in which the public and private sectors 
cooperate with each other in search of the most appropriate form”. 
  1        1 
(Felix; Villalba-Romero & Liyanage, 2016) “An agreement between a government and one or 
more private partners (which may include the operators and the financiers) by which the 
private partners provide the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of 
the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners and where the 
effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners”. 
 1   1 1      
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(Xueqing Zhang, 2011) “A contractual relationships governing a long-term public sector 
acquisition and private sector provision of public works and services”. 
1 1  1 1       
(Xu et al., 2012) “A contractual business relationship between government and private 
entities”. 
 1 1         
(Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014) “A long-term contractual relationship between a public body 
and a private partner (or a consortium of private firms) for the construction and operation of 
infrastructure”. “A cooperative venture between the public and private sectors built on the 
expertise of each partner that best meets clearly defined goals through the appropriate 
allocation of resources, risks and rewards”. “Reciprocal obligations and mutual 
accountability, voluntary or contractual relationships, the sharing of investment and 
reputational risks, and joint responsibility for design and execution” 
1 1 1 1  1      
(Wojewnik-Filipkowska & Trojanowski, 2013) “Various options of cooperation between 
public and private entities”. 
  1         
(European Commission Directorate General Regional Policy, 2003) “A partnership between 
the public sector and the private sector for delivering a project or a service traditionally 
provided by the public sector. PPPs recognize, that both parties have certain advantages 
relative to the other in the performance of specific tasks. By allowing each sector to do what 
it does best, public services and infrastructure can be provided in the most economically 
efficient manner” 
  1 1 1    1   
(LR Ministry of Finance, 2014) “An agreement’s form of the public and private sectors, 
which requires financial, technological, experience and other investments from the private 
partner, in which management of the main risks is transferred to the private sector, while the 
public sector pays for the private one for delivery of services traditionally provided by the 
public sector”. 
 1    1  1 1 1  
(LR Profit tax law, n.d.) “A collaboration ways of the state and local government and the 
private entity established in law, in which institutions of government or municipality transfer 
the functions assigned them to the private party, whereas the private subject invests in this 
activity and the infrastructure needed for its performance in return for a statutory 
compensation”. 
  1  1 1  1    
 
Appendix 2 
List of schemes of collaboration between the public and private entities 
(prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
 
Build-develop-operate (BDO) 
Build-lease-operate-transfer (BLOT) 
Build-operate-training-transfer (BOTT) 
Build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
Build-operate–transfer (BOT) 
Build-own-operate (BOO) 
Build-own-operate-shell (BOOS) 
Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) 
Build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) 
Build-rent-own-transfer (BROT) 
Build-transfer (BT) 
Build-transfer-operate (BTO) 
Buy-build-operate (BBO) 
Design-build-finance-maintain- operate (DBFMO) 
Design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) 
Design-build-finance-transfer (DBFT) 
Design-build-maintain (DBM) 
Design-build-maintain-transfer (DBMT) 
Design-build-operate (DBO) 
Design-build-operate-finance (DBOF) 
Design-build-operate-transfer (DBOT) 
Design-build-transfer (DBT) 
Design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF) 
Enhanced-use-leasing (EUL) 
Lease/Purchase (L) 
Lease-build-operate (LBO) 
Lease-develop-operate (LDO) 
Lease-upgrade-operate-transfer (LUOT) 
Maintain-manage (MM) 
Operate-maintain (OM) 
Rehabilitate-operate-manage (ROM) 
Rehabilitate-operate-transfer (ROT) 
Transfer-operate-transfer (TOT) 
 
Since ownership and status (new build or existing) of infrastructure are one of 
the most important aspects related to various arrangements of PPP, it is able to 
distinguish 3 groups of PPP schemes, respectively (Table). 
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Table. Groups of PPP schemes (prepared according to Hemming, (2006)) 
Group Schemes Definition 
1 Build-own-operate (BOO) 
Build-develop-operate (BDO) 
Design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF) 
The private sector designs, builds, owns, 
develops, operates, and manages an asset with 
no obligation to transfer ownership to the 
government. These are variants of design-
build-finance-operate (DBFO) schemes. 
2 Buy-build-operate (BBO) 
Lease-develop-operate (LDO) 
The private sector buys or leases an existing 
asset from the government; renovates, 
modernizes, and/or expands it; and then 
operates the asset, again with no obligation to 
transfer ownership back to the government. 
3 Build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) 
Build-rent-own-transfer (BROT) 
Build-lease-operate-transfer (BLOT) 
Build-transfer-operate (BTO) 
The private sector designs and builds an asset, 
operates it, and then transfers it to the 
government when the operating contract ends, 
or at some other prespecified time. The private 
sector partner may subsequently rent or lease 
the asset from the government. 
The first group includes schemes based on which the private entity on its own 
coherently performs all activities and remains the owner of infrastructure over the 
entire life cycle of IPs and beyond. The second group consists of similar schemes as 
in the previous case, however, the private entity acquires the existing infrastructure, 
which the private entity usually has to rehabilitate, upgrade or modernize it. The 
third includes the schemes, in which at the end of collaboration period or after 
completion of investment period property rights of build infrastructure is transferred 
to the public entity. For the transferred assets, the private entity is remunerated by its 
residual value, usually for less than its true residual value (and often at zero or a 
small, nominal cost). Considering requirements of the public sector to keep 
ownership of asset, the schemes of the last group are the most prevailing in practice. 
Appendix 3 
Public and private provision of infrastructure and services (adopting from de Jong et al. (2010)) 
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Appendix 4 
Differences of quantitative VfM assessment methodologies (prepared according to (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011; 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2008; EPEC, 2015b; FWHA, 2012; HM Treasury, 2006; Infrastructure Ontario, 2015) 
Country Costs identification Risk reflecting PV calculation Reasons for differences 
UK The CF of both PPP and CP 
options are adjusted based on 
expected optimism bias. 
The CF of both PPP and CP 
options are adjusted based on risk 
adjusted expected values. 
DR is standardized for all public 
IP appraisals. It is expressed in 
real  
terms, and is adjusted to a 
nominal rate by adding a 
prescribed inflation assumption. It 
is fixed and, unlike actual cost of 
financing approach equals the 
STPR. 
1. The impact of optimism bias 
and risk adjusted CFs. 
2. Difference between the cost of 
private capital and the public DR. 
FR Typically, cost and revenue 
estimations for the PPP option 
and the CP option are not 
identical, based on the notion that 
the private partner is likely to 
generate life cycle cost 
optimizations 
Both the volatility of CFs and 
events with a negative impact 
such as higher expected 
costs/delays are captured by a 
correction to the CFs. 
The Monte Carlo Simulation 
technique is used to modify the 
original ‘non-risk adjusted’ CFs 
to risk-corrected values. 
DR is equal to borrowing rate of 
the public sector entity, since 
assessment focuses on the 
financial assessment from a 
microeconomic perspective, i.e. 
from the procuring authority 
financing level. 
 
1. Different assumptions for the 
capex and opex due to the 
assumed efficiency of the PPP 
partner; 
2. Different assumptions in the 
risk valuation through CFs for the 
CP option and PPP options. 
3. Difference between the cost of 
private finance and the public 
DR. 
DE Typically, not cost estimations for 
the PPP and CP options are not 
identical, based on the notion that 
the private partner is likely to 
generate life cycle cost 
optimizations 
Risk calculation between the CP 
option and the PPP option (except 
in case of specifically identified 
differences). The adjustment for 
risk is through the CFs 
DR equal to the costs of loan of 
which maturity is equivalent to 
PPP project loan in the market. 
1. Different assumptions for the 
capex and opex due to the 
assumed efficiency of the PPP 
partner; 
2. Difference in DRs of the PPP 
partner and the PPA 
NL Cost and revenue estimations for 
the PPP option and the CP option 
are not identical. Efficiency factor 
is applied to capital and 
Risk adjustments are through CFs 
and for the CP and PPP options 
are identical. 
DR equals to market based 
government borrowing rate 
including risk premium. 
1. Assumptions about differences 
in operational cashflows. 
2. In the procurement phase, 
small differences may occur 
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operational expenditures of the 
PPP partner. 
 
between the market based 
discount rate and the actual 
private cost of capital 
BE   DR equals market based 
government borrowing rate 
including risk premium. 
 
CAN   DR is equal to the   approximate 
costs of average life loan  
 
AUS Typically, CFs estimations for the 
PPP option and the CP option are 
not identical. The private bids 
may incorporate additional 
innovations which can make it 
cheaper or more expensive for 
government to deliver 
infrastructure and services. 
Risk adjustment are preferable 
through CFs and for the CP and 
PPP options, and it is identical. 
DR equals risk-free rate plus 
systemic risk premium. The more 
Systematic Risk transferred to the 
private sector, the higher the DR 
should be to evaluate that option. 
 
1. Assumptions about differences 
in operational CFs. 
2. Difference between the cost of 
private capital and the DR of the 
CP option. 
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Appendix 5 
Comparison of CSFs for PPP amongst the three stakeholders (according to S. T. Ng et al., (2012)) 
Cod
e CSFs 
All 
respondents Public sector Private sector Community 
    Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank 
S4 Level of toll/tariff is acceptable 5,78 1 6,02 3 5,4 7 6,13 1 
T4 Availability of experienced, strong and reliable private consortium 5,72 2 5,88 6 5,78 2 5,51 8 
S1 There is a long-term demand of the products/service in the community 5,72 3 5,83 8 5,43 4 5,89 4 
O9 Matching government's strategic and long-term objectives 5,71 4 6,1 2 5,53 5 5,64 7 
S3 Delivery of services is stable and reliable 5,71 5 6 4 5,35 9 5,98 3 
F4 IP is of financial interest to private sector 5,67 6 5,75 9 5,93 1 5,23 16 
F1 IP is more cost effective than traditional forms of IP delivery 5,66 7 6,17 1 5,21 16 5,87 6 
S2 The community is understanding and supportive 5,62 8 5,85 7 5,23 15 6 2 
O8 Possibility of an effective control mechanism over the private consortium 5,56 9 5,92 5 5,14 19 5,89 4 
F6 IP is bankable and profitability of the IP is sufficient to attract investors and lenders 5,47 10 5,21 25 5,68 3 5,4 10 
F2 IP can be substantially self-funded or on a non-recourse basis 5,35 11 5,56 12 5,15 18 5,47 9 
P5 There is a favorable legal framework (mature, reasonable and predictable) 5,34 12 5,29 21 5,35 9 5,38 11 
O5 Flexible to decide appropriate risk allocation 5,31 13 5,56 12 5,14 19 5,36 12 
T2 Possibility of innovative solutions (e.g. leading to time/cost savings 5,3 14 5,35 16 5,31 12 5,23 16 
F8 Existence of a sound governmental economic policy 5,3 15 5,23 24 5,43 6 5,19 18 
T5 Service quality can be easily defined and objectively measured 5,27 16 5,69 10 5,21 16 4,98 24 
P4 The project is compatible with current statutory and institutional arrangements 5,2 17 5,29 21 5,09 23 5,28 14 
P3 There is political support for the IP 5,18 18 5,1 27 5,36 8 4,98 24 
F7 Economic environment is stable and favorable 5,14 19 4,94 33 5,25 14 5,15 20 
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S6 IP is environmentally sustainable 5,13 20 5,33 18 4,89 26 5,3 13 
T3 Availability of Government experience in packaging similar PPP IPs 5,13 21 5,08 28 5,13 21 5,17 19 
O4 Supportiveness and commitment of staff to the IP 5,1 22 5,6 11 4,88 27 4,98 24 
O7 Authority can be shared between the public and private sectors 5,1 23 5 30 5,06 24 5,25 15 
P2 Political environment is stable 5,1 24 4,96 31 5,3 13 4,92 28 
F3 
IP value is sufficiently large to avoid procurement disproportionate procurement 
costs 5,09 25 5,31 29 5,13 21 4,82 30 
T6 Contract is flexible enough for frequent change in output specification 5,06 26 5,48 14 4,81 28 5,06 22 
O6 Support from the government (e.g. guarantee or loans) is available 5,06 27 4,96 31 5,33 11 4,74 31 
T1 IP size is technically manageable by a single consortium 5 28 5,17 26 4,91 25 4,98 24 
O1 Fairness of new conditions to employees 4,98 29 5,42 15 4,71 32 5 23 
S5 IP can create more job opportunities 4,95 30 5,29 21 4,76 30 4,92 28 
P1 IP is not politically sensitive 4,93 31 5,02 29 4,75 31 5,13 21 
O3 Existence of a resolution for any civil service staff redundancy 4,81 32 5,35 16 4,6 34 4,62 33 
O2 Possibility of significant redundancy 4,76 33 5,31 19 4,46 35 4,7 32 
F5 IP can attract foreign capital 4,65 34 4,54 35 4,8 29 4,53 34 
T7 IP is not susceptible to fast-laced change (e.g. technological change 4,52 35 4,56 34 4,65 33 4,3 36 
F9 Competition from other IPs is limited 4,31 36 4,04 36 4,46 35 4,34 35 
Note: Items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 - strongly disagree and 7 - strongly agree 
 
 
Appendix 6 
Cost of equity estimation models (according to Gözen (2013)) 
Table 1. CAPMs 
Models Description 
A - Models standard for the international setting  
The Global
a 
CAPM  Re
=R
fw
+β
w
(R
mw
-R
fw
)  
B - Models including additional risk premium, in general for country risk  
Depending on the country where the investment is made, an additional risk premium (R
a
) is 
added to the cost of equity estimated by CAPM (Sabal, 2004: 155-166).  
Country risk premium (R
c
) is added to the CAPM formula instead of usually the U.S. market 
risk premium of (R
mu
-R
fu
) (Sabal, 2004: 155-166). Then the formula could be written as 
R
e
=R
fu
+β
u
R
c 
 
Country risk premium is added usually to U.S. market risk premium (The Beta Approach) 
(R
mu
-R
fu
+R
c
) (Damodaran, 2003a: 63-76, 2009b, 2010).  
Country risk premium is added to the cost of equity estimated by CAPM usually for a U.S. 
asset, R
e
=R
fu
+β
u
(R
mu
-R
fu
)+R
c 
(The Bludgeon Approach).  
The same calculation is done by multiplying R
c 
with a parameter (namely Lambda) to convert 
the calculation to the company level (The Lambda Approach).  
For different ways of calculating country risk premium and other details, see Damodaran 
(2003a: 63-76, 2003b, 2009b, 2010).  
Sovereign spread is added instead of the risk-free rate and formulated as R
e
=R
s
+β
w
(R
mw
-R
fw
) 
(The Goldman Sovereign Spread Model) (Harvey, 2005).  
For the calculation of beta and market risk premium, local data are used. Instead of the local 
risk-free rate, global risk-free rate is used and country risk premium is added to it. R
e
=R
fw
+ 
R
c
+β
l
(R
ml
-R
fl
) (The Local CAPM) (Pereiro, 2006: 160-183).  
The cost of equity is calculated by adding the country long-term debt rate and the global 
market risk premium (The U.S. market is assumed to represent the global market), or by 
adding the cost of equity for a U.S. utility and the country risk premium (Voll et al., 1998). 
The latter is identical to the Bludgeon Approach.  
C - Models including country/sovereign risk premiums with adjusted/modified risk 
factors  
The Goldman Sachs Model  R
e
=R
fu
+R
c
+β
l
(R
mu
-R
fu
)(1-ρ
sb
)(σ
c
/σ
u
) where 0 
< ρ
sb 
< 1  
The Goldman Sovereign Spread Volatility 
Ratio Model  
R
e
=R
s
+(σ
c
/σ
u
)(R
mw
-R
fw
)  
The Godfrey and Espinosa Model  R
e
=R
fu
+R
c
+0.60(σ
c
/σ
u
)(R
mu
-R
fu
)  
The Adjusted Hybrid CAPM  R
e
=R
fw
+R
c
+{β
c
[β
gu
(R
mw
-R
fw
)]}(1-R
2
)  
The Lessard Model  R
e
=R
fu
+R
c
+(β
p
β
c
)(R
mu
-R
fu
)  
The Salomon Smith Barney Model  R
e
=R
fw
+{(γ
1
+γ
2
+γ
3
)/30)}R
c
+β
p
(R
mw
-R
fw
) 
where 0 ≤ γ
n 
≤ 10  
D - Models with adjusted/modified beta  
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The Adjusted Local CAPM  R
e
=R
fw
+β
l
(R
ml
-R
fl
)(1-R
i
2
)  
The Modified International CAPM  R
e
=R
fu
+β
wp
(R
mw
-R
fw
), Either world or the 
U.S. market risk premium is used (Sabal, 
2004).  
E - Models with risk factors other than beta  
Estrada's Downside Risk Model  R
e
=R
fu
+RM(R
mw
-R
fw
)  
Arbitrage Pricing Theory  R
e
=R
f
+β
l
f
1
+β
2
f
2
+...+β
n
f
n 
 
F - Other models  
The Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta Model  R
e
=ε
0
+ε
1
lnCR, where ε
0 
and ε
1 
are regression 
parameters. Country credit rating is available 
twice a year and the return is semi-annual.  
The Implied Cost of Capital Model  
  
This model aims at finding R
e 
from this 
equation in the international market.  
The Bekaert and Harvey Model  R
e
=R
fl
+(1-λ)β
l
(R
ml
-R
fl
)+λβ
w
(R
mw
-R
fw
)  
The Ibbotson Bayesian Model  It is a hybrid of the global CAPM.  
 
Table 2. Nomenclature for Table 1 
Parameter Definition  
Re The cost of equity  
Rf , Rfl , Rfu , Rfw , Rfb , Rs 
The risk-free rate, the local risk-free rate, the U.S. risk-free rate, the global 
risk-free rate, the stripped 
 
yield of a Brady bond, and the sovereign spread 
respectively  
Rml , Rmu , Rmw 
The local market return, the U.S. market return, and the global market return 
respectively 
βl The beta of the local company computed against the local market index 
βu The beta of the U.S. company computed against the U.S. market index 
βw The beta of the local company computed against the global market index 
Rc The country risk premium  
Ra 
Additional risk premium depending on the country where the investment is 
made. 
βp 
The beta of the relevant industry with respect to the world market. This 
parameter refers to the industry 
 
beta in the SalomonSmithBarney Model. On the other hand, it refers to the 
beta of a U.S. based 
 project, which is a proxy for a foreign project in the Lessard Model. 
βc 
The beta of the relevant country with respect to the world/U.S. market. This 
refers to the relative 
 
sensitivity of the returns of the local stock market to the U.S. market returns in 
the Lessard model. It 
 
refers to the slope of the regression between the local equity market index and 
the global market index 
 in the Adjusted Hybrid Model.  
βcr The beta of the relevant country with respect to the region concerned. 
βgu 
The average unlevered beta of comparable companies listed in the global 
market. It requires releveling 
 with the target leverage.  
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βn The sensitivity to factor n.  
Βwp The weighted beta of projects in different locations (Sabal, 2004: 155-166). 
ρsb The correlation between the stock and bond markets of the country 
σc, , σce , σcd 
The standard deviation of returns in the local 
equity market  
σu 
The standard deviation of returns in the U.S. 
equity market  
γ1 
A firm related score indicating access to capital 
markets, 0 ≤ γ 
1 ≤ 10, and a score of 0 indicates 
the 
 best access.  
γ2 
The susceptibility of the industry to political 
intervention, 0 ≤ γ 
2 ≤ 10, a score of 0 indicates the 
least 
 susceptibility.  
γ3 
The portion of the firm’s total assets at the local level, 0 ≤ 
γ 3 
≤ 10, a score of 0 indicates 
that the 
 
investment at the local level constitutes only a 
small portion.  
CR Country credit rating of the relevant country  
 
Table 3. The models: their appearances in the literature and short descriptions 
Models 
Models Date Short description of the models 
The Standard CAPM
a 
(Sharpe, 
1964: 425-442; Lintner, 1965: 
13-37; Black, 1972: 444-455)  
1964  The local parameters are used in the CAPM 
formula. Due to its methodology, there is no 
need to add a country risk premium.  
The Arbitrage Pricing Model 
(Ross, 1976: 341-360)  
1976  The model foresees more than one risk factor 
compared with the single beta of CAPM, but 
there is no answer for the type and number of 
possible risk factors.  
The Goldman Sovereign Spread 
Model (Mariscal and Lee, 1993; 
Harvey, 2005)  
1993  It recommends the addition of a sovereign 
spread instead of the risk-free rate.  
The Goldman Sovereign Spread 
Volatility Ratio Model (Harvey, 
2005)  
1994  Sovereign spread is added instead of the risk-
free rate and the relative volatility of markets 
are multiplied by the market risk premium. 
Alternatively, Harvey (2005) proposes to 
calculate the volatility by the same 
methodology of the Implied Sovereign Spread 
Model.  
The Erb-Harvey-Viskanta 
Model (Erb et al., 1995, 1996: 
46-58)  
1995  The cost of equity is associated with country 
credit rating.  
The Bekaert and Harvey Model 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 1995: 
773-816)  
1995  CAPM is reformulated with time-varying 
market integration. It is a dynamic model and 
combines both local and global CAPMs in a 
single formula.  
The Implied Sovereign Spread 
Model proposed by Erb, 
Harvey, and Viskanta (Erb et 
al., 1996: 46-58; Harvey, 2005)  
1996  Sovereign spread is calculated by running a 
regression of observed sovereign spreads on 
country risk ratings. This is advised to 
calculate the sovereign spread as an 
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alternative to the Goldman Sovereign Spread 
Model.  
The Lessard Model (Lessard, 
1996: 52-63; Pereiro, 2006: 
160-183)  
1996  Country risk premium is added to the CAPM 
and modified betas (country beta and 
industrial beta) are used.  
Godfrey and Espinosa Model 
(Godfrey and Espinosa, 1996: 
80-89; Pereiro, 2006: 160-183)  
1996  Country risk premium is added to the CAPM 
and relative volatility of the market returns of 
the local and U.S. markets are used instead of 
beta.  
The CSFB Model (Harvey, 
2005)  
1997  A relatively complex beta adjustment is used.  
The Global CAPM (O'Brien, 
1999: 73-79; Stulz, 1999: 8-25; 
Schramm and Wang, 1999: 63-
72)  
1999  The global parameters are used instead of 
local parameters. Due to its methodology, 
there is no need to include a country risk 
premium.  
The Goldman Sachs Model 
(Mariscal and Hargis, 1999; 
Pereiro, 2006: 160-183)  
1999  Country risk premium is added to the CAPM 
and instead of beta as a risk factor; the relative 
volatility of the market returns of the local and 
U.S. markets and the correlation of equity and 
debt markets of the local country are used.  
The Ibbotson Bayesian Model 
(Harvey, 2005)  
1999  A hybrid of the global CAPM.  
The Beta Approach, the 
Lambda Approach, and the 
Bludgeon Approach 
(Damodaran, 2003a: 63-76; 
2003b, 2009a, 2009b)  
1999  Country risk premium is added to a) the base 
premium for mature equity market, b) U.S. 
market risk premium, or c) CAPM based cost 
of equity formula for a U.S. company by 
different measures of country risk.  
Estrada’s Downside Risk 
Model (Estrada, 2000: 72-77)  
2000  Market risk premium is multiplied by a risk 
measure instead of the beta factor.  
The Adjusted Hybrid CAPM 
(Pereiro, 2001: 330-370)  
2001  Country risk premium is added to the CAPM 
and an adjusted and modified beta is used.  
The Adjusted Local CAPM 
(Pereiro, 2001: 330-370)  
2001  Adjusted beta is used. The cost of equity 
estimated by the local CAPM is multiplied by 
the variance of equity volatility of the target 
company.  
The SalomonSmithBarney 
Model (Zenner and Akaydin, 
2002; Pereiro, 2006: 160-183)  
2002  Country risk premium is added to the CAPM 
and an adjusted beta is used.  
The Modified International 
CAPM (Sabal, 2004: 155-166)  
2002  It uses weighted beta value when the company 
concerned operates in more than one country.  
The Implied Cost of Capital 
Model (Damodaran, 2003b; Lee 
et al., 2003, 2009: 307-335)  
2003  Its methodology is similar to the Gordon 
Growth Model. The model is based on 
calculating the cost of equity capital, which 
makes the present value of the forecasts of 
cash flows or dividends to the equity holders 
equal to the market price of the relevant 
common stock. Country risk premium is 
implicitly considered.  
 
Appendix 7 
Descriptive statistics of comparative analysis of estimated and actual used investment costs in the IPs (prepared according to 
(Jasiukevicius & Vasiliauskaite, 2015a)) 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Gr. 
N Dist Min Max Avg St. Dev Kurtosis Excess Quantiles 
Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Error Stat. Error 25% 50% 75% 
GS 853 3,32 0,75 3,98 1,256 0,6172 2,482 0,084 5,882 0,167 0,993 1 1,2105 
A1 1 0 1,89 1,89 1,889 - - - - - 1,889 1,889 1,889 
A2 2 0,005 0,995 1 0,997 3,54E-03 - - - - - 2,5E-03 - 
A3 564 3,23 0,75 3,98 1,287 0,613 2,189 0,103 4,556 0,205 0,992 1 1,364 
A4 259 3,22 0,75 3,97 1,185 0,604 3,23 0,151 9,882 0,302 0,995 1 1 
A5 4 1,5 1 2,5 1,471 0,709 1,641 1,014 2,537 2,619 1 1,1925 2,221 
A5* 27 2,902 0,765 3,667 1,263 ,749 2,491 0,448 5,424 0,872 0,898 1 1,048 
A6* 823 3,22 0,75 3,98 1,255 0,613 2,489 0,085 5,958 0,17 0,994 1 1,217 
A7 23 2,9 0,77 3,67 1,227 0,765 2,752 0,481 6,717 0,935 0,884 1 1,045 
GS - General sample; A1 - Land; A2 - Real estate; A3 - Construction, major repairs and other repairs; A4 - Equipment and machineries and other assets; A5 
- Projection, technical maintenance and other services related with investment into A1-A4; A5* - Projection, technical maintenance and other services 
related with investment into A1-A4, (A5 and A7); A6* - Reinvestments (A3 and A4); A7 - Other services. 
Table 2. Results of the Mann-Whitney U test 
Gr. CF N Avg. A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A5* A6 A7 
A1 Land 1 1,889 - 0,221 0,209 0,133 0,468 0,234 0,184 0,216 
A2 Real estate 2 0,997 0,221 - 0,504 0,636 0,140 0,662 0,545 0,840 
A3 Construction, major repairs and other repairs 564 1,287 0,209 0,504 - 0,004 0,283 0,357 0,208 0,152 
A4 Equipment and machineries and other assets 259 1,185 0,133 0,636 0,004 - 0,086 0,895 0,038 0,586 
A5 
Projection, technical maintenance and other 
services related with investment into A1-A4 
4 1,471 0,468 0,140 0,283 0,086 - - 0,204 0,146 
A5* 
Projection, technical maintenance and other 
services related with investment into A1-A4, (A5 
and A7) 
27 1,263 0,234 0,662 0,357 0,895 - - 0,553 0,679 
A6 Reinvestments (A3 and A4) 823 1,255 0,184 0,545 0,208 0,038 0,204 0,553 - 0,243 
A7 Other services 23 1,227 0,216 0,840 0,152 0,586 0,146 0,679 0,243 - 
Appendix 8 
TOP 5 theoretical PDs statistically the most suitable to define the Risk in the pubic IPs (prepared according to (Jasiukevicius & 
Vasiliauskaite, 2015a)) 
Gr Pr. grupė 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
PD Dist PD Dist PD Dist PD Dist PD Dist 
 General sample Cauchy 0,219 
Gen. 
Pareto 
0,231 
Log-
Pearson 3 
0,237 Erlang 0,250 
Log-
Logistic 
(3P) 
0,253 
A3 
Construction, major repairs 
and other repairs 
Erlang 
(3P) 
0,202 
Gen. 
Pareto 
0,208 Beta 0,212 
Log-
Pearson 3 
0,222 
Log-
Logistic 
(3P) 
0,222 
A4 
Equipment and machineries 
and other assets 
Cauchy 0,257 
Gen. 
Pareto 
0,287 
Gen. 
Extreme 
value 
0,300 
Log-
Logistic 
(3P) 
0,326 
Log-
Pearson 3 
0,329 
A5* 
Projection, technical 
maintenance and other 
services related with 
investment into A1-A4, 
(A5 and A7) 
Burr (4P) 0,198 
Log-
Logistic 
(3P) 
0,201 
Dagum 
(4P) 
0,206 
Gen. 
Extreme 
Value 
0,210 
Frechet 
(3P) 
0,217 
A6 Reinvestments (A3 and A4) Cauchy 0,224 
Gen. 
Pareto 
0,235 
Log-
Pearson 3 
0,239 Erlang 0,254 
Log-
Logistic 
(3P) 
0,256 
A7 Other services Cauchy 0,190 
Log-
Logistic 
(3P) 
0,205 Burr (4P) 0,207 
Gen. 
Extreme 
Value 
0,211 
Dagum 
(4P) 
0,213 
 
The list of theoretical PDs statistically the most suitable to define the Risk 
in the general sample of IPs 
PD Statistic Rank PD Statistic Rank 
Cauchy 0,219 1 Kumaraswamy 0,322 32 
Gen. Pareto 0,231 2 Log-Logistic 0,324 33 
Log-Pearson 3 0,237 3 Pearson 5 0,328 34 
Erlang 0,250 4 Lognormal 0,330 35 
Log-Logistic (3P) 0,253 5 Gen. Gamma 0,331 36 
Gen. Extreme Value 0,262 6 Normal 0,332 37 
Dagum (4P) 0,262 7 Power Function 0,339 38 
Frechet (3P) 0,264 8 Fatigue Life 0,340 39 
Inv. Gaussian 0,264 9 Logistic 0,349 40 
Pearson 6 (4P) 0,265 10 Weibull 0,353 41 
Pearson 5 (3P) 0,265 11 Hypersecant 0,363 42 
Pareto 0,267 12 Nakagami 0,368 43 
Gen. Gamma (4P) 0,267 13 Dagum 0,373 44 
Frechet 0,269 14 Error 0,391 45 
Rice 0,270 15 Laplace 0,391 46 
Lognormal (3P) 0,273 16 Pert 0,392 47 
Burr (4P) 0,274 17 Gumbel Min 0,394 48 
Exponential (2P) 0,276 18 Rayleigh (2P) 0,399 49 
Weibull (3P) 0,276 19 Levy 0,442 50 
Rayleigh 0,279 20 Exponential 0,449 51 
Gamma 0,279 21 Pareto 2 0,452 52 
Inv. Gaussian (3P) 0,281 22 Reciprocal 0,498 53 
Gumbel Max 0,284 23 Triangular 0,524 54 
Fatigue Life (3P) 0,297 24 Chi-Squared 0,613 55 
Uniform 0,297 25 Error Function 0,887 56 
Beta 0,302 26 
Chi-
Squared (2P) No fit   
Gamma (3P) 0,302 27 Erlang (3P) No fit   
Johnson SB 0,302 28 Johnson SU No fit   
Levy (2P) 0,309 29 Log-Gamma No fit   
Burr 0,310 30 Student's t No fit   
Pearson 6 0,320 31       
 
Appendix 9 
Checklist of risk factors identified in the PPP IPs, (prepared according to Ernest Effah; Ameyaw & Chan (2015); Chou et 
al. (2012); Chung et al. (2010); Hwang et al. (2013); Ke et al. (2010); Martins et al. (2011); A. Ng & Loosemore (2007); Li Yin 
Shen et al. (2006)) 
ID Risk factor Definition 
1 Corruption Corrupt local government officials demand bribes or unjust rewards 
2 Government’s intervention Public sector interferes unreasonably in privatized facilities/services 
3 Expropriation and nationalization 
Due to political, social or economic pressures, local government takes over the facility run by private firm without 
giving reasonable compensation 
4 Government’s reliability The reliability and creditworthiness of the government to be able and willing to honor their obligations in future 
5 Third party reliability The reliability and creditworthiness of a third party to be able and willing to honor their obligations in future 
6 Public/political opposition Prejudice from public due to different local living standards, values, culture, social system, etc. 
7 Immature juristic system The lack of national PPP law leads to different ways of PPP implementation 
8 Change in law Local government’s inconsistent application of new regulations and laws 
9 Interest rate Unanticipated local interest rate changes due to immature local economic and banking systems 
10 
Foreign exchange and 
convertibility Fluctuation in currency exchange rate and/or difficulty of convertibility 
11 Inflation Unanticipated local inflation rate due to immature local economic and banking systems 
12 Poor political decision-making 
Government officials considers more their career achievement or short-term goals or personal interests, or with little 
PPP experience etc., resulting in a poor political decision-making process 
13 Land acquisition The project land is unavailable, or unable to be occupied at the required time 
14 Approval and permit Delay or refusal of project approval and permit by local government 
15 Improper contracts 
Improper arrangements in the contracts including inappropriate risk allocation among stakeholders, commitment 
from public/private partners 
16 Financing risk Poor financial market or unavailability of financial instrument resulting difficulty of financing 
17 Construction changes Unanticipated changes and errors in the construction resulting from the improper design or poor investigation 
18 Operation changes Unanticipated changes and errors in the operation resulting from the improper design or poor investigation 
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19 Construction completion Longer construction time than predicted, Construction cost overrun or poor construction quality 
20 Delay in supply Subcontractors and suppliers not being able to supply labor or material on time 
21 Technology risk The technology adopted not being mature or able to meet the requirements 
22 Ground/weather conditions Poor or unexpected ground/weather conditions 
23 Operation cost overrun Operation cost overrun resulting from improper measurement, ill planned schedule or low operation efficiency 
24 Competition (exclusive right) 
The government does not offer the exclusive right, or does not honor to its commitment and build another 
competitive project 
25 Market demand change Demand change from other factors, i.e. social, economic, etc., except the exclusive right 
26 Tariff change Improper tariff design or inflexible adjustment framework leading to the insufficient income 
27 Payment risk The government not being able or willing to pay, due to social or other reasons 
28 Supporting utilities risk 
Supporting utilities, such as electricity, water, necessary for the construction, operation and management would not 
be available in a timely manner or at fair rates 
29 Residual assets risk Assets transferred to the government at the end of the concession period would not be normally running 
30 Uncompetitive tender 
The tendering process and documents vary from project to project and from province to province in China without 
transparent or standardized models 
31 Consortium inability The consortium not being able to perform its obligations as a PPP project company 
32 Force majeure 
The circumstances that are out of the control of both foreign and local partners, such as flood, fires, storms, epidemic 
diseases, war, hostilities and embargo 
33 
Organization and coordination 
risk An increase of transaction cost or a dispute may occur because of the improper organization and coordination 
34 Tax regulation changes Central or local government’s inconsistent application of the tax regulation 
35 Environmental protection Stringent regulation which will have an impact on construction firms’ poor attention to environmental issues 
36 Private investor change Due to the disputes among private investors or other reasons, one or some investors exit/enter the consortium 
37 Subjective evaluation Subjective evaluation and design of the concession period, tariff structure, market demand, etc. 
38 Insufficient financial audit The government/lenders would not perform a careful audit to the financial status of the project company 
39 Improper design Improper design resulting in higher cost of operation and maintenance 
40 
Design fault in tender 
specifications Improper design specification resulting in proposals which do not meet the needs 
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41 Site safety and security Site does not comply with health and safety law 
42 Construction cost overrun Construction cost overrun resulting from improper measurement, ill planned schedule or low operation efficiency 
43 Maintenance cost overrun 
Maintenance cost overrun resulting from improper design, low quality materials installed or higher than expected 
load 
44 
Inadequate distribution of 
responsibilities Responsibilities are distributed between entities above their abilities to manage risks in the most efficient way 
45 
Failure to meet performance 
criteria Project fails to meet performance criteria at the predetermined costs 
46 
Inadequate distribution of 
authority Distributed authorities are insufficient to meet efficiency goals or give possibilities to abuse  
47 
Lack of commitment of between 
parties Entities do not comply with the contract 
48 Differences in working method Incompatibility between entities' working methods resulting in negative effect on the project or its failure 
49 Excessive contract variation Difficulties to control responsibilities of entities 
50 
Financial attraction of project to 
investors Project return is insufficient to attract investors to participate 
51 Scope variation Difficulties to determine risk and responsibilities of entities as well as total cost of projects 
52 Insufficient income Income are lower than expected and, therefore, requires additional financing 
53 Fluctuation of material cost Changes of material price in the market causing the requirement for additional financing 
54 Operator default Bankruptcy of operator 
55 Influential economic events Loss caused by economic or financial crisis  
56 Insolvency of subcontractors Subcontractors are not able to apply the undertakings 
57 Quality risk It is not satisfied the predetermined quality standards 
58 Availability of labor/materials Difficulties to find labor and material of appropriate quality, quantity and qualification accordingly 
59 Labor disputes and strikes Interruption of performance due to labor disputes and strikes 
60 Land use Legal issues to use particular land for implementation of project 
61 Waste of materials Loss caused by inefficiency use of materials 
62 
Protection of geological and 
historical objects Demage on protected objects 
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63 Archaeologic object It emerges early unknown restrictions on archaeological and cultural heritage protection requirements 
64 Low operating productivity Outputs are lower than it was planned 
65 Asset ownership 
Risks associated with ownership of the assets, including the risk that the technology becomes obsolete or that the 
value of the assets at the end of the contract is different than was expected 
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Appendix 10 
Comparative analysis of preferences of risk allocation from different literature (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
ID Risk factor Category 
PPP 
specific? 
1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 6* 7* 8* 9* Same? 
Author 
preference 
1 Corruption Political No               Pu     Pu 
2 Government’s intervention Political No   Pu     Pu Pu   Pu   Yes Pu 
3 Expropriation and nationalization Political No   Po Pu   Pu Pu   Pu   No Pu 
4 Government’s reliability Political No Pu Pu           Pu   Yes Pu 
5 Third party reliability Legal No Pu   Pr         Sh   No Pu 
6 Public/political opposition political No               Sh     Pu 
7 Immature juristic system Legal Yes               Pu     Pu 
8 Change in law Political No Sh Pr Sh Sh Sh Sh Pu Pu Pr No Pr or Pu1 
9 Interest rate Economic No   Sh Pr   Sh Pr   Sh Pr No Pr 
10 Foreign exchange and convertibility Economic No         Pu Pr   Sh Pr No Pr 
11 Inflation Construction No Sh Sh Pr Pr Sh Sh Sh Sh   No Pr 
12 Poor political decision-making Political No               Pu     Pu 
13 Land acquisition Political No               Pu     Pu 
14 Approval and permit Political No Pr Sh   Sh     Pr Pu Pu No Pu or Pr2 
15 Improper contracts Legal No               Sh Pu No Pu 
16 Financial risk Economic No   Pr Pr Pr     Pr Pr   Yes Pr 
17 Construction changes Construction No Pr Pu       Pu Pu Pr   No Pr 
18 Operation changes Operation No Pr Pu       Pu Pu Pr   No Pr 
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19 Construction completion Construction No Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Yes Pr 
20 Delay in supply Construction No               Pr     Pr 
21 Technology risk Construction No     Pr Sh   Sh Pr Pr   No Pr 
22 Ground/weather conditions Construction No Pu Pr Pr       Pr Sh   No Pr 
23 Operation cost overrun Operation No   Pr Pr Pr   Pr   Pr Pr Yes Pr 
24 Competition (exclusive right) Market No               Pu     Pu 
25 Market demand change Market No   Pr Pr Sh Pr Sh   Sh   No Pr or Sh3 
26 Tariff change Market No   Pr Pr   Pr Pr Pr Sh Pr No Pr 
27 Payment risk Market No               Sh     Pu 
28 Supporting utilities risk Operation No               Pu     Pu 
29 Residual assets risk Residual value No     
 
Pr   Pr Pu Pr   No Pr 
30 Uncompetitive tender Legal No               Pu     Pu 
31 Consortium inability Legal Yes               Pr     Pr 
32 Force majeure Other No   Sh Sh Sh   Sh Sh Sh   Yes Sh 
33 Organization and coordination risk Legal No               Pr     Pr 
34 Tax regulation changes Political No               Pu   Yes Pr or Pu4 
35 Environmental protection Construction No               Sh Pr Yes Pr 
36 Private investor change Legal Yes               Pr     Pu 
37 Subjective evaluation Legal No               Sh     Pu 
38 Insufficient financial audit Legal No               Sh     Pu 
39 Improper design Design No Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr   Pr Yes Pr 
40 Design fault in tender specifications Legal No                 Pu Yes Pu 
41 Site safety and security Construction No Pr     Pr           Yes Pr 
42 Construction cost overrun Construction No Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr   Pr Yes Pr 
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43 Maintenance cost overrun Operation No     Pr Pr   Pr Pr     Yes Pr 
44 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities Legal No                     Pu 
45 Failure to meet performance criteria Operation No                 Pr   Pr 
46 Inadequate distribution of authority Legal No                     Pu 
47 Lack of commitment of between parties Legal No                     Pr or Pu5 
48 Differences in working method Operation No                     Pr 
49 Excessive contract variation Legal No                     Pu 
50 Financial attraction of project to investors Market Yes                     Pu 
51 Scope variation Legal No                     Pu 
52 Insufficient income Market No     Pr Pr Pr           Pr 
53 Fluctuation of material cost Construction No   Pr     Pr Pr Pr   Pr Yes Pr 
54 Operator default Legal No   Pr   Pr Pr         Yes Pr 
55 Influential economic events Market No     Pr       Pr     Yes Pr 
56 Insolvency of subcontractors Legal No Pr   Pr Pr Pr Pr       Yes Pr 
57 Quality risk Operation No Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr     Yes Pr 
58 Availability of labor/materials Construction No Pr   Pr   Pr         Yes Pr 
59 Labor disputes and strikes Other No Pr       Pr   Pr     Yes Pr 
60 Land use Political No   Pu Pu     Pu       Yes Pu 
61 Waste of materials Operation No   Pr Pr Pr           Yes Pr 
62 Protection of geological and historical objects Construction No         Pr   Pr     Yes Pr 
63 Archaeologic object Construction No                     Pu 
64 Low operating productivity Operation No     Pr Pr Pr Pr         Pr 
65 Asset ownership Legal Yes                     Pu 
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No Authors 
1* Lam et al. (2007) 
2* Ng and Loosemore (2007) 
3* Li et al. (2005) 
4* Arndt (1998) 
5* Wang and Tiong (2000) 
6* NTSA (2004) 
7* VDTF (2001) 
8* Ke et al. (2010) 
9* Guasch (2004) 
 
No RC explanation 
1 If it is general law applied for all entities - Pr, if it is specifically applied to PPPs - Pu 
2 If the private entity has done its obligation and the public sector is later in its decision - Pu, otherwise - Pr 
3 Usually private, but the PPA may provide partial or full guarantees. 
4 Usually private, but in a case of VAT tax - public 
5 Depending on the PPP contract 
 
Appendix 11 
The model: Stage 1: preparation of the initial IP (prepared by the author of 
this dissertation) 
1
. 
C
o
n
te
x
t
• Conversion of market prices to shadow prices,
• SDR determination
• Evaluation of direct and external impact
• Determination of economic CFs
• Definition of services
• Soc-economic environment & legal analysis,
• Demand and supply analysis,
• Identification of the problems
Parts of IP 
development for PS
• Purpose & Tasks,
• Determination of results
Development of work 
breakdown structure
2
. 
C
on
te
n
t
3
. 
O
p
ti
o
n
 
an
al
y
si
s • List of tasks
• Formation of alternatives
4
. 
F
in
an
ci
al
 a
n
al
y
si
s
Building of schedule 
network
FNPVc, SFA, 
IRR, ACF
ACF >= 0? CF adjustment
Determination 
of FDR
Setting of start time 
and finish time of each 
work activity
Determination of IP 
construction period
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
p
er
io
d Determination of 
construction cost of 
each activity
Calculation 
of Capex 
and RV
O
p
er
at
io
n
 
pe
ri
od Setting time of 
operation period
Calculation of Opex,  
Revenue, Financing and 
taxes
No
5
. 
S
oc
-E
co
no
m
ic
 a
na
ly
si
s
ENPV >= 0? 
Yes
6
. 
R
is
k
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t
Opt 1
Opt. I < N? 
Yes
Opt. x + 1
Yes
IP commercial 
adjustment
IP revision
Possibilities to 
revise IP left?
Potential for 
commerce?
No
No
Yes
Yes
No procurement
Opt. is eliminated No
Any opt. with 
ENPV>0 left? 
Select the option, with max ENPV
Yes
No No
Processes & analyses
Risk assessment
Estimation of RA-indicators: 
NPVc, NPV(I), IRR, ACF
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Appendix 12 
The model: Stage 1: preparation of the initial IPs: Approaches to Risk 
assessment (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
 
Identification of Appropriate risks
Identification of impact of each risk
Estimation of the likelihood of each risk occurring
Estimation of the cost of each risk
Estimation of RA-indicators: 
NPVc, NPV(I), IRR, SFA
Identification of strategies for mitigating risks
Traditional approach
Estimation of the PDs of CFs
Estimation of RA-indicators: 
NPVc, NPVc, IRR, ACF
Identification of RGs
Attribution of CFs to appropriate RGSs
Estimation of the cost of RGs
Suggested approach
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Appendix 13 
The model: Stage 3: PPP feasibility analysis: development of the PSC 
(prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
 
Assessment of total risk
1
. 
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l 
IP
Has
 scope of IP changed in 
PPP?
Parts of PSC 
development
Adjustment of scope: Capex, 
Opex, Residual value, 
Revenue, Financing and Taxes
Yes
Raw PSC
No
Public sector Implementing institution
2
. 
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 n
eu
tr
a
li
ty
Determination of competitive neutrality cost:
• Land and real asset tax;
• PPP monitoring tax;
• Contribution for municipality
• Other
Determination of CN cost:
• Land and real asset 
tax, VAT;
• PPP monitoring tax;
• Contribution for 
municipality
• Other
3
. 
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k
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ss
e
ss
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t
Allocation of risk 
Risk retained
4
. 
N
F
B
s 
o
f 
P
P
P
Calculation of NFBs
PSC 
5
. 
R
e
su
lt
PSC
Development of 
shadow bid
Adjusted base cost 
converted into 
subsidies
Comparison of PSC with SB to determine 
option with greater VfM
Financing cost
Cost of the public 
sector/PPA in the 
SB
FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr
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Appendix 14 
The model: stage 3: PPP feasibility analysis: Institutional PPP 
development (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
High strategic
Importance?
1
. 
S
el
ec
ti
on
 o
f 
P
3
 t
yp
e
Contractual PPPInstitutionalized PPP
No
Yes
Estimation of Capex, Opex
Costs saving?
Estimation of optimal and range of 
possible distribution of capital shares 
between both partners
CP
Comparison of PSC cost with SB to 
determine option with greater VfM
VfM? 
2
. 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
 o
f 
ca
p
it
al
 s
ha
re
s
V&A?
Ɵ + 1%
Ɵ max. 
available 
reached?
CP
Yes
No Yes
No
No
Ɵ > 0? CPNo
Comparison of both subjects  costs
Yes
Pr. share Ɵ, Pu. share (1 – Ɵ)
PPP contract: divestitures
Yes
Divestitures
Commercial use of assets
Private capital optimization
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Appendix 15 
The model: stage 3: PPP feasibility analysis: Institutional PPP 
development: Optimal share of public and private capital (prepared by the 
author of this dissertation) 
Inputs:
rpu, rpr, Iq, Jq
Private share in 
capital: Ɵ = 0%
Total costs: 
F(q;Ɵ)
Ɵk+1 = Ɵk + 0,01 
Ɵ = 100%?
Determination 
of all values of 
F(q;Ɵ)  
No
Min (F(q;Ɵ)) ƟMin(F(q;Ɵ)) > 0?
Yes
CP
Pr. share Ɵ,
Pu. share (1 – Ɵ)
No
Yes
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Appendix 16 
The model: stage 3: PPP feasibility analysis: Institutional PPP 
development: Capital structure optimization (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
 
Input: Emin, 
IRREmin,SFAmin 
DSCRmin, rtax, rpr, rpu 
i = 1, Ei = Emin
Calculation of: Ei, Di, 
IRRE, DSCR, SFA Ei = 100%?
Ei+1 = Ei + 1% No
Selection of iteration where: DSCRi   DSCRmin;
 IRREi   IRREmin; SFAi   1.
Any
iterations?
Yes
Finding of E, where 
min(IRRE)
UP/Pi+1=
UP/Pi + 1 No
Yes
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Appendix 17 
The model: stage 3: PPP feasibility analysis: Institutional PPP 
development: Contractual PPP development (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
Contractual PPP
Main revenues from
direct users ?
Commercial 
use of state 
assests
Performance of 
state institutional 
function
Private 
investments?
No
Yes
Combined scheme 
of: Design, Build, 
Rehabilitate, 
Operate, Own, 
Lease and Transfer
Management 
or Leasing
Combined scheme 
of: Design, Build, 
Rehabilitate, 
Finance, Operate, 
Own, Lease and 
Transfer
No
Private 
investments?
Management
No
Yes
Yes
CSO 
model
CSO 
model
CSO 
model
CSO 
model
Revenues
 from direct 
users?
CP
V&A?
No
V&A?V&A? V&A?
Comparison of PSC with SB to 
calculate the quantitative VfM
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
 t = 1
 ti+1 = 
ti+1
Yes
ti < tn?
No
C&R 
of Pu.S
C&R 
of Pu.S
C&R of 
Pu.S
C&R 
of Pu.S
 
 
Appendix 18 
Calculation of the FDR based on the CAPM approach (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Country Code 
National 
security 
market 
index 
Classification: 
Dow Jones, 
MSCI 
Risk-
free 
rate: 
US 10y 
bond 
yields) 
S&P100 
Global 
(10-y 
return 
rate) 
St. 
Dev. σl 
Corr 
(rl,rg) 
S&P100 
Global: 
σg 
Moody's 
rating 
Rating-
based 
default 
spread 
β FDR 
Sweden SWE OMXS30 D 2,82% 4,91% 4,85% 63,43% 4,74% Aaa 0,00% 0,65 4,18% 
Denmark DEN OMXC20 D 2,82% 4,91% 5,54% 59,08% 4,74% Aaa 0,00% 0,69 4,26% 
United Kingdom UK FTSE100 D 2,82% 4,91% 4,06% 87,62% 4,74% Aa1 0,46% 0,75 4,39% 
Finland FIN OMXH25 D 2,82% 4,91% 5,77% 62,09% 4,74% Aa1 0,46% 0,75 4,40% 
Ireland IRE ISEQ D 2,82% 4,91% 6,20% 61,82% 4,74% A3 1,39% 0,81 4,51% 
Portugal POR PSI20 D 2,82% 4,91% 5,76% 68,38% 4,74% Ba1 2,89% 0,83 4,56% 
Belgium BEL BEL20 D 2,82% 4,91% 4,97% 79,80% 4,74% Aa3 0,70% 0,84 4,57% 
Netherlands NL AEX D 2,82% 4,91% 5,34% 80,86% 4,74% Aaa 0,00% 0,91 4,72% 
France FRA CAC40 D 2,82% 4,91% 5,06% 87,00% 4,74% Aa2 0,57% 0,93 4,76% 
Germany GER DAX D 2,82% 4,91% 5,63% 82,85% 4,74% Aaa 0,00% 0,98 4,88% 
Spain SPA IBEX35 D 2,82% 4,91% 6,04% 78,74% 4,74% Baa2 2,20% 1,00 4,92% 
Luxembourg LUX LUXX D 2,82% 4,91% 7,54% 66,52% 4,74% Aaa 0,00% 1,06 5,03% 
Italy ITA FTSEMIB D 2,82% 4,91% 6,51% 79,52% 4,74% Baa2 2,20% 1,09 5,10% 
Austria AST ATX D 2,82% 4,91% 6,74% 80,60% 4,74% Aa1 0,46% 1,15 5,21% 
Czech Republic CZR PX E 2,82% 4,91% 6,37% 73,36% 4,74% A1 0,81% 0,81 5,31% 
Poland POL WIG20 E 2,82% 4,91% 6,02% 73,52% 4,74% A2 0,98% 0,76 5,39% 
Hungary HUN BUX E 2,82% 4,91% 6,83% 73,72% 4,74% Baa3 2,54% 0,86 7,17% 
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Greece GRE ATG E 2,82% 4,91% 9,74% 71,67% 4,74% Caa3 11,55% 1,23 16,94% 
Slovakia SLK SAX F 2,82% 4,91% 4,22% 26,61% 4,74% A2 0,98% 0,53 4,91% 
Malta MAL MALTEX F 2,82% 4,91% 5,66% 59,77% 4,74% A3 1,39% 0,72 5,71% 
Estonia EST OMXT F 2,82% 4,91% 8,21% 36,07% 4,74% A1 0,81% 1,04 5,80% 
Latvia LAT OMXR F 2,82% 4,91% 6,44% 28,89% 4,74% A3 1,39% 0,81 5,91% 
Lithuania LIT OMXV F 2,82% 4,91% 7,36% 40,10% 4,74% A3 1,39% 0,93 6,16% 
Slovenia SLO SBITOP F 2,82% 4,91% 5,74% 42,44% 4,74% Baa3 2,54% 0,73 6,88% 
Bulgaria BUL SOFIX F 2,82% 4,91% 8,36% 53,32% 4,74% Baa2 2,20% 1,06 7,23% 
Romania ROM BET F 2,82% 4,91% 8,78% 71,00% 4,74% Baa3 2,54% 1,11 7,68% 
Croatia CRO CRBEX F 2,82% 4,91% 7,27% 58,09% 4,74% Ba2 3,47% 0,92 8,21% 
Cyprus CYP CYFT20 F 2,82% 4,91% 13,00% 52,10% 4,74% B1 5,20% 1,64 11,46% 
 
 
Appendix 19 
Key inputs of the hypothetical IP (the revenue generating model) (prepared 
by the author of this dissertation) 
Economic data
2,00% Inflation rate for everything except expense of energy, water and waste disposal
3,00% Infliation rate for expense of energy, water and waste disposal
0,00% Interest rate earned on cash deposits
1 Is the indexation applied in Public Sector Model?      <<< Enter 0 for non-application; Enter 1 for application
NOMINAL PRICES
1 Income received?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (FALSE)
Taxes
21,00% VAT
1 Possibility to recover VAT      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (FALSE)
15,00% Profit tax
1 PSC: Profit tax for the public sector company applied?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (FALSE)
0 Tax Holiday (year tax holiday ends)
0 PPP: Nonprofit organization (NPO) // non-business entity?      <<< Enter 1 (Nonprofit) or 0 (business entity)
0 Allow Tax Holiday?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no tax holiday)
5 Tax Holiday (year tax holiday ends)
1,00% Real estate tax
0 Allow Tax Holiday?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no tax holiday)
26 Tax Holiday (year tax holiday ends)
0,40% Land tax
1 500 000 Base for land tax (€)
6 000 Land rent tax per year (€)
16 Land rent tax per day (€)
0 Allow land tax holiday?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no tax holiday)
26 Tax Holiday (year tax holiday ends)
0 Require contribution for manucipality?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no contribution for municipality required)
1 500 000 Contribution for manucipality
45 000 PPP contract implementation monitoring tax per year (€ per unit without VAT)
123 PPP contract implementation monitoring tax per day (€ per unit without VAT)
1 Is PPP contract monitoring tax required?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no monitoring tax required)
 
Project schedule
Days for the calculation of costs / income per day
1461 Number of days in period of four years
365,25 Number of days in period of one year
30,44 Number of days in period of one month
Construction period
25 Reference period (number of years)
2016-12-31 Date of financial closure
SimulationPublic sector PPP Diff. (%)
# 150 150 0% Days needed to complete the design
0 0 0% Days of Design completion dalay
150 150   <<< Design timing is planned well
2017-05-31 2017-05-31 Date of garage construction begin
# 360 360 0% Days needed to complete garage (per contract)
0 0 0% Days of garage completion delay
360 360   <<< Construction timing is planned well
2018-05-26 2018-05-26 Date of installation begin
# 91 91 0% Days needed to install equipment (per contract)
0 0 0% Days of equipment installation delay
91 91    <<< Equipment instalation timing is planned well
601 601 Total days in construction period
#  
Operation period
Public sector PPP
2018-08-26 2018-08-26 Date of operation begin
2041-12-30 2041-12-30 Reference period end day
8 621 8621 Total days in reference period
2016-06-01 Base date for all costs and prices used in the model      <<< All  costs in later time periods are based on this date
and then indexed for inflation  
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Reinvestments
Public sector PPP
2026-08-25 2026-08-25 Data of the reinvestments No. 1 is completed
2034-08-25 2034-08-25 Data of the reinvestments No. 2 is completed
 
Investments in infrastructure
SimulationPublic sector PPP Diff. (%)
# 7000 6300 -10% Cost (€ per multi-storey parking space without VAT)
2 400 2400 0% Number of parking spaces built in multi-storey parking facility
7 7 Parking spaces per day (€ per multi-level parking space without VAT)
# 1600 1440 -10% Cost (€ per ground parking space without VAT)
600 600 0% Number of parking spaces built in ground parking facility
2 2 Parking spaces per day (€ per ground parking space without VAT)
# 1,50% 1,4% -10% Development fees
# 0,50% 0,5% -10% Advisory fees
# 1,50% 1,4% -10% Insurance
# 10,00% 9,0% -10% Contingency
# 150 000 135 000 -10% Design cost (€)
1 000 900 Design cost (€) per day
 
Parking equipment
SimulationPublic sector PPP Diff. (%)
# 3 260 2 934 -10% ANPR camera for charge (€ per unit without VAT)
3 3 0% Number of ANPR cameras for charge
# 1 290 1 161 -10% Road gate  (€ per unit without VAT)
6 6 0% Number of road gate
# 14 480 13 032 -10% Payment desk  (€ per unit without VAT)
6 6 0% Number of payment payment desk
# 145 131 -10% Intercom  (€ per unit without VAT)
8 8 0% Number of Intercom
# 5 890 5 301 -10% Information board in front of the parking facility  (€ per unit without VAT)
3 3 0% Number of Information board in front of the parking facility
# 8 680 7 812 -10% Software  (€  without VAT)
1 1 0% Number of software
# 0,15 14% -10% Instalation and adjustment, coefficient from the estimate of parking equipment
1450 1305 Equipment cost (€) per day
Renewal and reinvestments of parking equipment
Public sector PPP
131 910 118 719 Cost (€) of reinvestment
19 787 16 027 Cost (€) of reinvestment instalation and adjustment
 
Amortization and depreciation
Norms for the public sector model applied
1 Depreciation norms applied for parking plots    <<< where 0 is norms of the public sector, 1 - the private sector
Norms for the both of sectors' model applied
Public Private
60 15 Depreciation period for garage (years)   <<< adjuested for the concesion period calculation if needed
21 915 5 479 Days depreciation period for garage
8 5 Depreciation period for equipment (years)   <<< adjuested for the concesion period calculation if needed
2 922 1 826 Days depreciation period for equipment
Norms of sector
 
Procurement and oversight
Total investments
SimulationPublic sector PPP Diff. (%)
# 50 000 100 000 100% Procurement cost
 
Operation expenditure
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Infrastructure maitenance costs
SimulationPublic sector PPP Diff. (%)
# 120 108 -10% Cost of medium repair per parking space (capital investments €  without VAT)
# 350 315 -10% Cost of major repair per parking space (capital investment €  without VAT)
13 13 Project year of medium maitenance needed
0 0 Project year of medium repair needed
20 20 Project year of major maitenance needed
 
Energy
# 0,12 Electric energy tariff (without VAT), €/kWh
# 0,09 Heating energy tariff (without VAT), €/kWh
# 0,79 Drinking water and wastewater treatment tariff (without VAT), €/m3
Fixed costs of services
SimulationPublic sector PPP Diff. (%)
# 4 200 3 780 -10% System maitenance services per month (€ per unit without VAT)
138 124 System maitenance services per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 580 522 -10% Accounting services per month (€ per unit without VAT)
19 17 Accounting services per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 7 000 6 300 -10% Audit services per year (€ per unit without VAT)
19 17 Audit services per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 15 000 13 500 -10% Insurance services per year (€ per unit without VAT)
41 37 Insurance services per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 1 100 990 -10% Calling center serices per month (€ per unit without VAT)
36 33 Calling center serices per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 2 000 1 800 -10% Asset management tax per month (€ per unit without VAT)
66 59 Asset management tax per day (€ per unit without VAT)
Viriable costs of services
SimulationPublic sector PPP Diff. (%)
# 0,06 0,054 -10% Costs of sand and oil trap services for one parking space per month (€ per unit without VAT)
0,002 0,002 Costs of sand and oil trap services for one parking space per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 1,45 1,305 -10% Costs of permanent repair for one parking space per month (€ per unit without VAT)
0,048 0,043 Costs of permanent repair for one parking space per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 0,1 0,090 -10% Maitenance of equipment of one parking space per month (€ per unit without VAT)
0,003 0,003 Maitenance of equipment of one parking space per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 3,000 2,700 -10% Cleannig services for one parking space per month (€ per unit without VAT)
0,099 0,089 Cleannig services for one parking space per day (€ per unit without VAT)
# 0,030 0,027 -10% Wastewater treatment m3 for one parking space per month
0,001 0,001 Wastewater treatment m3 for one parking space per day
# 15,000 13,500 -10% Average heat cunsumptions kWh per day
# 2 100 1 890 -10% Electricity energy consumption kWh per day
Salaries
SimulationPublic sector PPP Diff. (%)
4 4,00 0% Number of working staff
2 2,00 0% Number of staff in administration
# 1 000 900 -10% Costs of job place of one worker (€) per month
33 30 Costs of job place of one worker (€) per day
# 2 500 2 250 -10% Costs of job place of one worker in administration (€) per month
82 74 Costs of job place of one worker in administration (€) per day
# 30 000 27 000 -10% Other administration expense
 
Income
1 Income received?      <<< Enter 0 for non-gathering; Enter 1 for gathering
Public sector PPP
Distribution of parking spaces of different pricing availible Distribution of parking plots of different pricing availible
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
10% 5% 85% 10% 5% 85%
300 150 2550 300 150 2550
Average number of occupied parking spaces of day parking
P1 P2 P3
45% 5% 65%
 
Average number of occupied parking spaces of day parking Average number of occupied parking spaces of day parking
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
45% 5% 65% 45% 5% 65%
135 7,5 1657,5 135 7,5 1657,5
 
Availible parking spaces left to hourly parking Availible parking spaces left to hourly parking
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
165 142,5 892,5 165 142,5 892,5  
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Average occupation of parking spaces of hourly parking Average occupation of parking spaces of hourly parking
Hour P1 P2 P3 Hour P1 P2 P3
0 - 1 val. 40% 10% 10% 0 - 1 val. 40% 10% 10%
1 - 2 val. 15% 5% 10% 1 - 2 val. 15% 5% 10%
2 - 3 val. 10% 5% 10% 2 - 3 val. 10% 5% 10%
3 - 4 val. 10% 5% 10% 3 - 4 val. 10% 5% 10%
4 - 5 val. 10% 5% 10% 4 - 5 val. 10% 5% 10%
5 - 6 val. 20% 5% 10% 5 - 6 val. 20% 5% 10%
6 - 7 val. 50% 5% 10% 6 - 7 val. 50% 5% 10%
7 - 8 val. 60% 10% 10% 7 - 8 val. 60% 10% 10%
8 - 9 val. 60% 15% 10% 8 - 9 val. 60% 15% 10%
9 - 10 val. 40% 15% 10% 9 - 10 val. 40% 15% 10%
10 - 11 val. 30% 15% 10% 10 - 11 val. 30% 15% 10%
11 - 12 val. 40% 20% 10% 11 - 12 val. 40% 20% 10%
12 - 13 val. 50% 20% 10% 12 - 13 val. 50% 20% 10%
13 - 14 val. 70% 20% 10% 13 - 14 val. 70% 20% 10%
14 - 15 val. 60% 15% 10% 14 - 15 val. 60% 15% 10%
15 - 16 val. 50% 15% 10% 15 - 16 val. 50% 15% 10%
16 - 17 val. 50% 15% 10% 16 - 17 val. 50% 15% 10%
17 - 18 val. 50% 15% 10% 17 - 18 val. 50% 15% 10%
18 - 19 val. 50% 20% 10% 18 - 19 val. 50% 20% 10%
19 - 20 val. 50% 20% 10% 19 - 20 val. 50% 20% 10%
20 - 21 val. 70% 20% 10% 20 - 21 val. 70% 20% 10%
21 - 22 val. 60% 15% 10% 21 - 22 val. 60% 15% 10%
22 - 23 val. 50% 10% 10% 22 - 23 val. 50% 10% 10%
23 - 24 val. 50% 10% 10% 23 - 24 val. 50% 10% 10%
Average 44% 13% 10% Average 44% 13% 10%
Average number of occupied parking spaces of hourly parking Average number of occupied parking spaces of hourly parking
0 - 1 val. 66 14 89 0 - 1 val. 66 14 89
1 - 2 val. 25 7 89 1 - 2 val. 25 7 89
2 - 3 val. 17 7 89 2 - 3 val. 17 7 89
3 - 4 val. 17 7 89 3 - 4 val. 17 7 89
4 - 5 val. 17 7 89 4 - 5 val. 17 7 89
5 - 6 val. 33 7 89 5 - 6 val. 33 7 89
6 - 7 val. 83 7 89 6 - 7 val. 83 7 89
7 - 8 val. 99 14 89 7 - 8 val. 99 14 89
8 - 9 val. 99 21 89 8 - 9 val. 99 21 89
9 - 10 val. 66 21 89 9 - 10 val. 66 21 89
10 - 11 val. 50 21 89 10 - 11 val. 50 21 89
11 - 12 val. 66 29 89 11 - 12 val. 66 29 89
12 - 13 val. 83 29 89 12 - 13 val. 83 29 89
13 - 14 val. 116 29 89 13 - 14 val. 116 29 89
14 - 15 val. 99 21 89 14 - 15 val. 99 21 89
15 - 16 val. 83 21 89 15 - 16 val. 83 21 89
16 - 17 val. 83 21 89 16 - 17 val. 83 21 89
17 - 18 val. 83 21 89 17 - 18 val. 83 21 89
18 - 19 val. 83 29 89 18 - 19 val. 83 29 89
19 - 20 val. 83 29 89 19 - 20 val. 83 29 89
20 - 21 val. 116 29 89 20 - 21 val. 116 29 89
21 - 22 val. 99 21 89 21 - 22 val. 99 21 89
22 - 23 val. 83 14 89 22 - 23 val. 83 14 89
23 - 24 val. 83 14 89 23 - 24 val. 83 14 89
Average 72 18 89 Average 72 18 89
0,50000 Price viriable 0,00% Change of the price level
Simulation. Coefficients
Duration P1 P2 P3
Hourly-parking 2,5 3,5 2
Day-parking 17,4 17,4 6,1
Simulation. Prices without VAT
Duration P1 P2 P3
Hourly-parking 1,03 1,45 0,83
Day-parking 7,19 7,19 2,52
Prices without VAT Simulation. Prices without VAT
Duration P1 P2 P3 Duration P1 P2 P3
Hourly-parking 1,03 1,45 0,83 Hourly-parking 1,03 1,45 0,83
Day-parking 7,19 7,19 2,52 Day-parking 7,19 7,19 2,52
Revenues of day Revenues of day
Duration P1 P2 P3 Duration P1 P2 P3
Hourly-parking 1 776 641 1 778 Hourly-parking 1 776 641 1 778
Day-parking 971 54 4 177 Day-parking 971 54 4 177
Total: 2 747 694 5 955 Total: 2 747 694 5 955
Average income (€) form one parking space per day Average income (€) form one parking space per day
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
9,16 4,63 2,34 9,16 4,63 2,34  
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0 Additional income gathered? 0 Additional income gathered?  
0 Income (€) from additional acctivities a day 0 Income (€) from additional acctivities a day  
Reserve accounts
1 Debt Service Reserve Account (months)
1 Subordinated debt reserve account (months)
100% Maintenance Reserve Account  
Net operating working capital
1,00% Accounts Receivable (% of Sales)
1,25% Inventory (% of Sales)
1,50% Accounts Payable (% of Routine O&M)
Financing
For public sector comparator model
Simulation
# 4,1% 4,1% Real financial discount rate (FDRr)
6,2% 6,2% Nominal financial discount rate (FDRn)
For PSC
Debt of Bank
3,0% Interest rate on loan during construction period
2,5% Interest rate on loan (post construction)
10 Term of permanent loan (years)
3653 Term of permanent loan (days)
70% Percentage amount of funding financed by senior debt   <<< adjusted for the concesion period calculation if needed
 
For PPP
Debt of Bank
3,3% Interest rate on loan during construction period   <<< adjuested for the concesion period calculation if needed
2,7% Interest rate on loan (post construction)   <<< adjuested for the concesion period calculation if needed
10 Term of permanent loan (years)
3653 Term of permanent loan (days)
1 Type of loan amortization      <<< Enter 0 for Level Payment Amortization; Enter 1 for Level Principal Amortization
70% Percent of project finance by debt
15 Number of operating years for project loan coverage ratio, PLCR
5479 Number of Operating Days for Project Loan Coverage Ratio, PLCR
Equity Data:
1 Unlevered Beta Coefficient
2,82% 10-Year Government Borrowing Rate
3,34% Market Risk Premium
100% Dividend level
Subordinated debt
10 Term of permanent subordinated debt (years)
3653 Term of permanent subordinated debt (days)
60% Percent of equity by subordinated debt
5% Interest rate on subordinated debt
Government (in case of concetion)
0 Grant from Government (VGF)
0 Government compensation for operaintg loss      <<< Enter 0 for no compensation; Enter 1 for compensation
100% Percantage of compensation
0 Annual steady government compensation for operating loss      <<< Enter 0 for no compensation; Enter 1 for compensation
150 000 Annual amount (€) of steady government compensation
 
Risk assessment
70% Confidence level
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Duration of reference period (DRP) for calculation of risk estimates
25 DRP for calculation of risk estimates
0% Part of residual value left for the private subject after PPP period
For goal seek of price and cost adjustment comparison with private entity
0% Delay uncertainty
100% Procurement cost uncertainty
-10% Capex uncertainty
-10% Opex uncertainty
0% Demand uncertainty
0% Price uncertainty
 
Profit Sharing with Government:
0 Marginal amount of annual revenue € (MAAR) per one parking space
0 Total marginal amount of annual revenue € (MAAR)
# 0% Income sharing with Government (%)
0% Profit Sharing with Government (%)
3 Year Profit Sharing Begins
 
Externalities
Costs of non-supplied public services at determined quantity and/or quality for society
3,0 Years of service are being delayed
612 000 Annual cost (€) of unsured quality of public services
1 676 Day cost (€) of unsured quality of public services
 
 
Appendix 20 
Cash flows of the initial IP (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBLIC SECTOR: DAYS AND INFLATION
Period begins: 16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
Period ends: 16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Project year X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Design
Days in period 214 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365
Days of design in period 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflation factors
Inflation Factor: 1,012 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020
Cumulative inflation factor: 1,012 1,032 1,053 1,074 1,095 1,117 1,139 1,162 1,186 1,209 1,233 1,258 1,283 1,309 1,335 1,362 1,389 1,417 1,445 1,474 1,504 1,534 1,565 1,596 1,628 1,660
Inflation Factor for expense of energy, water and waste disposal 1,018 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030
Cumulative Inflation Factor: 1,018 1,048 1,080 1,112 1,145 1,180 1,215 1,252 1,289 1,328 1,368 1,409 1,451 1,495 1,540 1,586 1,633 1,682 1,733 1,785 1,839 1,894 1,951 2,009 2,070 2,132
Construction of parking plots
Days of parking plots in period 215 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Installation of parking equipment
Days of quipment installation in period 0 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operation
Days for operation left in period 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365
Repair
Is medium repair needed? FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Is major repair needed? FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Depreciation, summary
Parking plots 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment (reinvestments 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment (reinvestments 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 365 366 365 365 365 366 365
Debt repayment
Repayment days in period 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
External impact
Days in period the external impact is assessed 365 365 365 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: CAPEX NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION Without VAT
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
TEST (Used to determine time for reinvestments 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEST (Used to determine time for reinvestments 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construction of parking plots:
Multi-level parking plots 10 354 004 7 122 592 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ground parking plots 591 657 407 005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking plots, total 10 945 662 7 529 597 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional cost of parking plots construction:
Design 154 794 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Development fees 164 185 112 944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Advisory fees 54 728 37 648 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Insurance 164 185 112 944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Contingency 1 094 566 752 960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional cost, total 1 632 458 1 016 496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking garage, total 12 578 120 8 546 093 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation of parking equipment:
Equipment 0 138 848 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation and adjustment 0 20 827 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation of parking equipment, total 0 159 676 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments:
Renewal and reinvestments of parking equipment 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 187 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Renewal and reinvestments of parking equipment 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments, total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 187 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capex: total investments 12 578 120 8 705 768 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 187 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: CAPEX AND DEPRECIATION NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION Without VAT
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Compute gross fixed assets:   <<< IDC is not calculated
Gross Fixed Assets: Parking garage 12 578 120 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212 21 124 212
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (investment) 0 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248
Gross Fixed Assets, total 12 578 120 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241
Calculate depreciation expense:
Depreciation expense: parking garage 0 124 345 351 829 352 793 351 829 351 829 351 829 352 793 351 829 351 829 351 829 352 793 351 829 351 829 351 829 352 793 227 243 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (investment) 0 7 049 19 946 20 000 19 946 19 946 19 946 20 000 19 946 12 896 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 196 23 372 23 436 23 372 23 372 23 372 23 436 23 372 15 176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 604 27 387 27 462 27 387 27 387 27 387 27 462 27 387
Depreciation expense, total 0 131 394 371 775 372 794 371 775 371 775 371 775 372 794 371 775 372 922 375 201 376 229 375 201 375 201 375 201 376 229 250 615 24 780 27 387 27 462 27 387 27 387 27 387 27 462 27 387
Calculate accumulated depreciation:
Depreciation expense: parking garage 0 124 345 476 174 828 967 1 180 797 1 532 626 1 884 455 2 237 248 2 589 078 2 940 907 3 292 736 3 645 529 3 997 358 4 349 188 4 701 017 5 053 810 5 281 053 5 281 053 5 281 053 5 281 053 5 281 053 5 281 053 5 281 053 5 281 053 5 281 053
Depreciation expense: equipment (investment) 0 7 049 26 995 46 996 66 941 86 887 106 833 126 833 146 779 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676 159 676
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 196 31 568 55 005 78 377 101 749 125 121 148 558 171 930 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 604 36 991 64 454 91 841 119 228 146 615 174 078 201 465
Depreciation expense, total 0 131 394 503 169 875 963 1 247 738 1 619 513 1 991 288 2 364 082 2 735 857 3 108 779 3 483 980 3 860 210 4 235 411 4 610 612 4 985 814 5 362 043 5 612 659 5 637 439 5 664 826 5 692 288 5 719 675 5 747 063 5 774 450 5 801 912 5 829 299
Calculate net fixed assets
Gross fixed assets 12 578 120 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 283 888 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 470 994 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241 21 690 241
Total accumulated depreciation 0 131 394 503 169 875 963 1 247 738 1 619 513 1 991 288 2 364 082 2 735 857 3 108 779 3 483 980 3 860 210 4 235 411 4 610 612 4 985 814 5 362 043 5 612 659 5 637 439 5 664 826 5 692 288 5 719 675 5 747 063 5 774 450 5 801 912 5 829 299
Net fixed assets 12 578 120 21 152 494 20 780 719 20 407 925 20 036 150 19 664 375 19 292 600 18 919 806 18 548 031 18 362 215 17 987 014 17 610 784 17 235 583 16 860 381 16 485 180 16 108 951 15 858 335 16 052 803 16 025 416 15 997 953 15 970 566 15 943 179 15 915 792 15 888 329 15 860 942
Residual value for FNIS calculation
Residual value, Total 12 578 120 21 152 494 20 780 719 20 407 925 20 036 150 19 664 375 19 292 600 18 919 806 18 548 031 18 362 215 17 987 014 17 610 784 17 235 583 16 860 381 16 485 180 16 108 951 15 858 335 16 052 803 16 025 416 15 997 953 15 970 566 15 943 179 15 915 792 15 888 329 15 860 942
Period begins:
Period ends:
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The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: revenue NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Revenue
P1 parking plots 0 372 952 1 076 356 1 100 950 1 119 901 1 142 299 1 165 145 1 191 768 1 212 282 1 236 528 1 261 258 1 290 078 1 312 284 1 338 529 1 365 300 1 396 496 1 420 535 1 448 945 1 477 924 1 511 694 1 537 715 1 568 469 1 599 839 1 636 394 1 664 561
P2 parking plots 0 94 298 272 148 278 366 283 158 288 821 294 598 301 329 306 516 312 646 318 899 326 186 331 800 338 436 345 205 353 093 359 171 366 354 373 681 382 220 388 799 396 575 404 506 413 749 420 871
P3 parking plots 0 808 569 2 333 569 2 386 889 2 427 975 2 476 535 2 526 065 2 583 785 2 628 260 2 680 825 2 734 441 2 796 922 2 845 066 2 901 967 2 960 006 3 027 641 3 079 756 3 141 351 3 204 178 3 277 392 3 333 806 3 400 482 3 468 492 3 547 745 3 608 813
Additional activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue, total 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: OPEX NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION Without VAT
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Salaries / wages 0 40 150 115 875 118 523 120 563 122 974 125 434 128 300 130 508 133 118 135 781 138 883 141 274 144 099 146 981 150 340 152 927 155 986 159 106 162 741 165 543 168 853 172 230 176 166 179 198
Electricity 0 35 094 102 277 105 642 108 514 111 770 115 123 118 911 122 143 125 808 129 582 133 846 137 484 141 609 145 857 150 657 154 752 159 395 164 177 169 579 174 189 179 415 184 797 190 878 196 067
Heating (except electricity) costs 0 188 548 566 581 599 617 637 654 674 694 717 737 759 781 807 829 854 880 908 933 961 990 1 023 1 050
Infrastructure maitenance costs:
Medium maitenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 471 235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Major maitenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 578 964 0 0 0 0 0
Maitenance, total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 471 235 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 578 964 0 0 0 0 0
Other fixed costs:
System maitenance services 0 18 737 54 075 55 311 56 263 57 388 58 536 59 873 60 904 62 122 63 364 64 812 65 928 67 246 68 591 70 159 71 366 72 793 74 249 75 946 77 253 78 798 80 374 82 211 83 626
Accounting services 7 178 7 321 7 468 7 638 7 770 7 925 8 083 8 268 8 411 8 579 8 750 8 950 9 104 9 286 9 472 9 689 9 855 10 052 10 253 10 488 10 668 10 882 11 099 11 353 11 548
Audit services 7 219 7 363 7 510 7 682 7 814 7 971 8 130 8 316 8 459 8 628 8 801 9 002 9 157 9 340 9 527 9 744 9 912 10 110 10 312 10 548 10 730 10 944 11 163 11 418 11 615
Insurance services 15 469 15 778 16 094 16 461 16 745 17 080 17 421 17 819 18 126 18 489 18 858 19 289 19 621 20 014 20 414 20 881 21 240 21 665 22 098 22 603 22 992 23 452 23 921 24 467 24 889
Calling center serices 0 4 907 14 163 14 486 14 735 15 030 15 331 15 681 15 951 16 270 16 595 16 975 17 267 17 612 17 964 18 375 18 691 19 065 19 446 19 891 20 233 20 638 21 050 21 531 21 902
Asset management tax 0 8 922 25 750 26 338 26 792 27 328 27 874 28 511 29 002 29 582 30 173 30 863 31 394 32 022 32 662 33 409 33 984 34 664 35 357 36 165 36 787 37 523 38 273 39 148 39 822
Land rent tax per day (€)
PPP contract implementation monitoring tax
Other administration expense 30 959 31 578 32 210 32 856 33 513 34 183 34 867 35 566 36 277 37 003 37 743 38 500 39 270 40 055 40 856 41 675 42 509 43 359 44 226 45 113 46 016 46 936 47 875 48 835 49 811
Other fixed costs, total 60 824 94 607 157 269 160 772 163 631 166 904 170 242 174 034 177 129 180 672 184 285 188 391 191 741 195 575 199 487 203 931 207 557 211 709 215 943 220 753 224 679 229 172 233 756 238 963 243 213
Other viriable costs:
Costs of sand and oil trap services 0 803 2 318 2 370 2 411 2 459 2 509 2 566 2 610 2 662 2 716 2 778 2 825 2 882 2 940 3 007 3 059 3 120 3 182 3 255 3 311 3 377 3 445 3 523 3 584
Costs of permanent repair 0 19 406 56 006 57 286 58 272 59 437 60 626 62 012 63 079 64 341 65 627 67 127 68 282 69 648 71 041 72 664 73 915 75 393 76 901 78 658 80 012 81 612 83 245 85 147 86 612
Maitenance of equipment 0 1 338 3 863 3 951 4 019 4 099 4 181 4 277 4 350 4 437 4 526 4 629 4 709 4 803 4 899 5 011 5 098 5 200 5 304 5 425 5 518 5 628 5 741 5 872 5 973
Cleanning services 0 40 150 115 875 118 523 120 563 122 974 125 434 128 300 130 508 133 118 135 781 138 883 141 274 144 099 146 981 150 340 152 927 155 986 159 106 162 741 165 543 168 853 172 230 176 166 179 198
Wastewater treatment 0 402 1 159 1 185 1 206 1 230 1 254 1 283 1 305 1 331 1 358 1 389 1 413 1 441 1 470 1 503 1 529 1 560 1 591 1 627 1 655 1 689 1 722 1 762 1 792
Other viriable costs, total 0 62 099 179 220 183 315 186 471 190 200 194 004 198 437 201 853 205 890 210 007 214 806 218 503 222 874 227 331 232 525 236 528 241 258 246 084 251 706 256 039 261 160 266 383 272 470 277 160
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: Senior Debt NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION Without VAT
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
TEST used for bsenior debt repayment period to determine 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senior debt capitalization
Beginning Balance in the first period of loan 0 11 026 341 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amount borrowed at beginning of period 10 705 185 6 483 886 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beginning of period balance, after loan drawdown 10 705 185 17 510 227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalized Interest during construction, total 321 156 339 650 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
End of Period Loan Balance 11 026 341 17 849 877 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senior debt amortization
Beginning balance in the first period of loan 0 17 849 877 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beginning balance in the other period of loan 0 0 17 219 450 15 435 684 13 647 031 11 863 265 10 079 499 8 295 733 6 507 080 4 723 315 2 939 549 1 155 783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Principal payment 0 630 427 1 783 766 1 788 653 1 783 766 1 783 766 1 783 766 1 788 653 1 783 766 1 783 766 1 783 766 1 155 783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest expense 0 157 715 430 486 385 892 341 176 296 582 251 987 207 393 162 677 118 083 73 489 18 671 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total payment 0 788 142 2 214 252 2 174 545 2 124 942 2 080 348 2 035 753 1 996 046 1 946 443 1 901 849 1 857 255 1 174 454 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ending balance 0 17 219 450 15 435 684 13 647 031 11 863 265 10 079 499 8 295 733 6 507 080 4 723 315 2 939 549 1 155 783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
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The Hypothetical IP
INITIAL PUBIC SECTOR INVESTMENT PROJECT NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION Without VAT
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Investment, total 19 739 529 12 578 120 8 705 768 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 187 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Immovables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construction, reconstruction, other works 19 275 418 12 423 326 8 546 093 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment and other long-term assets 141 576 0 159 676 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Design, technical supervisory and other services related to investments 
in long-term assets (A.1.-A.4.) 145 757 154 794 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project administration and implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other services and costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments 176 777 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 187 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Residual value 3 525 462 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 860 942
Revenue, total 48 174 636 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
Revenue from goods 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from main services 48 174 636 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
Revenue from additional services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from financial, investment and other activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial and operating costs, total 9 244 987 60 824 389 853 985 675 954 710 920 936 889 028 857 406 827 712 794 965 764 244 733 838 695 313 689 739 704 916 720 438 738 260 752 594 769 202 786 188 805 688 821 383 839 562 858 157 879 499 896 688
Operating costs 7 483 168 60 824 232 138 555 189 568 818 579 760 592 446 605 419 620 319 632 288 646 161 660 349 676 642 689 739 704 916 720 438 738 260 752 594 769 202 786 188 805 688 821 383 839 562 858 157 879 499 896 688
Raw materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salaries/wages 1 516 058 0 40 150 115 875 118 523 120 563 122 974 125 434 128 300 130 508 133 118 135 781 138 883 141 274 144 099 146 981 150 340 152 927 155 986 159 106 162 741 165 543 168 853 172 230 176 166 179 198
Electricity costs 1 464 247 0 35 094 102 277 105 642 108 514 111 770 115 123 118 911 122 143 125 808 129 582 133 846 137 484 141 609 145 857 150 657 154 752 159 395 164 177 169 579 174 189 179 415 184 797 190 878 196 067
Heating (except electricity) costs 7 844 0 188 548 566 581 599 617 637 654 674 694 717 737 759 781 807 829 854 880 908 933 961 990 1 023 1 050
Infrastructure maintenance costs 740 234 0 1 338 3 863 3 951 4 019 4 099 4 181 4 277 4 350 4 437 4 526 4 629 475 944 4 803 4 899 5 011 5 098 5 200 5 304 1 584 389 5 518 5 628 5 741 5 872 5 973
Other costs 3 754 784 60 824 155 367 332 626 340 137 346 083 353 005 360 065 368 195 374 631 382 124 389 767 398 567 -65 700 413 646 421 919 431 445 438 988 447 767 456 723 -1 111 929 475 200 484 704 494 398 505 561 514 399
Interest on loans (G.3.1.) 1 761 819 0 157 715 430 486 385 892 341 176 296 582 251 987 207 393 162 677 118 083 73 489 18 671 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taxes (+negative impact;- positive impact on project cash flows -4 718 280 2 654 178 1 600 607 -680 979 -696 341 -708 086 -722 018 -736 223 -752 821 -765 508 -741 269 -795 906 -813 839 -827 544 -843 804 -860 381 -879 755 -894 557 -866 079 -930 027 -950 955 -966 941 -985 912 -1 005 251 -1 027 856 -1 045 119
Total import/purchase VAT 5 398 394 2 654 178 1 868 529 92 256 94 562 96 431 98 589 100 797 103 324 105 374 147 031 110 159 112 929 115 178 117 771 120 426 123 463 125 930 174 817 131 687 135 019 137 726 140 849 144 044 147 700 150 673
Total sales VAT 10 116 674 0 267 922 773 235 790 903 804 517 820 608 837 020 856 145 870 882 888 300 906 066 926 769 942 721 961 576 980 807 1 003 218 1 020 487 1 040 897 1 061 714 1 085 974 1 104 667 1 126 760 1 149 296 1 175 556 1 195 791
Total sum of other indirect taxes 0
Net revenue 19 190 121 -12 638 944 -7 819 802 2 696 398 2 811 496 2 910 098 3 018 627 3 128 402 3 249 170 3 352 093 3 278 649 3 580 761 3 717 872 3 799 411 3 874 017 3 950 073 4 038 970 4 106 867 3 968 201 4 269 595 4 365 617 4 438 937 4 525 964 4 614 680 4 718 389 4 797 557
Financing, total 11 520 136 15 293 122 9 420 409 -1 783 766 -1 788 653 -1 783 766 -1 783 766 -1 783 766 -1 788 653 -1 783 766 -1 783 766 -1 783 766 -1 155 783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Requested financing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EU structural assistance funds 0
LT co-financing funds 0
Other international financing funds 0
Funds of special budgetary programme for VAT financing 0
Own funds 6 879 161 4 266 781 3 227 299 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public funds (state, municipal budget, other public funds) 6 879 161 4 266 781 3 227 299 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Private funds (own, other private resources) 0
Loans 4 640 975 11 026 341 6 193 109 -1 783 766 -1 788 653 -1 783 766 -1 783 766 -1 783 766 -1 788 653 -1 783 766 -1 783 766 -1 783 766 -1 155 783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loans 16 432 690 11 026 341 6 823 536 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loans reimbursement (not including interest) 11 791 715 0 630 427 1 783 766 1 788 653 1 783 766 1 783 766 1 783 766 1 788 653 1 783 766 1 783 766 1 783 766 1 155 783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
 
Financial cash flows:
Cash flow for investment FA indicators 24 477 402 -12 638 944 -7 662 087 3 126 884 3 197 388 3 251 274 3 315 209 3 380 389 3 456 563 3 514 770 3 396 732 3 654 249 3 736 543 3 799 411 3 874 017 3 950 073 4 038 970 4 106 867 3 968 201 4 269 595 4 365 617 4 438 937 4 525 964 4 614 680 4 718 389 20 658 499
Cumulative financial sustainability cash flow 0 0 1 593 611 1 719 184 1 834 418 1 956 880 2 080 859 2 213 338 2 333 835 2 236 151 2 592 901 3 375 928 4 626 955 4 717 821 4 810 455 4 918 725 5 001 424 4 834 280 5 199 622 5 316 572 5 405 877 5 511 876 5 619 931 5 746 245 5 842 675
Cash flow for capital FA indicators -4 327 605 -2 739 622 912 632 1 022 843 1 126 333 1 234 861 1 344 636 1 460 517 1 568 327 1 681 989 1 796 995 2 562 089 3 799 411 3 874 017 3 950 073 4 038 970 4 106 867 4 187 448 4 269 595 4 365 617 4 438 937 4 525 964 4 614 680 4 718 389 20 658 499
Cash flow for investment FA indicators without residual value -12 638 944 -7 662 087 3 126 884 3 197 388 3 251 274 3 315 209 3 380 389 3 456 563 3 514 770 3 396 732 3 654 249 3 736 543 3 799 411 3 874 017 3 950 073 4 038 970 4 106 867 3 968 201 4 269 595 4 365 617 4 438 937 4 525 964 4 614 680 4 718 389 4 797 557
Cash flow for investment FA indicators by strecing period 20 951 940 -11 901 077 -18 694 647 -16 084 060 -13 570 453 -11 163 703 -8 852 895 -6 634 213 -4 497 981 -2 452 591 -591 292 1 294 216 3 109 631 4 847 822 6 516 675 8 118 952 9 661 641 11 138 686 12 482 541 13 844 051 15 154 908 16 409 967 17 614 924 18 771 776 19 885 571 20 951 940
Financial indicators: NPV of indicators depending on the length of 
a period NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Financial net present value - FNPV(I) 24 477 402 -57 273 60 157 1 265 442 2 473 108 3 668 023 4 853 809 6 028 278 7 194 873 8 341 279 9 470 606 10 575 101 11 665 901 12 732 923 13 779 811 14 805 869 15 814 472 16 842 178 17 918 918 18 954 317 19 958 588 20 925 463 21 859 513 22 761 698 23 636 077 24 477 402
Financial internal rate of return - FIRR(I) 15,5% #NUM! 6,7% 10,5% 11,6% 12,2% 12,6% 12,9% 13,2% 13,5% 13,7% 13,9% 14,1% 14,3% 14,4% 14,6% 14,7% 14,8% 15,0% 15,1% 15,2% 15,3% 15,3% 15,4% 15,5% 15,5%
Financial modified internal rate of return - FMIRR(I) 10,0% #DIV/0! 6,7% 9,7% 10,7% 11,1% 11,2% 11,3% 11,3% 11,2% 11,1% 11,1% 11,0% 10,9% 10,8% 10,7% 10,6% 10,6% 10,5% 10,4% 10,3% 10,3% 10,2% 10,1% 10,0% 10,0%
Financial cost-benefit ratio 2,03 0,00 1,06 1,43 1,53 1,58 1,62 1,65 1,67 1,70 1,72 1,74 1,76 1,78 1,80 1,33 1,84 1,86 1,89 1,91 1,94 1,96 1,98 2,00 2,02 2,03
Financial sustainability (real values) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
0 NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
NPV(I) 20 951 940 -11 901 077 -18 694 647 -16 084 060 -13 570 453 -11 163 703 -8 852 895 -6 634 213 -4 497 981 -2 452 591 -591 292 1 294 216 3 109 631 4 847 822 6 516 675 8 118 952 9 661 641 11 138 686 12 482 541 13 844 051 15 154 908 16 409 967 17 614 924 18 771 776 19 885 571 20 951 940
IRR(I) -42% -24% -13% -6% -1% 3% 6% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 14% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
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Appendix 21 
Risk assessment of the initial IP (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: RISK ESTIMATES NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION Without VAT
Duration of reference period (DRP) for calculation of risk estimates Period begins: 16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
25 Period ends: 16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV Sum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Investment, total 6 771 805 7 428 761 4 334 036 2 977 061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 485 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Immovables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construction, reconstruction, other works 6 650 422 7 234 887 4 286 307 2 948 580 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment and other long-term assets 25 253 28 481 0 28 481 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Design, technical supervisory and other services related to investments 
in long-term assets (A.1.-A.4.) 44 943 47 730 47 730 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project administration and implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other services and costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments 51 187 117 663 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 485 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Residual value insert viriable for simulation of length period 462 189 2 079 372 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 079 372
Revenue, total 12 631 402 28 207 544 0 334 520 965 440 987 500 1 004 498 1 024 588 1 045 080 1 068 959 1 087 360 1 109 107 1 131 289 1 157 138 1 177 056 1 200 597 1 224 609 1 252 591 1 274 152 1 299 635 1 325 628 1 355 918 1 379 257 1 406 842 1 434 979 1 467 768 1 493 032
Revenue from goods 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from services 12 631 402 28 207 544 0 334 520 965 440 987 500 1 004 498 1 024 588 1 045 080 1 068 959 1 087 360 1 109 107 1 131 289 1 157 138 1 177 056 1 200 597 1 224 609 1 252 591 1 274 152 1 299 635 1 325 628 1 355 918 1 379 257 1 406 842 1 434 979 1 467 768 1 493 032
Revenue from financial, investment and other activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial and operating costs, total 3 444 482 7 954 353 22 839 104 943 256 990 257 082 256 151 255 889 255 734 256 303 255 758 255 942 256 244 256 184 337 706 264 696 270 525 277 217 282 599 288 835 295 214 1 634 621 308 429 315 256 322 238 330 252 336 707
Operating costs 3 245 922 7 678 893 22 839 87 168 208 473 213 591 217 700 222 464 227 335 232 930 237 424 242 634 247 961 254 079 337 706 264 696 270 525 277 217 282 599 288 835 295 214 1 634 621 308 429 315 256 322 238 330 252 336 707
Raw materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salaries/wages 569 280 1 271 276 0 15 076 43 511 44 505 45 271 46 177 47 100 48 177 49 006 49 986 50 986 52 151 53 048 54 109 55 191 56 453 57 424 58 573 59 744 61 109 62 161 63 404 64 673 66 150 67 289
Electricity costs 549 825 1 260 767 0 13 178 38 405 39 669 40 747 41 970 43 229 44 651 45 865 47 241 48 658 50 259 51 625 53 174 54 769 56 572 58 110 59 853 61 648 63 677 65 408 67 370 69 391 71 675 73 623
Heating (except electricity) costs 2 945 6 754 0 71 206 213 218 225 232 239 246 253 261 269 277 285 293 303 311 321 330 341 350 361 372 384 394
Infrastructure maintenance costs 277 958 812 226 0 503 1 450 1 484 1 509 1 539 1 570 1 606 1 634 1 666 1 700 1 738 178 717 1 804 1 840 1 882 1 914 1 952 1 991 594 938 2 072 2 113 2 156 2 205 2 243
Other costs 1 845 914 4 327 870 22 839 58 340 124 901 127 721 129 954 132 553 135 204 138 257 140 674 143 488 146 357 149 662 54 038 155 324 158 430 162 008 164 840 168 137 171 499 914 555 178 438 182 006 185 647 189 838 193 157
Interest on loans (G.3.1.) 198 560 275 460 0 17 775 48 517 43 491 38 451 33 425 28 399 23 374 18 334 13 308 8 282 2 104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net revenue 2 415 115 12 824 431 -4 356 876 -2 747 484 708 450 730 418 748 347 768 699 789 346 812 656 831 601 798 987 875 045 900 955 839 351 935 901 954 085 975 374 991 553 947 314 1 030 414 -278 703 1 070 828 1 091 587 1 112 741 1 137 515 1 156 326 
 
Risk group 
Design risks 44 943 47 730 47 730 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired construction quality risks 6 650 422 7 234 887 4 286 307 2 948 580 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired services quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 25 253 28 481 0 28 481 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial accessibility risks 198 560 275 460 0 17 775 48 517 43 491 38 451 33 425 28 399 23 374 18 334 13 308 8 282 2 104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Availability risks 3 245 922 7 678 893 22 839 87 168 208 473 213 591 217 700 222 464 227 335 232 930 237 424 242 634 247 961 254 079 337 706 264 696 270 525 277 217 282 599 288 835 295 214 1 634 621 308 429 315 256 322 238 330 252 336 707
Demand risks 12 631 402 28 207 544 0 334 520 965 440 987 500 1 004 498 1 024 588 1 045 080 1 068 959 1 087 360 1 109 107 1 131 289 1 157 138 1 177 056 1 200 597 1 224 609 1 252 591 1 274 152 1 299 635 1 325 628 1 355 918 1 379 257 1 406 842 1 434 979 1 467 768 1 493 032
Residual value risks 513 376 2 197 035 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 485 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 079 372
Total value of risk in period 23 309 877 45 670 029 4 356 876 3 416 524 1 222 430 1 244 582 1 260 649 1 280 477 1 300 814 1 325 263 1 343 118 1 419 227 1 387 533 1 413 322 1 514 762 1 465 293 1 495 134 1 529 808 1 556 751 1 651 955 1 620 842 2 990 539 1 687 686 1 722 098 1 757 217 1 798 020 3 909 111
Residual value for risk assessment, year 12 578 120 21 152 494 20 780 719 20 407 925 20 036 150 19 664 375 19 292 600 18 919 806 18 548 031 18 362 215 17 987 014 17 610 784 17 235 583 16 860 381 16 485 180 16 108 951 15 858 335 16 052 803 16 025 416 15 997 953 15 970 566 15 943 179 15 915 792 15 888 329 15 860 942
NPV of Risk values depending on the length of a period
Design risks 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943
Acquired construction quality risks 4 036 070 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422 6 650 422
Acquired services quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 0 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253 25 253
Financial accessibility risks 0 15 760 56 266 90 456 118 919 142 217 160 857 175 302 185 972 193 264 197 538 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560 198 560
Availability risks 21 506 98 793 272 844 440 758 601 910 756 974 906 183 1 050 139 1 188 306 1 321 261 1 449 204 1 572 649 1 727 146 1 841 172 1 950 905 2 056 789 2 158 426 2 256 242 2 350 381 2 841 206 2 928 411 3 012 342 3 093 124 3 171 081 3 245 922
Demand risks 0 296 601 1 102 633 1 878 950 2 622 528 3 336 699 4 022 626 4 683 266 5 316 046 5 923 800 6 507 519 7 069 720 7 608 211 8 125 406 8 622 146 9 100 575 9 558 827 9 998 956 10 421 679 10 828 818 11 218 787 11 593 334 11 953 068 12 299 541 12 631 402
Residual value risks 1 552 724 62 2 274 522 2 103 313 1 944 441 1 796 951 1 660 054 1 532 935 1 415 078 1 348 804 1 246 413 1 151 416 1 063 426 981 886 906 344 836 325 777 416 763 897 721 144 680 951 643 170 607 653 574 267 542 879 513 376
NPV of risk depending on the length of a period 5 655 244 7 131 834 10 426 882 11 234 093 12 008 415 12 753 459 13 470 338 14 162 260 14 826 018 15 507 747 16 121 291 16 712 962 17 317 959 17 867 641 18 398 572 18 912 865 19 413 846 19 938 272 20 412 381 21 270 152 21 709 545 22 132 507 22 539 636 22 932 679 23 309 877 
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Appendix 22 
Risk allocation (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Risk factorsand their allocation Private Public
Design risks 75,0% 25%
RF1: Occasional restriction on the land transferred to implementation of the IP 
that have not been known in advance 0% 100%
RF2: Errors in project design 100% 0%
RF3: Delay  of design work 100% 0%
RF4: Cost-overrrun of design work 100% 0%
Acquired construction quality risks 75,0% 25%
RF1: Occasional restrictions on the work of the contract due to the requirements 
of archaeological and cultural heritage protection that have not been known in 
advance 0% 100%
RF2: Quality of contruction is not ensured due to a lack of resources 100% 0%
RF3: Delay  of construction work 100% 0%
RF4: Cost-overrrun of construction work 100% 0%
Acquired services quality risks 75,0% 25%
RF1: The duration of the services is deviating from the plan 100% 0%
RF2: The price of the services is deviating from the predetermined value 100% 0%
RF3: Changes of requirements from the public sector for quality of services 0% 100%
RF4: Cost-overrrun of construction work 100% 0%
Acquired equipment quality risks 100,0% 0%
RF1: Delay to acquire the equipment 100% 0%
FR1:Delay to install equipment due to a lack of human resources 100% 0%
RF3: Changes of requirements from the public sector for quality of services 100% 0%
RF4: Damage done to the third parties by installing the equipment 100% 0%
Financial accessibility risks 100,0% 0%
RF1: Increase of financing needed due to cost overrun 100% 0%
RF2: Interest rate changes 100% 0%
RF3: Increase of financing needed due to chages in taxation sytem (excluding VAT) 100% 0%
RF4: Non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the main loan 100% 0%
Availability risks 100,0% 0%
RF1: Use of low-quality materials and equipment 100% 0%
RF2: Damange made to the third parties 100% 0%
RF3: Necessary permissions (licenses) are not obtained 100% 0%
RF4: The availability of services or infrastructure is not ensured due to a lack of human resources 100% 0%
Demand risks 88,0% 12%
RF1: Aging of technologies 100% 0%
RF2: Delay to start providing the services 100% 0%
RF3: Changes of competition in the market 50% 50%
RF4: Changes in pricing 100% 0%
Residual value risks 100,0% 0%
RF1: Deviation from the property maintenance plan 100% 0%
RF2: Inaccurate plan of maintenance costs 100% 0%
RF3: Lack of information on the use of property during the operation period 100% 0%
RF4: Restrictions on the management, use and disposal rights of transferred / 
returned assets due to transactions with third parties 100% 0%
NPV of risk groups Private Public
Design risks 33 707 11 236
Acquired construction quality risks 4 987 816 1 662 605
Acquired services quality risks 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 25 253 0
Financial accessibility risks 198 560 0
Availability risks 3 245 922 0
Demand risks 11 115 634 1 515 768
Residual value risks 513 376 0 Private Public
Total 20 120 268 3 189 609 86% 14%
Period begins:
Period ends:
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Appendix 23 
Calculation of FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr and risk values (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of 
this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: MAXIMUM OBLIGATION NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION Without VAT
Period begins: 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
Period ends: 42735 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Period number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Payments calculation
 
Risk values (adjusted) NPV
Design risks 44 943 47 730 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired construction quality risks 6 650 422 4 286 307 2 948 580 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired services quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 25 253 0 28 481 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial accessibility risks 198 560 0 17 775 48 517 43 491 38 451 33 425 28 399 23 374 18 334 13 308 8 282 2 104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Availability risks 3 245 922 22 839 87 168 208 473 213 591 217 700 222 464 227 335 232 930 237 424 242 634 247 961 254 079 337 706 264 696 270 525 277 217 282 599 288 835 295 214 1 634 621 308 429 315 256 322 238 330 252 336 707
Demand risks 12 631 402 0 334 520 965 440 987 500 1 004 498 1 024 588 1 045 080 1 068 959 1 087 360 1 109 107 1 131 289 1 157 138 1 177 056 1 200 597 1 224 609 1 252 591 1 274 152 1 299 635 1 325 628 1 355 918 1 379 257 1 406 842 1 434 979 1 467 768 1 493 032
Residual value risks 513 376 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 485 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 079 372
Total value of risk in period 23 309 877 4 356 876 3 416 524 1 222 430 1 244 582 1 260 649 1 280 477 1 300 814 1 325 263 1 343 118 1 419 227 1 387 533 1 413 322 1 514 762 1 465 293 1 495 134 1 529 808 1 556 751 1 651 955 1 620 842 2 990 539 1 687 686 1 722 098 1 757 217 1 798 020 3 909 111  
Maximum obligations of the public sector NPV
Based on actual actual cost 5 226 200 17 048 414 11 198 656 -1 661 862 -1 708 963 -1 745 819 -1 788 787 -1 832 469 -1 882 841 -1 922 150 -1 726 770 -2 014 725 -2 069 764 -2 030 063 -2 152 803 -2 197 659 -2 250 296 -2 290 027 -2 054 712 -2 385 747 -1 110 355 -2 485 204 -2 536 257 -2 588 259 -2 649 306 -615 952 
NPV of values depending on the length of a period NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
NPV of total risks 4 102 520 7 131 772 8 152 360 9 130 780 10 063 974 10 956 508 11 810 283 12 629 325 13 410 941 14 188 631 14 904 566 15 591 234 16 284 222 16 915 443 17 521 917 18 106 228 18 666 118 19 225 563 19 742 425 20 640 389 21 117 563 21 576 041 22 016 557 22 440 987 23 309 877
Max. obligation based on actual costs 16 053 120 25 982 380 24 594 917 23 251 426 21 959 086 20 712 244 19 509 522 18 345 885 17 227 306 16 281 092 15 241 540 14 235 937 13 307 204 12 379 817 11 488 376 10 628 873 9 805 259 9 109 418 8 348 639 8 015 235 7 312 571 6 637 338 5 988 489 5 363 109 5 226 200 
 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: RETAINED OBLIGATION AND PAYMENT NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION Without VAT
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Period begins:
Period ends:  
Risk retained by the Public sector in period NPV
Design risks 11 236 11 932 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired construction quality risks 1 662 605 1 071 577 737 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired services quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial accessibility risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Availability risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Demand risks 1 515 768 0 40 142 115 853 118 500 120 540 122 951 125 410 128 275 130 483 133 093 135 755 138 857 141 247 144 072 146 953 150 311 152 898 155 956 159 075 162 710 165 511 168 821 172 197 176 132 179 164
Residual value risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3 189 609 1 083 509 777 287 115 853 118 500 120 540 122 951 125 410 128 275 130 483 133 093 135 755 138 857 141 247 144 072 146 953 150 311 152 898 155 956 159 075 162 710 165 511 168 821 172 197 176 132 179 164
Transferred risk 3 273 367 2 639 236 1 106 578 1 126 082 1 140 110 1 157 527 1 175 405 1 196 988 1 212 635 1 286 134 1 251 778 1 274 465 1 373 515 1 321 222 1 348 181 1 379 497 1 403 853 1 495 999 1 461 766 2 827 828 1 522 176 1 553 277 1 585 020 1 621 888 3 729 947 
Maximum payment to the private sector in the PPP NPV
Based on actual actual cost -831 672 15 912 311 10 301 323 -2 020 307 -2 071 306 -2 111 165 -2 157 682 -2 204 985 -2 259 575 -2 302 135 -2 110 598 -2 402 471 -2 462 077 -2 425 896 -2 552 795 -2 601 893 -2 659 474 -2 703 014 -2 472 202 -2 807 829 -1 537 788 -2 916 761 -2 972 688 -3 029 660 -3 096 501 -1 067 610 
NPV of values depending on the length of a period NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Retained obligation of the public sector in the PPP 1 020 253 1 709 433 1 806 157 1 899 315 1 988 545 2 074 245 2 156 556 2 235 833 2 311 767 2 384 697 2 454 744 2 522 208 2 586 826 2 648 890 2 708 499 2 765 910 2 820 900 2 873 716 2 924 443 2 973 299 3 020 096 3 065 041 3 108 209 3 149 786 3 189 609
Maximum payment to the private sector in the PPP based on actual costs 14 983 343 24 116 985 22 430 262 20 801 918 19 239 132 17 735 158 16 287 940 14 891 473 13 551 765 12 395 226 11 155 606 9 959 396 8 849 573 7 749 877 6 694 466 5 678 677 4 706 531 3 869 306 2 973 931 2 512 182 1 687 501 896 075 136 571 -594 371 -831 672 
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Appendix 24 
Calculation of neutrality costs (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: NEUTRALITY NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Other fixed costs:
Land rent tax 93 670 6 188 6 311 6 438 6 585 6 698 6 832 6 969 7 128 7 250 7 395 7 543 7 716 7 849 8 006 8 166 8 352 8 496 8 666 8 839 9 041 9 197 9 381 9 568 9 787 9 955
Real estate tax 2 072 068 0 66 399 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873
PPP contract implementation monitoring tax 702 524 46 406 47 335 48 281 49 384 50 235 51 239 52 264 53 458 54 378 55 466 56 575 57 868 58 864 60 041 61 242 62 642 63 720 64 994 66 294 67 809 68 976 70 356 71 763 73 402 74 666
Contribution for the municipality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other obligations, total 2 868 262 52 594 120 045 242 592 243 842 244 806 245 944 247 106 248 459 249 502 250 735 251 992 253 457 254 586 255 920 257 281 258 867 260 089 261 533 263 006 264 723 266 046 267 609 269 204 271 063 272 495
Profit tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutrality costs, total 2 868 262 52 594 120 045 242 592 243 842 244 806 245 944 247 106 248 459 249 502 250 735 251 992 253 457 254 586 255 920 257 281 258 867 260 089 261 533 263 006 264 723 266 046 267 609 269 204 271 063 272 495
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
 
Calculation of non-financial benefits (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: EXTERNALITIES NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Costs of Externalities :
Social cost of services not being delivered 1 714 350 631 128 643 750 656 625 1 376 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
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Appendix 25 
Calculation of Public Sector Comparator (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
VALUE FOR MONEY NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
PSC (Pu. S.) = PSC (PPA) NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Procurement and oversight cost 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000
Net base cost -20 262 241 11 901 077 18 694 647 16 084 060 13 570 453 11 163 703 8 852 895 6 634 213 4 497 981 2 452 591 591 292 -1 294 216 -3 109 631 -4 632 237 -6 301 090 -7 903 367 -9 446 056 -10 923 101 -12 266 956 -13 628 466 -14 465 210 -15 720 269 -16 925 226 -18 082 078 -19 195 873 -20 262 241
Raw cost 27 912 395 11 901 077 19 825 849 20 289 367 20 736 540 21 165 706 21 578 661 21 976 021 22 359 391 22 727 346 23 183 949 23 524 674 23 853 424 24 384 557 24 688 222 24 980 454 25 262 433 25 533 106 25 867 850 26 118 554 26 834 590 27 066 826 27 290 345 27 505 475 27 713 085 27 912 395
Capex 19 739 529 11 843 804 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529
Opex 8 172 866 57 273 263 097 726 616 1 173 789 1 602 955 2 015 909 2 413 270 2 796 640 3 164 594 3 518 670 3 859 395 4 188 144 4 719 278 5 022 943 5 315 175 5 597 154 5 867 827 6 128 321 6 379 025 7 095 061 7 327 298 7 550 816 7 765 947 7 973 556 8 172 866
Total revenue 48 174 636 0 1 131 202 4 205 308 7 166 087 10 002 003 12 725 765 15 341 808 17 861 410 20 274 755 22 592 657 24 818 890 26 963 054 29 016 794 30 989 312 32 883 821 34 708 489 36 456 207 38 134 806 39 747 020 41 299 799 42 787 095 44 215 571 45 587 553 46 908 958 48 174 636
Main services 48 174 636 0 1 131 202 4 205 308 7 166 087 10 002 003 12 725 765 15 341 808 17 861 410 20 274 755 22 592 657 24 818 890 26 963 054 29 016 794 30 989 312 32 883 821 34 708 489 36 456 207 38 134 806 39 747 020 41 299 799 42 787 095 44 215 571 45 587 553 46 908 958 48 174 636
Additional services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total risk 23 132 868 4 102 520 7 131 772 8 152 360 9 130 780 10 063 974 10 956 508 11 810 283 12 629 325 13 410 941 14 188 631 14 904 566 15 591 234 16 329 166 16 960 387 17 566 861 18 151 172 18 711 062 19 270 506 19 787 369 20 463 379 20 940 554 21 399 032 21 839 547 22 263 977 23 132 868
Retained risk 3 189 609 1 020 253 1 709 433 1 806 157 1 899 315 1 988 545 2 074 245 2 156 556 2 235 833 2 311 767 2 384 697 2 454 744 2 522 208 2 586 826 2 648 890 2 708 499 2 765 910 2 820 900 2 873 716 2 924 443 2 973 299 3 020 096 3 065 041 3 108 209 3 149 786 3 189 609
Transferable risk 19 943 258 3 082 266 5 422 338 6 346 203 7 231 465 8 075 429 8 882 263 9 653 727 10 393 492 11 099 174 11 803 934 12 449 822 13 069 026 13 742 339 14 311 497 14 858 362 15 385 262 15 890 162 16 396 791 16 862 926 17 490 080 17 920 458 18 333 990 18 731 338 19 114 191 19 943 258
Competitive neutrality 2 774 592 49 524 155 961 358 497 550 192 731 409 902 840 1 065 025 1 218 579 1 363 774 1 501 169 1 631 191 1 754 334 1 870 804 1 981 050 2 085 411 2 184 285 2 277 827 2 366 397 2 450 266 2 529 754 2 604 975 2 676 222 2 743 708 2 807 694 2 868 262
Profit tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other taxes and obligations 2 774 592 49 524 155 961 358 497 550 192 731 409 902 840 1 065 025 1 218 579 1 363 774 1 501 169 1 631 191 1 754 334 1 870 804 1 981 050 2 085 411 2 184 285 2 277 827 2 366 397 2 450 266 2 529 754 2 604 975 2 676 222 2 743 708 2 807 694 2 868 262
PSC (Pu. S.) 5 695 219 16 103 120 26 032 380 24 644 917 23 301 426 22 009 086 20 762 244 19 559 522 18 395 885 17 277 306 16 331 092 15 291 540 14 285 937 13 617 733 12 690 346 11 798 905 10 939 402 10 115 788 9 419 948 8 659 168 8 577 924 7 875 260 7 200 027 6 551 178 5 925 798 5 788 888
NFBs, Total 1 714 350 594 282 1 165 061 1 713 268 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350
PSC (Pu. S. including NFBs) 7 409 568 16 697 402 27 197 441 26 358 184 25 015 776 23 723 436 22 476 593 21 273 872 20 110 235 18 991 655 18 045 441 17 005 890 16 000 287 15 332 083 14 404 695 13 513 255 12 653 752 11 830 138 11 134 297 10 373 518 10 292 273 9 589 610 8 914 377 8 265 527 7 640 148 7 503 238 
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Appendix 26 
Cash flows of the Shadow bid model (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: DAYS AND INFLATION
Period begins: 16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
Period ends: 16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Project year X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Design
Days in period 214 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365
Sum of days in the refference period 365 730 1 095 1 461 1 826 2 191 2 556 2 922 3 287 3 652 4 017 4 383 4 748 5 113 5 478 5 844 6 209 6 574 6 939 7 305 7 670 8 035 8 400 8 766 9 131
Days left of garage construction in period 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Days of garage construction in period 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflation factors
Does Period Have Either 365 or 366 Days? FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
Inflation Factor: 1,012 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020
Cumulative inflation factor: 1,012 1,032 1,053 1,074 1,095 1,117 1,139 1,162 1,186 1,209 1,233 1,258 1,283 1,309 1,335 1,362 1,389 1,417 1,445 1,474 1,504 1,534 1,565 1,596 1,628 1,660
Inflation Factor for expense of energy, water and waste disposal 1,018 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030
Cumulative Inflation Factor: 1,018 1,048 1,080 1,112 1,145 1,180 1,215 1,252 1,289 1,328 1,368 1,409 1,451 1,495 1,540 1,586 1,633 1,682 1,733 1,785 1,839 1,894 1,951 2,009 2,070 2,132
Construction of parking plots
Days of parking plots in period 215 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Installation of parking equipment
Days of quipment installation in period 0 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operation
Cumulative days for operation left in period 0 129 494 860 1 225 1 590 1 955 2 321 2 686 3 051 3 416 3 782 4 147 4 512 4 877 5 243 5 608 5 973 6 338 6 704 7 069 7 434 7 799 8 165 8 530
Repair
Is medium repair needed? FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Is major repair needed? FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Depreciation of parking plots
Depreciation days in period 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation of equipment
Depreciation days in period 0 129 365 366 365 365 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation of reinvestments No. 1
Depreciation days in period 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 365 366 365 365 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation of reinvestments No. 2
Depreciation days in period 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 365 366 365 365 237 0 0
Depreciation, summary
Parking plots 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment 0 129 365 366 365 365 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment (reinvestments 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 365 366 365 365 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment (reinvestments 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 365 366 365 365 237 0 0
Time for debt capitalization
Investments days in period 365 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cumulative investments days in period 365 601 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Time for debt repayment
Repayment days in period 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 236,5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Time for subordinated debt repayment
Repayment days in period 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: CAPEX NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Construction of parking plots:
Multi-level parking plots 14 458 285 9 318 604 6 410 333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ground parking plots 826 188 532 492 366 305 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking plots, total 15 284 472 9 851 095 6 776 637 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional cost of parking plots construction:
Design 131 181 139 315 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Development fees 206 340 132 990 91 485 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Advisory fees 68 780 44 330 30 495 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Insurance 206 340 132 990 91 485 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Contingency 1 375 603 886 599 609 897 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional cost, total 1 988 245 1 336 223 823 361 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking garage, total 17 272 717 11 187 318 7 599 999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation of parking equipment:
Equipment 110 799 0 124 964 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation and adjustment 14 958 0 16 870 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation of parking equipment, total 125 756 0 141 834 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments:
Renewal and reinvestments of parking equipment 1 91 071 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Renewal and reinvestments of parking equipment 2 65 953 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments, total 157 024 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capex: total (re)-investments (Excl. Interest During Construction, IDC) 17 555 498 11 187 318 7 741 832 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Compute External Funding Required, Net of Government Grant:
Capex: total investments, excluding IDC 17 398 474 11 187 318 7 741 832 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grant from government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
External funding required, net of government grant 17 398 474 11 187 318 7 741 832 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Compute Capitalized Loan Interest During Construction (IDC):
Beginning of period balance, before loan drawdown 7 172 579 0 8 089 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amount borrowed at beginning of period 12 178 932 7 831 123 5 419 283 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beginning of period balance, after loan drawdown 19 351 510 7 831 123 13 508 832 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalized Interest during construction, total 498 905 258 427 288 238 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalized interest during construction for parking garage 494 223 258 427 282 957 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalized interest during construction for equipment 4 682 0 5 281 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
End of Period Loan Balance 19 850 415 8 089 550 13 797 070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Compute Capitalized Subordinated Debt Interest During Construction (IDC):
Beginning of period balance, before subordinated debt drawdown 1 844 377 0 2 080 170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amount left for financing of private subject at beginning of period 5 219 542 3 356 195 2 322 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amount sub. Debt borrowed at beginning of period 3 131 725 2 013 717 1 393 530 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalized interest during construction for parking garage, total 88 936 66 453 29 734 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalized interest during construction for parking garage 88 453 66 453 29 189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalized interest during construction for equipment 483 0 545 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
End of Period Subordinated Debt Balance 3 220 662 2 080 170 1 423 264 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Compute Total Capex for funding:
Capex: Investments and capitalized IDC 17 986 315 11 512 198 8 059 804 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capex:Reinvestments 157 024 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Capex 18 143 340 11 512 198 8 059 804 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
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The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: CAPEX AND DEPRECIATION NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Compute gross fixed assets:
Gross Fixed Assets: Parking garage 11 187 318 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (investment) 0 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 749 194 749 194 749 194 749 194 749 194 749 194 749 194 749
Gross Fixed Assets, total 11 187 318 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098
Calculate depreciation expense:
Depreciation expense: parking garage 0 442 357 1 251 631 1 255 060 1 251 631 1 251 631 1 251 631 1 255 060 1 251 631 1 251 631 1 251 631 1 255 060 1 251 631 1 251 631 1 251 631 1 255 060 808 416 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (investment) 0 10 019 28 347 28 425 28 347 28 347 18 348 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 649 33 217 33 308 33 217 33 217 21 591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 650 38 923 39 030 38 923 38 923 25 300 0 0
Depreciation expense, total 0 452 376 1 279 978 1 283 485 1 279 978 1 279 978 1 269 979 1 255 060 1 251 631 1 263 279 1 284 847 1 288 368 1 284 847 1 284 847 1 273 222 1 255 060 808 416 13 650 38 923 39 030 38 923 38 923 25 300 0 0
Calculate accumulated depreciation:
Depreciation expense: parking garage 0 442 357 1 693 988 2 949 047 4 200 678 5 452 308 6 703 939 7 958 998 9 210 629 10 462 259 11 713 890 12 968 950 14 220 580 15 472 211 16 723 841 17 978 901 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317 18 787 317
Depreciation expense: equipment (investment) 0 10 019 38 366 66 791 95 138 123 486 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834 141 834
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 649 44 866 78 174 111 391 144 608 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199 166 199
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 650 52 573 91 603 130 526 169 449 194 749 194 749 194 749
Depreciation expense, total 0 452 376 1 732 354 3 015 838 4 295 816 5 575 794 6 845 772 8 100 832 9 352 463 10 615 742 11 900 589 13 188 957 14 473 804 15 758 652 17 031 873 18 286 933 19 095 349 19 108 999 19 147 922 19 186 952 19 225 875 19 264 798 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098
Calculate net fixed assets
Gross fixed assets 11 187 318 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098
Total accumulated depreciation 0 452 376 1 732 354 3 015 838 4 295 816 5 575 794 6 845 772 8 100 832 9 352 463 10 615 742 11 900 589 13 188 957 14 473 804 15 758 652 17 031 873 18 286 933 19 095 349 19 108 999 19 147 922 19 186 952 19 225 875 19 264 798 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098
Net fixed assets 11 187 318 18 476 775 17 196 797 15 913 312 14 633 335 13 353 357 12 083 378 10 828 318 9 576 688 8 479 607 7 194 760 5 906 392 4 621 545 3 336 697 2 063 476 808 416 0 181 099 142 176 103 146 64 223 25 300 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
Residual value for FNIS calculation  
Residual value, Total 11 187 318 18 476 775 17 196 797 15 913 312 14 633 335 13 353 357 12 083 378 10 828 318 9 576 688 8 479 607 7 194 760 5 906 392 4 621 545 3 336 697 2 063 476 808 416 0 181 099 142 176 103 146 64 223 25 300 0 0 0 
The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: FUNDING NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
TEST used for bank loan repayment period to determine 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEST used for subordinated loan repayment period to determine 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Calculate total funding tequired:
Capex per period 18 143 340 11 512 198 8 059 804 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total capex (cumulative) 239 317 205 11 512 198 19 572 002 19 572 002 19 572 002 19 572 002 19 572 002 19 572 002 19 572 002 19 572 002 19 738 200 19 738 200 19 738 200 19 738 200 19 738 200 19 738 200 19 738 200 19 738 200 19 932 949 19 932 949 19 932 949 19 932 949 19 932 949 19 932 949 19 932 949 19 932 949
Grant from government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cumulative government grant amount 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net financing needed, excluding DSRA (Cumulative) 28 193 576 11 512 198 19 572 002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Initial funding of debt service reserve account 129 520 0 146 078 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Initial funding of subordinated debt service reserve account 39 634 0 44 701 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total financing needed (Cumulative) 28 323 096 11 512 198 19 718 080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total financing needed (per period) 18 115 835 11 512 198 8 205 882 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Calculate cumulative funding amounts of debt and equity:
Debt financing (per period) 12 681 085 8 058 539 5 744 117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cumulative amount of debt financing 19 826 167 8 058 539 13 802 656 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Initial financing of the private subject during construction (per period) 5 434 751 3 453 659 2 461 765 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net private financing needed, excluding DSRA (Cumulative) 8 496 929 3 453 659 5 915 424 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Initial subordinated debt financing during construction (per period) 3 260 850 2 072 196 1 477 059 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cumulative amount of sub. Debt 5 098 157 2 072 196 3 549 254 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Initial pure equity financing during construction (per period) 2 173 900 1 381 464 984 706 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional equity financing during operating period (per period) 159 715 169 617 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total equity financing (Cumulative) 30 881 642 1 551 081 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
Loan Amortization: Level Payment
Beginning Balance in the first period of loan 0 13 802 656 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beginning Balance in lalter periods 0 0 13 371 215 12 138 821 10 873 153 9 573 311 8 238 374 6 867 394 5 459 397 4 013 385 2 528 330 1 003 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Payment 10 525 895 0 563 153 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 029 626 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest Expense 1 522 828 0 131 711 361 023 327 748 293 575 258 479 222 436 185 420 147 404 108 361 68 265 17 539 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Principal Payment (udjusted for the modeling) 8 998 738 0 431 441 1 232 394 1 265 668 1 299 841 1 334 937 1 370 980 1 407 997 1 446 013 1 485 055 1 525 152 1 003 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ending Balance 0 13 371 215 12 138 821 10 873 153 9 573 311 8 238 374 6 867 394 5 459 397 4 013 385 2 528 330 1 003 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Loan Amortization: Level Payment
Beginning Balance in the first period of loan 0 13 802 656 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beginning Balance in lalter periods 0 0 13 371 215 12 138 821 10 873 153 9 573 311 8 238 374 6 867 394 5 459 397 4 013 385 2 528 330 1 003 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Payment 10 525 895 0 563 153 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 593 416 1 029 626 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest Expense 1 522 828 0 131 711 361 023 327 748 293 575 258 479 222 436 185 420 147 404 108 361 68 265 17 539 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Principal Payment (udjusted for the modeling) 8 998 738 0 431 441 1 232 394 1 265 668 1 299 841 1 334 937 1 370 980 1 407 997 1 446 013 1 485 055 1 525 152 1 003 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ending Balance 0 13 371 215 12 138 821 10 873 153 9 573 311 8 238 374 6 867 394 5 459 397 4 013 385 2 528 330 1 003 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
282 
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Period begins:
Period ends:  
Selected Loan Amortization Used In Model Calculations
Beginning Balance 0 13 802 656 13 315 170 11 935 849 10 552 749 9 173 428 7 794 108 6 414 787 5 031 687 3 652 366 2 273 045 893 724 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Principal Payment 9 118 101 0 487 486 1 379 321 1 383 100 1 379 321 1 379 321 1 379 321 1 383 100 1 379 321 1 379 321 1 379 321 893 724 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest Expense 1 471 338 0 131 711 359 510 322 268 284 924 247 683 210 441 173 199 135 856 98 614 61 372 15 593 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Payment 10 589 439 0 619 197 1 738 830 1 705 368 1 664 245 1 627 003 1 589 762 1 556 299 1 515 176 1 477 935 1 440 693 909 317 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ending Balance 0 13 315 170 11 935 849 10 552 749 9 173 428 7 794 108 6 414 787 5 031 687 3 652 366 2 273 045 893 724 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subordinated Debt amortization
Beginning balance in the first period of loan 0 3 549 254 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beginning balance in the other period of loan 0 0 3 423 918 3 069 284 2 713 678 2 359 045 2 004 411 1 649 777 1 294 171 939 537 584 903 230 269 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Principal payment 2 344 570 0 125 336 354 634 355 606 354 634 354 634 354 634 355 606 354 634 354 634 354 634 230 269 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest expense 663 476 0 22 167 171 196 153 464 135 684 117 952 100 221 82 489 64 709 46 977 29 245 4 828 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total payment 3 008 046 0 147 503 525 830 509 070 490 318 472 586 454 854 438 094 419 343 401 611 383 879 235 097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ending balance 0 3 423 918 3 069 284 2 713 678 2 359 045 2 004 411 1 649 777 1 294 171 939 537 584 903 230 269 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: OPEX NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Salaries / wages 1 364 452 0 36 135 104 288 106 670 108 507 110 677 112 890 115 470 117 457 119 806 122 203 124 995 127 146 129 689 132 283
Electricity 1 317 823 0 31 585 92 049 95 078 97 663 100 593 103 610 107 020 109 929 113 227 116 624 120 461 123 736 127 448 131 272
Heating (except electricity) costs 7 060 0 169 493 509 523 539 555 573 589 607 625 645 663 683 703
Infrastructure maitenance costs:
Medium maitenance 1 194 027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 424 112 0 0
Medium maitenance 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Major maitenance 426 702 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maitenance, total 620 728 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 424 112 0 0
Other fixed costs:
System maitenance services 636 744 0 16 863 48 668 49 780 50 636 51 649 52 682 53 886 54 813 55 910 57 028 58 331 59 335 60 522 61 732
Accounting services 97 791 6 460 6 589 6 721 6 874 6 993 7 132 7 275 7 441 7 569 7 721 7 875 8 055 8 194 8 358 8 525
Audit services 98 353 6 497 6 627 6 759 6 914 7 033 7 173 7 317 7 484 7 613 7 765 7 921 8 102 8 241 8 406 8 574
Insurance services 210 757 13 922 14 200 14 484 14 815 15 070 15 372 15 679 16 037 16 314 16 640 16 973 17 360 17 659 18 012 18 373
Calling center serices 166 766 0 4 417 12 746 13 037 13 262 13 527 13 798 14 113 14 356 14 643 14 936 15 277 15 540 15 851 16 168
Asset management tax 303 212 0 8 030 23 175 23 705 24 113 24 595 25 087 25 660 26 102 26 624 27 156 27 777 28 255 28 820 29 396
Land rent tax 93 670 6 188 6 311 6 438 6 585 6 698 6 832 6 969 7 128 7 250 7 395 7 543 7 716 7 849 8 006 8 166
Real estate tax 2 072 068 0 66 399 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873 187 873
PPP contract implementation monitoring tax 702 524 46 406 47 335 48 281 49 384 50 235 51 239 52 264 53 458 54 378 55 466 56 575 57 868 58 864 60 041 61 242
Contribution for the municipality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other administration expense 421 538 27 863 28 420 28 989 29 570 30 161 30 765 31 380 32 009 32 649 33 302 33 968 34 650 35 343 36 049 36 770
Other fixed costs, total 4 803 425 107 336 205 191 384 134 388 537 392 074 396 158 400 323 405 090 408 918 413 339 417 848 423 008 427 152 431 938 436 819
Other viriable costs:
Costs of sand and oil trap services 27 289 0 723 2 086 2 133 2 170 2 214 2 258 2 309 2 349 2 396 2 444 2 500 2 543 2 594 2 646
Costs of permanent repair 659 485 0 17 465 50 406 51 557 52 445 53 494 54 564 55 810 56 771 57 906 59 065 60 414 61 454 62 683 63 937
Maitenance of equipment 45 482 0 1 205 3 476 3 556 3 617 3 689 3 763 3 849 3 915 3 994 4 073 4 166 4 238 4 323 4 409
Cleanning services 1 364 452 0 36 135 104 288 106 670 108 507 110 677 112 890 115 470 117 457 119 806 122 203 124 995 127 146 129 689 132 283
Wastewater treatment 15 463 0 371 1 080 1 116 1 146 1 180 1 216 1 256 1 290 1 329 1 368 1 413 1 452 1 495 1 540
Other viriable costs, total 2 112 171 0 55 898 161 335 165 033 167 884 171 254 174 690 178 694 181 783 185 431 189 153 193 489 196 834 200 785 204 815
Operation expenditure, total 10 225 660 107 336 328 978 742 299 755 828 766 651 779 219 792 070 806 847 818 676 832 410 846 453 862 599 1 299 643 890 543 905 892
Period begins:
Period ends:
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The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: REVENUE NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Revenue
P1 parking plots 14 082 577 0 372 952 1 076 356 1 100 950 1 119 901 1 142 299 1 165 145 1 191 768 1 212 282 1 236 528 1 261 258 1 290 078 1 312 284 1 338 529 1 365 300 1 396 496 1 420 535 1 448 945 1 477 924 1 511 694 1 537 715 1 568 469 1 599 839 1 636 394 1 664 561
P2 parking plots 3 560 665 0 94 298 272 148 278 366 283 158 288 821 294 598 301 329 306 516 312 646 318 899 326 186 331 800 338 436 345 205 353 093 359 171 366 354 373 681 382 220 388 799 396 575 404 506 413 749 420 871
P3 parking plots 30 531 394 0 808 569 2 333 569 2 386 889 2 427 975 2 476 535 2 526 065 2 583 785 2 628 260 2 680 825 2 734 441 2 796 922 2 845 066 2 901 967 2 960 006 3 027 641 3 079 756 3 141 351 3 204 178 3 277 392 3 333 806 3 400 482 3 468 492 3 547 745 3 608 813
Main activities 48 174 636 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
Additional activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue, total 48 174 636 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
Income sharing
Marginal amount of annual revenue € (MAAR) 0 271 384 783 226 798 933 814 912 831 210 847 834 864 837 882 134 899 777 917 772 936 178 954 902 974 000 993 480 1 013 404 1 033 672 1 054 345 1 075 432 1 097 000 1 118 940 1 141 319 1 164 145 1 187 492 1 211 241
Income above MMAI 0 1 004 435 2 898 847 2 967 273 3 016 123 3 076 445 3 137 974 3 212 044 3 264 923 3 330 222 3 396 826 3 477 007 3 534 248 3 604 933 3 677 032 3 763 826 3 825 789 3 902 305 3 980 351 4 074 305 4 141 380 4 224 207 4 308 691 4 410 396 4 483 003
Income sharing with governement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income left for the private subject 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
Revenue for calculation of VfM for the users 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
NPV depending on a length of a period 0 1 131 202 4 205 308 7 166 087 10 002 003 12 725 765 15 341 808 17 861 410 20 274 755 22 592 657 24 818 890 26 963 054 29 016 794 30 989 312 32 883 821 34 708 489 36 456 207 38 134 806 39 747 020 41 299 799 42 787 095 44 215 571 45 587 553 46 908 958 48 174 636
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: RESERVE ACCOUNT NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Debt Service Reserve Account:
Debt Payment 0 619 197 1 738 830 1 705 368 1 664 245 1 627 003 1 589 762 1 556 299 1 515 176 1 477 935 1 440 693 909 317 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Required for Debt Service Reserve Account 0 51 600 144 903 142 114 138 687 135 584 132 480 129 692 126 265 123 161 120 058 75 776 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow to Debt Service Reserve Account 0 51 600 93 303 -2 789 -3 427 -3 103 -3 103 -2 789 -3 427 -3 103 -3 103 -44 281 -75 776 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subordinated debt reserve account:
Subordinated debt payment 0 147 503 525 830 509 070 490 318 472 586 454 854 438 094 419 343 401 611 383 879 235 097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Required for subordinated debt Service Reserve Account 0 12 292 43 819 42 422 40 860 39 382 37 905 36 508 34 945 33 468 31 990 19 591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow to subordinated debt Service Reserve Account 12 292 31 527 -1 397 -1 563 -1 478 -1 478 -1 397 -1 563 -1 478 -1 478 -12 399 -19 591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Infrastructure maitenance reserve account:
Opex: Medium maitenance 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 424 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Opex: Medium maitenance 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Opex: Major maitenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0
Total: Maitenance expense 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 424 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow to: Medium maitenance 1 0 14 466 40 931 41 043 40 931 40 931 40 931 41 043 40 931 40 931 40 931 41 043 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow to: Medium maitenance 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow to: Major maitenance 0 28 924 81 838 82 062 81 838 81 838 81 838 82 062 81 838 81 838 81 838 82 062 81 838 81 838 81 838 82 062 81 838 81 838 81 838 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total cash flow for maitenance 0 43 390 122 769 123 105 122 769 122 769 122 769 123 105 122 769 122 769 122 769 123 105 81 838 81 838 81 838 82 062 81 838 81 838 81 838 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow Released from MRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -424 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow to or from MRA Reserve Account 0 43 390 122 769 123 105 122 769 122 769 122 769 123 105 122 769 122 769 122 769 123 105 -342 274 81 838 81 838 82 062 81 838 81 838 81 838 -1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Balance in MRA Reserve Account 0 43 390 166 159 289 264 412 033 534 802 657 571 780 676 903 445 1 026 214 1 148 983 1 272 089 929 815 1 011 653 1 093 491 1 175 554 1 257 392 1 339 230 1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: NET OPERATING WORKING CAPITAL NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Calculate Net Operating Working Capital Components:
Accounts Receivable (% of revenue) 0 12 758 36 821 37 662 38 310 39 077 39 858 40 769 41 471 42 300 43 146 44 132 44 891 45 789 46 705 47 772 48 595 49 567 50 558 51 713 52 603 53 655 54 728 55 979 56 942
Inventory (% of revenue) 0 15 948 46 026 47 078 47 888 48 846 49 823 50 961 51 838 52 875 53 932 55 165 56 114 57 237 58 381 59 715 60 743 61 958 63 197 64 641 65 754 67 069 68 410 69 974 71 178
Accounts Payable (% of routine O&M, excluding contribution for the municipality) 1 610 4 935 11 134 11 337 11 500 11 688 11 881 12 103 12 280 12 486 12 697 12 939 19 495 13 358 13 588 13 853 14 065 14 311 14 563 36 169 15 085 15 354 15 629 15 946 16 200
Period begins:
Period ends:
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Appendix 27 
Financial statements of the Shadow bid model (the revenue generating model) (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: PROFIT & LOSS STATEMENT (P&L) NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Revenues 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
Total Operating Expense 107 336 328 978 742 299 755 828 766 651 779 219 792 070 806 847 818 676 832 410 846 453 862 599 1 299 643 890 543 905 892 923 539 937 681 954 094 970 878 2 411 237 1 005 640 1 023 590 1 041 947 1 063 042 1 079 971
EBITDA -107 336 946 841 2 939 774 3 010 379 3 064 384 3 128 436 3 193 739 3 270 035 3 328 381 3 397 588 3 468 146 3 550 586 3 189 507 3 688 390 3 764 619 3 853 691 3 921 780 4 002 556 4 084 906 2 760 069 4 254 679 4 341 936 4 430 890 4 534 846 4 614 273
Depreciation 0 452 376 1 279 978 1 283 485 1 279 978 1 279 978 1 269 979 1 255 060 1 251 631 1 263 279 1 284 847 1 288 368 1 284 847 1 284 847 1 273 222 1 255 060 808 416 13 650 38 923 39 030 38 923 38 923 25 300 0 0
EBIT -107 336 494 465 1 659 796 1 726 894 1 784 406 1 848 458 1 923 760 2 014 975 2 076 751 2 134 309 2 183 299 2 262 219 1 904 659 2 403 542 2 491 397 2 598 632 3 113 363 3 988 906 4 045 982 2 721 039 4 215 756 4 303 013 4 405 590 4 534 846 4 614 273
Interest Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest Expense 0 153 878 530 705 475 732 420 608 365 635 310 661 255 688 200 564 145 591 90 617 20 420 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earnings Before Profit Sharing and Tax -107 336 340 587 1 129 091 1 251 162 1 363 798 1 482 823 1 613 099 1 759 287 1 876 187 1 988 719 2 092 681 2 241 799 1 904 659 2 403 542 2 491 397 2 598 632 3 113 363 3 988 906 4 045 982 2 721 039 4 215 756 4 303 013 4 405 590 4 534 846 4 614 273
Compensation for operating loss 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earnings Before Profit Sharing and Tax (after compensation) -107 336 340 587 1 129 091 1 251 162 1 363 798 1 482 823 1 613 099 1 759 287 1 876 187 1 988 719 2 092 681 2 241 799 1 904 659 2 403 542 2 491 397 2 598 632 3 113 363 3 988 906 4 045 982 2 721 039 4 215 756 4 303 013 4 405 590 4 534 846 4 614 273
Profit Sharing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBT -107 336 340 587 1 129 091 1 251 162 1 363 798 1 482 823 1 613 099 1 759 287 1 876 187 1 988 719 2 092 681 2 241 799 1 904 659 2 403 542 2 491 397 2 598 632 3 113 363 3 988 906 4 045 982 2 721 039 4 215 756 4 303 013 4 405 590 4 534 846 4 614 273
EBT of previous period 0 -107 336 233 251 1 129 091 1 251 162 1 363 798 1 482 823 1 613 099 1 759 287 1 876 187 1 988 719 2 092 681 2 241 799 1 904 659 2 403 542 2 491 397 2 598 632 3 113 363 3 988 906 4 045 982 2 721 039 4 215 756 4 303 013 4 405 590 4 534 846
Government grant depreciation recovery 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBT for tax payment -107 336 233 251 1 129 091 1 251 162 1 363 798 1 482 823 1 613 099 1 759 287 1 876 187 1 988 719 2 092 681 2 241 799 1 904 659 2 403 542 2 491 397 2 598 632 3 113 363 3 988 906 4 045 982 2 721 039 4 215 756 4 303 013 4 405 590 4 534 846 4 614 273
Taxes 3 704 789 0 34 988 169 364 187 674 204 570 222 423 241 965 263 893 281 428 298 308 313 902 336 270 285 699 360 531 373 710 389 795 467 005 598 336 606 897 408 156 632 363 645 452 660 838 680 227 692 141
Net Earnings -107 336 305 599 959 727 1 063 488 1 159 228 1 260 400 1 371 134 1 495 394 1 594 759 1 690 411 1 778 779 1 905 529 1 618 961 2 043 011 2 117 688 2 208 837 2 646 359 3 390 570 3 439 085 2 312 883 3 583 393 3 657 561 3 744 751 3 854 619 3 922 132
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
 
The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: BALANCE SHEET NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
ASSETS
Cash (Debt Service Reserve Account) 51 600 144 903 142 114 138 687 135 584 132 480 129 692 126 265 123 161 120 058 75 776 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash (Subordinated Debt Service Reserve Account) 12 292 43 819 42 422 40 860 39 382 37 905 36 508 34 945 33 468 31 990 19 591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash (MRA Reserve Account) 0 43 390 166 159 289 264 412 033 534 802 657 571 780 676 903 445 1 026 214 1 148 983 1 272 089 929 815 1 011 653 1 093 491 1 175 554 1 257 392 1 339 230 1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash and Cash Equivalents 63 892 232 111 350 695 468 811 586 999 705 187 823 770 941 886 1 060 074 1 178 262 1 244 351 1 272 089 929 815 1 011 653 1 093 491 1 175 554 1 257 392 1 339 230 1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accounts Receivable 0 12 758 36 821 37 662 38 310 39 077 39 858 40 769 41 471 42 300 43 146 44 132 44 891 45 789 46 705 47 772 48 595 49 567 50 558 51 713 52 603 53 655 54 728 55 979 56 942
Inventory 0 15 948 46 026 47 078 47 888 48 846 49 823 50 961 51 838 52 875 53 932 55 165 56 114 57 237 58 381 59 715 60 743 61 958 63 197 64 641 65 754 67 069 68 410 69 974 71 178
Total Current Assets 63 892 260 817 433 542 553 551 673 197 793 109 913 451 1 033 616 1 153 383 1 273 437 1 341 430 1 371 385 1 030 821 1 114 679 1 198 578 1 283 041 1 366 730 1 450 754 1 534 823 116 354 118 357 120 724 123 139 125 952 128 121
Fixed Assets (Gross) 11 187 318 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 18 929 151 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 095 349 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098
Less Accumumulated Depreciation 0 452 376 1 732 354 3 015 838 4 295 816 5 575 794 6 845 772 8 100 832 9 352 463 10 615 742 11 900 589 13 188 957 14 473 804 15 758 652 17 031 873 18 286 933 19 095 349 19 108 999 19 147 922 19 186 952 19 225 875 19 264 798 19 290 098 19 290 098 19 290 098
Fixed Assets (Net) 11 187 318 18 476 775 17 196 797 15 913 312 14 633 335 13 353 357 12 083 378 10 828 318 9 576 688 8 479 607 7 194 760 5 906 392 4 621 545 3 336 697 2 063 476 808 416 0 181 099 142 176 103 146 64 223 25 300 0 0 0
Total Assets 11 251 210 18 737 592 17 630 339 16 466 863 15 306 532 14 146 466 12 996 829 11 861 935 10 730 071 9 753 044 8 536 189 7 277 778 5 652 366 4 451 377 3 262 054 2 091 457 1 366 730 1 631 854 1 676 999 219 501 182 580 146 024 123 139 125 952 128 121
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Accounts Payable 1 610 4 935 11 134 11 337 11 500 11 688 11 881 12 103 12 280 12 486 12 697 12 939 19 495 13 358 13 588 13 853 14 065 14 311 14 563 36 169 15 085 15 354 15 629 15 946 16 200
Total Current Liabilities 1 610 4 935 11 134 11 337 11 500 11 688 11 881 12 103 12 280 12 486 12 697 12 939 19 495 13 358 13 588 13 853 14 065 14 311 14 563 36 169 15 085 15 354 15 629 15 946 16 200
Subordinated Debt 2 072 196 3 423 918 3 069 284 2 713 678 2 359 045 2 004 411 1 649 777 1 294 171 939 537 584 903 230 269 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Long-Term Debt 8 058 539 13 315 170 11 935 849 10 552 749 9 173 428 7 794 108 6 414 787 5 031 687 3 652 366 2 273 045 893 724 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 10 132 344 16 744 023 15 016 268 13 277 765 11 543 973 9 810 206 8 076 444 6 337 961 4 604 183 2 870 434 1 136 690 12 939 19 495 13 358 13 588 13 853 14 065 14 311 14 563 36 169 15 085 15 354 15 629 15 946 16 200
Grant from Government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equity Investment 1 551 081 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787 2 535 787
Retained earnings -432 215 -542 217 78 284 653 311 1 226 772 1 800 472 2 384 598 2 988 187 3 590 101 4 346 823 4 863 712 4 729 052 3 097 084 1 902 232 712 678 -458 182 -1 183 122 -918 244 -873 351 -2 352 455 -2 368 291 -2 405 116 -2 428 277 -2 425 780 -2 423 866
Total Equity 1 118 866 1 993 569 2 614 071 3 189 098 3 762 559 4 336 259 4 920 385 5 523 974 6 125 888 6 882 610 7 399 499 7 264 839 5 632 871 4 438 018 3 248 465 2 077 604 1 352 664 1 617 542 1 662 436 183 332 167 496 130 671 107 510 110 007 111 921
Total Liabilities and Equity 11 251 210 18 737 592 17 630 339 16 466 863 15 306 532 14 146 466 12 996 829 11 861 935 10 730 071 9 753 044 8 536 189 7 277 778 5 652 366 4 451 377 3 262 054 2 091 457 1 366 730 1 631 854 1 676 999 219 501 182 580 146 024 123 139 125 952 128 121
Period begins:
Period ends:
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The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: CASH FLOW WATERFALL STATEMENT NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Revenues 0 1 275 819 3 682 073 3 766 206 3 831 034 3 907 655 3 985 808 4 076 882 4 147 058 4 229 999 4 314 599 4 413 185 4 489 150 4 578 933 4 670 511 4 777 230 4 859 461 4 956 650 5 055 783 5 171 305 5 260 319 5 365 526 5 472 836 5 597 888 5 694 245
Interest Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operating Expenses 107 336 328 978 742 299 755 828 766 651 779 219 792 070 806 847 818 676 832 410 846 453 862 599 1 299 643 890 543 905 892 923 539 937 681 954 094 970 878 2 411 237 1 005 640 1 023 590 1 041 947 1 063 042 1 079 971
Capex 11 187 318 7 741 832 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow Before Funding -11 294 654 -6 794 992 2 939 774 3 010 379 3 064 384 3 128 436 3 193 739 3 270 035 3 328 381 3 231 390 3 468 146 3 550 586 3 189 507 3 688 390 3 764 619 3 853 691 3 921 780 3 807 807 4 084 906 2 760 069 4 254 679 4 341 936 4 430 890 4 534 846 4 614 273
Initial Equity Investments (Pre-Operating Phase) 1 381 464 984 706 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional Equity Investments (Operating Phase) (calculated below) 169 617 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Debt Issuance 8 058 539 5 744 117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subordinated Debt Issuance 2 072 196 1 477 059 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grant from Government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Compensation from government for operating loss 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income Taxes 0 34 988 169 364 187 674 204 570 222 423 241 965 263 893 281 428 298 308 313 902 336 270 285 699 360 531 373 710 389 795 467 005 598 336 606 897 408 156 632 363 645 452 660 838 680 227 692 141
Increase in Accounts Receivable 0 12 758 24 063 841 648 766 782 911 702 829 846 986 760 898 916 1 067 822 972 991 1 155 890 1 052 1 073 1 251 964
Increase in Inventory 0 15 948 30 078 1 052 810 958 977 1 138 877 1 037 1 057 1 232 950 1 122 1 145 1 334 1 028 1 215 1 239 1 444 1 113 1 315 1 341 1 563 1 204
Increase in Accounts Payable 1 610 3 325 6 200 203 162 189 193 222 177 206 211 242 6 556 -6 136 230 265 212 246 252 21 605 -21 084 269 275 316 254
Cash Flow Available for Debt Service, CFADS 388 771 1 350 521 2 722 469 2 821 014 2 858 518 2 904 477 2 950 208 3 004 314 3 045 552 2 931 422 3 152 551 3 212 341 2 908 654 3 319 702 3 389 079 3 461 760 3 453 137 3 207 530 3 476 029 2 370 919 3 599 229 3 694 386 3 767 912 3 852 122 3 920 218
Interest Expense 0 153 878 530 705 475 732 420 608 365 635 310 661 255 688 200 564 145 591 90 617 20 420 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loan Principal Repayment 0 487 486 1 379 321 1 383 100 1 379 321 1 379 321 1 379 321 1 383 100 1 379 321 1 379 321 1 379 321 893 724 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subordinated Debt Repayment 0 125 336 354 634 355 606 354 634 354 634 354 634 355 606 354 634 354 634 354 634 230 269 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow Available for Reserve Accounts 388 771 583 821 457 809 606 577 703 955 804 887 905 592 1 009 921 1 111 033 1 051 876 1 327 979 2 067 927 2 908 654 3 319 702 3 389 079 3 461 760 3 453 137 3 207 530 3 476 029 2 370 919 3 599 229 3 694 386 3 767 912 3 852 122 3 920 218
Cash Flow to Debt Service Reserve Account 51 600 93 303 -2 789 -3 427 -3 103 -3 103 -2 789 -3 427 -3 103 -3 103 -44 281 -75 776 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow to subordinated debt Service Reserve Account 12 292 31 527 -1 397 -1 563 -1 478 -1 478 -1 397 -1 563 -1 478 -1 478 -12 399 -19 591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow to Maitenance Reserve Account 0 43 390 122 769 123 105 122 769 122 769 122 769 123 105 122 769 122 769 122 769 123 105 -342 274 81 838 81 838 82 062 81 838 81 838 81 838 -1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow Available for Profit Sharing 324 880 415 601 339 225 488 461 585 767 686 699 787 008 891 805 992 845 933 688 1 261 890 2 040 189 3 250 928 3 237 864 3 307 241 3 379 698 3 371 299 3 125 692 3 394 191 3 791 987 3 599 229 3 694 386 3 767 912 3 852 122 3 920 218
Profit Sharing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow Available to Pay Dividends 324 880 415 601 339 225 488 461 585 767 686 699 787 008 891 805 992 845 933 688 1 261 890 2 040 189 3 250 928 3 237 864 3 307 241 3 379 698 3 371 299 3 125 692 3 394 191 3 791 987 3 599 229 3 694 386 3 767 912 3 852 122 3 920 218
Dividends (Adjusted) 324 880 415 601 339 225 488 461 585 767 686 699 787 008 891 805 992 845 933 688 1 261 890 2 040 189 3 250 928 3 237 864 3 307 241 3 379 698 3 371 299 3 125 692 3 394 191 3 791 987 3 599 229 3 694 386 3 767 912 3 852 122 3 920 218
Net Change in Cash 63 892 168 220 118 584 118 116 118 188 118 188 118 584 118 116 118 188 118 188 66 089 27 738 -342 274 81 838 81 838 82 062 81 838 81 838 81 838 -1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0
Beginning Cash Balance 0 63 892 232 111 350 695 468 811 586 999 705 187 823 770 941 886 1 060 074 1 178 262 1 244 351 1 272 089 929 815 1 011 653 1 093 491 1 175 554 1 257 392 1 339 230 1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0
Ending Cash Balance 63 892 232 111 350 695 468 811 586 999 705 187 823 770 941 886 1 060 074 1 178 262 1 244 351 1 272 089 929 815 1 011 653 1 093 491 1 175 554 1 257 392 1 339 230 1 421 068 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
The Hypothetical IP
CONCESSION MODEL: DEBT SERVICE COVER RATIO NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Calculate Debt Service Cover Ratio, DSCR:
Cash Flow Available for Debt Service, CFADS 0 477 308 2 722 469 2 821 014 2 858 518 2 904 477 2 950 208 3 004 314 3 045 552 2 931 422 3 152 551 3 212 341 2 908 654 3 319 702 3 389 079 3 461 760 3 453 137 3 207 530 3 476 029 2 370 919 3 599 229 3 694 386 3 767 912 3 852 122 3 920 218
Debt Payment Due 0 619 197 1 738 830 1 705 368 1 664 245 1 627 003 1 589 762 1 556 299 1 515 176 1 477 935 1 440 693 909 317 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Debt Service Coverage Ratio, DSCR 0,77 1,57 1,65 1,72 1,79 1,86 1,93 2,01 1,98 2,19 3,53
Minimum DSCR 0,77
Average DSCR 1,91
Calculate Loan Life Cover Ratio, LLCR:
Qualifying CFADS 0 477 308 2 722 469 2 821 014 2 858 518 2 904 477 2 950 208 3 004 314 3 045 552 2 931 422 3 152 551 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NPV (Qualifying CFADS) 0 22 952 249 23 094 652 20 995 738 18 741 608 16 389 114 13 927 143 11 352 968 8 655 184 5 843 322 3 069 670 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loan Balance at start of period 0 3 549 254 3 423 918 3 069 284 2 713 678 2 359 045 2 004 411 1 649 777 1 294 171 939 537 584 903 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loan Life Coverage Ratio, LLCR 6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 6,9 6,9 6,9 6,7 6,2 5,2
Minimum DSCR 5,25
Average DSCR 6,59
Calculate Project Life Cover Ratio, PLCR:
Qualifying CFADS 0 477 308 2 722 469 2 821 014 2 858 518 2 904 477 2 950 208 3 004 314 3 045 552 2 931 422 3 152 551 3 212 341 2 908 654 3 319 702 3 389 079 3 461 760 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NPV (Qualifying CFADS) 0 34 464 562 34 917 798 33 138 109 31 211 824 29 196 025 27 079 841 24 860 789 22 527 716 20 090 412 17 701 431 15 026 819 12 220 202 9 641 493 6 582 112 3 370 750 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loan Balance at start of period 0 3 549 254 3 423 918 3 069 284 2 713 678 2 359 045 2 004 411 1 649 777 1 294 171 939 537 584 903 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project Life Coverage Ratio, PLCR 9,7 10,2 10,8 11,5 12,4 13,5 15,1 17,4 21,4 30,3
Minimum DSCR 9,71
Average DSCR 15,22
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
The Hypothetical IP
NOMINAL PRICES NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Calculate Equity Cash Flows:
Equity Investments 1 551 081 984 706 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dividends 324 880 415 601 339 225 488 461 585 767 686 699 787 008 891 805 992 845 933 688 1 261 890 2 040 189 3 250 928 3 237 864 3 307 241 3 379 698 3 371 299 3 125 692 3 394 191 3 791 987 3 599 229 3 694 386 3 767 912 3 852 122 3 920 218
Equity Cash Flow -1 226 201 -569 104 339 225 488 461 585 767 686 699 787 008 891 805 992 845 933 688 1 261 890 2 040 189 3 250 928 3 237 864 3 307 241 3 379 698 3 371 299 3 125 692 3 394 191 3 791 987 3 599 229 3 694 386 3 767 912 3 852 122 3 920 218
Base Date for Computing NPV and IRR: 2017-01-01
Cost of Equity 12,8%
Equity IRR 34,3% #N/A #NUM! -66% -29% -8% 5% 13% 18% 22% 24% 26% 28% 30% 31% 32% 33% 33% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34%
NPV on Equity Investment 7 622 653 -1 226 201 -1 730 797 -1 464 116 -1 123 755 -761 856 -385 690 -3 444 380 477 759 447 1 075 440 1 454 098 1 996 729 2 763 371 3 440 381 4 053 512 4 608 871 5 100 055 5 503 835 5 892 598 6 277 566 6 601 546 6 896 397 7 163 029 7 404 641 7 622 653
Equity IRR > Cost of Equity
Equity NPV > 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
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Appendix 28 
Results of stakeholders’ satisfaction (The shadow bid model: revenue generating IP) (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Indicators
0 -1 226 201 -1 730 797 -1 464 116 -1 123 755 -761 856 -385 690 -3 444 380 477 759 447 1 075 440 1 454 098 1 996 729 2 763 371 3 440 381 4 053 512 4 608 871 5 100 055 5 503 835 5 892 598 6 277 566 6 601 546 6 896 397 7 163 029 7 404 641 7 622 653
12,8% #N/A #NUM! -66% -29% -8% 5% 13% 18% 22% 24% 26% 28% 30% 31% 32% 33% 33% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34%
1,3 0,77 1,17 1,33 1,43 1,50 1,56 1,61 1,66 1,70 1,75 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91 1,91
2,00 6,47 6,61 6,68 6,74 6,78 6,81 6,82 6,80 6,74 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59 6,59
7,00 9,71 9,95 10,24 10,55 10,92 11,35 11,88 12,57 13,55 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22 15,22
Tests for satisfaction of indicators
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
#N/A #NUM! 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Average LLCR
Average PLCR
NPV on Equity Investment
Equity IRR
Average DSCR
Average DSCR
Average DSCR
NPV on Equity Investment
Equity IRR
Average DSCR
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Appendix 29 
VfM assessment (the revenue generating IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
VALUE FOR MONEY NOMINAL PRICES CONCESSION
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Period begins:
Period ends:  
Procurement and oversight cost 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 
Revenue to the public sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income sharing with governemnt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit Sharing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total risk 3 189 609 1 020 253 1 709 433 1 806 157 1 899 315 1 988 545 2 074 245 2 156 556 2 235 833 2 311 767 2 384 697 2 454 744 2 522 208 2 586 826 2 648 890 2 708 499 2 765 910 2 820 900 2 873 716 2 924 443 2 973 299 3 020 096 3 065 041 3 108 209 3 149 786 3 189 609
Retained risk 3 189 609 1 020 253 1 709 433 1 806 157 1 899 315 1 988 545 2 074 245 2 156 556 2 235 833 2 311 767 2 384 697 2 454 744 2 522 208 2 586 826 2 648 890 2 708 499 2 765 910 2 820 900 2 873 716 2 924 443 2 973 299 3 020 096 3 065 041 3 108 209 3 149 786 3 189 609
Subsidies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grant from government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
General compensation for operating loss 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Con (Pu. S.) 3 189 609 1 020 253 1 709 433 1 806 157 1 899 315 1 988 545 2 074 245 2 156 556 2 235 833 2 311 767 2 384 697 2 454 744 2 522 208 2 586 826 2 648 890 2 708 499 2 765 910 2 820 900 2 873 716 2 924 443 2 973 299 3 020 096 3 065 041 3 108 209 3 149 786 3 189 609
Con (PPA) 3 189 609 1 020 253 1 709 433 1 806 157 1 899 315 1 988 545 2 074 245 2 156 556 2 235 833 2 311 767 2 384 697 2 454 744 2 522 208 2 586 826 2 648 890 2 708 499 2 765 910 2 820 900 2 873 716 2 924 443 2 973 299 3 020 096 3 065 041 3 108 209 3 149 786 3 189 609
VfM - Con (Pu. S.) 2 505 609 15 082 867 24 322 946 22 838 760 21 402 111 20 020 542 18 687 998 17 402 966 16 160 052 14 965 539 13 946 394 12 836 796 11 763 729 11 030 907 10 041 456 9 090 406 8 173 492 7 294 888 6 546 232 5 734 726 5 604 624 4 855 165 4 134 986 3 442 968 2 776 012 2 599 279
VfM - Con (Pu. S. including NFBs) 4 219 959 15 677 149 25 488 008 24 552 027 23 116 460 21 734 891 20 402 348 19 117 315 17 874 401 16 679 889 15 660 744 14 551 146 13 478 079 12 745 256 11 755 806 10 804 756 9 887 842 9 009 237 8 260 581 7 449 075 7 318 974 6 569 514 5 849 335 5 157 318 4 490 362 4 313 629
VfM - Con (PPA) 4 219 959 15 677 149 25 488 008 24 552 027 23 116 460 21 734 891 20 402 348 19 117 315 17 874 401 16 679 889 15 660 744 14 551 146 13 478 079 12 745 256 11 755 806 10 804 756 9 887 842 9 009 237 8 260 581 7 449 075 7 318 974 6 569 514 5 849 335 5 157 318 4 490 362 4 313 629
VfM - Con (Users) 1 714 350 594 282 1 165 061 1 713 268 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 
 
 
Appendix 30 
Key-inputs different from the former scenario (the non-revenue generating IP) 
(prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
Taxes
21,00% VAT
0 Possibility to recover VAT      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (FALSE)
15,00% Profit tax
1 PSC: Profit tax for the public sector company applied?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (FALSE)
0 Tax Holiday (year tax holiday ends)
0 PPP: Nonprofit organization (NPO) // non-business entity?      <<< Enter 1 (Nonprofit) or 0 (business entity)
0 Allow Tax Holiday?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no tax holiday)
5 Tax Holiday (year tax holiday ends)
1,00% Real estate tax
1 Allow Tax Holiday?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no tax holiday)
26 Tax Holiday (year tax holiday ends)
0,40% Land rent tax
1 500 000 Base for land tax (€)
6 000 Land rent tax per year (€)
16 Land rent tax per day (€)
1 Allow land tax holiday?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no tax holiday)
26 Tax Holiday (year tax holiday ends)  
0 PPP contract implementation monitoring tax per year (€ per unit without VAT)
0 PPP contract implementation monitoring tax per day (€ per unit without VAT)
0 Is PPP contract monitoring tax required?      <<< Enter 1 (TRUE) or 0 (no monitoring tax required)
 
27 Business accounting standard (BAS)
100% Market price and cost of construction ratio
138 476 Payment viriable
Annual payment 
coefficent
Part
11,4 P2 - Equity, P3 - Credit
0,9 P3 - Administration
1,3 P1 - Maitenance
1,7 P5 - Services
0,9 P6 - Minucipality taxes
Annual payment Margin Part
1 583 908 27% P2 - Equity, P3 - Credit
121 594 27% P3 - Administration
177 057 27% P1 - Maitenance
241 698 27% P5 - Services
120 282 26% P6 - Minucipality taxes
 
 
Appendix 31 
Cash flows if the hypothetical IP (the non-revenue generating IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBLIC SECTOR: DAYS AND INFLATION
Period begins: 16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
Period ends: 16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Project year X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Design
Days in period 214 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365
Days of design in period 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflation factors
Inflation Factor: 1,012 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020
Cumulative inflation factor: 1,012 1,032 1,053 1,074 1,095 1,117 1,139 1,162 1,186 1,209 1,233 1,258 1,283 1,309 1,335 1,362 1,389 1,417 1,445 1,474 1,504 1,534 1,565 1,596 1,628 1,660
Inflation Factor for expense of energy, water and waste disposal 1,018 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030
Cumulative Inflation Factor: 1,018 1,048 1,080 1,112 1,145 1,180 1,215 1,252 1,289 1,328 1,368 1,409 1,451 1,495 1,540 1,586 1,633 1,682 1,733 1,785 1,839 1,894 1,951 2,009 2,070 2,132
Construction of parking plots
Days of parking plots in period 215 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Installation of parking equipment
Days of quipment installation in period 0 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operation
Days for operation left in period 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365
Repair
Is medium repair needed? FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Is major repair needed? FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Depreciation, summary
Parking plots 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment (reinvestments 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment (reinvestments 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 365 366 365 365 365 366 365
Debt repayment
Repayment days in period 0 129 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
External impact
Days of operation 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365
Days of service being delayed 1096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096
Days left for being delaysed 731 366 1 -365 -730 -1095 -1460 -1826 -2191 -2556 -2921 -3287 -3652 -4017 -4382 -4748 -5113 -5478 -5843 -6209 -6574 -6939 -7304 -7670 -8035
Days in period the external impact is assessed 365 365 365 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: CAPEX NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
TEST (Used to determine time for reinvestments 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEST (Used to determine time for reinvestments 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construction of parking plots:
Multi-level parking plots 10 354 004 7 122 592 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ground parking plots 591 657 407 005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking plots, total 10 945 662 7 529 597 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional cost of parking plots construction:
Design 154 794 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Development fees 164 185 112 944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Advisory fees 54 728 37 648 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Insurance 164 185 112 944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Contingency 1 094 566 752 960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional cost, total 1 632 458 1 016 496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking garage, total 15 219 525 10 340 772 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation of parking equipment:
Equipment 0 138 848 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation and adjustment 0 20 827 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instalation of parking equipment, total 0 193 208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments:
Renewal and reinvestments of parking equipment 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 187 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Renewal and reinvestments of parking equipment 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments, total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 226 398 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 265 290 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capex: total investments 15 219 525 10 533 980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 226 398 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 265 290 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: CAPEX AND DEPRECIATION NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Compute gross fixed assets:   <<< IDC is not calculated
Gross Fixed Assets: Parking garage 15 219 525 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297 25 560 297
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (investment) 0 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106
Gross Fixed Assets: Equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248 219 248
Gross Fixed Assets, total 15 219 525 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858
Calculate depreciation expense:
Depreciation expense: parking garage 0 150 458 425 713 426 880 425 713 425 713 425 713 426 880 425 713 425 713 425 713 426 880 425 713 425 713 425 713 426 880 274 964 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (investment) 0 8 530 24 134 24 201 24 134 24 134 24 134 24 201 24 134 15 605 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 196 23 372 23 436 23 372 23 372 23 372 23 436 23 372 15 176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 604 27 387 27 462 27 387 27 387 27 387 27 462 27 387
Depreciation expense, total 0 158 987 449 848 451 080 449 848 449 848 449 848 451 080 449 848 449 514 449 086 450 316 449 086 449 086 449 086 450 316 298 336 24 780 27 387 27 462 27 387 27 387 27 387 27 462 27 387
Calculate accumulated depreciation:
Depreciation expense: parking garage 0 150 458 576 171 1 003 051 1 428 764 1 854 477 2 280 191 2 707 070 3 132 784 3 558 497 3 984 211 4 411 090 4 836 804 5 262 517 5 688 230 6 115 110 6 390 074 6 390 074 6 390 074 6 390 074 6 390 074 6 390 074 6 390 074 6 390 074 6 390 074
Depreciation expense: equipment (investment) 0 8 530 32 664 56 865 80 999 105 133 129 268 153 468 177 603 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208 193 208
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 196 31 568 55 005 78 377 101 749 125 121 148 558 171 930 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106 187 106
Depreciation expense: equipment (reinvestment 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 604 36 991 64 454 91 841 119 228 146 615 174 078 201 465
Depreciation expense, total 0 158 987 608 835 1 059 915 1 509 763 1 959 611 2 409 459 2 860 539 3 310 387 3 759 901 4 208 987 4 659 303 5 108 388 5 557 474 6 006 559 6 456 875 6 755 212 6 779 992 6 807 379 6 834 841 6 862 228 6 889 616 6 917 003 6 944 465 6 971 852
Calculate net fixed assets
Gross fixed assets 15 219 525 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 753 505 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 25 940 610 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858 26 159 858
Total accumulated depreciation 0 158 987 608 835 1 059 915 1 509 763 1 959 611 2 409 459 2 860 539 3 310 387 3 759 901 4 208 987 4 659 303 5 108 388 5 557 474 6 006 559 6 456 875 6 755 212 6 779 992 6 807 379 6 834 841 6 862 228 6 889 616 6 917 003 6 944 465 6 971 852
Net fixed assets 15 219 525 25 594 517 25 144 670 24 693 589 24 243 742 23 793 894 23 344 046 22 892 966 22 443 118 22 180 709 21 731 624 21 281 308 20 832 222 20 383 137 19 934 051 19 483 735 19 185 399 19 379 866 19 352 479 19 325 017 19 297 630 19 270 242 19 242 855 19 215 393 19 188 006
Residual value for FNIS calculation
Period begins:
Period ends:
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PUBIC SECTOR: OPEX NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Salaries / wages 0 40 150 115 875 118 523 120 563 122 974 125 434 128 300 130 508 133 118 135 781 138 883 141 274 144 099 146 981 150 340 152 927 155 986 159 106 162 741 165 543 168 853 172 230 176 166 179 198
Electricity 0 42 464 123 755 127 827 131 302 135 241 139 298 143 882 147 794 152 227 156 794 161 953 166 356 171 347 176 487 182 295 187 250 192 868 198 654 205 190 210 769 217 092 223 605 230 962 237 241
Heating (except electricity) costs 0 132 385 397 408 420 433 447 459 473 487 503 517 532 548 566 582 599 617 638 655 675 695 718 737
Infrastructure maitenance costs:
Medium maitenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 471 235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Major maitenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 578 964 0 0 0 0 0
Maitenance, total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 570 194 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 910 547 0 0 0 0 0
Other fixed costs:
System maitenance services 0 18 737 54 075 55 311 56 263 57 388 58 536 59 873 60 904 62 122 63 364 64 812 65 928 67 246 68 591 70 159 71 366 72 793 74 249 75 946 77 253 78 798 80 374 82 211 83 626
Accounting services 7 178 7 321 7 468 7 638 7 770 7 925 8 083 8 268 8 411 8 579 8 750 8 950 9 104 9 286 9 472 9 689 9 855 10 052 10 253 10 488 10 668 10 882 11 099 11 353 11 548
Audit services 7 219 7 363 7 510 7 682 7 814 7 971 8 130 8 316 8 459 8 628 8 801 9 002 9 157 9 340 9 527 9 744 9 912 10 110 10 312 10 548 10 730 10 944 11 163 11 418 11 615
Insurance services 15 469 15 778 16 094 16 461 16 745 17 080 17 421 17 819 18 126 18 489 18 858 19 289 19 621 20 014 20 414 20 881 21 240 21 665 22 098 22 603 22 992 23 452 23 921 24 467 24 889
Calling center serices 0 4 907 14 163 14 486 14 735 15 030 15 331 15 681 15 951 16 270 16 595 16 975 17 267 17 612 17 964 18 375 18 691 19 065 19 446 19 891 20 233 20 638 21 050 21 531 21 902
Asset management tax 0 8 922 25 750 26 338 26 792 27 328 27 874 28 511 29 002 29 582 30 173 30 863 31 394 32 022 32 662 33 409 33 984 34 664 35 357 36 165 36 787 37 523 38 273 39 148 39 822
Land rent tax per day (€)
PPP contract implementation monitoring tax
Other administration expense 30 959 31 578 32 210 32 856 33 513 34 183 34 867 35 566 36 277 37 003 37 743 38 500 39 270 40 055 40 856 41 675 42 509 43 359 44 226 45 113 46 016 46 936 47 875 48 835 49 811
Other fixed costs, total 73 597 114 474 190 295 194 534 197 994 201 954 205 993 210 582 214 326 218 613 222 985 227 953 232 006 236 646 241 379 246 756 251 144 256 167 261 291 267 111 271 861 277 299 282 845 289 146 294 287
Other viriable costs:
Costs of sand and oil trap services 0 803 2 318 2 370 2 411 2 459 2 509 2 566 2 610 2 662 2 716 2 778 2 825 2 882 2 940 3 007 3 059 3 120 3 182 3 255 3 311 3 377 3 445 3 523 3 584
Costs of permanent repair 0 19 406 56 006 57 286 58 272 59 437 60 626 62 012 63 079 64 341 65 627 67 127 68 282 69 648 71 041 72 664 73 915 75 393 76 901 78 658 80 012 81 612 83 245 85 147 86 612
Maitenance of equipment 0 1 338 3 863 3 951 4 019 4 099 4 181 4 277 4 350 4 437 4 526 4 629 4 709 4 803 4 899 5 011 5 098 5 200 5 304 5 425 5 518 5 628 5 741 5 872 5 973
Cleanning services 0 40 150 115 875 118 523 120 563 122 974 125 434 128 300 130 508 133 118 135 781 138 883 141 274 144 099 146 981 150 340 152 927 155 986 159 106 162 741 165 543 168 853 172 230 176 166 179 198
Wastewater treatment 0 402 1 159 1 185 1 206 1 230 1 254 1 283 1 305 1 331 1 358 1 389 1 413 1 441 1 470 1 503 1 529 1 560 1 591 1 627 1 655 1 689 1 722 1 762 1 792
Other viriable costs, total 0 75 140 216 856 221 811 225 629 230 142 234 745 240 109 244 242 249 126 254 109 259 915 264 389 269 677 275 070 281 356 286 199 291 923 297 761 304 565 309 807 316 003 322 324 329 688 335 363
Operation expenditure, total 73 597 272 360 647 166 663 093 675 896 690 731 705 902 723 319 737 329 753 558 770 156 789 208 1 374 737 822 302 840 467 861 313 878 103 897 543 917 429 2 850 792 958 635 979 922 1 001 698 1 026 680 1 046 827
Period begins:
Period ends:
 
 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: Senior Debt NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
TEST used for bsenior debt repayment period to determine 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senior debt capitalization
Beginning Balance in the first period of loan 0 11 026 341 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amount borrowed at beginning of period 10 705 185 7 564 437 453 016 464 165 473 127 483 512 494 132 506 323 516 130 685 969 539 109 552 445 962 316 575 611 588 327 602 919 614 672 813 983 642 200 1 995 555 671 044 685 945 701 189 718 676 732 779
Beginning of period balance, after loan drawdown 10 705 185 18 590 779 453 016 464 165 473 127 483 512 494 132 506 323 516 130 685 969 539 109 552 445 962 316 575 611 588 327 602 919 614 672 813 983 642 200 1 995 555 671 044 685 945 701 189 718 676 732 779
Capitalized Interest during construction, total 321 156 360 610 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
End of Period Loan Balance 11 026 341 18 951 389 453 016 464 165 473 127 483 512 494 132 506 323 516 130 685 969 539 109 552 445 962 316 575 611 588 327 602 919 614 672 813 983 642 200 1 995 555 671 044 685 945 701 189 718 676 732 779
Senior debt amortization
Beginning balance in the first period of loan 0 18 951 389 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beginning balance in the other period of loan 0 0 18 282 058 16 388 217 14 489 186 12 595 345 10 701 503 8 807 661 6 908 631 5 014 789 3 120 947 1 227 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Principal payment 0 669 330 1 893 842 1 899 030 1 893 842 1 893 842 1 893 842 1 899 030 1 893 842 1 893 842 1 893 842 1 227 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest expense 0 167 447 457 051 409 705 362 230 314 884 267 538 220 192 172 716 125 370 78 024 19 823 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total payment 0 836 778 2 350 893 2 308 736 2 256 071 2 208 725 2 161 379 2 119 222 2 066 557 2 019 211 1 971 865 1 246 929 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ending balance 0 18 282 058 16 388 217 14 489 186 12 595 345 10 701 503 8 807 661 6 908 631 5 014 789 3 120 947 1 227 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Period begins:
Period ends:
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INITIAL PUBIC SECTOR INVESTMENT PROJECT NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Investment, total 23 884 830 15 219 525 10 533 980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 226 398 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 265 290 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Immovables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construction, reconstruction, other works 23 353 865 15 064 731 10 340 772 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment and other long-term assets 171 307 0 193 208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Design, technical supervisory and other services related to investments 
in long-term assets (A.1.-A.4.) 145 757 154 794 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project administration and implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other services and costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments 213 901 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 226 398 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 265 290 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Residual value 4 264 979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 188 006
Revenue, total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from goods 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from main services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from additional services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from financial, investment and other activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial and operating costs, total 11 437 349 73 597 439 807 1 104 217 1 072 798 1 038 126 1 005 615 973 440 943 510 910 045 878 928 848 180 809 031 1 374 737 822 302 840 467 861 313 878 103 897 543 917 429 2 850 792 958 635 979 922 1 001 698 1 026 680 1 046 827
Operating costs 9 566 809 73 597 272 360 647 166 663 093 675 896 690 731 705 902 723 319 737 329 753 558 770 156 789 208 1 374 737 822 302 840 467 861 313 878 103 897 543 917 429 2 850 792 958 635 979 922 1 001 698 1 026 680 1 046 827
Raw materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salaries/wages 1 516 058 0 40 150 115 875 118 523 120 563 122 974 125 434 128 300 130 508 133 118 135 781 138 883 141 274 144 099 146 981 150 340 152 927 155 986 159 106 162 741 165 543 168 853 172 230 176 166 179 198
Electricity costs 1 771 739 0 42 464 123 755 127 827 131 302 135 241 139 298 143 882 147 794 152 227 156 794 161 953 166 356 171 347 176 487 182 295 187 250 192 868 198 654 205 190 210 769 217 092 223 605 230 962 237 241
Heating (except electricity) costs 5 505 0 132 385 397 408 420 433 447 459 473 487 503 517 532 548 566 582 599 617 638 655 675 695 718 737
Infrastructure maintenance costs 885 070 0 1 338 3 863 3 951 4 019 4 099 4 181 4 277 4 350 4 437 4 526 4 629 574 904 4 803 4 899 5 011 5 098 5 200 5 304 1 915 971 5 518 5 628 5 741 5 872 5 973
Other costs 5 388 436 73 597 188 275 403 289 412 395 419 604 427 996 436 556 446 414 454 218 463 302 472 568 483 238 491 686 501 520 511 550 523 101 532 246 542 890 553 748 566 252 576 151 587 674 599 427 612 962 623 677
Interest on loans (G.3.1.) 1 870 540 0 167 447 457 051 409 705 362 230 314 884 267 538 220 192 172 716 125 370 78 024 19 823 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taxes (+negative impact;- positive impact on project cash flows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total import/purchase VAT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total sales VAT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total sum of other indirect taxes 0
Net revenue -35 322 179 -15 293 122 -10 973 786 -1 104 217 -1 072 798 -1 038 126 -1 005 615 -973 440 -943 510 -910 045 -1 105 325 -848 180 -809 031 -1 374 737 -822 302 -840 467 -861 313 -878 103 -1 162 833 -917 429 -2 850 792 -958 635 -979 922 -1 001 698 -1 026 680 -1 046 827
Financing, total 35 322 179 15 293 122 10 973 786 1 104 217 1 072 798 1 038 126 1 005 615 973 440 943 510 910 045 1 105 325 848 180 809 031 1 374 737 822 302 840 467 861 313 878 103 1 162 833 917 429 2 850 792 958 635 979 922 1 001 698 1 026 680 1 046 827
Requested financing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EU structural assistance funds 0
LT co-financing funds 0
Other international financing funds 0
Funds of special budgetary programme for VAT financing 0
Own funds 23 803 270 4 266 781 3 718 069 2 545 043 2 507 664 2 458 840 2 415 945 2 373 150 2 336 218 2 287 756 2 313 198 2 202 912 1 483 691 412 421 246 691 252 140 258 394 263 431 348 850 275 229 855 238 287 590 293 977 300 509 308 004 314 048
Public funds (state, municipal budget, other public funds) 23 803 270 4 266 781 3 718 069 2 545 043 2 507 664 2 458 840 2 415 945 2 373 150 2 336 218 2 287 756 2 313 198 2 202 912 1 483 691 412 421 246 691 252 140 258 394 263 431 348 850 275 229 855 238 287 590 293 977 300 509 308 004 314 048
Private funds (own, other private resources) 0
Loans 11 518 909 11 026 341 7 255 717 -1 440 826 -1 434 865 -1 420 714 -1 410 330 -1 399 710 -1 392 707 -1 377 712 -1 207 873 -1 354 732 -674 660 962 316 575 611 588 327 602 919 614 672 813 983 642 200 1 995 555 671 044 685 945 701 189 718 676 732 779
Loans 24 038 288 11 026 341 7 925 048 453 016 464 165 473 127 483 512 494 132 506 323 516 130 685 969 539 109 552 445 962 316 575 611 588 327 602 919 614 672 813 983 642 200 1 995 555 671 044 685 945 701 189 718 676 732 779
Loans reimbursement (not including interest) 12 519 379 0 669 330 1 893 842 1 899 030 1 893 842 1 893 842 1 893 842 1 899 030 1 893 842 1 893 842 1 893 842 1 227 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial cash flows:
Cash flow for investment FA indicators -29 186 659 -15 293 122 -10 806 339 -647 166 -663 093 -675 896 -690 731 -705 902 -723 319 -737 329 -979 956 -770 156 -789 208 -1 374 737 -822 302 -840 467 -861 313 -878 103 -1 162 833 -917 429 -2 850 792 -958 635 -979 922 -1 001 698 -1 026 680 18 141 179
Cumulative financial sustainability cash flow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash flow for capital FA indicators -4 340 378 -4 554 847 -4 895 936 -4 816 399 -4 714 912 -4 624 670 -4 534 529 -4 455 439 -4 354 314 -4 332 410 -4 174 778 -2 730 620 -412 421 -246 691 -252 140 -258 394 -263 431 -348 850 -275 229 -855 238 -287 590 -293 977 -300 509 -308 004 18 873 958
Cash flow for investment FA indicators without residual value -15 293 122 -10 806 339 -647 166 -663 093 -675 896 -690 731 -705 902 -723 319 -737 329 -979 956 -770 156 -789 208 -1 374 737 -822 302 -840 467 -861 313 -878 103 -1 162 833 -917 429 -2 850 792 -958 635 -979 922 -1 001 698 -1 026 680 -1 046 827
Cash flow for investment FA indicators by strecing period -33 451 639 -14 400 303 -23 981 716 -24 522 025 -25 043 311 -25 543 642 -26 025 104 -26 488 416 -26 935 443 -27 364 525 -27 901 509 -28 298 892 -28 682 331 -29 311 259 -29 665 491 -30 006 411 -30 335 391 -30 651 203 -31 045 003 -31 337 557 -32 193 560 -32 464 603 -32 725 490 -32 976 605 -33 218 957 -33 451 639
Financial indicators: NPV of indicators depending on the length of 
a period NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Financial net present value - FNPV(I) -29 186 659 -69 300 -1 288 403 -3 529 128 -5 630 602 -7 597 254 -9 439 992 -11 166 802 -12 787 088 -14 303 943 -15 747 200 -17 085 874 -18 342 722 -19 780 733 -20 884 819 -21 920 522 -22 893 557 -23 751 124 -24 481 896 -25 166 341 -26 390 868 -27 008 418 -27 595 130 -28 152 624 -28 683 084 -29 186 659
Financial internal rate of return - FIRR(I) -6,0% #NUM! -3,3% -3,9% -4,1% -4,3% -4,4% -4,5% -4,5% -4,6% -4,8% -4,8% -4,9% -5,3% -5,4% -5,5% -5,6% -5,6% -5,6% -5,5% -6,3% -6,2% -6,1% -6,1% -6,0% -6,0%
Financial modified internal rate of return - FMIRR(I) -2,7% #DIV/0! -3,3% -1,9% -2,6% -3,0% -3,2% -3,3% -3,3% -3,4% -3,4% -3,4% -3,4% -3,7% -3,5% -3,5% -3,5% -3,5% -3,4% -3,2% -3,6% -3,1% -3,0% -2,9% -2,8% -2,7%
Financial cost-benefit ratio 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Financial sustainability (real values) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period begins:
Period ends:
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Appendix 32 
Risk assessment and allocation (the non-revenue generating IP) (prepared by the author of this dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: RISK ESTIMATES NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
Period begins: 16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
Period ends: 16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV Sum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Investment, total 8 195 006 8 989 993 5 245 376 3 602 244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 556 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 817 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Immovables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construction, reconstruction, other works 8 057 571 8 765 429 5 197 647 3 567 782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equipment and other long-term assets 30 556 34 462 0 34 462 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Design, technical supervisory and other services related to investments 
in long-term assets (A.1.-A.4.) 44 943 47 730 47 730 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project administration and implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other services and costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvestments 61 937 142 372 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 556 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 817 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Residual value insert viriable for simulation of length period 559 139 2 515 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 515 550
Revenue, total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from goods 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue from financial, investment and other activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial and operating costs, total 3 803 152 8 537 977 27 636 121 143 294 521 295 166 294 623 294 858 295 218 296 422 296 332 297 091 297 987 298 582 516 214 308 774 315 595 323 423 329 728 337 028 344 495 1 070 473 359 968 367 961 376 138 385 518 393 084
Operating costs 3 592 339 8 245 519 27 636 102 271 243 011 248 991 253 799 259 370 265 066 271 606 276 867 282 961 289 194 296 348 516 214 308 774 315 595 323 423 329 728 337 028 344 495 1 070 473 359 968 367 961 376 138 385 518 393 084
Raw materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salaries/wages 569 280 1 271 276 0 15 076 43 511 44 505 45 271 46 177 47 100 48 177 49 006 49 986 50 986 52 151 53 048 54 109 55 191 56 453 57 424 58 573 59 744 61 109 62 161 63 404 64 673 66 150 67 289
Electricity costs 665 288 1 525 528 0 15 945 46 470 47 999 49 304 50 783 52 307 54 028 55 497 57 161 58 876 60 814 62 467 64 341 66 271 68 452 70 313 72 422 74 595 77 049 79 144 81 518 83 964 86 726 89 084
Heating (except electricity) costs 2 067 4 740 0 50 144 149 153 158 163 168 172 178 183 189 194 200 206 213 218 225 232 239 246 253 261 269 277
Infrastructure maintenance costs 332 344 973 895 0 503 1 450 1 484 1 509 1 539 1 570 1 606 1 634 1 666 1 700 1 738 215 876 1 804 1 840 1 882 1 914 1 952 1 991 719 448 2 072 2 113 2 156 2 205 2 243
Other costs 2 023 359 4 470 081 27 636 70 697 151 435 154 854 157 562 160 713 163 927 167 628 170 559 173 970 177 449 181 456 184 628 188 321 192 087 196 424 199 858 203 855 207 933 212 628 216 345 220 672 225 085 230 167 234 191
Interest on loans (G.3.1.) 210 813 292 458 0 18 872 51 510 46 174 40 824 35 488 30 152 24 816 19 465 14 129 8 793 2 234 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net revenue -11 998 158 -17 527 970 -5 273 012 -3 723 387 -294 521 -295 166 -294 623 -294 858 -295 218 -296 422 -296 332 -362 646 -297 987 -298 582 -516 214 -308 774 -315 595 -323 423 -329 728 -413 845 -344 495 -1 070 473 -359 968 -367 961 -376 138 -385 518 -393 084
Risk group 
Design risks 44 943 47 730 47 730 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired construction quality risks 8 057 571 8 765 429 5 197 647 3 567 782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired services quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 30 556 34 462 0 34 462 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial accessibility risks 210 813 292 458 0 18 872 51 510 46 174 40 824 35 488 30 152 24 816 19 465 14 129 8 793 2 234 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Availability risks 3 592 339 8 245 519 27 636 102 271 243 011 248 991 253 799 259 370 265 066 271 606 276 867 282 961 289 194 296 348 516 214 308 774 315 595 323 423 329 728 337 028 344 495 1 070 473 359 968 367 961 376 138 385 518 393 084
Demand risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Residual value risks 621 076 2 657 922 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 556 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 817 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 515 550
Total value of risk in period 12 557 298 20 043 520 5 273 012 3 723 387 294 521 295 166 294 623 294 858 295 218 296 422 296 332 362 646 297 987 298 582 516 214 308 774 315 595 323 423 329 728 413 845 344 495 1 070 473 359 968 367 961 376 138 385 518 2 908 634
Residual value for risk assessment, year 15 219 525 25 594 517 25 144 670 24 693 589 24 243 742 23 793 894 23 344 046 22 892 966 22 443 118 22 180 709 21 731 624 21 281 308 20 832 222 20 383 137 19 934 051 19 483 735 19 185 399 19 379 866 19 352 479 19 325 017 19 297 630 19 270 242 19 242 855 19 215 393 19 188 006
NPV of Risk values depending on the length of a period
Design risks 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943 44 943
Acquired construction quality risks 4 894 206 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571 8 057 571
Acquired services quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 0 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556 30 556
Financial accessibility risks 0 16 732 59 738 96 038 126 257 150 994 170 783 186 120 197 448 205 190 209 728 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813 210 813
Availability risks 26 022 116 701 319 587 515 330 703 204 883 993 1 057 967 1 225 826 1 386 946 1 542 000 1 691 217 1 835 199 2 071 361 2 204 375 2 332 391 2 455 923 2 574 510 2 688 647 2 798 501 3 119 930 3 221 707 3 319 670 3 413 964 3 504 967 3 592 339
Demand risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Residual value risks 1 878 796 62 2 752 172 2 545 009 2 352 774 2 174 310 2 008 666 1 854 851 1 712 244 1 629 354 1 505 950 1 391 446 1 285 375 1 187 070 1 095 983 1 011 548 940 523 922 361 870 984 822 671 777 243 734 528 694 361 656 590 621 076
NPV of risk depending on the length of a period 6 843 968 8 266 565 11 264 566 11 289 446 11 315 305 11 342 367 11 370 485 11 399 866 11 429 708 11 509 613 11 539 964 11 570 527 11 700 619 11 735 327 11 772 257 11 811 353 11 858 916 11 954 890 12 013 367 12 286 483 12 342 833 12 398 080 12 452 208 12 505 440 12 557 298 
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The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: RETAIN OBLIGATION AND PAYMENT NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Risk factorsand their allocation Private Public
Design risks 75,0% 25%
RF1: Occasional restriction on the land transferred to implementation of the IP 
that have not been known in advance 0% 100%
RF2: Errors in project design 100% 0%
RF3: Delay  of design work 100% 0%
RF4: Cost-overrrun of design work 100% 0%
Acquired construction quality risks 75,0% 25%
RF1: Occasional restrictions on the work of the contract due to the requirements 
of archaeological and cultural heritage protection that have not been known in 
advance 0% 100%
RF2: Quality of contruction is not ensured due to a lack of resources 100% 0%
RF3: Delay  of construction work 100% 0%
RF4: Cost-overrrun of construction work 100% 0%
Acquired services quality risks 75,0% 25%
RF1: The duration of the services is deviating from the plan 100% 0%
RF2: The price of the services is deviating from the predetermined value 100% 0%
RF3: Changes of requirements from the public sector for quality of services 0% 100%
RF4: Cost-overrrun of construction work 100% 0%
Acquired equipment quality risks 100,0% 0%
RF1: Delay to acquire the equipment 100% 0%
FR1:Delay to install equipment due to a lack of human resources 100% 0%
RF3: Changes of requirements from the public sector for quality of services 100% 0%
RF4: Damage done to the third parties by installing the equipment 100% 0%
Financial accessibility risks 100,0% 0%
RF1: Increase of financing needed due to cost overrun 100% 0%
RF2: Interest rate changes 100% 0%
RF3: Increase of financing needed due to chages in taxation sytem (excluding VAT) 100% 0%
RF4: Non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the main loan 100% 0%
Availability risks 100,0% 0%
RF1: Use of low-quality materials and equipment 100% 0%
RF2: Damange made to the third parties 100% 0%
RF3: Necessary permissions (licenses) are not obtained 100% 0%
RF4: The availability of services or infrastructure is not ensured due to a lack of human resources 100% 0%
Demand risks 50,0% 50%
RF1: Aging of technologies 100% 0%
RF2: Delay to start providing the services 100% 0%
RF3: Changes of competition in the market 0% 100%
RF4: Changes in pricing 0% 100%
Residual value risks 100,0% 0%
RF1: Deviation from the property maintenance plan 100% 0%
RF2: Inaccurate plan of maintenance costs 100% 0%
RF3: Lack of information on the use of property during the operation period 100% 0%
RF4: Restrictions on the management, use and disposal rights of transferred / 
returned assets due to transactions with third parties 100% 0%
NPV of risk groups Private Public
Design risks 33 707 11 236
Acquired construction quality risks 6 043 178 2 014 393
Acquired services quality risks 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 30 556 0
Financial accessibility risks 210 813 0
Availability risks 3 592 339 0
Demand risks 0 0
Residual value risks 621 076 0 Private Public
Total 10 531 669 2 025 629 84% 16%
Risk retained by the Public sector in period NPV
Design risks 11 236 11 932 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired construction quality risks 2 014 393 1 299 412 891 946 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired services quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acquired equipment quality risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial accessibility risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Availability risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Demand risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Residual value risks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 025 629 1 311 344 891 946 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transferred risk 3 961 668 2 831 441 294 521 295 166 294 623 294 858 295 218 296 422 296 332 362 646 297 987 298 582 516 214 308 774 315 595 323 423 329 728 413 845 344 495 1 070 473 359 968 367 961 376 138 385 518 2 908 634
Period begins:
Period ends:
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Appendix 33 
Calculation of FOPSmax, FOPSrtn, MPpr and risk values (the non-revenue generating IP) (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: MAXIMUM OBLIGATION NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
Period begins: 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
Period ends: 42735 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Period number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Part of days for operation in the full year 0,00 0,35 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Index of infliation 1 1 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,02
Cumulative index of infliation 1 1 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08 1,10 1,13 1,15 1,17 1,20 1,22 1,24 1,27 1,29 1,32 1,35 1,37 1,40 1,43 1,46 1,49 1,52 1,55 1,58
Payments calculation
 
Maximum obligations of the public sector NPV
Based on actual actual cost 46 008 936 20 566 134 14 529 726 941 687 958 259 970 519 985 589 1 001 121 1 019 741 1 033 661 1 342 602 1 068 143 1 087 789 1 890 951 1 131 076 1 156 062 1 184 736 1 207 831 1 576 677 1 261 923 3 921 265 1 318 602 1 347 883 1 377 836 1 412 198 3 955 461 
 
The Hypothetical IP
PUBIC SECTOR: RETAIN OBLIGATION AND PAYMENT NOMINAL PRICES PFI VAT included
16.06.01 17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
16.12.31 17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Period begins:
Period ends:  
Retained obligation of the public sector in the PPP
Retained obligation of the public sector in the PPP 2 025 629 1 311 344 891 946 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VAT of retained obligation of the public sector in the PPP 351 787 227 835 154 800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
NPV of values depending on the length of a period NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Retained obligation of the public sector in the PPP 1 234 787 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629 2 025 629
VAT 214 534 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787 351 787
Maximum payment to the private sector in the PPP based on actual costs 18 130 687 30 222 591 31 008 791 31 762 120 32 480 545 33 167 532 33 824 607 34 454 830 35 056 360 35 792 062 36 343 199 36 871 706 37 736 797 38 224 043 38 692 979 39 145 490 39 579 889 40 113 840 40 516 249 41 693 681 42 066 501 42 425 351 42 770 760 43 104 115 43 983 308
VAT based on actual costs 3 130 801 5 177 824 5 202 475 5 226 463 5 249 675 5 272 196 5 294 049 5 315 310 5 335 882 5 383 606 5 402 970 5 421 810 5 502 308 5 519 983 5 537 126 5 553 800 5 569 927 5 605 675 5 620 844 5 772 548 5 786 819 5 800 659 5 814 082 5 827 138 5 936 716 
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Appendix 34 
Calculation of PSC of the PPA and the public sector (the non-revenue generating IP) (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
VALUE FOR MONEY NOMINAL PRICES PFI
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
PSC (Pu. S.) NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Procurement and oversight cost 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000
Net base cost 28 853 054 11 913 104 19 866 984 20 389 305 20 893 097 21 376 507 21 841 557 22 288 952 22 720 498 23 134 607 23 635 538 24 018 836 24 388 577 24 958 983 25 300 364 25 628 822 25 945 679 26 249 767 26 616 604 26 898 130 27 643 842 27 904 511 28 155 336 28 396 692 28 629 552 28 853 054
Raw cost 28 853 054 11 913 104 19 866 984 20 389 305 20 893 097 21 376 507 21 841 557 22 288 952 22 720 498 23 134 607 23 635 538 24 018 836 24 388 577 24 958 983 25 300 364 25 628 822 25 945 679 26 249 767 26 616 604 26 898 130 27 643 842 27 904 511 28 155 336 28 396 692 28 629 552 28 853 054
Capex 19 739 529 11 843 804 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529
Opex 9 113 525 69 300 304 233 826 554 1 330 346 1 813 755 2 278 806 2 726 201 3 157 747 3 571 856 3 970 259 4 353 557 4 723 298 5 293 704 5 635 085 5 963 543 6 280 400 6 584 488 6 877 075 7 158 601 7 904 314 8 164 982 8 415 807 8 657 163 8 890 024 9 113 525
Total revenue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Main services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total risk 10 867 379 4 107 036 6 851 624 7 090 852 7 316 401 7 528 205 7 727 620 7 915 448 8 092 863 8 259 712 8 446 759 8 595 234 8 735 160 8 949 347 9 077 536 9 200 872 9 319 852 9 434 037 9 565 403 9 671 116 9 951 132 10 049 013 10 143 197 10 233 827 10 321 266 10 867 379
Retained risk 1 673 841 1 020 253 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841
Transferable risk 9 193 538 3 086 782 5 177 783 5 417 010 5 642 560 5 854 364 6 053 779 6 241 607 6 419 021 6 585 871 6 772 918 6 921 393 7 061 319 7 275 506 7 403 695 7 527 031 7 646 011 7 760 196 7 891 562 7 997 275 8 277 290 8 375 171 8 469 356 8 559 986 8 647 425 9 193 538
Competitive neutrality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other taxes and obligations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PSC (Pu. S.) 39 770 433 16 070 140 26 768 608 27 530 157 28 259 498 28 954 712 29 619 177 30 254 400 30 863 361 31 444 319 32 132 297 32 664 071 33 173 737 33 958 330 34 427 901 34 879 694 35 315 531 35 733 804 36 232 007 36 619 246 37 644 974 38 003 524 38 348 533 38 680 519 39 000 818 39 770 433
NFBs, Total 1 714 350 594 282 1 165 061 1 713 268 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350
PSC (Pu. S. including NFBs) 41 484 783 16 664 422 27 933 670 29 243 425 29 973 848 30 669 061 31 333 527 31 968 749 32 577 710 33 158 669 33 846 647 34 378 420 34 888 087 35 672 680 36 142 250 36 594 043 37 029 881 37 448 154 37 946 357 38 333 595 39 359 324 39 717 873 40 062 883 40 394 868 40 715 168 41 484 783
PSC (PPA) NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Procurement and oversight cost 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000 50 000
Net base cost 28 853 054 11 913 104 19 866 984 20 389 305 20 893 097 21 376 507 21 841 557 22 288 952 22 720 498 23 134 607 23 635 538 24 018 836 24 388 577 24 958 983 25 300 364 25 628 822 25 945 679 26 249 767 26 616 604 26 898 130 27 643 842 27 904 511 28 155 336 28 396 692 28 629 552 28 853 054
Raw cost 28 853 054 11 913 104 19 866 984 20 389 305 20 893 097 21 376 507 21 841 557 22 288 952 22 720 498 23 134 607 23 635 538 24 018 836 24 388 577 24 958 983 25 300 364 25 628 822 25 945 679 26 249 767 26 616 604 26 898 130 27 643 842 27 904 511 28 155 336 28 396 692 28 629 552 28 853 054
Capex 19 739 529 11 843 804 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 562 751 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 665 279 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529 19 739 529
Opex 9 113 525 69 300 304 233 826 554 1 330 346 1 813 755 2 278 806 2 726 201 3 157 747 3 571 856 3 970 259 4 353 557 4 723 298 5 293 704 5 635 085 5 963 543 6 280 400 6 584 488 6 877 075 7 158 601 7 904 314 8 164 982 8 415 807 8 657 163 8 890 024 9 113 525
Total revenue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Main services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total risk 10 867 379 4 107 036 6 851 624 7 090 852 7 316 401 7 528 205 7 727 620 7 915 448 8 092 863 8 259 712 8 446 759 8 595 234 8 735 160 8 949 347 9 077 536 9 200 872 9 319 852 9 434 037 9 565 403 9 671 116 9 951 132 10 049 013 10 143 197 10 233 827 10 321 266 10 867 379
Retained risk 1 673 841 1 020 253 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841
Transferable risk 9 193 538 3 086 782 5 177 783 5 417 010 5 642 560 5 854 364 6 053 779 6 241 607 6 419 021 6 585 871 6 772 918 6 921 393 7 061 319 7 275 506 7 403 695 7 527 031 7 646 011 7 760 196 7 891 562 7 997 275 8 277 290 8 375 171 8 469 356 8 559 986 8 647 425 9 193 538
Competitive neutrality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other taxes and obligations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PSC (PPA) 41 484 783 16 664 422 27 933 670 29 243 425 29 973 848 30 669 061 31 333 527 31 968 749 32 577 710 33 158 669 33 846 647 34 378 420 34 888 087 35 672 680 36 142 250 36 594 043 37 029 881 37 448 154 37 946 357 38 333 595 39 359 324 39 717 873 40 062 883 40 394 868 40 715 168 41 484 783
NFBs, Total 1 714 350 594 282 1 165 061 1 713 268 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350
VAT 6 288 503 3 345 334 5 529 611 5 554 263 5 578 250 5 601 462 5 623 984 5 645 836 5 667 097 5 687 669 5 735 394 5 754 757 5 773 597 5 854 095 5 871 771 5 888 914 5 905 587 5 921 714 5 957 462 5 972 632 6 124 336 6 138 606 6 152 446 6 165 869 6 178 925 6 288 503
PSC (PPA, including VAT and NFBs) 47 773 286 20 009 757 33 463 281 34 797 687 35 552 098 36 270 523 36 957 510 37 614 585 38 244 808 38 846 338 39 582 040 40 133 178 40 661 684 41 526 775 42 014 021 42 482 957 42 935 468 43 369 867 43 903 819 44 306 227 45 483 659 45 856 479 46 215 329 46 560 738 46 894 093 47 773 286
Period begins:
Period ends:
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Appendix 35 
VfM results depending on length of the period (the non-revenue generated IP) (prepared by the author of this 
dissertation) 
The Hypothetical IP
VALUE FOR MONEY NOMINAL PRICES PFI
17.01.01 18.01.01 19.01.01 20.01.01 21.01.01 22.01.01 23.01.01 24.01.01 25.01.01 26.01.01 27.01.01 28.01.01 29.01.01 30.01.01 31.01.01 32.01.01 33.01.01 34.01.01 35.01.01 36.01.01 37.01.01 38.01.01 39.01.01 40.01.01 41.01.01
17.12.31 18.12.31 19.12.31 20.12.31 21.12.31 22.12.31 23.12.31 24.12.31 25.12.31 26.12.31 27.12.31 28.12.31 29.12.31 30.12.31 31.12.31 32.12.31 33.12.31 34.12.31 35.12.31 36.12.31 37.12.31 38.12.31 39.12.31 40.12.31 41.12.31
Financial cash flow / Project year NPV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Period begins:
Period ends:  
PFI (Prefered bid) option NPVt=1 NPVt=2 NPVt=3 NPVt=4 NPVt=5 NPVt=6 NPVt=7 NPVt=8 NPVt=9 NPVt=10 NPVt=11 NPVt=12 NPVt=13 NPVt=14 NPVt=15 NPVt=16 NPVt=17 NPVt=18 NPVt=19 NPVt=20 NPVt=21 NPVt=22 NPVt=23 NPVt=24 NPVt=25
Procurement and oversight cost 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000 100 000
Annual payments 31 507 421 0 740 352 2 752 300 4 684 784 6 540 842 8 323 497 10 035 651 11 680 181 13 259 673 14 776 699 16 233 730 17 633 214 18 977 350 20 268 329 21 508 252 22 699 203 23 843 054 24 941 667 25 996 833 27 010 324 27 983 732 28 918 645 29 816 584 30 679 057 31 507 421
Additional services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total risk 1 673 841 1 020 253 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841
Retained risk 1 673 841 1 020 253 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841 1 673 841
Subsidies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grant from government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VAT 6 968 065 214 253 506 981 929 490 1 335 311 1 725 083 2 099 441 2 458 993 2 804 345 3 136 038 3 454 614 3 760 590 4 054 482 4 336 750 4 607 856 4 868 240 5 118 339 5 358 548 5 589 257 5 810 842 6 023 675 6 228 090 6 424 422 6 612 989 6 794 109 6 968 065
PFI - PB cost (Pu. S.) 33 281 262 1 120 253 2 514 193 4 526 142 6 458 625 8 314 683 10 097 338 11 809 492 13 454 022 15 033 514 16 550 541 18 007 571 19 407 055 20 751 192 22 042 170 23 282 093 24 473 044 25 616 895 26 715 508 27 770 674 28 784 165 29 757 574 30 692 486 31 590 425 32 452 898 33 281 262
PFI - PB cost (PPA) 40 249 327 1 334 507 3 021 173 5 455 631 7 793 937 10 039 767 12 196 779 14 268 485 16 258 367 18 169 552 20 005 154 21 768 162 23 461 537 25 087 942 26 650 026 28 150 333 29 591 383 30 975 443 32 304 765 33 581 516 34 807 839 35 985 664 37 116 908 38 203 414 39 247 007 40 249 327
VfM - PB (Pu. S.) 6 489 171 14 949 887 24 254 415 23 004 015 21 800 873 20 640 028 19 521 839 18 444 908 17 409 339 16 410 805 15 581 757 14 656 499 13 766 682 13 207 138 12 385 730 11 597 600 10 842 487 10 116 909 9 516 498 8 848 572 8 860 809 8 245 950 7 656 047 7 090 094 6 547 920 6 489 171
VfM - PB (Pu. S. including NFBs) 8 203 520 15 544 169 25 419 477 24 717 283 23 515 222 22 354 378 21 236 189 20 159 258 19 123 688 18 125 155 17 296 106 16 370 849 15 481 032 14 921 488 14 100 080 13 311 950 12 556 837 11 831 259 11 230 848 10 562 921 10 575 159 9 960 300 9 370 397 8 804 444 8 262 270 8 203 520
VfM - PB (PPA) 7 523 959 18 675 250 30 442 107 29 342 056 27 758 161 26 230 756 24 760 732 23 346 100 21 986 441 20 676 786 19 576 886 18 365 016 17 200 148 16 438 833 15 363 995 14 332 624 13 344 085 12 394 425 11 599 053 10 724 711 10 675 820 9 870 815 9 098 421 8 357 324 7 647 086 7 523 959
VfM - PB (Users) 1 714 350 594 282 1 165 061 1 713 268 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350 1 714 350
VfM - PB (Pu. S.) 16% 93% 91% 84% 77% 71% 66% 61% 56% 52% 48% 45% 41% 39% 36% 33% 31% 28% 26% 24% 24% 22% 20% 18% 17% 16%
VfM - PB (Pu. S. including NFBs) 20% 93% 91% 85% 78% 73% 68% 63% 59% 55% 51% 48% 44% 42% 39% 36% 34% 32% 30% 28% 27% 25% 23% 22% 20% 20%
VfM - PB (PPA) 16% 93% 91% 84% 78% 72% 67% 62% 57% 53% 49% 46% 42% 40% 37% 34% 31% 29% 26% 24% 23% 22% 20% 18% 16% 16% 
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